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After the French and Dutch public rejected the European Constitution in 
2005, enthusiasm for referendums declined markedly among political 
leaders in Europe. Today, however, they are back on the agenda, with 
EU-related referendums being held in Greece in July 2015 on the country’s 
bailout deal, in Denmark in December 2015 on its opt-out from the EU area 
of freedom, security and justice, in the Netherlands in April 2016 on the EU’s 
Association Agreement with Ukraine, and in the UK in June 2016 on Brexit.
 
In this book, Saskia Hollander demonstrates that the generally assumed 
dichotomy between referendums and representative democracy does not 
do justice to the diversity of types of referendum and how they are used in 
EU countries. Although in all referendums citizens vote directly on issues 
rather than letting their political representatives do this for them, some 
referendums are more direct than others. Rather than reflecting the direct 
power of the People, most referendums in EU countries are held by, and 
serve the interest of, the political elites, most notably the executive – i.e. the 
Machiavellian Prince.
This book places political agency as central to referendum research. It 
argues that referendums are called because political actors have an interest 
in doing so, and that their interests rarely match the justifications given in 
the public debate. Instead of being driven by the need to compensate for 
the deficiency of political parties, political actors use referendums primarily 
to protect the position of their party. In unravelling the strategic role played 
by national referendums in decision-making, this book makes an 
unconventional contribution to the debate on the impact of referendums on 
democracy. 
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Chapter 1
CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE USE OF REFERENDUMS IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
In	the	past	decades,	an	extensive	academic	literature	has	been	established	on	the	use	
of	 referendums	 in	 European	 democracies.	 This	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 referendums	 is	
driven	by	 the	numerous	popular	 votes	held	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	20th 
and	 beginning	 of	 the	 21st	 centuries.	 These	 votes	 primarily	 concerned	 constitutional	
consolidation	and	reform,	the	status	of	overseas	territories,	sovereignty	transfers	and	
consecutive	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 treaty	 ratifications	 (LeDuc	 2003,	 23-28;	 Qvortrup	
2014).	Referendum	scholars	often	perceive	the	impressive	number	of	referendums	held	
in	this	period,	in	Europe	and	beyond,	as	representing	a	shift	towards	direct	democracy	
in	which	 ‘more	and	more	 important	questions	are	decided	by	referendum’	(Hug	and	
Tsebelis	2002,	465;	see	also:	Butler	and	Ranney	1978;	1994;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	
Matsusaka	2005a;	Qvortrup	2005;	2014;	Pállinger,	Kaufmann,	Marxer,	and	Schiller	2007).	
A	noteworthy	argument	is	put	forward	by	Bruce	Cain,	Russell	Dalton	and	Susan	Scarrow	
(2003).	They	stress	that	the	increased	institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	across	
the	world	represent	‘a	significant	 institutional	change	for	contemporary	democracies	
[that]	 influences	 political	 discourse	 and	 principles	 of	 political	 legitimacy	 beyond	 the	
policy	at	stake	in	any	single	referendum’	(Dalton,	Cain	and	Scarrow	2003,	254).	Or,	as	
Dick	Morris	(1999,	23)	puts	it,	‘The	fundamental	paradigm	that	dominates	our	politics	
is	 the	 shift	 from	 representational	 (Madisonian)	 to	 direct	 (Jeffersonian)	 democracy’.	
While	Morris’	conclusion	is	primarily	based	on	American	politics,	scholars	studying	the	
European	 context	 also	underscore	 the	notion	of	 an	 ‘increase	 in	 the	 real	 importance	
of	the	phenomenon	of	“direct	democracy”’	(Marxer,	Pállinger,	Kaufmann	and	Schiller	
2007,	7).	
	 On	 an	 aggregated	 level	 the	 number	 of	 referendums	 in	 European	 democracies	
has	 indeed	 increased	 significantly	 in	 the	 last	 half	 century,	which	 is	 especially	 due	 to	
the	large	number	of	votes	on	EU	affairs.	These	have	dealt	not	least	with	the	question	
of	whether	a	country	should	be	part	of	 	 the	EU	(or	 its	predecessor),	which	has	been	
submitted	 to	a	 referendum	 in	many	of	 the	non-founding	member	countries,	 such	as	
Ireland,	the	United	Kingdom,	Austria,	Malta,	the	Scandinavian	countries,	and	notably	
most	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries.	Many	votes	have	also	been	held	on	
subsequent	EU	treaty	changes,	most	notably	in	Ireland	and	Denmark.	In	particular	the	
European	Constitutional	Treaty	(TCE),	signed	in	2004,	generated	a	significant	number	
of	referendum	pledges.	Today,	too,	the	EU	remains	a	prominent	referendum	topic,	as	
illustrated	by	the	Greek	referendum	on	the	country’s	bailout	deal	with	the	eurogroup	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
9
Introduction
held	 in	 July	 2015,	 the	 Danish	 referendum	 on	 its	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	 of	 freedom,	
security	 and	 justice	 (formerly	 the	 Justice	 and	Home	Affairs	 pillar)	 held	 in	December	
2015,	the	Dutch	referendum	on	the	EU’s	association	agreement	with	Ukraine	held	 in	
April	2016,	and	the	referendum	on	Britain’s	renewed	EU	membership	conditions	held	in	
June	2016.	These	observations	come	close	to	Simon	Hug’s	15-year-old	prediction	that	
‘together	with	other	referendums	in	the	offing,	it	is	likely	that	close	to	a	dozen	of	votes	
[on	the	EU]	will	occur	in	the	2010s’	(Hug	2002,	115).
	 Although	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 associated	 with	 a	
declining	relevance	of	representative	decision-making,	or	as	Matsusaka	(2005a)	coins	
it	 ‘the	eclipse	of	 legislatures’,	 the	academic	 literature	 so	 far	has	not	provided	 sound	
evidence	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 this	 increase	 actually	 marks	 a	 pendulum	 swing	 from	
decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.	
This	ambiguity	stems	from	the	fact	that	such	claims	are	largely	based	on	aggregated 
analyses	of	referendum	practice	that	do	not	take	into	account	cross-country	variations	
in	 the	 frequency	 with	 which	 referendums	 are	 used.	 In	 practice	 though,	 only	 a	 few	
European	 countries	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 frequent	 users	 of	 referendums,	 and	most	
countries	have	only	 experienced	one	or	 just	 a	 few	 referendums	over	 the	past	 sixty-
five	 years.	Moreover,	 aggregated	 studies	 on	 referendums	 tend	 not	 to	 acknowledge	
the	wide	variety	of	referendum	institutions	available	and	used	in	European	countries.1 
This	has	led	many	scholars	to	overestimate	the	transformative	character	of	European	
referendum	practice.	Although	in	all	referendums	citizens	vote	directly	on	issues	rather	
than	letting	representatives	do	this	for	them,	some referendums are more direct than 
others.	Certain	referendums	indeed	strengthen	direct	participation	by	the	Rousseauian 
People, but	most	referendums	held	in	EU	countries	in	fact	serve	the	political	elites,	most	
notably	the	executive	–	i.e.	the	Machiavellian	Prince. 
	 Assessing	whether	national-level	referendum	practice	in	Europe	truly	represents	a	
direct	democracy	shift	requires	not	only	unravelling	the	various	referendum	forms	and	
procedures,	but	also	analysing	the	reasons	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	why	
they	are	used.	It	has	become	common	wisdom	to	explain	the	alleged	direct	democratic	
shift	as	a	consequence	of	an	alleged	crisis of representative democracy.2 The	argument	
holds	 that	 referendums	 are	 increasingly	 institutionalized	 and	 used	 in	 response	 to	
1.	 	For	an	overview	of	this	problem	of	establishing	conceptual	equivalence,	see	Landman	(2003,	43-44).	
Landman	cites	Mayer	(1989,	57)	who	stresses	that:	‘the	contextual	relativity	of	the	meaning	or	the	
measures	of	indicators	constitutes	the	most	serious	impediment	to	the	cross-contextual	validity	
of	empirically	testable	explanatory	theory’.	Hence,	in	assessing	and	explaining	referendum	use,	it	
is	important	to	deconstruct	the	concept	of	the	referendum:	does	it	mean	the	same	in	the	different	
contexts?	Analysis	shows	that	this	is	not	the	case:	a	French	referendum	triggered	by	the	president	
is	of	different	nature	than	a	Slovakian	referendum		triggered	by	a	number	of	citizens.	Yet,	while	
referendum	scholars	take	these	differences	into	account	on	a	theoretical	level,	they	often	fail	to	do	so	
when	assessing	the	number	of	referendums	held.	
2.  The concept of crisis of democracy	was	introduced	by	Michel	J.	Crozier,	Samuel	Huntington	and	Joji	
Watanuki	in	1975.
1
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discontent	 with	 representative	 democracy	 (Sartori	 1987;	 Cronin	 1999;	 Mendelsohn	
and	Parkin	2001;	Scarrow	2001;	LeDuc	2003).	For	example,	Dalton,	Scarrow	and	Cain	
(2003,	1)	 speak	of	 a	 ‘spreading	dissatisfaction	with	 the	 institutions	and	processes	of	
representative	democracy’,	which	they	see	as	trend	that	is	‘concomitant	with	increasing	
demands	 for	political	 reforms	 to	expand	citizen	and	 interest	group	access	 to	politics	
in	 new	ways,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 restructure	 the	 process	 of	 democratic	 decision-making’.	
Lawrence	LeDuc	also	stresses	that	the	renewed	interest	in	referendums	as	crisis-solving	
instruments	 around	 the	 turn	of	 the	 century	 reflects	 the	 ‘mood	of	 the	times’	 (LeDuc	
2003,	20).	 In	 similar	 vein,	 John	Matsusaka	emphasizes	 that	 the	 strengthened	 role	of	
direct	democracy	is	the	outcome	of	a	‘general	meltdown	in	public	confidence	regarding	
legislatures	(and	government	in	general)	over	the	last	four	decades’	(Matsusaka	2005a,	
162).	Especially	in	relation	to	the	EU,	referendums	are	widely	considered	as	legitimizing	
instruments	capable	of	restoring	citizens’	control	over	and	trust	in	EU	decision-making	
(Grande	1996;	2000;	Hug	2002;	Follesdal	and	Hix	2006).	
	 This	 crisis	 discourse	 has	 in	 fact	 become	 the	 raison d’être	 of	 a	 ‘renaissance’	 of	
referendum	literature	in	recent	decades	(Vatter	2000,	171).	Yet,	regardless	of	whether	
referendums	have	a	legitimizing	effect,	it	is	questionable	whether	they	are	indeed	pushed	
by	citizens’	demands	and	motivated	by	concerns	about	 the	quality	of	 representative	
democracy.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 assumption	 is	 not	 commonly	 challenged.	 Although	
scholarly	attention	has	been	given	to	the	role	authorities	play	in	framing	the	referendum	
question	and	debate	(cf.	Schuck	and	de	Vreese	2009),	little	comparative research has 
been	done	on	whether	the	normative	arguments	by	which	authorities	legitimize	their	
referendum	 calls	 coincide	with	 their	 real	 intentions.	 An	 exception	 is	Matt	Qvortrup	
(2007,	3),	who	states	that	‘while	support	for	increased	participation	is	a	constant	theme	
in	the	political	rhetoric	of	the	elites,	decisions	to	submit	more	issues	to	the	voters	do	not	
always	live	up	their	idealistic	billing’.	Carlos	Closa	(2007)	also	distinguishes	normative	
motives	 for	 pledging	 a	 referendum	 from	 strategic	 ones,	 and	 concludes	 that	 in	 the	
case	of	 ratifying	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty,	 the	referendum	was	seen	as	an	
‘appropriate	mechanism’	(Closa	2007,	1327),	but	that	governments	used	this	normative	
discourse	strategically.	
	 By	drawing	on	this	literature,	I	examine	whether	referendums	in	Europe	are	indeed	a	
norm-driven	response	to	alleged	flaws	in	representation	and	accountability	or	whether	
more	attention	should	be	given	to	political	agency.	And,	given	that	referendums	are	not	
held	with	 the	same	frequency	 in	different	European	countries,	 I	also	assess	whether	
political	representatives	in	some	countries	are	more	prone	to	adopting	such	strategies	
than	their	counterparts	in	other	countries,	due	to	the	character	of	the	democratic	polity	
or	 past	 referendum	 experience.	 These	 are	 important	 considerations	 that	 challenge	
claims	of	a	direct	democratic	mood	or	Zeitgeist.	The	central	questions	that	guided	this	
research	are	thus:	1)	Did	Europe	experience	an	increase	in	the	institutionalization	and	
use	of	national	referendums	between	1950	and	2014?	2)	If	so,	does	this	increase	mark	
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a	shift	from	national	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	
citizens’	participation?	And	3)	Which	factors	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	and	
use	of	national	referendums	in	European	democracies? 
	 With	these	questions,	the	objective	of	this	study	is	fourfold.	I	first	aim	to	provide	
a	classification	of	referendums	according	to	the	actors	triggering	the	referendum	(i.e.	
the	political	elites,	citizens	or	the	constitution).	I	thereby	draw	on	pioneering	work	by	
Gordon	Smith	(1976),	Michael	Gallagher	and	Pier	Vincenzo	Uleri	(1996)	and	Maija	Setälä	
(1999).	Based	on	such	a	classification,	which	is	ultimately	based	on	who	actually	controls	
the	referendum	process,	my	second	aim	is	to	provide	a	cross-country	comparison	of	
the	types	of	referendum	that	are	legally	provided	for,	and	of	the	frequency	with	which	
they	are	actually	held.	 I	show	that	both	in	terms	of	frequency	and	form,	referendum	
practice	in	the	Europe	has	not	transformed	the	status	quo	of	representative	decision-
making,	since	there	are	still	very	few	European	countries	where	referendums	are	part	of	
the	political	routine,	and	even	fewer	countries	where	they	can	be	triggered	by	citizens	
directly.	
	 My	 third	 aim	 is	 to	 empirically	 assess	 what	 motivates	 political	 elites	 to	 hold	
referendums.	 I	 thereby	 follow	 a	 strand	 of	 referendum	 literature	 that	 outlines	 the	
strategic	 motives	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 initiating	 popular	 votes,	 rather	 than	 assuming	
that	 referendums	are	enforced	by	 the	people	against	 the	 interest	or	will	 of	political	
representatives	(cf.	Bjørklund	1982;	Qvortrup	2007;	Closa	2007;	Rahat	2009;	Oppermann	
2011).	I	show	that,	although	normative	arguments	play	an	important	role	in	the	political	
discourse,	strategic	motives	are	often	decisive	and	referendums	should	be	understood	
mainly	 in	 terms	of	 government-opposition	dynamics.	 This	 disqualifies	 the	 claim	 that	
referendums	are	transforming	representative	decision-making,	as	often	assumed	in	the	
literature.
	 Finally,	 I	 aim	 to	 explain	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 referendum	 patterns,	 and	
examine	whether	 the	adoption	of	 referendum	strategies	by	political	agents	 is	either	
constrained	or	enabled	by	their	institutional	and	political-cultural	context.	I	show	that	
referendums	are	used	in	both	majoritarian	and	consensus	democracies,	but	that	only	in	
the	latter	are	they	used	as	minority	instruments	by	opposition	parties	or	citizens.	And	
while	past	experience	of	public	referendum	demands	can	indeed	create	a	convention	
to	use	 referendums	with	 greater	 frequency,	political	 elites	 assess	 each	possibility	 to	
pledge	a	referendum	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	and	rarely	does	such	a	convention	lead	to	
referendums	that	go	against	the	interest	of	political	decision-makers.	This	debunks	the	
argument	of	a	direct	democratic	Zeitgeist.	
1
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1.2 A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SHIFT: FREQUENCY AND FORM?
When	 referendum	scholars	 identify	a	 shift	 towards	direct	democracy,	 they	base	 this	
conclusion	on	observations	of	an	aggregated	increase	in	referendums	in	the	world,	in	
Europe	in	particular.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	evidence,	sometimes	even	presented	
by	the	same	scholars	that	speak	of	a	shift,	that	such	conclusions	are	based	on	a	limited	
number	 of	 countries	 where	 referendums	 are	 frequently	 held,	 like	 Switzerland,	 Italy	
and	 Ireland,	 while	 in	 most	 countries	 referendums	 remain	 sparsely	 used	 (cf.	 Butler	
and	Ranney	1978;	1994;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	LeDuc	2003;	Qvortrup	2005;	2014).	
Yet,	 despite	 these	 national	 differences,	 the	 general	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 shift	 is	
indeed	Europe-wide	or	even	world-wide.	As	LeDuc	puts	it,	 ‘A	number	of	countries	or	
jurisdictions	which	previously	had	no	provision	in	law	for	the	conduct	of	referendums	
have	adopted	new	initiative	or	referendum	legislation.	 [...]	Other	European	countries	
[...]	which	have	long	had	referendum	provisions	in	their	national	constitutions	or	on	the	
statute	books,	seem	to	be	using	such	mechanisms	more	frequently’	(LeDuc	2002,	70-
71).	However,	this	does	certainly	not	apply	to	all	countries,	including	European	ones:	for	
example,	Austria	and	Luxembourg	have	long	had	referendum	legislation	incorporated	
in	their	constitutions,	while	both	countries	still	rarely	make	use	of	those	stipulations.	
What	is	more,	the	bulk	of	European	countries	have	held	only	one	or	two	referendums,	
and	have	done	so	on	exceptional	occasions,	such	as	constitutional	reform	or	the	EU.	On	
such	issues,	referendums	have	always	been	an	accepted	instrument,	so	this	observation	
certainly	does	not	mark	a	shift.	Frequent	use	of	referendums	on	a	wider	variety	of	policy	
issues	 is	exceptional,	and	 limited	 to	only	a	 few	European	countries	 such	as	 Italy	and	
some	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	(hereafter	the	CEECs).	
	 Scholarly	 claims	 of	 a	 national	 shift	 towards	 direct	 democracy	 are	 often	 based	
on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 at	 local	 or	 regional	 level.	 Direct	 democratic	 practice	 at	
national	level	is	significantly	less	common	than	at	regional	or	local	level.	For	example,	
Germany,	which	has	not	held	 a	 nationwide	 referendum	 in	 the	post-WWII	 era,	 has	 a	
rather	robust	 track	record	of	holding	referendums	 in	 the	Länder.	 In	Belgium	and	the	
Netherlands,	 which	 both	 experienced	 only	 one	 nationwide	 referendum	 between	
1950	and	2014,	municipality	referendums	have	also	been	much	more	common.	Thus,	
while	 it	 is	often	assumed	that	 local	 referendums	serve	as	a	testing	ground	for	direct	
democratic	reform	at	national	level	(Delwit,	Pilet,	Reynaert	and	Steyvers	2007),	these	
countries	are	compelling	examples	of	local	referendum	practice	not	simply	spilling	over	
to	national	level.	Moreover,	citizens	voting	on	the	construction	of	a	new	shopping	mall	
is	of	a	different	order	to	voting	on	the	adoption	of	a	new	currency.	Nevertheless,	many	
academic	accounts	infer	a	direct	democratic	shift	on	the	basis	of	an	increase	in	regional	
and	 local	 referendums.	 For	 example,	 Susan	 Scarrow’s	 conclusion	 that	 ‘countries	 are	
expanding	 opportunities	 for	 citizens	 to	 directly	 decide	 issues,	 and	 they	 are	 giving	
citizens	 more	 chances	 to	 directly	 select	 executive	 leaders	 rather	 than	 having	 these	
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leaders	selected	by	assemblies’	(Scarrow	2003,	56)	is	mainly	based	on	an	expansion	of	
referendums	and	direct	elections	of	political	leaders	at	local	level.	
	 The	 democratic	 shift	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 misconception	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
frequency	and	weight	of	popular	votes,	but	also	in	terms	of	form.	Not	all	participatory	
institutions	 are	 alike,	 and	 their	 use	does	not	 imply	one	uniform	 shift	 towards	direct	
citizens’	 participation.	 Institutions	 that	 give	 citizens	 direct	 decision-making	 power,	
like	 referendums,	 are	 mentioned	 in	 one	 breath	 with	 participatory	 institutions	 that	
give	citizens	more	voice	but	no	direct	decision-making	power,	 like	agenda	 initiatives,	
petitions	 and	 deliberative	 forums	 (see	 for	 example	 Marxer	 and	 Pállinger	 2007).	 In	
addition,	Dalton,	Scarrow	and	Cain	(2003,	1)	identify	a	direct	democratic	trend	marked	
by	enhanced	 citizens’	 participation	 in	 various	 ‘new	 forms	of	 action’,	 such	as	 ‘signing	
petitions,	joining	citizen	interest	groups,	and	engaging	in	unconventional	political	action’.	
The	question	however	is	whether	such	actions	are	indeed	transforming representative	
decision-making,	as	the	authors	suggest.	
	 Lack	of	conceptual	clarity	not	only	marks	the	literature	on	participatory	institutions	
in	general,	but	also	referendum	research	 in	particular.	As	the	majority	of	 the	people	
decide	 on	 issues	 directly,	 thereby	 circumventing	 parliamentary	 decision-making,	
referendums	 are	 usually	 gathered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 direct	 democracy	 and	
contrasted	 with	 representative	 democracy.	 I	 follow	 Setälä	 (1999)	 and	 argue	 that	
this	 dichotomous	 classification	 is	 too	 simplistic	 to	 analyse	 referendum	 practice	 in	
contemporary	democratic	 countries,	 as	 referendums	and	 their	 associated	provisions	
come	in	various	forms.	Although	all	referendums	provide	citizens	with	a	direct	role	in	
decision-making,	they	do	not	similarly	 imply	a	direct	democracy	shift.	This	argument	
is	 adopted	 from	Francis	Hamon	 (1995),	who	 identifies	 three	different	ways	 in	which	
referendums	are	used:	1)	as	‘the	recourse	of	the	Prince’	(i.e.	referendums	triggered	by	
the	president	or	other	ruling	figure);	2)	as	‘the	recourse	of	the	parties’	(i.e.	referendums	
triggered	by	political	parties);	and	3)	as	‘the	recourse	of	the	citizens’	(i.e.	referendums	
triggered	 by	 citizens).	 According	 to	Hamon,	 only	 the	 latter	 category	 implies	 genuine	
direct	 democracy.	 When	 referendums	 are	 used	 as	 the	 recourse	 of	 the	 political	
elites,	whether	the	executive	or	opposition	parties,3	their	direct	democratic	nature	is	
ambiguous	as	they	are	usually	used	to	strengthen	the	position	of	the	political	actors	
that	trigger	the	vote	(either	government	or	opposition),	rather	than	of	the	people	as	
such.				
	 Referendum	 scholars	 take	 these	 distinctions	 into	 account	 when	 classifying	
referendums	 and	 when	 providing	 an	 overview	 of	 available	 referendum	 legislation 
(see	for	example	Suksi	1993;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	Setälä	1999;	Setälä	and	Schiller	
3.	 	In	contrast	to	Hamon	(1995),	I	consider	both	referendums	that	are	triggered	by	the	president	and	
those	that	are	triggered	by	the	governing	party	or	coalition	as	a	recourse of the Prince,	as	both	are	
triggered	by	the	ruling	majority	(either	a	public	or	parliamentary	majority),	or	hence,	the	political	
executive.	Such	referendums	should,	as	I	argue	in	chapter 2,	be	contrasted	to	referendums	triggered	
by	the	political	opposition,	and	referendums	triggered	by	citizens	themselves.
1
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2009),	 but	 do	not	 assess	what	 types	of	 referendum	are	used	with	which	 frequency.	
For	example,	LeDuc	(2003,	47-48)	adopts	the	conceptual	differentiation	put	forward	by	
Hamon	(1995),	but	makes	no	distinction	in	initiation	procedures	in	his	overview	of	held	
referendums	 (LeDuc	2003,	23-28).	And	although	he	acknowledges	 that	 ‘referendums	
most	often	take	place	as	the	recourse	of	the	parties’	(LeDuc	2003,	167),	he,	like	many	
other	referendum	scholars,	nevertheless	coins	this	observation	as	a	 ‘growth	of	more	
participatory	democratic	institutions’	(2003,	189).	Yet,	without	comparatively	analysing	
and	unravelling	the	different	types	of	referendum	actually	used,	it	seems	premature,	
or	 even	 contradictory,	 to	 mark	 European	 referendum	 practice	 as	 a	 broader	 direct	
participatory	shift.	
	 Referendums	 not	 only	 differ	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 direct 
participatory	 devices,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 extent	 to	which	 their	 outcomes	 simply	 reflect	
the	majority	will	 (cf.	Marxer	2012).	While	 referendums	triggered	by	 the	president	or	
government	 reflect	 decision-making	 by	majority	 rule,	 those	 triggered	 by	 opposition	
parties	or	citizens	allow	minority	preferences	to	be	integrated	in	decision-making.	It	is	
thus	important	to	develop	a	classification	of	referendums	based	on	whether	they	give	
primacy	 to	 the	people	or	 the	political	elites	 (and	which	political	elites),	and	whether	
the	 referendum	 is	merely	majority-	 or	minority-protective.	 These	 questions	 depend	
ultimately on who controls the referendum process.	This	refers	above	all	to	who	actually	
triggers	the	vote,	but	also	to	who	has	set	(and	framed)	the	agenda	of	the	vote,	to	whether	
political	representatives	have	imposed	hurdles	on	the	vote	(for	example	in	the	form	of	
turnout	or	approval	quorums	or	subject	restrictions),	and	to	whether	the	authorities	can	
disregard	the	outcome	of	the	vote	or	whether	it	is	legally	binding	(although	in	practice	
formally	non-binding	referendums	also	tend	to	be	politically	binding).	
	 Rather	than	focusing	on	referendums	solely	as	 institutions,	 I	 follow	Setälä	(1999)	
and	Qvortrup	(2005)	and	place	much	more	emphasis	on	the	politics of referendum use, 
which	 also	 grasps	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 referendums,	 the	 political	 context	 in	which	
they	are	held	and	the	motives	and	(un)certainties	of	the	actors	that	trigger	them.	After	
all,	 when	 aiming	 to	 assess	 the	 shift	 towards	 direct	 democracy,	 it	 matters	 whether	
referendums	are	initiated	by	citizens	themselves,	possibly	against	the	interest	of	political	
representatives,	or	by	political	representatives,	possibly	with	the	aim	of	consolidating	
their	 interests.	Moreover,	 it	 also	matters	whether	 referendums	are	 triggered	by	 the	
opposition	or	by	the	ruling	majority.	Arguably,	the	latter	category	does	not	challenge	
the	 status	quo	as	 such.	However,	 despite	 these	 important	differences,	 scholars	who	
refer	to	the	increase	in	referendums	as	marking	a	direct	democratic	shift	usually	refrain	
from	acknowledging	that	the	largest	part	of	these	referendums	were	triggered	by	the	
ruling	majority	(i.e.	the	Machiavellian	Prince) rather	than	by	the	people.	Although	the	
outcomes	of	such	votes	may	go	against	the	position	of	the	governing	authorities,	they	
are	generally	pledged	in	order	to	fulfil	other	political	objectives,	thereby	strengthening,	
rather	than	challenging,	representative	decision-making	(Qvortrup	2005,	90).	Hence,	as	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
15
Introduction
Setälä	argues,	although	all	referendums	are	‘bringing	in	the	people’	(Suksi	1993),	‘the	
crucial	question	is	[…]	why	and	under	whose	control	this	is	done’	(Setälä	1999,	169).	
 
1.3 REFERENDUMS AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Much	 of	 the	 referendum	 literature	 assumes	 a	 generic	 cause	 to	 be	 at	 work	 in	
contemporary	representative	democracies	that	leads	to	increased	use	of	referendums.	
This	 literature	 includes	 comparative	 analyses	 of	 referendums	 held	 (cf.	 Butler	 and	
Ranney	 1978;	 1994;	 Gallagher	 and	 Uleri	 1996;	 LeDuc	 2003;	 Qvortrup	 2005;	 2014);	
descriptive	studies	on	selected	countries	where	referendums	are	flourishing	(cf.	Frey	
1994;	 Cronin	 1999;	 Amar	 2004);	 normative	 pleas	 for	 direct	 democracy	 (cf.	 Barber	
1984;	2003;	Budge	1996;	Frey	2003);	and	examinations	of	the	effects	of	referendums	
on	national	and	EU	decision-making	 (Morel	1993;	Hug	and	Tsebelis	2002;	Matsusaka	
2005b;	 Hobolt	 2006;	 Hug	 2007).	 What	 these	 studies	 have	 in	 common	 is	 that	 they	
either	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 trace	 an	 increase	 in	 number	 of	 referendums	 back	 to	
changes	 in	 people’s	 value	 orientation	 (cf.	 Inglehart	 1971;	 1977)	 and	 the	 subsequent	
‘unfreezing’	of	political	alignments	(cf.	Bogdanor	1994),	which	have	fed	into	a	general	
mood	in	Western	Europe	that	‘representative	government	is	no	longer	as	compelling	a	
proposition	as	it	once	was’	(Dahrendorf	2000,	311).	The	underlying	argument	is	that,	
since	representative	institutions	do	not	provide	sufficient	participatory	channels	for	a	
growing	dissatisfied	mass	that	is	both	increasingly	skilled	at	making	political	decisions	
and	 increasingly	 dissatisfied	 with	 representative	 decision-making	 (cf.	 Norris	 1999;	
Dalton	2004),	 referendums	are	pledged	because	politicians	assume	that	direct	votes	
can	channel	such	sentiments.	
	 I	 argue	 that	 such	a	 line	of	 reasoning	 stems	 from	a	normative	preference	on	 the	
part	of	many	referendum	scholars,	rather	than	from	empirical	analysis	per	se.	Typical	
studies	 in	 this	 respect	 are	 Benjamin	 Barber’s	 Strong Democracy (1984),	 Ian	 Budge’s	
The New Challenge of Direct Democracy	 (1996)	 and	Mark	Warren’s	Democracy and 
Association (2001).	LeDuc,	too,	whose	declared	aim	is	to	provide	a	more	comparative	
overview	of	referendums	around	the	world,	states	that	‘While	the	referendum	may	not	
be	capable	of	resolving	all	of	democracy’s	problems,	it	does	respond	to	at	least	some	of	
the	concerns	expressed	by	many	citizens	in	contemporary	democratic	societies’	(LeDuc	
2003,	20).	This	underscores	the	argument	famously	put	forward	by	Vernon	Bogdanor,	
who	stressed	that	‘the	arguments	against	the	referendum	are	also	arguments	against	
democracy’	(1981,	93).	
	 First,	 referendums	 are	 seen	 as	 solution	 to	 both	 an	 input-	 and	 output-legitimacy	
crisis	of	national	decision-making.4	The	input-legitimacy	crisis	is,	as	the	argument	goes,	
grounded	 in	eroding	 levels	of	 trust	 in	political	parties	and	a	 subsequent	 increasingly	
4.	 	The	distinction	between	input-legitimacy	and	output-legitimacy	is	borrowed	from		Fritz	Scharpf	
(1999).
1
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
16
Chapter 1
volatile	 electorate.	 This	 is	 preventing	 parliamentary	 elections	 from	 providing	
satisfactory	 representative	 outcomes	 which,	 arguably,	 creates	 an	 ever-growing	 gap	
between	political	 leaders	and	 the	electorate	 (cf.	 Fuchs	and	Klingemann	1995;	Norris	
1999;	2011;	Mair	2002;	Krouwel	2004;	Kriesi,	Grande,	Lachat,	Dolezal,	Bornschier	and	
Frey	2006).	Also	in	terms	of	the	outputs	of	decision-making,	representative	democracy	
is	said	to	be	 in	crisis.	Accordingly,	 in	the	face	of	new	global	challenges,	governments	
are	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 offer	 effective	 policy	 outcomes	 that	meet	 the	 demands	 of	 an	
individualized	 and	 diverse	 electorate,	 (e.g.	 Pharr,	 Putnam	 and	 Dalton	 2000;	 Barber	
2003;	Norris	2011;	Poguntke,	Rossteutscher,	Schmitt-Beck	and	Zmerli	2015).	Concerns	
about	growing	public	apathy	towards	parliamentary	democracy	(Nye	1997;	Norris	1999;	
2011;	Bowler	and	Donovan	2002;	Dalton	2013)	have	led	scholars	to	argue	in	favour	of	
increasing	the	scope	of	popular	participation	and	 introducing	 institutional	devices	 to	
bring politics back to the people	(cf.	Barber	1984;	Budge	1996;	Warren	2001).	
	 In	particular,	referendums	are	seen	as	solution	to	a	legitimacy	crisis	stemming	from	
processes	of	 globalization	and	European	 integration	 (cf.	Grande	1996;	 Scharpf	1999;	
Follesdal	and	Hix	2006).	Decision-making	in	a	growing	number	of	crucial	areas	has	shifted	
to	new,	transnational	layers	of	political	authority,	where	they	are	shielded	from	national	
public	control	(Scharpf	1999;	Stiglitz	2002;	Crum	2012).	It	is	stressed	that	referendums	
on	such	important	sovereignty	issues	can	strengthen	the	input-legitimacy	of	decision-
making	by	compensating	for	losses	of	democratic	control	by	national	parliaments	(Pharr	
and	Putnam	2000;	Krouwel	2004;	Schmidt	2007).	At	the	same	time,	they	can	strengthen	
output-legitimacy	by	providing	citizens	with	an	 instrument	to	block	global	pressures,	
like	 privatization	 and	 European	 financial	 and	monetary	 integration	 (cf.	 Barber	 1984;	
WRR	2007;	Schmidt	2013;	Mendez,	Mendez	and	Triga	2014).
	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 scholars	 hold	 the	 view	 that	 referendums	 can serve as 
crisis-management	 instruments	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 these	 instruments	
are	 being	 used	 to	 this	 end.	 And	 yet,	 the	 assumption	 that,	 in	 calling	 referendums,	
political	representatives	are	driven	by	a	belief	that	popular	votes	will	compensate	for	
democratic	gaps,	is	not	systematically	analysed.	Rather,	indicators	of	such	a	democratic	
crisis	 (i.e.	declining	 levels	of	political	participation	or	 increased	public	dissatisfaction	
with	 the	 functioning	of	democracy)	are	often	simply	 taken	as	 indicators	of	demands	
for	 referendums,	without	 empirically	 assessing	whether	 this	 shift	 has	 actually	 taken	
place	and	if	so,	in	what	form;	and	without	analysing	whether,	in	implementing	or	calling	
referendums,	 political	 representatives	 have	 been	 susceptible	 to	 such	 demands	 and/
or	pressures.	 Regardless	of	 the	question	as	 to	whether	 representative	democracy	 is	
indeed	in	crisis,	I	argue	that	such	claims	(of	a	crisis)	should	be	separated	from	empirical	
investigations	 on	 referendum	 practice.	 If	 invoked	 with	 different	 motivations	 than	
generally	assumed,	the	effects	might	also	be	of	a	different	–	perhaps	even	opposite	–	
nature.	
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1.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING REFERENDUM USE
Bearing	in	mind	that	referendums	have	been	used	more	frequently	in	some	countries	
than	in	others,	it	is	more	relevant	to	explain	the	varying	frequency	of	referendum	use	
across	countries	than	to	explain	the	aggregated	increase	in	referendums.	The	existing	
literature,	however,	focuses	too	little	on	the	first	question.	Most	referendum	research	
explains	 the	 increased	aggregated	use	of	 referendums,	which	 is	perceived	as	part	of	
a	direct	democratic	Zeitgeist,	as	an	outcome	of	increased	political	dissatisfaction	and	
decreasing	 levels	 of	 trust	 in	 representative	 institutions,	 rather	 than	 of	 normative	 or	
strategic	considerations	on	the	part	of	political	agents.	When	scholars	do	take	account	
of	 the	motivations	of	political	 agents	 to	pledge	 referendums,	 little	effort	 is	made	 to	
place	 explanations	 in	 a	 cross-country	 comparative	 perspective.	 Much	 of	 the	 work	
aimed	at	explaining	referendum	pledges	 is	focused	on	referendums	in	one	particular	
country	(cf.	Bjørklund	1982;	Miller	1982;	Frey	1994;	Cronin	1999;	Svensson	2002;	Amar	
2004;	Rahat	2009),	one	particular	referendum	(cf.	Hainsworth	2006;	Curtice	2013)	or	on	
a	particular	category	of	referendums,	such	as	those	on	the	EU	(cf.	Qvortrup	2007;	Closa	
2007;	Oppermann	2011).	
	 There	are	few	comparative	studies	on	political	elites’	motives	to	pledge	referendums,	
and	such	studies	mainly	entail	edited	volumes	that	lack	an	overall	analytical	framework	
to	assess	the	drivers	of	referendum	use	and	cross-country	differences	(see	Butler	and	
Ranney	1978;	1994;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	Qvortrup	2014).	The	single-author	studies	
by	Markku	 Suksi	 (1993),	 Lawrence	 LeDuc	 (2003)	 and	Matt	Qvortrup	 (2005)	 are	 clear	
exceptions,	 as	 they	 do	 analyse	 referendums	 in	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 thereby	
taking	 into	 account	 the	motivations	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 pledging	 such	 referendums.	
These	studies,	however,	also	 focus	only	on	a	 limited	number	of	countries	and	 fail	 to	
provide	 an	 analytical	 framework	 to	 explain	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 referendum	
legislation	and	 the	reasons	why	referendums	are	used.	 In	general,	 such	studies	 tend	
to	reinforce	the	general	conclusion	by	Butler	and	Ranney	(1978,	18)	that,	despite	being	
largely	employed	as	a	crisis	instrument,	‘the	reasons	for	each	referendum	[…]	fail	to	fit	
any	clear	universal	pattern’,	and	that	consequently,	‘each	[referendum]	seems	to	have	a	
special	history’.	
	 At	the	same	time,	the	fact	that	referendums	tend	to	cluster	around	particular	issues	
like	constitutional	reform,	territorial	change	and	EU	affairs,	does	suggest	that	certain	
mechanisms	are	at	stake	that	can	be	generalized	across	time	and	space.	When	the	aim	
is	 indeed	to	 identify	 these	mechanisms	by	cross-country	variations,	explanations	are	
usually	sought	in	an	institutional	context	only.	For	example,	Adrian	Vatter	(2000;	2009)	
examines	 to	what	extent	 choices	 in	 referendum	 legislation	and	use	are	 grounded	 in	
the	existing	democracy	type	and	tradition.	Dag	Anckar	(2014)	extends	this	analysis	by	
also	explaining	a	country’s	referendum	track	record	in	terms	of	 institutional	spillover	
from	other	 countries	or	 its	own	historical	 context.	However,	Anckar	 focuses	only	on	
1
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referendums	on	constitutional	 reform.	 In	addition,	 there	are	no	comparative	studies	
that	 contrast	 such	 country-level	 explanations	 for	 referendum	use	 and	 cross-country	
differences	within	it	with	intentional	referendum-level	explanations	(i.e.	the	values	that	
political	actors	assign	to	referendums	or	the	interests	that	they	have	in	pledging	them).	
	 In	this	book,	I	combine	this	wealth	of	literature	and	provide	an	analytical	framework	
that	takes	into	account	both	structural	factors	that	are	expected	to	contribute	to	national-
level	referendum	practice	and	cross-country	variations	within	it	(i.e.	type	of	democracy	
and	 number	 of	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	
values),	and	political	agency	(i.e.	strategic	interests).	Rather	than	analysing	referendum	
use	 from	 one	 theoretical	 perspective,	 I	 apply	 the	 underpinnings	 of	 four	 schools	 of	
institutional	 thought:	 classical institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism.	 In	doing	so,	 I	 largely	follow	Closa	
(2007),	who	states	that	‘the	current	tendency	to	oppose	structure	against	rationality	or	
rational	choice	is	not	helpful	in	explaining	many	of	the	most	salient	political	processes	
in	empirical	research’	 (Closa	2007,	1313).	Closa	contrasts	sociological	 institutionalism	
–	 which	 analyses	 institutional	 development	 by	 a	 ‘logic	 of	 appropriateness’	 –	 with	
rational	choice	institutionalism	–	which	analyses	institutional	development	by	a	‘logic	
of	rationality’	–	in	his	analysis	of	EU	referendum	use.	In	addition	to	Closa,	I	also	draw	
on	 the	 work	 of	 Vatter	 (2009)	 and	 Anckar	 (2014)	 and	 apply	 the	 insights	 of	 classical	
institutionalism	–	which	places	the	functionality	of	the	political	system	at	the	centre	of	
the	analysis	of	institutional	development	–	and	historical	institutionalism	–	which	lays	
the	emphasis	on	path	dependency	and	tradition.	
	 In	combining	these	four	institutionalisms,	I	thus	aim	to	counterbalance	the	dominant	
sociological	 institutionalist	 argument	 that	 referendums	 are	 a	 direct	 response	 to	
concerns	about	the	sustainability	of	representative	democracy.	Underlying	such	claims	
is	 the	 assumption	 that	political	 actors,	who	–	 at	 least	 in	most	 European	 countries	 –	
eventually	decide	whether	or	not	to	implement	and	use	referendums,	are	susceptible	to	
democratic	concerns	and	public	demand.	However,	the	question	is	whether	politicians	
are	indeed	driven	by	such	normative	considerations,	or	whether	they	use	referendums	
to	 pursue	 their	 own	 interests.	 Moreover,	 how	 much	 freedom	 of	 manoeuvre	 do	
political	actors	have	in	pledging	referendums?	How	fruitful	are	insights	from	classical	
institutionalism	 which	 would	 lay	 the	 emphasis	 on	 how	 the	 political	 system	 shapes	
choices	in	referendum	legislation	and	use?	And	are	political	actors’	decisions	whether	
or	not	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums	affected	by	past	referendum	experience,	
as	historical	institutionalism	would	suggest?		
	 These	 questions	 require	 a	 research	 design	 that	 goes	 beyond	 an	 analysis	 of	
aggregated	data	on	 institutions	 and	enables	 examination	of	 actors’	motivations	 and	
beliefs.	Moreover,	an	assessment	of	the	importance	of	history	requires	the	possibility	
to	 trace	 referendum	 choices	 over	 time.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 concur	 with	 Qvortrup	 who,	
drawing	on	the	work	of	Clifford	Geertz	(1973),	states	that	‘politics	is	a	cultural	activity,	
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which	changes	in	response	to	numerous	personal,	social	and	cultural	factors.	To	fully	
grasp	the	nature	and	significance	of	political	events	and	phenomena,	we	must	steep	
ourselves	 in	the	details	 in	a	process	of	[…]	“thick	description”’	(Qvortrup	2007,	8).	To	
allow	for	such	a	 thick	description	of	political	motives	and	actions,	while	at	 the	same	
time	assessing	referendum	mechanisms	that	can	be	generalized	across	countries,	my	
study	is	grounded	in	a	comparative	case-study	design,	which	entails	in-depth	country	
analyses	of	referendum	use,	but	acknowledges	that	‘examples	from	individual	countries	
cannot	stand	alone,	but	must	be	put	into	perspective’	(Qvortrup	2007,	9).	
	 This	research	has	the	ambition	to	offer	four	academic	contributions,	of	a	theoretical,	
empirical,	 methodological	 and	 societal	 nature.	 First,	 I	 counterbalance	 claims	 of	 a	
direct	participatory	shift	by	linking	referendum	practice	to	democratic	theory.	I	do	so	
by	providing	a	comprehensive	classification	of	various	types	of	referendum	and	their	
diverging	impacts	on	representative	decision-making,	and	by	assessing	in	which	countries	
and	with	what	 frequency	 these	different	 types	are	provided	 for	and	used.	 Second,	 I	
provide	an	analytical	framework	to	analyse	the	factors	that	contribute	to	referendum	
institutionalization	and	use	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	combining	structural	
factors	 and	 political	 agency.	 Third,	my	 comparative	 case	 study	 design	 allows	me	 to	
strike	a	balance	between	asserting	causal	mechanisms	driving	referendum	practice	that	
can	be	generalized	across	different	political	contexts,	and	providing	detailed	context-
specific	descriptions	of	the	politics	of	referendum	use,	and	thus	the	political	conditions	
under	which	referendums	are	pledged	or	not.	Lastly,	by	unravelling	the	various	types	of	
referendum	and	their	functions	in	the	decision-making	process,	my	study	contributes	
to	the	public	debate	on	the	crisis-solving	capacity	of	referendums	and	the	way	in	which	
they	transform	representative	decision-making.
1.5 PLAN OF THE BOOK
This	study	 is	 largely	structured	on	the	basis	of	my	research	questions:	1)	Did	Europe	
experience	an	increase	in	the	institutionalization	and	the	use	of	national	referendums	
between	1950	and	2014?	2)	If	so,	does	this	increase	mark	a	shift	from	national	decision-
making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation?	And	3)	
Which	factors	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	national	referendums	in	
European	democracies?	
	 In	chapter	2,	I	outline	the	theoretical	underpinnings	that	guide	the	analysis	of	these	
questions.	First,	I	outline	the	theoretical	approaches	to	referendums	and	their	relation	
to	 representative	 democracy.	 To	 understand	 contemporary	 referendum	 practice	
in	 Europe,	 and	 more	 in	 particular	 the	 various	 perspectives	 on	 the	 instrument,	 it	 is	
useful	to	discuss	 it	 in	relation	to	theories	of	democracy.	 In	doing	so,	 I	go	beyond	the	
dichotomous	contradiction	between	representative	and	direct	democracy	and	develop	
1
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a	classification	of	different	 types	of	 referendum	and	referendum	procedures.	Such	a	
classification	allows	examination	of	why	certain	types	of	referendum	are	provided	for	
in	some	countries	but	not	in	others.	Secondly,	I	present	a	comprehensive	overview	of	
the	different	variables	that	follow	from	the	four	institutionalist	approaches	to	studying	
referendum	practice.
	 In	chapter	3,	I	discuss	the	research	design	adopted	to	examine	my	research	questions.	
On	the	basis	of	the	descriptive	overview	of	the	referendum	provisions	available	in	28	
EU	member	 countries	 and	 their	 use,	 I	 choose	five	 countries	 for	 in-depth	 case	 study	
analyses:	 France,	 Denmark,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 Sweden	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 To	
increase	the	number	of	cases,	for	each	country,	I	examine	all	referendums	between	1950	
and	2014.	These	five	countries	represent	three	different	groups:	France	and	Denmark	
are	countries	that	both	have	extensive	referendum	legislation	and	made	recurrent	use	
of	referendums	between	1950	and	2014;	the	United	Kingdom	and	Sweden	are	countries	
with	 legal	 provisions	 for	 referendums,	 but	 made	 use	 of	 them	 only	 occasionally	 in	
this	period;	finally,	at	 least	until	2015,	the	Netherlands	was	a	country	with	no	formal	
referendum	legislation	and	had	only	held	one	referendum.	
	 In	chapter	4,	I	examine	the	first	research	question:	whether	there	is	a	shift	towards	
intensified	national	referendum	practice	in	Europe.	The	first	part	provides	an	overview	
of	the	referendum	provisions	in	the	28	EU	countries.	It	asks	which	of	the	five	referendum	
types	are	provided	for	 in	which	countries,	on	which	 issues	referendums	can	be	held,	
and	 which	 additional	 requirements	 apply	 regarding	 turnout	 and	 approval	 quorums.	
The	second	part	provides	an	overview	of	the	actual	referendums	held,	differentiated	
by	type.	In	addition,	this	chapter	assesses	the	explanatory	power	of	two	country-level	
factors:	democracy	type	and	the	existence	of	referendum	precedents.	
 Chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7	 contain	 the	 case	 studies.	 Chapter	 5	 deals	 with	 France	 and	
Denmark,	 chapter	 6	with	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Sweden,	 and	 chapter	 7	with	 the	
Netherlands.	 For	 each	 country,	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 is	 provided	 of	 the	 available	
referendum	provisions	and	their	use.	The	case	study	analyses	also	provide	the	basis	for	
examining	the	six	assumptions	concerning	the	potential	drivers	of	referendum	practice.	
I	 assess	 to	what	 extent	 a	 country’s	 referendum	 track	 record	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	
its	particular	 referendum	experience;	 to	what	extent	 referendum	practice	 resonates	
within	the	existing	institutional	context;	to	what	extent	it	is	an	outcome	of	a	norm	or	
public	demands;	and	to	what	extent	referendum	practice	should	be	seen	as	an	outcome	
of	political	strategies.
	 In	chapter	8,	I	synthesize	the	main	findings	of	my	study	by	combining	and	comparing	
the	findings	of	the	cross-country	comparisons	and	the	individual	country	chapters.	Also,	
I	briefly	discuss	 the	academic	 implications	of	 this	 study	and	place	my	findings	 in	 the	
broader	debate	on	the	effects	of	referendums	on	democratic	decision-making.
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CHAPTER 2. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO REFERENDUM USE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Most	 referendum	 research	 starts	 from	 the	observation	 that	 the	 growing	number	of	
referendums	in	Europe	in	the	past	half	century	is	a	peculiar	phenomenon	that	needs	
to	be	explained	 (cf.	 Butler	 and	Ranney	1994;	Gallagher	 and	Uleri	 1996;	Morel	 2001;	
Pállinger,	Kaufmann,	Marxer	and	Schiller	2007;	Qvortrup	2014).	In	doing	this,	scholars	
are	mainly	inspired	by	sociological institutionalist theory,	which	perceives	referendums	
as	instruments	that	are	increasingly	used	to	legitimize	and	boost	political	involvement	
in	national	and	EU	decision-making	(Cain,	Dalton	and	Scarrow	2003;	LeDuc	2003;	Dalton	
2004).	 Alternatively,	 such	 analyses	 are	 strongly	 embedded	 in	 rational choice theory, 
which	 explains	 the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	 terms	 of	 political	
actors’	strategic	interests	(cf.	Closa	2007;	Oppermann	2011;	Dür	and	Mateo	2011).	The	
aim	of	such	research	is	usually	not	to	explain	why	referendums	are	designed	in	different	
ways	in	different	countries,	nor	why	political	actors	in	some	countries	are	more	liable	
to	 use	 referendums	 than	 in	 other	 countries.	 To	 provide	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	
cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	 practice,	 this	 chapter	 presents	 an	 analytical	
framework	that	contrasts	both	strands	of	literature	and	combines	them	with	insights	
from	 classical institutionalism, which	 places	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 a	 country’s	 existing	
institutional	 context,	 and	historical institutionalism, which	examines	 the	 role	of	path	
dependency	in	institutional	choices.	
	 Referendums	are	 commonly	perceived	 as	participatory	 and	majoritarian	devices	
(cf.	Gamble	1997;	Gerber	1999;	Chambers	2001).	Often	no	distinction	is	made	between	
different	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 varying	 functions	 that	 they	 have	 in	 political	
decision-making.	While	some	referendums	give	primacy	to	popular	sovereignty,	others	
remain	 largely	 controlled	 by	 political	 representatives.	Moreover,	while	 some	merely	
reflect	 majority	 rule,	 others	 provide	 scope	 to	 integrate	 minority	 views	 in	 decision-
making	at	the	expense	of	the	ruling	majority	 (cf.	Setälä	1999).	Hence,	understanding	
the	institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	
requires	 differentiation	between	 various	 types	 of	 referendum,	 their	 design	 and	use.	
To	 allow	 for	 such	 a	 differentiation,	 this	 chapter	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 theoretical	
approaches	to	referendum	use.	First,	in	section	2.2,	I	discuss	the	referendum	instrument	
in	relation	to	democratic	theory.	In	section	2.3,	I	provide	a	classification	of	the	various	
types	 of	 referendum	 and	 how	 they	 are	 linked	 to	 various	 ideal	 types	 of	 democracy.	
This	 classification	 serves	not	only	 to	assess	whether	Europe	has	 indeed	experienced	
a	shift	 from	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	
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participation,	 but	 also	 to	 understand	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 referendum	 use.	
Section	2.4	discusses	the	assumptions	and	relevance	of	the	four	schools	of	institutional	
thought, and	applies	these	four	institutionalisms	to	the	study	of	referendums	within	a	
comprehensive	analytical	framework.	
2.2 REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Referendums	enable	citizens	to	vote	on	issues	directly	rather	than	letting	representatives	
do	 this	 for	 them.	 For	 that	 reason,	 they	 are	 usually	 gathered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	
direct	democracy	and	contrasted,	or	even	opposed,	to	representative	democracy.	For	
example,	by	referring	to	British	democracy,	Lijphart	(1984,	9)	argues	that	‘Parliamentary	
sovereignty	 also	 means	 that,	 because	 all	 power	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 House	 of	
Commons	 acting	 as	 the	 people’s	 representative,	 there	 is	 no	 room	 for	 any	 element	
of	 direct	 democracy	 such	 as	 the	 referendum’,	 since	 ‘Parliamentary	 sovereignty	 and	
popular	sovereignty	are	incompatible’.	However,	such	a	classification	does	not	do	justice	
to	the	different	types	of	referendum	and	their	use,	and	is	too	limited	to	fully	grasp	their	
role	in	contemporary	democracies.	As	Setälä	(1999,	157)	argues,	‘the	analogy	between	
referendums	and	classical	forms	of	direct	democracy	in	ancient	city-states	is,	in	many	
respects,	 too	 simplistic’,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 referendums	 provide	 citizens	with	
an	 instrument	to	 influence	decision-making	directly	at	the	expense	of	the	will	of	 the	
political	executive,	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	referendum	(Setälä	1999,	169;	Setälä	
2006,	709).	
	 Referendums	are	not	restricted	to	one	particular	model	of	democracy,	and	they	are	
used	in	countries	with	various	democratic	systems.	Nor	are	they	necessarily	democratic	
instruments,	 as	 shown	by	 their	 authoritarian	 use	 by	Napoleon	 I	 and	Napoleon	 III	 in	
France	 (cf.	Morel	 1996)	 and	under	 fascist	 rule	 in	Germany,	 Italy,	 Spain	 and	Portugal	
(cf.	 Rodrigues	 2013).	 Moreover,	 even	 when	 they	 are	 used	 democratically,	 political	
elites	often	exercise	considerable	control	over	the	referendum	process,	making	them	
instruments	of	 party	democracy	 rather	 than	of	 direct	 democracy	 as	 such.	 To	 assess	
the	nature	of	referendum	legislation	and	use,	and	understand	how	that	varies	among	
countries,	I	classify	referendums	on	the	basis	of	the	theoretical	principles	of	four	ideal	
types	of	democracy:	majoritarian,	consensus,	direct	and	deliberative.	
2.2.1 Four ideal types of democracy
Over	time,	political	thinkers	have	elaborated	on	various	ideal	types	of	democracy	(cf.	
Held	1996).	To	understand	referendum	use	in	contemporary	democratic	countries,	it	is	
important	to	consider	four	models	of	democracy	in	particular,	which	can	be	demarcated	
on	the	basis	of	two	well-known	dimensions.	The	first	dimension	deals	with	the role of 
citizens in the decision-making process:	do	citizens	participate	indirectly	in	democratic	
2
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decision-making	through	a	process	of	political representation	or	does	decision-making	
take	place	on	the	basis	of	citizens’ direct participation	(cf.	Milbrath	and	Goel	1977;	Dahl	
1989)?	In	the	first	case,	sovereignty	resides	in	the	people’s	representatives,	while	in	the	
latter,	it	resides	in	the	people.	The	second	dimension	deals	with	how decisions are made: 
are	they	made	by	procedures	that	allow	for	preference	aggregation	or	by	procedures	
that	allow	for	preference	integration	and	that	are	based	on	deliberation	and	consensus-
building	(cf.	March	and	Olsen	1989;	Elster	1998;	Lijphart	1999)?	When	preferences	are	
aggregated,	decisions	are	made	on	the	basis	of	majority	rule;	when	they	are	integrated,	
the	outcome	is	primarily	minority-protective.	These	dimensions	serve	as	an	analytical	
framework	 and	 reflect	 a	 continuum	 rather	 than	 a	 dichotomy.	 In	 practice,	 polities	
often	 include	 a	mix	 of	 decision-making	 procedures,	 some	 primarily	 aggregative	 and	
some	primarily	integrative.	When	the	two	dimensions	are	combined,	four	democratic	
ideal	 types	 can	be	distinguished	 (cf.	Hendriks	 2006,	 41-43):	majoritarian democracy, 
consensus democracy, direct democracy and deliberative democracy.	An	overview	of	the	
four ideal types is provided in table 2.1.	
	 Majoritarian	 democracy	 is	 an	 ideal	 type	 in	 which	 decisions	 are	 made	 by	
representatives	on	the	basis	of	procedures	 in	which	preferences	are	aggregated	and	
hence	where	decisions	are	based	on	majority	rule.	In	consensus	democracy,	decisions	
are	also	made	by	representatives,	but	more	room	is	given	to	decision-making	procedures	
that	allow	for	minority	views	to	be	 integrated	through	a	process	of	deliberation	and	
power	 sharing.	 It	 thus	 combines	 the	 notion	 of	 representative	 sovereignty	 with	 the	
notion	of	minority	protection.5	Direct	democracy	and	deliberative	democracy	are	ideal	
types	 in	which	 citizens	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 directly	 rather	 than	 indirectly	
by	 electing	 representatives.	 Hence,	 in	 both	 models,	 popular	 sovereignty	 prevails.	
While	in	direct	democracy	decisions	are	made	by	aggregating	individual	preferences,	
in	 deliberative	 democracy	 decisions	 are	made	by	 integrating	 and	 balancing	 the	 vast	
plurality	of	individual	preferences.	These	four	models	are	by	no	means	exhaustive	but	
serve	as	a	framework	to	examine	contemporary	referendum	use.6 
	 The	two	dimensions	on	the	basis	of	which	various	democratic	ideal	types	can	be	
classified,	can	also	be	used	to	classify	democratic	institutions,	including	referendums.	
Referendums	are	generally	seen	as	direct	participatory	and	majoritarian	instruments.	
This	assumption	is	based	on	the	fact	that	in	referendums	citizens	vote	on	issues	directly,	
and	the	outcome	of	the	vote	reflects	the	will	of	the	voting	majority.7	Yet,	depending	
5.	 	The	institutional	distinction	between	majoritarian	and	consensus	democracy	is	famously	outlined	by	
Arend	Lijphart	in	his	book	Patterns of Democracy (1999).
6.	 	Indeed,	there	are	more	dimensions	on	which	democracies	can	be	distinguished	from	each	other.	For	
example,	how	different	democracies	deal	with	the	distribution	of	common	goods;	the	extent	to	which	
they	allow	for	either	national	or	transboundary	decision-making;	or	the	scope	they	provide	for	the	
protection	of	human	rights,	etc.	Yet,	for	this	study	on	referendum	use,	I	consider	the	two	dimensions	
of	where	sovereignty	resides	and	whether	decision-making	is	majority-	or	minority-protective		to	be	
crucial,	because	these	dimensions	also	allow	for	a	classification	of	referendum	types	and	regulations.
7.	 	In	referendums	voters	are	usually	provided	with	a	choice	between	two	options	(i.e.	‘yes’	or	‘no’);	the	
alternative	that	receives	the	simple	majority	of	the	votes	wins.	
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Table 2.1: Four ideal types of democracy
Representation Participation
Aggregation
Majoritarian	democracy
•	 Representative sovereignty
•	 Majority rule
•	 Decision-making	by	representatives	on	
the	basis	of	aggregation
•	 Electoral	system	based	on	majority	or	
plurality rule
•	 Concentration	of	executive	power	in	
single-party	bare-majority	governments
•	 Two-party	system
•	 Constitutional	flexibility
  
Democratic tradition:
Protective	republicanism	/	Protective	liberal	
democracy
Exemplary thinkers: 
Bentham,	Hamilton,	J.	Mill,	Schumpeter
 
Perception citizens’ participation:
Instrumental
Direct	democracy
•	 Popular sovereignty
•	 Majority rule
•	 Collective,	non-intermediary,	decision-
making
•	 Mass-participation
•	 Delegative	governing	structure:	self-
government	in	small	administrative	
units;	directly	elected	officials	for	larger	
administrative	units
•	 Decision-making	by	unanimity/majority-
rule
  
Democratic tradition:
Classical	democratic	thought/	Developmental	
republicanism/	Participationist	school
Exemplary thinkers: 
Rousseau,	Jefferson,	Marx	&	Engels	
Perception citizens’ participation:
Intrinsic
Integration
Consensus	democracy
•	 Representative sovereignty
•	 Minority protection
•	 Decision-making	by	representatives	on	
the	basis	of	consensus-seeking
•	 Electoral	system	based	on	proportional	
representation
•	 Executive	power-sharing	in	broad	
coalition	governments
•	 Multiparty	system
•	 Constitutional	rigidity
Democratic tradition:
Developmental	liberal	democracy
Exemplary thinkers:
Madison,	J.S.	Mill,	De	Tocqueville,	Lijphart
Perception citizens’ participation:
Intrinsic	and	Instrumental
Deliberative	democracy
•	 Popular sovereignty
•	 Minority protection
•	 Citizens’	non-intermediary	decision-
making
•	 Limited	participation
•	 Decision-making	by	deliberation	and	
public	reasoning
•	 Participation	in	deliberative	institutions	
on	the	basis	of	proportionate	selection
Democratic tradition:
Deliberative	democratic	thought
Exemplary thinkers:
Habermas,	Cohen,	Dryzek,	Fishkin
Perception citizens’ participation:
Intrinsic	and	Instrumental
Sources:	Held	1996;	Lijphart	1999;	Shapiro	2002;	Hendriks	2006
on	 the	 exact	 provisions,	 some	 referendums	 give	 citizens	 a	more	 substantive	 role	 in	
political	decision-making	than	others,	and	some	allow	for	more	integration	of	minority	
views	than	others.	A	classification	of	referendums	based	on	a	intersection	of	these	two	
dimensions	allows	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	role	of	referendums	in	European	
2
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democracies	 and	 of	 why,	 and	 under	 what	 conditions,	 they	 are	 institutionalized	 and	
used.	Before	elaborating	on	this	argument	 in	section	2.3,	 I	first	provide	an	overview	
of	 the	development	of	political	 thought	on	the	preferred	role	of	citizens	 in	decision-
making	and	the	preferred	decision-making	modes.	
2.2.2 Representation versus Participation
Over	time,	different	views	developed	about	the	appropriate	role	of	citizens	in	political	
decision-making.	In	some	views,	this	role	is	restricted	to	the	election	of	representatives,	
while	 in	others,	 citizens	are	granted	a	direct	participatory	 role.	 This	 contrast	 can	be	
traced	back	 to	an	ultimate	difference	 in	 conception	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
state	 (i.e.	 ‘the	 public’)	 and	 the	 individual	 (i.e.	 ‘the	 private’).	 According	 to	 a	 liberal	
democratic	notion	extensively	put	forward	by	British	early	19th	century	philosophers	
Jeremy	Bentham	and	 James	Mill,	 the	 two	need	 to	 be	 strictly	 separated	 in	 order	 for	
individuals	 to	flourish.	Such	a	perspective	would	be	hostile	 towards	decision-making	
instruments	that	grant	citizens	a	final	say	in	decision-making,	such	as	some	referendums.	
Accordingly,	voting	in	referendums	would	not	only	place	an	extra	burden	on	citizens,	it	
would	also	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	elected	representatives.	Such	a	notion	of	a	strict	
separation	between	 the	public	and	 the	private	was	challenged	by	 thinkers	 like	 Jean-
Jacques	Rousseau,	who	stressed	that	the	two	cannot	be	separated	as	human	beings	are	
essentially	political	beings.	According	to	such	a	Rousseauian	notion,	the	polity	should	
enable	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 directly	 and	 hence	 referendums	
are	 applauded	 as	 instruments	 to	 achieve	 this	 goal.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 first	 provide	 an	
overview	of	political	 thinkers	proclaiming	direct	 citizens’	 participation,	 starting	 from	
political	thinkers	in	Ancient	Greece	to	the	development	of	the	participationist	school	in	
the	1960s,	after	which	I	look	how	the	notion	of	political	representation	evolved,	from	
Machiavelli’s	Prince	 to	 the	 restrictive	participatory	notion	developed	by	Schumpeter	
and	Weber	in	the	post-WWII	era.
	 Political	 thinkers	 proclaiming	 citizens’	 direct	 participation	 in	 political	 decision-
making	 generally	 refer	 to	 democratic	 life	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 (cf.	 Lucardie	 2012).	
Indeed,	 in	many	ancient	Greek	city-states,	citizens	participated	directly	 in	public	and	
administrative	affairs	(cf.	Finley	1973).	Aristotle	(384-322	BC),	who	provided	one	of	the	
most	thorough	accounts	of	democracy	in	Athens	in	his	books	Politics and The Athenian 
Constitution,	describes	a	system	based	on	 ‘checks	and	balances’,	 in	which	all	citizens	
(demos) rule (kratos)	 over	 all	 by	 participating	 in	 the	Assembly.	 For	 the	 advocates	 of	
this	system,	the	modern	liberal	separation	between	the	public	and	the	private	would	
have	been	unthinkable.	As	famously	stated	one	century	earlier	by	Pericles,	a	prominent	
Athenian	politician	of	 that	time,	 ‘we	do	not	say	 that	a	man	who	takes	no	 interest	 in	
politics	 is	 a	man	who	minds	his	 own	business;	we	 say	 that	 he	has	no	business	 here	
at	 all’	 (in	 Thucydides	 c.431BC,	History of the Peloponnesian War,	 Penguin	edition	by	
Warner	and	Finley	1972,	147).	At	least	for	the	affluent	male	population	–	women,	slaves,	
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descendants	of	immigrants,	and	foreigners	were	deprived	of	the	right	to	participate	in	
public	affairs	–	the	public	and	the	private	were	thus	considerably	intertwined.		
	 In	practice,	however,	this	direct	participatory	ideal	only	thrived	in	Athens	and	a	few	
other	ancient	city-states.	 It	was	not	until	 the	high	and	 late	medieval	period	 that	 the	
notion	of	direct	citizens’	participation	was	revived	 in	Europe,	albeit	on	a	small	 scale.	
Examples	are	 the	 founding	of	 the	Alþingi	 in	930	 in	 Iceland,	one	of	 the	oldest	extant	
parliaments	in	the	world,	the	establishment	of	the	water	councils	in	the	Netherlands	in	
the	beginning	of	the	thirteenth	century,	and	the	conciliarist	movement in the Catholic 
church	in	the	fifteenth	century.	In	addition,	in	the	eleventh	century,	the	ancient	Athenian	
democratic	polity	experienced	a	short	revival	in	Northern	Italy,	with	the	establishment	
of	several	self-ruled	city-states	like	Florence,	Padua,	Pisa	and	Milan.	These	small-scale	
participatory	republics	stood	in	sharp	contrast	to	feudal	rule	in	the	medieval	Western	
European	empires	and	kingdoms.	They	were	also	at	odds	with	the	realism	attributed	to	
Niccolò	Machiavelli’s	(1469-1527)	The Prince	(1532),	as	well	as	the	later	dominant	liberal	
democratic	mode	of	thought,	inspired	by	thinkers	like	Thomas	Hobbes	(1588-1679)	and	
John	Locke	(1632-1702),	whose	considerations	are	discussed	below.
	 The	notion	of	direct	citizens’	participation	specifically	gained	significance	with	the	
writings	of	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	(1712-1778).	Rousseau	refuted	the	liberal	democratic	
idea	that	‘the	public’	could	be	separated	from	‘the	private’.	Rather,	in	his	famous	work	
The Social Contract (1762),	Rousseau	reaffirmed	the	ancient	notion	of	the	homo politicus, 
and	argued	that	 the	 ideal	society	 is	a	society	 in	which	political	affairs	are	 integrated	
into	 the	 affairs	 of	 ordinary	 citizens.	 As	 Rousseau	 stated,	 ‘as	 soon	 as	 public	 business	
ceases	to	be	the	citizens’	principal	business,	and	they	prefer	to	serve	with	their	purse	
rather	than	with	their	person,	the	state	is	already	close	to	ruin’	(in	Rousseau	The Social 
Contract,	Cambridge	University	Press	edition	by	Gourevitch	1762/1997,	113).	According	
to	Rousseau,	direct	citizens’	participation	 is	 the	best	guarantee	that	 individuals,	who	
live	together	on	the	basis	of	a	social	contract,	remain	as	free	as	they	were	prior	to	the	
contract	(idem,	49).	As	he	put	it,	‘Any	law	which	the	People	has	not	ratified	in	person	is	
null;	it	is	not	a	law	at	all’	(idem,	141).	
	 In	the	United	States,	Rousseau’s	 ideal	of	popular	sovereignty	found	resonance	in	
the	 thinking	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 (1743-1826).	 Jefferson	 refuted	 the	 tendency	 of	 his	
contemporary	James	Madison	(1751-1836)	to	reduce	democracy	to	a	system	in	which	
‘the	people	will	have	the	virtue	and	intelligence	to	select	men	of	virtue	and	wisdom’	
(in	Madison,	The Writings of James Madison, G.P.	Putnam’s	Sons	edition	by	Hunt	1783-
1787/1901,	223).	Although	Jefferson	did	not	go	as	far	as	Rousseau	in	his	proclamation	
of	 direct	 democracy,	 he	 shared	 Rousseau’s	 confidence	 in	 the	 common	 sense	 of	 the	
ordinary	man,	and	stressed	that	the	‘will	of	the	people’	is	the	only	legitimization	of	any	
government	(cf.	Cronin	1999,	40).
	 In	 Europe,	 Rousseau	was	 an	 important	 source	 of	 inspiration	 for	 Friedrich	 Hegel 
(1770-1831), Karl	Marx	 (1818-1883)	 and	Friedrich	Engels	 (1820-1895).	 These	 thinkers	
2
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also	 contested	 the	 liberal	 separation	 between	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private,	 but	 with	
an	 essentially	 different	 rationale.	 In	 line	 with	 his	 contemporaries,	 Rousseau	 upheld	
a	 restrictive	conception	of	citizenship,	which	only	 included	the	male	population	with 
property.	For	Hegel,	Marx	and	Engels,	it	was	exactly	this	fundamental	inequality	on	the	
basis	of	class	that	justified	a	polity	in	which	citizens	directly	participate.	Accordingly,	if	
the	private	were	separated	from	the	public	–	and	hence	if	ordinary	men	had	no	role	
in	public	affairs	–	public	policy	would,	they	argued,	reinforce	the	unequal	distribution	
of	 wealth	 and	 power	 in	 society.	 Thus,	 in	 their	 ‘Communist	Manifesto’	 (1848),	Marx	
and	Engels	argued	that,	rather	than	entrusting	their	political	rights	to	representatives,	
workers	 needed	 to	 organize	 and	 exercise	 their	 political	 rights	 collectively.	 Popular 
sovereignty,	according	to	Marx	and	Engels,	implied	the	development	of	an	association	‘in	
which	the	free	development	of	each	is	the	condition	for	the	free	development	of	all’	(in	
Marx	and	Engels,	The Communist Manifesto,	Filiquarian	Publishing	edition	1848/2005,	
37).	In	the	eventual	communist	society,	‘politics’	would	no	longer	exist	and	all	aspects	
of	‘government’	–which	was	nothing	more	than	basic	administration	–	were	to	be	fully	
accountable	to	the	popular	will.	
	 In	 the	 decades	 after	 Marx	 and	 Engels,	 the	 idea	 of	 representative	 democracy	
flourished	 in	 Europe.	With	 the	 gradual	 extension	 of	 the	 franchise	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
and	early	twentieth	centuries	came	the	development	of	political	parties,	and	citizens	
exercised	power	indirectly	by	voting	for	these	parties	in	periodical	general	elections.	It	
was	not	until	the	1960s	and	1970s	that	this	notion	of	representative	party	democracy	
became	 contested.	 Based	 on	 their	 ‘freezing	 hypothesis’,	 Seymour	Martin	 Lipset	 and	
Stein	Rokkan	(1967)	challenged	the	basic	assumptions	of	party	democracy	which,	they	
argued,	was	no	longer	able	to	reflect	the	increasing	number	of	dimensions	of	political	
conflict	in	a	changing	society.	Inspired	by	widespread	civil	demonstrations	of	that	time,	
participationists	 like	Crawford	Brough	Macpherson,	Carole	Pateman,	Lee	Ann	Osbun,	
Robert	Putnam,	 Jurgen	Habermas	and	Benjamin	Barber	 stressed	 that	 representative	
decision-making	tends	to	exclude	and	alienate	vast	amounts	of	citizens.	Following	the	
Rousseauian	 tradition,	 they	 stressed	 that	 such	 a	 political	 alienation	 jeopardizes	 the	
pursuance	of	the	public	good,	as	only	through	political	expression	and	self-determination	
could	democracy	be	given	meaning	and	could	citizens	live	a	fulfilling	life	(c.f.	Pateman	
1970;	Osbun	 1985).	Modern	 participationists	 therefore	 called	 for	 a	 system	 in	which	
representative	institutions	are	supplemented	with	instruments	for	mass	participation,	
such	as	referendums,	community	consultations,	and	citizens’	juries	(see	Barber	1984;	
Pateman	1970;	2012;	Budge	1996).	
	 Modern	 participationists	 are	 thus	 not	 principally	 opposed	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
political	representation.	Rather,	they	aim	to	strengthen	representative	democracy	by	
incorporating	mass	participatory	tools	in	a	way	that	does	not	jeopardize	the	effectiveness	
of	 decision-making.	 This	 stands	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 radical,	 or	 agonistic,	
democracy,	which	was	developed	in	the	1980s	by	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe	
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(1985)	and	which	gained	renewed	attention	in	Europe	in	the	early	21st	century.	In	line	
with	Marx	and	Engels,	agonistic	democrats	criticize	representative	democracy	as	being	
a	reflection	of	an	unequal	distribution	of	power.	Accordingly,	when	‘the	people’	transfer	
their	decision-making	power	to	‘elites’,	they	have	no	proper	instruments	to	prevent	the	
latter	from	using	their	power	in	their	own	interests	(Cohen	and	Fung	2004,	25).	Like	the	
modern	participationists,	agonistic	democrats	advocate	broad	participation	of	citizens	
in	public	decision-making;	not,	however,	to	strengthen	representative	decision-making	
but	to	expose	the	vast	differences	 in	society.	As	this	element	 links	to	the	theoretical	
dimension	of	aggregative	versus	 integrative	decision-making,	their	argument	 is	more	
extensively	outlined	in	section 2.2.3.	
	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 direct	 participation,	 the	 concept	 of	 political	
representation unfolded during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a 
clear	reaction	to	the	absolutist	rule	that	prevailed	in	Europe	at	that	time.	Yet,	political	
thinkers	Niccolò	Machiavelli	(1469-1527)	and	Thomas	Hobbes	(1588-1679)	had	earlier	
expressed	views	on	political	representation.	Machiavelli’s	writings	were	a	clear	reaction	
to	the	decline	of	the	late	medieval,	early	renaissance	republican	city-states.	In	his	view,	
this	 decline	was	 inevitable	 as	people	were	 intrinsically	 self-seeking	 and	 incapable	of	
pursuing	the	common	good,	unless	they	were	forced	to	do	so	(in	Machiavelli,	Discourses 
on Livy, Dover edition	1531/2007,	50).	 Like	Aristotle,	Machiavelli	 stressed	 that	when	
the	mass	participates	directly	in	the	polity,	this	would	eventually	lead	to	chaos	or	even	
conflict.	Yet,	in	contrast	to	Aristotle,	Machiavelli	stressed	that	conflict	would	inevitably	
also	emerge	when	decision-making	is	left	to	one	person	or	a	few	of	the	richest,	as	they,	
too,	would	 ultimately	 pursue	 their	 own	 interests	 above	 the	 common	 good.	 Instead,	
Machiavelli	 advocated	 a	 ‘mixed	 government’,	 in	which	 people’s	 representatives,	 the	
Princes,	guaranteed	order	and	collective	well-being,	while	citizens’	liberty	was	protected	
by	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (Machiavelli 1531/2007).	 This	 notion	 of	 a	 necessary	 compromise	
between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	was	 shared	by	Hobbes,	who	underscored	 that	
citizens	should	be	willing	to	surrender	their	right	to	govern	themselves	to	a	powerful	
single authority, the Leviathan,	which	would	act	on	behalf	of	the	plurality	of	voices	in	
the	community	 (in	Hobbes,	Leviathan,	Dover	edition	1651/2006,	95).	As	he	famously	
put	it,	‘A	multitude	of	men,	are	made	One	Person,	when	they	are	by	one	man,	or	one	
Person,	Represented’	(Hobbes	1651/2006,	91).	
	 The	 writings	 of	 Machiavelli	 and	 Hobbes	 inspired	 later	 European	 Enlightenment	
thinkers	like	John	Locke	(1632-1704),	Charles	Louis	de	Secondat,	Baron	de	Montesquieu	
(1689-1755),	and	the	American	Federalists	Alexander	Hamilton	(1755-1804)	and	James	
Madison	 (1751-1836).	 All	 were	 occupied	 with	 the	 question	 under	 which	 conditions	
human	beings	would	be	willing	 to	 surrender	 their	 political	 rights	 to	 representatives.	
Unlike	Machiavelli	and	Hobbes,	these	thinkers	assigned	much	more	confidence	to	the	
individual	 but	 argued	 that,	 in	 an	 increasingly	 complex	 society,	 citizens’	 self-rule	was	
not	 possible.	 In	Montesquieu’s	words,	 ‘As	 in	 a	 country	 of	 liberty,	 every	man	who	 is	
2
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supposed	a	free	agent	ought	to	be	his	own	governor;	the	legislative	power	should	reside	
in	the	whole	body	of	the	people.	But	since	this	is	impossible	in	large	states,	and	in	small	
ones	 is	 subject	 to	many	 inconveniences,	 it	 is	 fit	 the	people	 should	 transact	 by	 their	
representatives	what	they	cannot	transact	by	themselves’	(in	Montesquieu,	The Spirit 
of Laws,	 Cosimo	 Classics	 edition	 1748/2007,	 154).	 These	 thinkers,	 however,	 strongly	
criticized	the	notion	of	a	strong	Prince or Leviathan,	as	this,	according	to	Madison	and	his	
fellow	Federalists,	provided	no	mechanism	‘to	check	the	inducements	to	sacrifice	the	
weaker	party	or	an	obnoxious	individual’	(in	Hamilton,	Madison	‎and	Jay,	The Federalist, 
Lawbook	Exchange	edition	1864/2005,	58).	Consequently,	a	strict	separation	between	
the	various	branches	of	governance	–	the	executive,	the	legislature	and	the	judiciary	–	
was	called	for	to	prevent	the	misuse	of	power	by	political	representatives.
	 During	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	this	liberal	conception	of	democratic	
government	 flourished	 across	 Europe.	 Subsequent	 political	 thinkers	 like	 Jeremy	
Bentham	(1748-1832)	and	James	Mill	(1773-1836)	shared	the	notion	of	a	separation	of	
powers,	as	put	forward	by	Locke	and	Montesquieu,	and	elaborated	more	extensively	
on	the	institutional	features	necessary	to	guarantee	that	elected	representatives	were	
accountable	 to	 the	people.	The	overarching	element	was	a	 restrained	conception	of	
political	participation,	which	was	perceived	as	purely	instrumental,	i.e.	as	a	means	to	
ensure	that	political	decisions	reflected	the	will	of	the	people.	Moreover	what	constituted	
the	‘people’	was	narrowed	down	to	only	a	small	proportion	of	the	community:	women	
and	individuals	without	property	were	not	entitled	to	participate	in	government	affairs	
(cf.	Held	1996,	98).		
	 A	 different	 view	was	 advocated	 by	 John	 Stuart	Mill	 (1806-1873).	 Like	 his	 liberal	
predecessors,	he	viewed	representative	democracy	as	the	only	governance	structure	
that	could	prevent	the	misuse	of	political	power	(in	Mill,	Considerations on Representative 
Government,	1861).	However,	his	conception	of	humankind	was	much	more	optimistic.	
Rather	 than	 stressing	 that	 democracy	 served	 to	 protect	 individuals	 from	 their	 own	
misbehavior,	Mill	 valued	 democracy	 intrinsically	 as	 a	minimal	 regulatory	 framework	
that	 guaranteed	 citizens’	 freedom,	 development	 and	 wellbeing.	 And,	 unlike	 earlier	
republican	 and	 liberal	 thinkers,	 Mill	 extended	 the	 notion	 of	 citizenship	 to	 formerly	
deprived	groups	in	society,	namely	women	and	the	poor.	
	 Mill’s	 optimistic	 notion	 of	 people’s	 capacity	 was	 contested	 by	 political	 thinkers	
like	 Max	 Weber	 (1864-1920)	 and	 Joseph	 Schumpeter	 (1883-1950).	 Writing	 in	 the	
context	 of	 nation-state	 expansion,	 they	 advocated	 the	 earlier	 restrictive	 conception	
of	representative	government	with	very	limited	scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation.	
According	 to	Weber	 and	 Schumpeter,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 citizenry	was	 incapable	of	
deciding	on	complex	political	matters	and	hence	participation	should	be	restricted	to	
the	election	of	political	leaders.	As	Schumpeter	put	it,	democracy	‘does	not	mean	and	
cannot	mean	that	the	people	actually	rule	in	any	obvious	sense	of	the	terms	‘people’	
and	‘rule’.	Democracy	means	only	that	the	people	have	the	opportunity	of	accepting	
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or	refusing	the	men	who	are	to	rule	them’	(in	Schumpeter,	Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy,	Allen	and	Unwin	edition	1942/1976,	284-285).	 In	a	 famous	essay	Weber	
sets	out	 the	 conditions	 for	 a	 strong	parliament	 as	 a	 competitive	 training	 ground	 for	
political	 leadership,	and	political	parties	as	crucial	 institutions	for	managing	electoral	
competition	in	the	context	of	the	development	of	mass	franchise	(in	Weber,	Politics as 
a Vocation,	Routledge	edition	by	Gerth,	Mills	and	Turner	1919/1991).	
	 After	 the	 introduction	of	universal	 suffrage	 in	Europe	 in	 the	 late	nineteenth	and	
twentieth	centuries,	there	was	for	a	long	time	no	genuine	alternative	to	representative	
(party)	 democracy.	 Yet,	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 the	 restrictive	 notion	 of	
representation	 was	 increasingly	 criticized	 and	 political	 thinkers	 began	 to	 favour	 a	
more	 integrative	 role	 for	 citizens	 in	 decision-making,	 for	 example	 by	 participating	
in	 intermediary	 groups	 (cf.	 Truman	 1951;	 Dahl	 1961)	 or	 through	 participatory	 and	
deliberative	 institutions	 (cf.	 Barber	 1984;	 Pateman	 1970;	 2012;	 Osbun	 1985;	 Budge	
1996).	 However,	 these	 notions	 implied	 calls	 to	 strengthen	 representative	 decision-
making,	 rather	 than	 for	 an	 alternative	 democracy	 model.	 Those	 who	 advocated	
alternative	models	were	critical	of	representative	democracy	for	not	adhering	to	one	
of	 the	 basic	 assumptions	 underlying	 democracy,	 namely	 politically equality.	 Some	
contemporary	 political	 thinkers	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	 reviving	 the	 principles	 of	 ancient	
Greek	direct	democracy	or,	as	some	would	say,	‘real	democracy’	(Lucardie	2012,	48).	
Others	began	theorizing	an	agonistic	democracy	model	that	takes	persisting	inequalities	
in	 society	 as	 its	 starting	 point,	 and	 that	 is	 aimed	 at	 integrating	 the	 widely	 varying	
views	of	 political	 decision-making	 (Tully	 2008;	Wenman	2013).	 Referendums	play	 an	
important	role	 in	both,	albeit	with	different	rationales.	Understanding	this	argument	
requires	understanding	the	different	notions	of	how	individual	preferences	should	be	
translated	 into	 policy.	 These	 notions,	 one	 based	 on	 preference	 aggregation	 and	 the	
other	on	preference	integration,	will	be	outlined	in	the	next	section.
2.2.3 Aggregation versus Integration
Besides	 the	 dimension	 that	 deals	 with	 the	 preferred	 role	 of	 the	 citizen,	 another	
dimension	used	to	demarcate	various	democratic	ideal	types	focuses	on	the	underlying	
logic	of	decision-making.	Perceptions	differ	on	how	citizens’	preferences	are	translated	
into	policy.	The	aggregative	notion	holds	that	policy	outcomes	should	reflect	the	will	of	
the	majority,	while	the	 integrative	notion	argues	that	policy	outcomes	should	reflect	
the	will	 of	 as	many	people	as	possible.	 These	 two	notions	divide	both	 scholars	who	
claim	that	decision-making	should	be	based	on	citizens’	direct	participation	and	those	
who	argue	 in	 favour	of	political	 representation	 (cf.	Shapiro	2002,	237).	Referendums	
are	usually,	and	wrongly	as	 I	argue,	perceived	as	purely	aggregative	decision-making	
instruments.	After	all,	in	a	referendum,	the	alternative	with	the	majority	of	the	votes	
wins.	For	that	reason,	referendums	are	often	said	to	be	incompatible	with	integrative	
notions	 of	 democratic	 decision-making.	 To	 understand	 this	 argument,	 as	 well	 as	 its	
2
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refutation,	this	section	outlines	the	theoretical	underpinnings	of	both	the	aggregative	
and	integrative	perspectives	on	political	decision-making.	
 The aggregative	notion	of	democratic	decision-making	prevailed	in	Ancient	Greece.	
Although	the	various	institutions	of	the	ancient	Greek	city-states	attempted	to	decide	
by	unanimity,	when	unanimity	could	not	be	reached,	decisions	were	made	by	majority	
rule	 (cf.	 Aristotle	 c.350	 BC,	 Politics,	 Dover	 edition	 by	 Jowett	 and	 Davis	 2000,	 240-
241).	This	conception	of	a	necessary	trade-off	was	shared	by	Rousseau.	According	to	
Rousseau,	people	are	ideally	governed	by	the	‘volonté générale’	(i.e.	the	general	will).	
However,	 as	 the	 general	 will	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 determine	 unanimously,	 Rousseau	
stated	that	majority	rule	provides	the	best	practical	approximation	to	the	general	will.	
As	he	explained,	‘There	is	often	a	great	deal	of	difference	between	the	will	of	all	and	the	
general	will.	The	latter	looks	only	to	the	common	interest;	the	former	considers	private	
interest	and	is	only	a	sum	of	private	wills.	But	take	away	from	these	same	wills	the	pluses	
and	minuses	that	cancel	each	other	out,	and	the	remaining	sum	of	the	differences	is	the	
general	will’	(in	Rousseau	1762/1997,	60).	
	 Early	liberal	democratic	thinkers	like	John	Locke,	Jeremy	Bentham	and	James	Mill	
also	widely	 embraced	 decision-making	 by	majority	 rule.	 As	 Locke	 put	 it,	 ‘When	 any	
number	of	men	have	so	consented to make one Community	or	Government,	they	are	
thereby	presently	incorporated,	and	make	one Body Politick, wherein	the	Majority have 
a	 Right	 to	 act	 and	 conclude	 the	 rest’	 (in	 Two Treatises of Government,	 Cambridge	
University	Press	edition	by	Laslett	1689/1988,	331).	Accordingly,	those	who	make	the	
decisions	are	legitimized	by	the	consent	of	the	majority.	Locke	saw	no	alternative	to	the	
‘doctrine’	of	majoritarian	decision-making	(Kendall	1941).	As	he	put	it,	‘for	where	the	
majority	cannot	conclude	the	rest,	there	they	cannot	act	as	one	body,	and	consequently	
will	be	immediately	dissolved	again’	(in	Locke 1689/1988,	333).	Bentham	and	Mill	shared	
Locke’s	view	and	extended	the	principle	of	aggregated	decision-making	to	a	wide	range	
of	 parliamentary	 reforms,	 such	 as	 virtually	 universal	 and	 equal	 suffrage	 (with	 the	
exception	of	women)	and	secrecy	of	the	ballot	(see	James	1981,	55).	For	Bentham,	the	
interest	of	the	community	as	a	whole	was	similar	to	 ‘the	sum	of	the	 interests	of	the	
several	members	who	 compose	 it’	 (in	 Bentham,	An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation,	Oxford	University	Press	edition	1789/1823,	3)	and	the	principle	
of	 utility	 stated	 that	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 community	was	 equivalent	 to	 ‘the	 greatest	
happiness	 of	 the	 greatest	 number’	 (idem:	 5,	 note).	 The	 ideal	 type	 of	 majoritarian	
democracy	owes	its	existence	to	the	writings	of	these	liberal	democrats.	
	 Their	views	inform	the	notion	that	‘the	people’	constitutes	a	rather	homogenous	
group	whose	preferences	can	be	aggregated	into	a	general	will.	Marx’	conception	of	
direct	democracy	was	also	based	on	a	homogenous	conception	of	‘the	people’.	Marx,	
however,	proclaimed	a	‘revolutionary	dictatorship	of	the	proletariat’,	by	which	he	meant	
‘the	democratic	control	of	society	and	state	by	those	–	the	overwhelming	majority	of	
adults	–	who	neither	own	nor	control	the	means	of	production’	(Held	1996,	141).	He	
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thus	perceived	 the	proletariat	 as	 constituting	a	homogenous	group,	whose	 interests	
were	easily	aggregated	into	the	general	will	and	contrasted	to	those	of	the	capitalist	
elite.	Moreover,	 the	delegative	decision-making	 structure	 that	Marx	proclaimed	was	
also	based	on	majority	rule:	the	administrative	units	that	made	up	his	pyramid	of	direct	
democracy	were	accountable	to	the	majority	of	the	electorate.	
	 For	modern	participationists,	majority	rule	is	not	as	much	an	underlying	principle	
as	a	practical	outcome	of	their	conception	of	the	preferred	role	of	citizens	in	decision-
making.	Participationists	argue	that,	for	political	decision-making	to	be	most	effective	
and	for	citizens	to	fulfil	their	purpose,	as	many	people	as	possible	should	participate	
in	political	life.	Given	the	practical	trade-off	between	participation	and	deliberation	–	
i.e.	in	large	societies	it	would	be	unworkable	for	the	whole	electorate	(or	a	significant	
proportion	of	it)	to	deliberate	on	policy	issues	–	decision-making	by	mass	participation	
implies	 sacrificing	 the	 integration	 of	minority	 views	 (Cohen	 and	 Fung	 2004).	 This	 is	
evident,	for	example,	in	Ian	Budge’s	‘unmediated	popular	voting’	democracy,	in	which	
law	proposals	are	indeed	formulated	after	a	public	debate,	but	in	which	actual	decision-
making	is	based	on	voting	by	majority	rule	(Budge	1993;	Setälä	1999).
 The integrative	 notion	 of	 democratic	 decision-making	 evolved	 in	 response	 to	
the	 restrictive	 version	 of	 political	 participation	 that	 prevailed	 until	 the	 eighteenth	
century.	At	the	time	when	political	thinkers	in	ancient	Greece	or	in	the	seventeenth	and	
eighteenth	centuries	largely	embraced	the	notion	of	aggregative	democratic	decision-
making,	citizenship	was,	in	practice,	restricted	to	a	small	group	of	affluent	individuals.	
And	it	was	reasonable	to	assume	that	these	individuals	shared	more	or	less	the	same	
preferences.	 However,	 with	 the	 slowly	 changing	 conception	 of	 ‘citizenship’	 in	 the	
eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	an	alternative	perspective	on	the	best	method	for	
representing	interests	came	to	the	fore:	namely	one	that	was	based	on	the	integration	
of	minority	views,	rather	than	the	subordination	of	individual	interests	to	the	will	of	the	
majority.	This	perspective	was	shared	by	the	German	philosopher	Immanuel	Kant	(1724-
1804).	Like	Locke	and	Bentham,	Kant	considered	direct	democracy	a	threat	to	individual	
freedom,	but	unlike	his	predecessors,	on	the	grounds	that	it	derives	from	majority	rule.	
While	 for	Mill	 and	Bentham,	 the	 role	of	 democracy	was	merely	protective,	 for	 Kant	
the	function	of	democracy	was	developmental:	only	if	all	adults	were	represented	in	
politics	could	they	develop	themselves	fully	and	live	a	life	in	human	dignity.	As	Kant	put	
it,	‘democracy	is,	properly	speaking,	necessarily	a	despotism,	because	it	establishes	an	
executive	power	in	which	“all”	decide	for	or	even	against	one	who	does	not	agree;	that	
is,	“all”,	who	are	not	quite	all,	decide,	and	this	is	a	contradiction	of	the	general	will	with	
itself	and	with	freedom’	(in	Perpetual Peace,	Filiquarian	edition	1795/2007,	15). In	the	
US,	Kant’s	concern	was	shared	by	James	Madison.	Referring	to	the	vast	class	differences	
in	his	country,	Madison	proposed	a	federal	government	structure,	based	on	a	division	of	
power	among	various	fractions,	as	a	guarantee	that	majority	interests	could	not	easily	
prevail	over	the	interests	of	the	minority	class.		
2
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	 In	Europe,	the	writings	of	Kant	inspired	John	Stuart	Mill	and	Alexis	De	Tocqueville	
(1805-1859),	who	both	argue	that	previous	democratic	theorists	had	mistakenly	failed	
to	develop	a	mechanism	that	would	allow	individual	interests	to	be	protected	against	
what	 De	 Tocqueville	 called	 the	 ‘tyranny	 of	 the	 majority’.	 Mill	 and	 De	 Tocqueville	
became	known	as	the	first	proponents	of	proportional	representation.	As	John	Stuart	
Mill	put	 it,	 ‘In	a	really	equal	democracy,	every	or	any	section	would	be	represented,	
not	 disproportionately	 but	 proportionately’	 (in	 Considerations on Representative 
Government	 1861,	 133).	 An	 important	 factor	 that	 triggered	 this	 thinking	 was	 a	
changed	 conception	 of	 ‘the	 citizen’.	Whereas	 protective	 liberal	 democrats	 excluded	
large	segments	of	society	from	citizens’	rights,	the	new	generation	of	developmental	
democrats	 proclaimed	 an	 extension	 of	 these	 rights	 to	 both	 women	 and	 the	 poor.	
And	 in	 a	 heterogeneous	 society	 it	 would,	 arguably,	 be	 far	more	 difficult	 to	 achieve	
representative	majorities.	
	 One	 contemporary	 political	 scientist	 who	 elaborated	 on	 this	 notion	 is	 Arend	
Lijphart	(1969;	1999).	Lijphart	criticized	Schumpeter’s	competitive	elitist	model,	which	
was	dominant	in	post-WWII	Europe,	and	maintained	that	differences	are	so	profound	
in	 heterogeneous	 societies	 that	 promoting	majority	 rule	 would	 lead	 to	 conflict	 and	
disintegration	(Lijphart	1969,	213-215;	Shapiro	2002,	249).	Lijphart	argued	that,	rather	
than	 majority	 rule,	 such	 societies	 are	 better	 suited	 to	 decision-making	 procedures	
based	on	consensus	building,	power	sharing	and	deliberation.		
	 Criticism	of	majoritarian	decision-making	was	also	expressed	on	more	procedural	
grounds,	most	notably	by	Marquis	de	Condorcet	(1743-1794)	who	exposed	an	intrinsic	
paradox	 underlying	 the	 notion	 of	 preference	 aggregation.	 He	 showed	 that	majority	
preferences	can	be	in	conflict	with	each	other	and	as	such	majority	voting	can	lead	to	
inconclusive	outcomes.	At	a	time	when	party	democracy	thrived	in	post-WWII	Europe,	
political	 scientists	 Hans	 Daudt	 and	 Douglas	 W.	 Rae	 (1976)	 took	 up	 this	 paradox	 in	
modern	party	democracy.	They	argued	that	misrepresentation	of	individual	interests	is	
inherent	to	any	representative	system	in	which	they	are	aggregated,	due	to	the	fact	that	
voters	choose	their	representatives	according	to	their	position	on	a	package	of	issues	
(i.e.	usually	 the	party	programme)	 rather	 than	on	 individual	 issues.	This	 ‘Ostrogorski	
paradox’,	named	after	political	 scientist	Moissei	Ostrogorski	 (1854-1921),	 reveals	 the	
possibility	that	a	political	party	that	represents	a	minority	view	on	basically	all	individual	
issues	can	still	win	the	majority	of	the	votes	during	elections.	
	 Modern	participationists	have	interpreted	the	Ostrogorski	paradox	as	an	argument	
in	 favour	of	referendums.	Since,	 in	referendums,	 individuals	vote	on	separate	 issues,	
it	 is	 argued	 that	 representation	 paradoxes	 do	 not	 occur.	 As	 such,	 referendums	 are	
considered	 to	provide	 an	 additional	 instrument	 to	decide	on	 issues	 that	 fall	 outside	
traditional	party	 competition	or	 that	are	usually	not	 salient	 in	normal	parliamentary	
elections,	 such	 as	 European	 integration	 (cf.	WRR	 2007).	 The	 view	 that	 referendums	
solve	voting	paradoxes	is	however	challenged	by	Elizabeth	Anscombe	(1981).	Anscombe	
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stresses	 that	 referendums	 create	 a	 reversed	 Ostrogorski	 paradox	 as,	 by	 separating	
issues	 on	which	 preferences	 are	 interdependent,	 alternatives	may	 be	 defeated	 that	
would	have	been	preferred	by	a	majority	of	the	voters	if	the	issues	had	been	voted	on	
in	a	more	compound	manner.	
	 The	 ideal	 type	of	deliberative	democracy	emerged	 in	 the	1990s	as	a	criticism	of	
both	 representative	 and	 aggregative	 decision-making.	 For	 deliberative	 democrats,	
democracy	 is	 ‘the	 ability	 or	 opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 effective	 deliberation	 on	
the	part	of	 those	subject	 to	collective	decisions’	 (Dryzek	2000,	1).	Accordingly,	 since	
society	 is	 too	 complex	 to	 reduce	policy	 issues	 to	a	 simple	 yes	or	no,	 citizens	 should	
communicate	 and	 deliberate	 on	 political	 choices	 rather	 than	 vote on these choices 
(Dryzek	 2000,	 2).	 Such	 a	 notion	 has	 famously	 been	 elaborated	 by	 Jürgen	Habermas	
(1981/1984)	and	John	Rawls	(1971;	1999),	who	stressed	that	legitimized	public	policy	
derives	from	public reason	understood	as	the	collective	judgement	of	the	community.	
Deliberative	democrats,	such	as	Joshua	Cohen	(1996),	Claus	Offe	(1997),	John	S.	Dryzek	
(2000)	and	 James	Fishkin	 (2009),	underscore	 the	notion	 that	 the	quality	of	decision-
making	is	more	important	than	the	quantity	of	those	participating	(cf.	Cohen	and	Fung	
2004,	27).	This	has	most	notably	been	argued	by	Fishkin	(2009),	who	stated	that	mass	
participation	will	ultimately	lead	to	manipulation	and	coercion.	Decision-making	should	
therefore	be	based	on	the	integration	of	individual	views	that	are	shared	and	weighed	
in	deliberative	processes.	
	 Agonistic	 democrats	 like	 Ernesto	 Laclau	 and	 Chantal	Mouffe	 (1985),	 James	 Tully	
(2008)	and	Mark	Wenman	(2013)	similarly	stress	that	decision-making	should	include	the	
vast	differences	that	exist	in	society.	Like	deliberative	democrats,	agonistic	democrats	
criticize	both	consensus	and	majoritarian	representation,	and	instead	advocate	a	‘shift	
from	 bargaining,	 interest	 aggregation,	 and	 power	 to	 the	 common	 reason	 of	 equal	
citizens	as	a	dominant	force	in	democratic	life’	(Cohen	and	Fung	2004,	24).	In	contrast	
to	 deliberative	 democrats,	 agonistic	 democrats	 argue	 that	 even	 mechanisms	 for	
deliberation	are	coercive	and	determined	by	unequal	power	distributions.	Rather	than	
aiming	to	arrive	at	those	issues	that	have	the	reasoned	consent	of	a	limited	number	of	
participants,	agonistic	democrats	are	concerned	with	how	best	to	combine	the	notion	of	
mass	participation	so	as	to	combat	political	inequality	with	the	notion	of	deliberation	in	
order	to	do	justice	to	social	complexity	(Cohen	and	Fung	2004,	25;	Tully	2008;	Wenman	
2013).	
	 In	sum,	referendums	are	usually	perceived	as	direct	participatory	and	majoritarian	
instruments	 (cf.	 Bogdanor	 1994;	 Cronin	 1999).	 Consequently,	 they	 are	 often	 placed	
under	 the	umbrella	of	direct democracy,	and	said	 to	 resonate	best	with	 the	 thinking	
of	 Jefferson,	Rousseau,	Marx	 and	–	more	 recently	 –	 the	participationist	 school.	 This	
argument	 is	based	on	 two	essential	 features	of	 referendums:	 citizens	vote	on	 issues	
directly	and	the	alternative	that	receives	a	majority	of	the	votes	wins.	As	citizens	‘either	
delegate	power	to	elected	representatives	or	retain	it	for	themselves’	(LeDuc	2002,	71),	
2
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referendums	are	often	considered	at	odds	with	the	ideal	of	representative democracy,	
as	 presented	 in	 the	 thinking	 of	 Hamilton,	 Bentham	 and	 Schumpeter.	 Moreover,	 as	
referendums	are	generally	referred	to	as	a	‘weapon	far	more	suited	to	a	society	based	on	
majority	rule’	(Bogdanor	1994,	88),	they	are	also	perceived	to	be	at	odds	with	integrative	
or deliberative	democratic	models	aimed	at	protecting	minority	interests,	as	presented	
by	Madison,	J.S.	Mill,	Kant,	and	Habermas.	However,	following	Setälä	(1999,	33),	I	argue	
that	both	tendencies	are	based	on	an	overly	narrow	conception	of	the	referendum	as	
an	instrument,	which	does	not	do	justice	to	the	different	types	of	referendum	that	exist	
in	practice.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	therefore	provide	a	classification	of	different	types	
of	referendum.	
2.3 A CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENDUMS
Referendums	come	in	various	forms,	some	of	which	are more directly participatory than 
others.	Moreover,	while	the	eventual	outcome	is	always	based	on	the	sum	of	individual	
preferences, some referendums allow for more integration of minority views than 
others.	The	extent	to	which	referendums	can	be	seen	as	instrument	of	direct	citizens’	
participation	 and	 majority	 rule	 depends on who ultimately controls the referendum 
process	 (representatives	 or	 citizens;	 the	 ruling	 majority	 or	 a	 political	 or	 citizens’	
minority).	 This	 control	 over	 the	 process	 is	 determined,	 as	 I	 argue,	 primarily	 by	 the	
question	of	who	triggers	the	referendum,	but	also	by	who	sets	and	frames	the	agenda,	
the	effect	of	the	outcome,	whether	there	is	a	quorum	applicable,	and	whether	there	
are	subject	restrictions	(cf.	Uleri	1996a;	Setälä	1999;	2006;	Marxer	and	Pállinger	2007).	
Since	 different	 types	 of	 referendum	 and	 associated	 provisions	 are	 grounded	 within	
different	normative	theories,	the	‘fit’	between	a	specific	referendum	and	a	democratic	
ideal	 type	depends	on	whether	 their	underlying	normative	 logics	 correspond.	 In	 the	
following	sections,	this	argument	 is	further	elaborated	by	outlining	a	classification	of	
referendums	on	the	basis	of	the	two	dimensions	for	classifying	democratic	ideal	types,	
as	extensively	outlined	in	the	previous	section.	In	section	2.3.1,	I	classify	five	types	of	
referendum,	based	on	who	decides	on	whether	the	vote	is	held.	In	section	2.3.2,	I	add	
four	 other	 elements	 to	 this	 classification	 to	 determine	 who	 ultimately	 controls	 the	
referendum	process,	namely	the	function	of	the	vote,	its	effect,	the	issues	on	which	it	
can	be	held,	and	whether	or	not	a	quorum	applies.
2.3.1 Five types of referendum: who triggers the vote?
In	the	literature,	many	different	labels	are	used	to	categorize	referendums	and	there	
is	 no	 consensus	 on	 the	 criteria	 to	 differentiate	 between	 various	 types	 (Setälä	 1999,	
70).	 For	 example,	 Uleri	 (1996a,	 10-11)	 outlines	 six	 criteria	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	
national	 referendums	 can	 be	 classified:	 1)	 Is	 the	 vote	 procedural	 or	 ad	 hoc?;	 2)	 Is	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
37
Theoretical approaches to referendum use
the	vote	mandated	by	 the	constitution	or	optional?;	3)	 Is	 the	referendum	binding	or	
advisory?;	4)	Is	the	vote	triggered	by	citizens	or	by	political	representatives?;	5)	Is	the	
actor	that	triggers	the	vote	the	same	as	the	agenda-setter	(in	that	case	the	function	of	
the	referendum	is	decision-promotive)	or	are	these	different	actors	 (in	 that	case	the	
referendum	is	decision-controlling)?;	And	finally,	in	case	of	the	latter,	6)	Is	the	proposal	
decided	upon	but	not	implemented	(i.e.	the	rejective	referendum)	or	does	the	proposal	
represent	 an	 existing	 law	 that	 has	 already	 been	 implemented	 (i.e.	 the	 abrogative	
referendum)?	Other	aspects	to	classify	referendums	include	the	issues	on	which	they	
can	be	held	(cf.	Smith	1976;	Möckli	1994),	and	whether	or	not	a	specific	quorum	applies	
(cf.	Marxer	and	Pállinger	2007).	As	Setälä	(1999,	70)	argues,	which	aspects	are	used	to	
classify	referendums	ultimately	depends	on	the	purpose	of	the	classification.	
	 I	propose	a	classification	of	referendums	based	on	who	triggers	the	vote,	since	this	
has,	as	Morel	(2001,	48)	puts	 it,	 ‘the	greatest	effect	on	the	practice	and	dynamics	of	
referendums’.	In	this,	I	follow	Smith	(1976)	who	stresses	that,	when	the	purpose	of	the	
analysis	 is	to	examine	the	role	of	referendums	in	the	political process, the actor that 
initiates	the	referendum	is	the	most	important	criterion.	He	makes	a	distinction	between	
mandatory	–	i.e.	triggered	by	the	constitution	–	and	non-mandatory	–	i.e.	triggered	by	
political	actors	–	referendums.	Suksi	(1993,	31-34)	furthermore	differentiates	between	
passive	 referendums	 –	 i.e.	 initiated	 by	 political	 actors	 in	 government	 –	 and	 active	
referendums	–	 i.e.	 initiated	by	citizens.	A	classification	of	 referendums	based	on	this	
criterion	is	also	grounded	in	the	particular	meaning	of	the	concept	‘referendum’	in	itself,	
which	 is	derived	 from	the	Latin	verb	referre	which	 loosely translated	means	to bring 
something back to its original place.	As	policy	instruments	referendums	were	introduced	
in	medieval	Switzerland	and	referred	to	the	practice	of	‘taking	central	decisions	back	to	
the	communes	ad referendum et instruendum’	(Kobach	1993,	18).	Thus,	the	concept	is	
used	to	describe	an	action	that	is	performed,	or	triggered, by	a	certain	actor.	In	European 
democracies,	referendums	are	triggered	either	by	a	parliamentary	majority	(usually	the	
government,	but	not	necessarily	so),	a	parliamentary	minority,	the	president,	citizens	
themselves,	or	by	the	constitution.	Thus,	five	different	types	of	referendum	are	broadly	
distinguished:	 1)	 optional	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 a	 legislative	majority	 (legislative	
majority	referendums),	2)	optional	referendums	triggered	by	the	president	(presidential	
referendums),	3)	optional	 referendums	 triggered	by	a	 legislative	minority	 (legislative	
minority	 referendums),	 4)	 citizen-initiated	 referendums;	 5)	 and,	 finally,	 mandatory	
referendums,	triggered	not	by	an	actor	but	by	the	constitution.	
	 These	labels	are	largely	based	on	the	labels	used	by	two	main	databases	that	map	
the	 availability	 and	 use	 of	 referendum	 institutions	 around	 the	world:	 the	Navigator 
to Modern Direct Democracy, and the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (see 
chapter 3). These	databases make	a	distinction	between,	amongst	others,	‘obligatory	
referendums’,	 ‘plebiscites’	 (referendums	 initiated	 by	 the	 legislative	 majority),	
‘authorities’	minority	plebiscites’	 (referendums	 triggered	by	 the	 legislative	minority),	
2
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and	 ‘popular	 initiatives’	 and	 ‘popular	 vetoes’	 (referendums	 initiated	 by	 citizens).	 As	
the Navigator to Modern Direct Democracy	has	no	separate	category	for	referendums	
initiated	by	 the	president,	 I	 follow	the	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy and 
categorize	this	as	a	separate	type.
	 I	argue	that	such	a	classification	of	referendums	on	the	basis	of	who	triggers	the	
vote	allows	me	to	theoretically	link	different	types	of	referendum	to	various	democratic	
ideal	types,	despite	this	also	being	dependent	on	other	associated	features,	such	as	the	
effect	of	the	vote	and	whether	or	not	a	quorum	applies	(see	section 2.3.2).	Ultimately,	
the	 question	 of	 who	 triggers	 the	 vote	 determines	 who	 exercises	 control	 over	 the	
referendum	process	and	hence	over	the	decision-making	process	(Setälä	2006,	705).	To	
be	more	specific,	it	determines	whether	decision-making	is	controlled	by	representatives 
or citizens,	and	also	whether	it	takes	place	on	the	basis	of	aggregation and majority rule, 
or of integration and minority protection.	Hence,	the	four	referendums	that	are	triggered	
by	actors	directly	can	be	placed	within	a	two-dimensional	framework,	as	shown	in	table 
2.2.	Such	a	classification	does	not	work	simply	 for	mandatory	referendums,	as	 these	
are	triggered	by	the	constitution.	Yet,	as	 I	will	argue	below,	mandatory	referendums	
allow	representatives	to	control	the	triggering	process	indirectly	through	the	setting	of	
the	agenda,	and	through	interpretation	of	the	constitution	(cf.	Morel	1993,	233;	Setälä	
1999).
Table 2.2: A two-dimensional classification of referendums
WHO CONTROLS THE TRIGGERING 
OF THE VOTE?
Political elites
Decision-making by representation
Citizens
Decision-making by participation
A majority
Decision-making by aggregation
Legislative	majority	referendum
Presidential	referendum
A minority
Decision-making by integration Legislative	minority	referendum Citizen-initiated	referendum
As	shown	 in	 table 2.2	 and	outlined	more	extensively	below,	 I	argue	 that	 in	 terms	of	
the	 triggering	 process,	 legislative	 majority	 referendums,	 presidential	 referendums	
and	 –	 depending	 on	 particular	 provisions	 and	 the	 constitution	 –	 some	 mandatory	
referendums	allow	the	representative	majority	(the	legislature	or	executive)	to	control	
the	referendum	process.	In	legislative	minority	referendums,	this	control	 is	exercised	
by	political	minorities,	while	in	citizen-initiated	referendums,	it	is	exercised	by	popular 
minorities	(cf.	Setälä	1999,	79;	Vatter	2002,	319;	2009,	130;	Marxer	and	Pállinger	2007,	
19).	Arguably,	citizen-initiated	referendums	are	the	most	challenging	to	the	elite	and	
therefore	most	closely	reflect	popular	sovereignty.	Only	when	citizens	are	able	to	trigger	
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a	referendum	on	the	basis	of	a	self-written	policy	proposal	 (i.e.	citizens’	 initiatives)	–	
such	as	in	Switzerland	(Kobach	1993;	Trechsel	and	Kriesi	1996)	–	do	referendums	bypass	
the	parliamentary	process	altogether.8
	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 whether	 referendums	 give	 primacy	 to	 representative	 or	
popular	 sovereignty	 depends	 on	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 referendum:	 before or after the 
parliamentary	handling	of	the	issue.	If	the	referendum	is	held	prior	to	the	parliamentary	
vote,	 citizens’	 influence	 on	 parliamentary	 decision-making	 is	 arguably	 greater	 than	
when	citizens	vote	on	proposals	after	parliament	has	done	so.	 In	such	pre-legislative 
referendums,	citizens	are	involved	at	a	time	when	the	issue	is	still	being	debated	and	
can	thereby,	arguably,	 influence	the	way	in	which	the	issue	is	debated	in	parliament.	
However,	 in	 general	 (except	 for	 citizens’	 initiatives),	 these	 are	 advisory	 referendums	
that	do	not	bind	parliament	to	a	certain	decision	(although	often	in	practice	they	do).	
Moreover,	pre-legislative	majority	referendums	are	controlled	by	parliament	precisely	
because	 it	 is	 parliament	 that	 decides	 whether	 the	 vote	 is	 held.	When	 referendums	
are post-legislative	 (held	 after	 the	 parliamentary	 vote),	 the	 legislative	 proposal	 has	
already	 been	 formulated,	 debated	 and	 decided	 upon	 before	 citizens	 get	 to	 vote	 on	
the	issue.	Unlike	pre-legislative	referendums,	post-legislative	referendums	are	usually	
binding.	Hence,	 it	 is	not	straightforward	to	assess	the	 impact	of	 referendums	on	the	
parliamentary	process	on	the	basis	of	the	timing	of	the	vote	in	itself.	
	 The	 link	 between	 different	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 two	 dimensions	 for	
demarcating	 democratic	 ideal	 types	 (representation versus participation and 
aggregation versus integration)	 is	 partially	 borrowed	 from	 Setälä	 (1999;	 2006)	 and	
Vatter	(2009).	Rather	than	the	dimension	of	representation versus participation,	both	
authors	classify	referendums	on	the	basis	of	the	degree of government control. They 
argue	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 government	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 process	 is	 the	
lowest	 in	 referendums	triggered	by	citizens	or	by	a	minority	 in	parliament,	or	–	 to	a	
lesser	extent	–	by	the	constitution.	I	find	such	a	classification	based	on	the	degree	of	
government	control	misleading,	 since	 in	 those	 referendums	 that	 the	authors	classify	
as	 government-initiated	 referendums	 (Setälä	 1999)	 or	 plebiscites	 (Vatter	 2009),	
it	 is	not	 the	government	as	 such	 that	decides	on	whether	a	 referendum	 is	held,	but	
either	parliament	or	 the	president.	Hence,	 only	when	 the	 government	 is	 dependent	
on	a	majority	 in	parliament	do	 legislative	majority	 referendums	equate	with	Setälä’s	
government-initiated	 referendums	 or	 Vatter’s	 plebiscites.	 If	 a	 government	 party	 or	
coalition	 of	 parties	 does	 not	 have	 a	majority	 of	 seats	 in	 parliament	 (i.e.	 a	minority	
government),	the	government	thus	needs	an	opposition	party	to	trigger	a	referendum.	
I	therefore	choose	a	classification	based	more	specifically	on	which	actor	triggers	the	
referendum,	and	not	simply	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	the	government controls 
8.	 	For	that	reason,	Switzerland	is	often	referred	to	as	closest	to	the	ideal-type	model	of	direct	
democracy,	where	citizens	have	various	tools	to	organize	and	vote	in	referendums	(Bogdanor	1994,	
24).
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the	referendum	process,	but	of	whether	this	control	is	exercised	by	the people or by the 
political elites (and	in	case	of	the	latter,	by	which	political	elites:	parliamentary	majority,	
parliamentary	minority	or	the	president).	A	more	detailed	overview	of	how	each	type	
of	referendum	is	placed	within	this	two-dimensional	framework	is	provided	below.
LEGISLATIVE	MAJORITY	REFERENDUM.	Legislative	majority	referendums	are	triggered	
by	a	parliamentary	majority	either	 to	advise	or	 to	 impose	a	binding	decision	on	 the	
government	 on	 a	 certain	 policy	 proposal.	 According	 to	 Smith	 (1976),	 these	 are	
‘controlled’	 referendums,	 since	 the	 political	 elites	 decide	 whether	 the	 vote	 is	 held	
and	hence	they	reflect	what	Budge	(1993)	call	‘mediated	popular	voting’.	Despite	the	
fact	that,	 like	all	referendums,	 legislative	majority	referendums	allow	citizens	to	vote	
directly	 on	 issues,	 political	 elites	 exercise	 considerable	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	
process	(and	hence	decision-making)	by	determining	whether	a	referendum	is	held,	the	
topic	on	which	it	is	held,	the	timing,	and	the	framing	of	the	policy	options.	Moreover,	
such	referendums	score	high	in	terms	of	preference	aggregation,	as	they	are	triggered	
by	a	majority of parliamentarians	(belonging	either	to	government	or	non-government	
parties).	Legislative	majority	referendums	are	therefore	located	in	the	upper-left	of	the	
framework	in	table 2.2.	As	I	will	show	in	chapter 4,	these	are	the	most	common	forms	
of	referendum	in	Europe	and	include	both	what	Uleri	(1996a)	calls	procedural	votes	(i.e.	
based	on	referendum	legislation)	and	ad	hoc	votes	(ultimately	decided	by	parliamentary	
act).	
PRESIDENTIAL	 REFERENDUM.	 Presidential	 referendums	 are	 also	 ‘controlled’	
referendums	 (Smith	 1976)	 and	 represent	 Budge’s	 (1993)	 ‘mediated	 popular	 voting’.	
Hence,	like	legislative	majority	referendums,	they	are	placed	in	the	left	of	the	framework	
in table 2.2.	These	referendums	have	the	tendency	to	strengthen	the	position	of	the	
president	and	are,	for	that	reason,	strongly	associated	with	authoritarian	rule	(Setälä	
1999,	 81;	 Rodrigues	 2013).	 Since	 the	 president	 is	 either	mandated	 by	 a	majority	 in	
parliament	(in	cases	where	the	president	is	elected	by	parliament)	or	by	a	majority	of	
the	people	(where	the	president	is	directly	elected),	I	consider	this	type	of	referendum	
mainly	aggregative	and	hence	place	it	at	the	top	of	the	framework.	However,	when	the	
president	does	not	hold	a	majority	 in	parliament	–	 i.e.	 in	times	of	cohabitation	–	the	
president	can	be	said	to	represent	a	representative	minority,	 rather	than	a	majority.	
In	 such	 cases,	 a	 referendum	can	 serve	 to	veto	decisions	made	by	 the	parliamentary	
majority,	making	such	referendums	rather	integrative.	Nevertheless,	in	these	cases	too,	
the	president	has	been	mandated	by	a	popular	majority,	and	 I	 therefore	this	kind	of	
referendum	primarily	aggregative.
LEGISLATIVE	 MINORITY	 REFERENDUM.	 Legislative	 minority	 referendums	 allow	
representative	minorities	to	control	the	triggering	process	and	challenge	the	position	
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of	 the	 parliamentary	 majority	 by	 initiating	 a	 referendum	 (cf.	 Vatter	 2002;	 Marxer	
and	Pállinger	2007).	This	type	of	referendum	therefore	appears	on	the	bottom	left	of	
the	 two-dimensional	 framework	 in	 table 2.2.	As	 (Setälä	1999,	166)	 argues,	 this	 type	
of	 referendum	 therefore	 fits	 the	 ‘Madisonian’	 theory	 of	 liberal	 democracy,	which	 is	
concerned	with	protecting	minority	interests	against	unlimited	powers	of	the	majority.	
According	to	Smith,	these	are	‘uncontrolled’	referendums,	in	the	sense	that	the	ruling	
majority	has	no	power	to	control	the	referendum	process.	Yet,	they	do	reflect	Budge’s	
‘mediated	popular	voting’,	since	political	elites	rather	than	citizens	trigger	the	vote.	
CITIZEN-INITIATED	REFERENDUM.	Ultimately,	the	more	citizens	are	able	to	control	the	
referendum	process,	they	more	they	are	able	to	directly	participate	in	political	decision-
making.	 Referendums	 triggered	 by	 citizens	 themselves	 provide	 citizens	 with	 the	
greatest	control	over	the	referendum	process	and	hence	the	decision-making	process	
(see	Setälä	1999,	80).	Thus,	in	table 2.2,	citizen-initiated	referendums	are	placed	on	the	
right	–	participatory	–	side	of	the	axis,	and	reflect	what	Budge	(1993)	has	referred	to	as	
‘unmediated	popular	voting’.	
	 Citizen-initiated	 referendums	are,	as	 the	name	suggests,	 triggered	by	a	group	of	
citizens	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 petition.	 To	 trigger	 a	 referendum,	 such	 a	 petition	needs	 to	
be	signed	by	a	considerable	number	(though	still	a	minority)	of	citizens.	Two	types	of	
citizens’	referendums	can	be	distinguished:	one	on	a	legislative	proposal	approved	by	
parliament	(or	a	piece	of	 legislation	already	 in	effect)	 (a	citizens’	veto)	and	the	other	
on	a	proposal	drafted	by	citizens’	themselves	(a	citizens’	initiative).9	Arguably,	citizens’	
initiatives	give	citizens	most	control	over	the	decision-making	process;	it	is	the	only	type	
of	referendum	in	which	the	parliamentary	process	is	largely	bypassed	since	parliament	
neither	decides	on	the	topic	nor	the	vote.	However,	in	practice,	citizens’	initiatives	are	
not	entirely	controlled	by	the	people	either,	due	to	the	applicability	of	quorums	and	
subject	restrictions.	Because	citizen-initiated	referendums	are	triggered	by	a	minority	
of	 citizens,	 they	 give	minority	 groups	 an	 opportunity	 to	 launch	 a	 campaign	 against	
proposed	laws	or	to	introduce	new	laws,	thereby	bypassing	the	majority	in	parliament	
(cf.	 Jung	 1996).	 Hence,	 these	 referendums	 allow	 for	 integrative	 decision-making,	
especially	when	citizens	set	the	agenda	themselves.	
MANDATORY	REFERENDUM.	A	mandatory	referendum	is	a	constitutionally	prescribed	
vote.	Most	commonly,	this	type	of	referendum	is	held	to	revise	a	country’s	constitution	
or	to	decide	on	other	issues	of	major	political	significance,	such	as	transfer	of	national	
sovereignty.	 The	mandatory	 referendum	 is	 not	 easily	 placed	within	 this	 framework,	
9.	 	Uleri	(1996a)	makes	a	case	for	not	labelling	citizen-initiated	referendums	as	referendums,	but	as	
initiatives. However,	since	I	use	the	triggering	actor	as	the	criterion	for	labelling	referendums,	I	
choose	to	use	the	concept	‘citizen-initiated	referendums’	to	refer	to	both	citizens’	vetoes	(which	
are,	based	on	Uleri’s	classification,	decision-controlling)	and	citizens’	initiatives	(which	are,	based	on	
Uleri’s	classification,	decision-promotive);	see	section	2.3.2.
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because	it	is	not	directly	triggered	by	citizens	or	representatives,	but	by	the	constitution.	
However,	depending	on	specific	regulations,	the	triggering	process	can	be	influenced	
by	political	representatives.	This	depends	on	which	actor	has	initiated	the	proposal	to	
be	 voted	 on,	 and	 how	parliament	 decides	 on	 the	 proposal	 (by	 a	 simple	 or	 qualified	
majority).	 Most	 importantly,	 it	 also	 depends	 on	 whether	 the	 ruling	 majority	 could	
potentially	have	avoided	a	referendum,	for	example,	by	ruling	that	a	certain	act	does	
not	imply	a	constitutional	revision	or	transfer	of	sovereignty	–	e.g.	by	leaving	pieces	of	
legislation	out	(cf.	Morel	1993,	233).
	 Mandatory	referendums	–	usually	–	serve	as	a	‘check’	that,	in	the	event	of	major	
political	decisions	like	revising	the	constitution,	transferring	sovereignty	and	territorial	
issues,	 the	 ruling	majority	 cannot	 easily	 impose	 its	will	 on	 the	 political	minority	 (cf.	
Bogdanor	1981,	14-19;	Setälä	1999,	94).	Ultimately,	as	mandatory	referendums	serve	as	
a	‘check’	to	simple	majority	rule,	they	are	integrative	rather	than	aggregative.	Moreover,	
they	provide	citizens	with	a	guarantee	that	a	referendum	is	automatically	held	in	certain	
cases,	 and	 therefore	 primarily	 reflect	 popular	 sovereignty.	 This	 decision-controlling	
(see	below)	feature	of	the	constitutional	referendum	was	famously	put	forward	by	the	
British	 constitutional	 theorist,	 A.V.	Dicey	 (1835-1922)	who,	 in	 his	 Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution	(1885),	made	a	case	for	mandatory	referendums	
on	constitutional	change,	and	argued	that,	on	politically	weighty	issues	such	as	political	
system	change,	they	provide	an	extra	check	in	the	hands	of	the	popular	majority	(see	
also	Qvortrup	1999).	
	 However,	in	practice	the	triggering	of	mandatory	referendums	is	influenced	by	the	
ruling majority:	they	take	the	initiative	for	and	approve	a	revision	of	the	constitution	or	
ratification	an	international	treaty	and	hence	thereby	indirectly	trigger	a	referendum.	
In	 addition,	 the	 ruling	 majority	 often	 has	 considerable	 leeway	 in	 interpreting	 the	
constitution	(for	example,	whether	ratification	of	an	international	treaty	is	considered	
a	transfer	of	national	sovereignty)	and	hence	to	determine	whether	it	is	necessary	to	
hold	a	referendum.	For	that	reason,	Setälä	argues	(2006,	715)	that	the	authorities	have	
medium-level	control	over	the	initiation	of	a	mandatory	referendum.	Moreover,	Vatter	
(2009)	argues	that,	when	the	constitution	can	be	freely	interpreted,	the	political	elites	
have	the	power	to	both	set	the	agenda	and	trigger	the	vote.	The	extent	to	which	the	
ruling	majority	 can	 influence	 the	 triggering	 process	 also	 depends,	 however,	 on	 how	
parliament	votes	on	the	proposal.	When	this	 is	done	by	a	qualified	majority,	political	
minorities	exercise	some	power	over	the	initiation	process	because	their	support	might	
be	necessary	to	trigger	a	vote.	In	the	end,	whether	mandatory	referendums	are	indeed	
controlled	by	the	parliamentary	majority	depends	on	the	polity	and	exact	regulations	
and	hence	the	positioning	of	mandatory	referendums	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-
by-case	basis.	
	 These	five	types	of	referendum	can	be	considered	as	primary	referendum	types,	
which	serve	as	heuristic	categories.	In	practice,	the	positioning	of	a	referendum	within	
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this	framework	depends	not	only	on	who	triggers	the	vote,	but	also	on	who	determines	
the	agenda	of	the	vote	and	the	range	of	issues	on	which	this	can	be	done,	and	hence	
on	what	function	the	referendum	has,	the	effect	of	the	vote	(binding	or	advisory),	and	
whether	a	quorum	applies.	After	outlining	the	main	criterion	for	classifying	referendums,	
the	next	section	provides	an	overview	of	four	additional	criteria	to	further	categorize	
the	five	types	of	referendum.
2.3.2 Functions, Issues, Effects, and Quorums 
As	Uleri	(1996a,	12)	argues,	the	referendum’s	function	in	the	decision-making	process	
depends	on	whether	the	promoter	of	the	referendum	and	the	agenda-setter	(i.e.	the	
author	of	 the	proposal	 to	be	voted	upon)	are	the	same	actors.	 If	 they	are	the	same,	
the	referendum	is	considered	decision-promotive:	it	serves	to	promote	a	certain	policy	
proposal	or	direction.	When	the	vote	is	triggered	by	a	different	actor	than	the	drafter	of	
the	proposal,	the	referendum	is	decision-controlling:	it	serves	to	control	the	decision-
making	process	and	hence	takes	place	after	parliament	has	voted	on	the	proposal.	Strict	
mandatory	 referendums	are	decision-controlling,	given	 that	 the	constitution	triggers	
the	 vote	 on	 a	 proposal	 approved	 by	 parliament.	 Hence,	 a	 mandatory	 referendum	
takes place after the	parliamentary	process	and	serves	as	a	guarantee	that	important	
decisions	cannot	be	made	against	the	consent	of	the	popular	majority.		
	 By	 contrast,	 legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 decision-promotive,	 as	 the	
parliamentary	majority	that	triggers	the	vote	is	usually	the	same	as	the	majority	(generally	
the	 government)	 that	 drafted	 the	 proposal.	 However,	 in	 consensus	 democracies	 or	
when	there	is	a	minority	government,	the	parliamentary	majority	that	triggers	the	vote	
does	not	necessarily	consist	of	the	same	actors	that	drafted	the	proposal.	Presidential	
referendums	are	also	usually	decision-promotive,	as	 the	president	generally	belongs	
to	 the	 ruling	 party,	 which	 drafted	 the	 proposal.	 However,	 in	 theory,	 a	 presidential	
referendum	can	also	be	decision-controlling,	in	that	it	can	be	used	to	veto	a	proposal	
drafted	by	the	majority	party.	Logically,	such	a	veto	would	only	be	used	in	periods	of	
cohabitation	–	when	the	president	belongs	to	a	different	political	party	than	the	party	
that	holds	the	majority	support	in	parliament	(and	hence	government).	
	 Both	 legislative	minority	 referendums	and	citizens’	 initiated	 referendums	can	be	
either	decision-promotive	or	decision-controlling.	When	the	vote	 is	promotive	 (i.e.	a	
legislative minority initiative or a citizens’ initiative),	it	is	triggered	on	a	proposal	drafted	
by	either	the	parliamentary	minority	or	citizens.	Initiatives	may	deal	with	new	proposals,	
existing	laws	or	constitutional	issues,	depending	on	the	country’s	jurisdiction.	When	the	
opposition	or	citizens	can	only	trigger	a	referendum	on	a	policy	proposal	that	has	been	
approved	by	the	parliamentary	majority,	 this	 is	considered	a	veto,	which	 is	decision-
controlling	(i.e.	a	legislative	minority	veto	or	citizens’	veto).	Following	Uleri	(1996a),	a	
distinction	can	be	made	between	vetoes	on	existing	laws	(abrogative	vetoes)	or	vetoes	
on	formal	legislative	proposals	that	have	not	yet	been	implemented	(rejective	vetoes).		
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	 As	I	argued	above,	both	legislative	minority	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	give	
minorities	 (either	 in	 parliament	 or	 popular	minorities)	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	
process	 and	 hence	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 The	 level	 of	minority-protection	 is	
higher	in	case	of	initiatives,	as	they	allow	minorities	to	both	set	the	agenda	and	trigger	
the	 vote,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 majority.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 vetoes,	 the	
abrogative	one	is	the	most	minority-protective	as	it	allows	for	earlier	participation	in	the	
decision-making	process.	In	these	cases,	citizens	can	repeal	existing	laws,	engendering	
a	new	decision-making	procedure	on	the	laws	concerned.	By	contrast,	rejective	vetoes	
can	only	be	invoked	at	the	end	of	a	decision-making	process.	
	 A	second	additional	aspect	on	the	basis	of	which	referendums	can	be	classified	is	
the issue	that	the	referendum	addresses.	Gordon	Smith	(1976,	3)	makes	a	distinction	
between	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 issues	 and	 questions	 concerning	 the	 basic	
nature	of	 the	 state	 (such	as	 sovereignty	 transfer),	 referendums	on	public	policy	 and	
referendums	on	moral	 issues.	Silvano	Möckli	 (1994,	153)	makes	a	 further	distinction	
between	 referendums	 on	 policy	 issues,	 and	 referendums	 as	 vote	 of	 confidence	 in	
political	 leaders	(for	example,	the	Belgium	referendum	of	1950	on	the	return	of	King	
Leopold	III)	(cf.	Setälä	1999,	69).	Obviously,	the	more	issues	on	which	referendums	can	
be	held,	 the	more	control	 citizens	have	over	political	decision-making.	But	 the	same	
applies	to	the	actor	that	can	trigger	the	vote:	when	referendums	can	be	held	on	a	wide	
range	 of	 issues,	 the	 triggering	 actor	 exercises	 greater	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	
process,	 greater	 than	when	 referendums	 can	 be	 held	 only	 on	 particular	 issues.	 For	
example,	when	minorities	can	trigger	the	referendum,	they	have	greater	control	over	
the	decision-making	process	when	 there	are	no	subject	 restrictions.	And	conversely,	
a	 parliamentary	 majority	 has	 more	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 process	 when	 a	
referendum	can	be	triggered	on	a	wide	range	of	 issues.	 In	practice,	there	 is	a	strong	
link	 between	 the	 type	 of	 issues	 and	 type	of	 referendum:	when	minorities	 (either	 in	
parliament	or	citizens)	can	trigger	a	referendum,	they	can	usually	do	so	only	on	regular	
policy	issues,	while	legislative	majority	referendums	tend	to	deal	with	politically	weighty	
issues	such	as	regime	change,	constitutional	reform	or	the	position	of	a	political	leader.	
	 A	 third	additional	aspect	 in	 classifying	 referendums	 is	 the	effect	of	 the	vote,	 i.e.	
whether	it	is	binding	or	advisory.	The	first	gives	citizens	most	control	over	the	decision-
making	process,	as	political	representatives	are	forced	to	comply	with	the	referendum	
outcome.	When	the	effect	is	advisory,	they	can	disregard	the	outcome.	However,	the	
differentiation	between	binding	and	advisory	referendums	is	usually	less	important,	as	
it	is	politically	risky	for	political	representatives	to	neglect	the	outcome	of	a	popular	vote	
(cf.	LeDuc	2002,	73),	especially	when	such	votes	deal	with	major	political	decisions	like	
constitutional	 reform	or	 sovereignty	 transfer.	Often,	however,	 advisory	 referendums	
lead	to	political	uncertainty	as	they	give	political	representatives	 leeway	to	 interpret	
the	outcome.
	 Finally,	quorums	also	affect	the	positioning	of	a	referendum	within	the	framework.	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
45
Theoretical approaches to referendum use
A	turnout	quorum	specifies	 that,	 for	a	 referendum	outcome	to	be	valid,	a	particular	
proportion	of	the	electorate	must	have	participated	in	the	vote.	The	higher	the	turnout	
quorum	–	 i.e.	 the	higher	 the	 required	number	of	 voters	–	 the	more	difficult	 it	 is	 for	
the	voting	majority	to	control	the	referendum	outcome,	and	hence	to	impose	its	will	
on	political	representatives.	Conversely,	if	there	is	no	turnout	requirement,	the	voting	
majority	can	rather	easily	overrule	the	majority	 in	parliament.	Hence,	 in	these	cases,	
citizens	exercise	more	control	over	the	decision-making	process.	
	 The	 question	 whether	 a	 quorum	 applies	 is	 also	 important	 in	 assessing	 to	 what	
extent	the	referendum	is	primarily	a	majoritarian	 instrument,	or	whether	 it	provides	
more	 scope	 for	 integrating	minority	 preferences	 in	 decision-making.	When	 there	 is	
no	 turnout	 quorum,	 this	 implies	 that	 the	 simple	majority	 of	 voters	 faces	 no	 hurdle	
to	enforce	a	particular	outcome.	After	all,	the	preference	of	the	majority	is	enforced,	
regardless	of	how	many	eligible	voters	actually	participated	in	the	vote.	When	there	is	
a	turnout	quorum	(especially	when	the	quorum	is	high),	the	majority	still	decides,	but	
in	this	case	a	certain	proportion	of	the	electorate	must	have	participated	in	the	vote	
for	the	outcome	to	be	valid.	This	imposes	an	extra	hurdle	to	majority	rule.	The	majority	
still	decides,	but	the	quorum	ensures	that	this	majority	represents	a	higher	proportion	
of	the	total	electorate.	Take	the	following	hypothetical	example:	in	a	referendum	the	
total	electorate	is	100,000.	In	total,	45,000	people	voted,	of	which	30,000	voted	‘yes’	
and	15,000	voted	‘no’.	If	there	were	no	turnout	quorum,	the	majority	of	67	per	cent	can	
in	theory	enforce	a	valid	referendum	outcome.	If,	however,	there	was	a	(relatively	high)	
turnout	quorum	of	50	per	cent,	the	67	per	cent	majority	would	be	unable	to	enforce	its	
desired	outcome,	since	the	quorum	was	not	reached	(only	45	per	cent	of	the	electorate	
voted).	Sometimes	an	approval	(or	rejection)	quorum	applies,	which	specifies	that	an	
outcome	is	valid	only	if	the	majority	in	favour	of	(or	against)	an	outcome	constitutes	a	
certain	percentage	of	the	total	electorate.	This	poses	an	even	larger	hurdle	for	majority	
rule.	 If	an	approval	quorum	of	50	per	cent	was	applicable	 in	the	above	example,	the	
outcome	would	have	been	 invalid	since	the	‘yes’	voters	constituted	only	30	per	cent	
of	the	total	electorate.	Hence,	20,000	more	‘yes’	votes	would	have	been	necessary	to	
enforce	the	outcome.	Referendums	with	quorums	thus	score	particularly	high	in	terms	
of	 minority-protection,	 since	 they	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 the	 voting	 majority	 to	
impose	its	will.	
	 	A	classification	of	referendum	legislation	(in	which	legislation	differs	with	respect	
to	 triggering	 actor,	 agenda-setter,	 effect,	 and	 the	applicability	of	 subject	 restrictions	
and	quorums)	 along	 the	 two	dimensions	 –	decision-making by representation versus 
participation, and decision-making by majority rule versus minority protection	–	allows	
for	a	more	accurate	analysis	of	whether	the	aggregated	increase	in	referendums	held	in	
Europe	marks	a	shift	towards	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.	Whether	
this	is	the	case	depends	on	the	types	of	referendum	provided	for	and,	moreover,	the	
way	in	which	they	are	used.	The	classification	also	provides	insights	into	the	question	of	
2
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why	certain	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used.	Notably,	the	two-dimensional	
framework	allows	referendums	to	be	linked	to	the	democratic	system.	In	the	following	
section,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	four	schools	of	institutional	thought	and	link	them	
to	the	study	of	referendums.
2.4 A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE REFERENDUM PRACTICE 
To	 examine	 the	 factors	 that	 impact	 upon	 referendum	 practice	 and	 how	 that	 varies	
among	 countries,	 I	 use	 the	 insights	 of	 four	 schools	 of	 institutional	 theory:	 classical 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism.	 These	 schools	 differ	 fundamentally	 in	 their	 approach	 to	
institutional	development,	and	consequently	in	how	they	would	explain	why	referendums	
are	institutionalized	and	used,	and	why	there	are	differences	between	countries	in	this	
respect.	 While	 classical	 institutionalism	 and	 historical	 institutionalism	 focus	 on	 the	
country-specific	 context	 in	which	 referendums	 are	more	 likely	 to	 occur,	 sociological	
institutionalism	and	rational	choice	institutionalism	focus	on	what	motivates	decision-
makers	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	 referendums.	 Rather	 than	 choosing	 between	 one	
of	 these	 schools,	 I	 argue	 that	 all	 perspectives	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	when	
analysing	 referendum	 practice	 in	 European	 democracies.	 In	 fact,	 combining	 these	
factors	 in	one	analytical	framework	allows	for	an	assessment	of	how	political	actors’	
intentions	to	institutionalize	and	use	referendums	(either	normative	or	strategic	ones)	
are bounded	by	the	structural	context	in	which	these	actors	operate,	such	as	the	type	of	
democracy,	institutional	constraints	(i.e.	veto	players),	historical	development	(i.e.	past	
referendum	experience)	and	the	extent	to	which	referendums	are	demanded	in	society	
(i.e.	public	demands).	 In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 shortly	outline	 the	underpinnings	of	each	
institutionalism	and	link	these	institutionalisms	to	the	study	of	referendums.	
2.4.1 Classical Institutionalism: Democracy Type and Veto Players
Classical	 institutionalism	comprises	a	group	of	 institutionalisms	that	have	in	common	
that	they	place	institutions	at	the	centre	of	the	study	of	politics.	Institutions	are	perceived	
as	relatively	stable	and	functional	entities	that	change	only	when	this	positively	impacts	
on	the	functionality	of	decision-making.	Of	crucial	importance	is	David	Easton’s	‘system	
theory’	 (1953;	 1965),	 designed	 to	 understand	 political	 decision-making	 in	 terms	 of	
the	flow	of	 inputs	and	outputs	of	 the	 system.	Central	 to	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	
approach	is	the	analysis	of	the	interrelationships	between	institutions	and	the	effects	
that	 certain	 institutions	 have	 on	 political	 action.	 A	 notable	 example	 is	 provided	 by	
Maurice	Duverger	who,	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	thoroughly	examined	the	relationship	
between	the	electoral	system	and	the	party	system	(i.e.	the	famous	Duverger’s	 law).	
Influential	 thinkers	who	also	 studied	 the	 interrelationship	between	 institutions	were	
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William	Riker	(1982),	Arend	Lijphart	(1984;	1999),	and	Paul	Pierson	(1996).	What	such	
approaches	have	in	common	is	that	they	focus	solely	on	formal	institutions,	which	are	
seen	as	stable	and	endogenous	elements	of	the	system.	Political	agency	is,	accordingly,	
limited	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 political	 system	 in	which	 they	 operate	 (cf.	 Amenta	 and	
Ramsey	2010).	
	 Classical	 institutionalism	is	primarily	 interested	in	how	institutions	affect	political	
action,	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	It	provides	limited	insights	into	why	certain	
institutions,	like	referendums	for	example,	are	designed	and	used.	When	this	question	
is	asked,	classical	institutionalism	would	trace	institutional	choices	back	to	the	nature	of	
the	political	system,	and	the	degree	of	functional	‘fit’	between	certain	institutions.	Thus,	
institutional	development	must	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	already	existing	context	
(cf.	Mahoney	and	Thelen	2010;	Da	Cunha	Rezende	2011).	As	this	context	defines	the	
political	‘rules	of	the	game’,	it	either	enables	or	constrains	specific	institutional	choices.	
An	elaboration	of	this	argument	is	provided	by	Börzel	and	Risse	(2000,	5),	who	argue	
that	 countries’	 capacity	 to	adapt	 to	European	 integration	depends	on	 the	 ‘goodness	
of	fit’	between	existing	institutions	and	the	reforms	imposed	by	the	EU	(for	example	
devolution).	
	 A	classical	institutionalist	approach	to	studying	referendums	would	be	to	examine	
the	 relationship	 between	 the	 democratic	 system	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 referendum	
legislation.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	the better the institutional fit between a 
country’s type of democracy and a particular referendum, the more likely that this type 
of referendum will be institutionalized and used.	This	relationship	has	been	analysed	by	
several	 referendum	scholars	 (cf.	 Jung	1996;	 Lijphart	1999;	 Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	2007;	
Vatter	 2009;	 Anckar	 2014),	 but	 their	 findings	 are	 fairly	 inconclusive.	 Such	 analyses	
largely	draw	on	the	work	of	Lijphart	(1984;	1999),	who	has	provided	a	famous	distinction	
between	majoritarian	and	consensus	democracies.	Lijphart	classifies	countries	as	either	
majoritarian	or	consensual	on	the	basis	of	a	two-dimensional	framework,	including	the	
executive-parties dimension,	which	assesses	whether	power	is	concentrated	or	shared	
between	 various	 actors,	 and	 the federal-unitary dimension	 which	 assesses	 whether	
power	is	concentrated	or	shared	between	different	administrative	units.	In	majoritarian	
democracies,	power	resides	in	the	political	majority,	and	such	polities	are	more	likely	to	
have,	among	other	things	(see	Lijphart	1999,	3-4),	a	two-party	system,	minimal-winning	
or	single-party	governments,	a	political	executive	that	holds	a	dominant	position	vis-
à-vis	the	legislature,	a	disproportional	electoral	system,	a	unitary	governing	structure,	
a	 unicameral	 parliament,	 and	 a	 flexible	 constitution.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 consensus	
democracies	power	is	shared,	and	such	polities	are,	according	to	Lijphart,	more	likely	
to	 have	 a	multi-party	 system,	 broad	 coalition	 governments,	 a	 balanced	 relationship	
between	 the	executive	and	 legislature,	 a	proportional	 electoral	 system,	 a	 federal	 or	
decentralized	governing	structure,	a	bicameral	parliament	and	a	rigid	constitution.	
	 In	earlier	work,	Lijphart	(1984)	argues	that,	on	the	theoretical	level,	the	referendum	
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instrument	does	not	fit	easily	into	either	one	of	his	two	conceptions	of	representative	
democracy,	 since	 in	 both	 models	 representative	 sovereignty	 prevails	 over	 popular	
sovereignty.	As	he	argues,	‘Direct	democracy	can	therefore	not	be	regarded	as	either	
typically	majoritarian	 or	 typically	 consensual.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 a	 foreign	 element	 in	 both	
majoritarian	and	consensus	democracy	because	 it	 is	 the	antithesis	of	 representative	
democracy’	 (Lijphart	 1984,	 31-32).	 However,	 based	 on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	
practice,	he	comes	to	see	the	referendum	as	a	‘strong	consensus-inducing	mechanism	
and	 the	 very	 opposite	 of	 a	 blunt	 majoritarian	 instrument’	 (Lijphart	 1999,	 231).	 His	
argument	 could	 be	 extended	 by	 hypothesizing	 that,	 for	 that	 reason,	 referendums	
will	 be	used	more	 in	 consensus	 countries	 than	 in	majoritarian	democracies.	 In	 their	
empirical	assessment	of	the	relationship	between	democracy	type	and	referendums	in	
countries	around	the	world,	Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	(2007)	found	that	this	is	indeed	the	case	
and	 that	majoritarian	 and	 presidential	 systems	 tend	 to	 provide	 fewer	 opportunities	
for	 referendums.	As	 an	explanation,	 they	argue	 that	 such	 systems	are	already	more	
accountable	to	citizens,	and	voters	therefore	have	little	interest	in	additional	channels	
to	 influence	 decision-making.	 However,	 they	 make	 no	 distinction	 in	 their	 analysis	
between	types	of	referendum.	
	 And	 indeed,	 the	findings	of	 Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	 stand	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 study	
of	Dag	Anckar	 (2014)	who	 found	 a	 positive	 correlation	between	one	particular	 type	
of	 referendum	 (namely	 mandatory	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 reform)	 and	
majoritarian	democracy.	He	concludes	that,	‘if	the	electoral	system	carries	in	its	wake	
situations	 in	which	 one	 single	 party	may	decide	 alone	on	 constitutional	 reform,	 the	
need	for	corrections	and	balancing	counter-measures	becomes	obvious’	(Anckar	2014,	
15).	However,	Anckar	focuses	only	on	constitutional	referendums	while,	when	aiming	to	
understand	the	linkages	between	political	institutions	and	referendums,	it	is	necessary	
to	make	a	distinction	between	the	different	types	of	referendum.	
	 This	is	argued,	for	example,	by	Adrian	Vatter	(2002;	2009),	who	states	that	direct	
democracy	 cannot	 be	 linked	 easily	 to	 either	 consensus	 or	 majoritarian	 democracy	
because	‘the	numerous	forms	of	direct	democracy	are	too	manifold	and	oppositional	
with	regard	to	their	 functions	and	effects’	 (Vatter	2009,	128).	Therefore,	 in	 line	with	
Setälä	 (1999;	 2006),	 Vatter	 calls	 for	 referendums	 to	 be	 differentiated	 and	 argues	
that	different	 types	of	 referendum	 link	up	differently	 to	certain	 types	of	democracy,	
depending	on	the	extent	to	which	the	government	majority	can	control	the	referendum	
vote	and	the	decision-making	rule	applied	(simple	majority	or	quorum	requirements)	
(Vatter	 2002;	 2009).	 He	 argues	 that	 optional	 and	 mandatory	 referendums	 without	
quorums	are	primarily	majoritarian	instruments,	while	citizens’	initiatives,	mandatory	
referendums,	 and	 optional	 referendums	 with	 quorums	 are	 consensual	 instruments	
(Vatter	2002,	310;	see	also	Marxer	and	Pállinger	2007,	19).	
	 Vatter’s	logic	can	be	extended	to	the	classification	of	referendums	that	I	presented	
in	section	2.3.1,	where	I	distinguished	five	types	of	referendum	based	on	who	ultimately	
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decides	whether	the	vote	is	held:	legislative	majority,	presidential,	legislative	minority,	
citizen-initiated	and	mandatory	referendums.	These	referendums	differ	in	the	extent	to	
which	either	citizens	or	representatives	exercise	control	over	the	referendum	process	
and	hence	decision-making.	This	control	over	the	process	is	based	on	who	ultimately	
decides	whether	the	referendum	is	held,	but	also	on	who	has	drafted	the	proposal	that	
is	submitted	to	a	referendum,	whether	there	are	subject	restrictions,	whether	a	quorum	
applies	and	whether	the	outcome	of	the	vote	is	binding	or	advisory	(Setälä	1999,	80).	
Second,	 these	five	 referendums	also	differ	 as	 to	whether	 the	 referendum	process	 is	
controlled	primarily	by	the	political	or	voting	majority	or	whether	it	is	largely	controlled	
by	political	or	citizens’	minorities	(Setälä	1999,	78-79;	Vatter	2009,	130).	On	the	basis	of	
the	two-dimensional	framework,	it	is	possible	to	assess	the	‘fit’	between	the	two	types	
of	representative	democracy	and	the	various	referendum	types	and	provisions.	This	is	
shown	in	tables 2.3 and 2.4.	
	 As	shown	in	table 2.3,	legislative	majority	and	presidential	referendums	share	with	
majoritarian	democracy	that	they	give	primacy	to	political	representation	rather	than	
direct	 citizens’	 participation	 and	 that	 they	 primarily	 allow	 for	 aggregative	 decision-
making	(and	thus	by	majority	rule).	Likewise,	legislative	minority	referendums	share	two	
dimensions	with	consensus	democracy:	 they	give	primacy	 to	political	 representation	
(i.e.	they	are	triggered	by	political	representatives)	and	they	allow	for	the	integration	
of	 the	preferences	of	 political	minorities,	 thereby	fitting	 the	power-sharing	principle	
that	also	underlies	consensus	democracy	(see	also	Jung	1996;	Setälä	1999;	Marxer	and	
Pállinger	2007;	Vatter	2009).	As	shown	in	table 2.4,	referendums	that	have	a	turnout	
quorum	 also	 have	 a	 theoretical	 ‘fit’	 with	 consensus	 polities	 on	 both	 dimensions.	 In	
addition,	citizen-initiated	referendums	share	with	the	consensus	model	that	they	allow	
for	integrative	decision-making	(i.e.	they	provide	minorities	an	instrument	to	influence	
decision-making).	 Yet,	 as	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 underscore	 the	 principle	 of	
direct	 citizens’	 participation	 rather	 than	 representation,	 they	 have	 no	 theoretical	 fit	
with	either	of	the	representative	democracy	models	based	on	the	first	dimension.	By	
contrast,	 referendums	with	 a	 quorum,	 advisory	 referendums,	 and	 referendums	 that	
have	issue	restrictions	share	with	both	representative	democracy	models	that	they	give	
primacy	to	decision-making	by	representation,	as	in	these	cases	the	political	elites	have	
considerable	control	over	the	referendum	process.	
2
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
50
Chapter 2
Table 2.3: Expected ‘fit’ between referendum types and type of democracy
Representation versus Participation Aggregation versus Integration 
Majoritarian	democracy
Legislative majority referendum
Presidential referendum
Legislative	minority	referendum
Legislative majority referendum
Presidential referendum
Consensus	democracy
Legislative	majority	referendum
Presidential	referendum
Legislative minority referendum
Citizen-initiated	referendum
Legislative minority referendum
Table 2.4: Expected ‘fit’ between referendum provisions and type of democracy
Representation versus Participation Aggregation versus Integration 
Majoritarian	democracy
Referendum	with	quorum
Advisory	referendum
Subject	restrictions
Referendum	without	quorum
Consensus	democracy
Referendum with quorum
Advisory	referendum
Subject	restrictions
Referendum with quorum
As	I	argued	in	section 2.3,	for	mandatory	referendums,	the	‘fit’	depends	on	whether	the	
ruling	majority	is	able	to	decide	whether	it	was	necessary	to	hold	a	referendum,	and	on	
how	parliament	has	approved	the	legislative	proposal	that,	based	on	the	constitution,	
triggers	 the	 popular	 vote.	When	 referendums	 are	 strictly	mandatory	 (i.e.	 when	 the	
government	 cannot	 avoid	 a	 referendum),	 representatives	 have	 no	 control	 over	 the	
process	and	hence	the	referendums	can	be	seen	as	reflection	of	popular	sovereignty.	
In	 addition,	when	 the	proposal	 is	 voted	upon	by	 a	 qualified	parliamentary	majority,	
political	minorities	exercise	greater	control	over	the	triggering	of	the	vote	than	when	
the	proposal	is	decided	upon	by	a	simple	majority.		
	 All	 in	all,	classical	 institutionalism	is	primarily	occupied	with	explaining	countries’	
institutional	 design	 in	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 rather	 than	 the	 conditions	 under	
which	 this	 design	 might	 change.	 Moreover,	 when	 the	 purpose	 of	 analysis	 is	 to	
explain	institutional	reform,	the	explanatory	factors	are	commonly	sought	within	the	
polity	 itself,	 for	example	the	number	of	veto	players	that	 inhabit	 it.	The	 ‘veto-player	
approach’	was	introduced	by	George	Tsebelis	(1999;	2002),	who	examines	the	impact	
of	institutional	constraints	on	policy	reform.	According	to	Tsebelis	(1999),	a	veto player 
is	an	individual	or	collective	player,	either	partisan	(i.e.	political	parties)	or	non-partisan	
(for	 example	 constitutional	 courts)	 whose	 approval	 is	 required	 to	 pursue	 a	 reform.	
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According	to	Tsebelis	 (2002),	the	number	of	veto	players	and	veto	points	(defined	as	
arenas	in	which	veto	players	operate)	affect	the	ease	with	which	policy	reform	can	be	
pursued.	Accordingly,	the	more	veto	players	 in	a	polity,	the	higher	the	potential	that	
these	players	will	use	their	power	to	block	policy	reform.	Tsebelis	furthermore	argues	
that	especially	a	high	number	of	partisan	veto	players	impedes	reform.	A	veto-player	
approach	to	the	study	of	referendums	is	provided	by	Jacobs	(2011,	28-29).	Based	on	a	
study	conducted	by	Hooghe	and	Deschouwer	(2011,	627)	on	the	role	of	veto	players	in	
electoral	reform,	Jacobs	assumes	that	a	high	number	of	both	partisan	and	non-partisan	
veto	players	constrains	the	implementation	of	referendum	legislation.	This	argument	
can	also	be	extended	to	the	use	of	referendums.	It	can	be	expected	that	the fewer veto 
players there are present in the process of institutionalizing or triggering referendums, 
the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 This	 seems	 a	 logical	 expectation	 as	 the	more	 veto	 players	 there	 are,	 the	more	
likely	 that	 these	 players	will	 use	 their	 veto	 power	 to	 block	 legislative	 proposals,	 for	
example	 to	 introduce	 referendum	 legislation	or	 to	 organize	 a	 referendum.	 The	 veto	
player	approach	is	particularly	relevant	when	explaining	the	former.	 In	Europe,	there	
are	a	wide	variety	of	procedures	to	amend	the	constitution.	For	example,	in	bicameral	
systems,	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution	 to	 allow	 for	 referendum	 legislation	
require	support	–	sometimes	of	a	supermajority	–	in	both	houses.	In	such	polities,	the	
number	 of	 veto	 players	 is	 potentially	 higher	 than	 in	 unicameral	 systems.	Moreover,	
in	a	 fragmented	polity,	a	parliamentary	majority	 is	made	up	of	more	parties	 than	 in	
majoritarian	systems	(where	the	parliamentary	majority	is	generally	one	party).	Based	
on	this	reasoning,	it	can	be	expected	that,	in	fragmented	polities,	the	chances	are	higher	
that	a	reform	proposal	is	vetoed.	However,	in	his	analyses	of	Austria,	Belgium	and	the	
Netherlands,	 Jacobs	 found	 that	 a	 high	number	of	 veto	players	 is	 actually	 associated	
with	more	reforms	(Jacobs	2011,	211).	As	a	reason,	he	argues	that	reforms	had	often	
been	the	result	of	frustration	with	a	high	number	of	veto	players	(Jacobs	2011,	212).	His	
analysis	however	only	includes	consensus	countries,	and	it	is	relevant	to	assess	whether	
his	conclusion	holds	in	a	wider	variety	of	polities.	
	 Another	 interesting	 question	 that	 has	 not	 been	 addressed	 in	 the	 referendum	
literature	is	whether	the	number	of	veto	players	affects	the	actual	use	of	referendums.	
To	assess	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	referendum	initiation	process,	the	question	
is	thus	how	many	actors	need	to	support	the	referendum	before	it	can	be	triggered.	One	
could	argue	that	the	higher	this	number,	the	less	likely	it	is	that	a	referendum	bill	will	
achieve	the	necessary	support.	At	a	basic	level,	one	could	thus	argue	that,	as	consensus	
democracies	are	potentially	inhabited	by	more	veto	players,	referendums	are	less	likely	
to	be	used	 in	 consensus	democracies	 than	 in	majoritarian	democracies	 since,	 in	 the	
former,	the	support	of	more	players	is	usually	necessary	to	effectuate	a	referendum	bill.	
To	be	more	specific,	in	consensus	democracies	a	parliamentary	majority	necessary	to	
trigger	a	referendum	usually	comprises	more	partisan	veto	players	(i.e.	political	parties)	
2
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than	in	majoritarian	democracies.
	 However,	this	argument	disregards	the	crucial	notification	that	more	players	does	
not	simply	mean	more	veto	players.	In	fact,	with	respect	to	the	veto	power	of	partisan	
veto	players,	one	could	alternatively	argue	that	the	veto	power	of	one	particular	player	
decreases	significantly	when	the	other	parties	work	together	to	block	the	player	that	
aims	to	veto	a	reform	proposal	or	a	referendum	pledge	(Rahat	2008,	270;	Jacobs	2011,	
210).	In	a	similar	vein,	Jacobs	(2011)	found	that	direct	democratic	reform	is	more	likely	
to	occur	when	political	parties	aimed	at	reform	combine	forces	to	break	the	veto	power	
of a cartel of parties	(see	also	Katz	and	Mair	1995;	Koole	1996)	opposing	the	reform.	In	
this	sense,	when	the	cartel	breaks	down,	it	is	no	longer	able	to	use	its	veto	power	(and	is	
thus	no	longer	considered	a	veto	player)	and	reform	is	more	likely	to	occur.	In	addition,	
it	could	also	well	be,	as	Jacobs	(2011,	212)	argues,	that	political	fragmentation	induces	
political	players	to	use	referendums	to	solve	conflict	between	players.	Hence,	while	a	
veto-player	approach	would	hold	that,	in	principle,	referendum	institutionalization	and	
use	is	more	limited	when	there	are	more	veto	players,	the	effect	of	the	number	of	veto	
players	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis	and	requires	the	insights	of	the	
other	institutionalisms	in	order	to	analyse	power	dynamics,	incentives	and	preferences.	
2.4.2 Historical Institutionalism: Past Referendum Experience
Historical	 institutionalism	 emerged	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	
tendency	 to	assess	and	compare	 the	 formal	 institutions	of	 the	 state	and	 its	primary	
occupation	with	explaining	the	institutional	status	quo	rather	than	institutional	change.	
By	 contrast,	 historical	 institutionalism	 is	 concerned	 with	 analysing	 the	 diverging	
historic	 pathways	 towards	 institutional	 outcomes.	 Historical	 institutionalists	 place	
strong	emphasis	on	 the	notion	of	path	dependency,	by	arguing	 that	 institutions	and	
organizations	are	‘mutually	reinforcing	or	complementary’	(Pierson	and	Skocpol	2002,	
709).	As	Pierson	and	Skocpol	(2002,	699)	argue,	‘outcomes	at	a	critical	juncture	trigger	
feedback	mechanisms	 that	 reinforce	 the	 recurrence	 of	 a	 particular	 pattern	 into	 the	
future’	[..and…]	‘once	actors	have	ventured	far	down	a	particular	path,	they	are	likely	to	
find	it	very	difficult	to	reverse	course’.	To	an	important	extent,	historical	institutionalism	
supports	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	 claim	 that	political	 outcomes	 are	 influenced	by	
existing	institutional	‘rules	of	the	game’.	As	Thelen	and	Steinmo	(1992,	10)	state,	‘The	
institutions	that	are	at	the	center	of	historical	institutional	analysis	[…]	can	shape	and	
constrain	 political	 strategies	 in	 important	 ways,	 but	 they	 are	 themselves	 also	 the	
outcome	(conscious	or	unintended)	of	deliberate	political	strategies	of	political	conflict	
and	 of	 choice’.	 Moreover,	 historical	 institutionalism	 places	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘power’	
at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 institutional	 change	 (Mahoney	 and	 Thelen	 2010,	 7).	
Accordingly,	institutions	set	off	processes	of	path	dependency,	in	which	new	institutions	
reshape	political	possibilities,	making	some	outcomes	more	likely	than	others,	given	the	
prevailing	distribution	of	power.
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	 Like	 classical	 institutionalism,	 historical	 institutionalism	 has	 also	 been	 criticized	
for	not	providing	a	comprehensive	explanation	of	why	 institutional	contexts	change,	
for	 example	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 referendum	 legislation.	 As	 Schmidt	 (2008,	
2)	 argues,	 ‘Although	 the	 shift	 in	 historical	 institutionalism	 from	 “big	 bang”	 theories	
of	 change	 to	 incremental	 or	 evolutionary	 approaches	 have	 gone	 a	 long	way	 toward	
accounting	 for	 change	over	time,	 they	 still	 do	more	 to	describe	what	 changes	occur	
than to explain	 why	 change	 occurs;	 and	where	 they	 do	 explain	 change,	 they	 do	 so	
mostly	by	reference	to	outside	(exogenous)	events	rather	than	to	internal	(endogenous)	
agency’.	Historical	institutionalists	are	typically	suspicious	of	functional	explanations	of	
institutional	change	and	of	analyses	that	perceive	political	outcomes	as	‘snapshots’	in	
time	(Pierson	2004,	2).	Rather,	historical	institutionalism	perceives	political	change	as	a	
long-term	process,	the	consequences	of	which	are	unpredictable	(Griffin	1992;	Pierson	
2004;	Sewell	2006).	They	maintain	that	 institutional	change	is	an	outcome	of	 ‘critical	
junctures’,	understood	as	periods	of	contingency	during	which	the	usual	constraints	on	
change	are	lifted	or	eased	(Capoccia	and	Keleman	2007).	Thus,	 institutions	change	in	
the	face	of	exogenous	‘shocks’	that	upset	the	institutional	equilibrium,	like	economic	
crisis	 or	military	 conflict	 (Hall	 and	 Taylor	 1996).	 At	 times	 of	 such	 shocks	 or	 ‘critical	
junctures’	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996,	939),	political	actors	tend	to	turn	to	established,	pre-
set	and	familiar	routines	in	determining	their	actions	(see	also	O’Loughlin	et	al.	1998).	
An	example	is	provided	by	Lijphart	(1992),	who	explains	the	institutional	choices	made	
by	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	(CEECs)	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	
Union	as	the	outcome	of	a	‘critical	juncture’	in	which	these	countries	needed	to	adopt	
a	grand	new	institutional	design	that	could	resist	potential	future	authoritarian	forces	
(Lijphart	1992,	208-209).
	 Historical	institutionalism	stresses	that	institutional	settings	tend	to	be	persistent	
and	 only	 change	 in	 light	 of	 ‘critical	 junctures’.	 It	 provides	 little	 explanation	 of	 why	
referendums	 are	 used	 more	 frequently	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others	 once	 the	
legislation	is	in	place.	However,	historical	institutionalism	does, in contrast to classical 
institutionalism,	provide	some	insights	as	to	why	political	actors	decide	at	some	point	
in	time	to	introduce	referendum	legislation.	In	this	respect,	historical	 institutionalism	
is	 particularly	 interested	 in	 examining	 the	 enabling	 or	 constraining	 role	 that	 past	
institutional	 choices	 play	 in	 institutional	 reform	 debates	 (cf.	 Hall	 and	 Taylor	 1996).	
Hence,	by	introducing	time	to	the	analysis,	a	combination	of	classical	 institutionalism	
with	historical	institutionalism	allows	assessment	of	how	present	institutional	choices	
are	 shaped	 by	 the	 existing	 institutional	 context.	 By	 placing	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	
process	of	institutional	reform,	historical	institutionalism	makes	it	possible	to	examine	
how	such	choices	are	affected	by	changes	in	power	relations.	
	 An	example	of	a	historical	institutionalist	approach	to	the	study	of	referendums	is	
provided	by	Albi	(2005),	who	explains	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	in	
the	CEECs	as	the	outcome	of	the	critical	juncture	imposed	by	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	
2
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Union	and	the	subsequent	necessity	to	adopt	a	new	constitution.	For	some	of	 these	
countries,	the	introduction	of	referendums	in	their	constitution	implied,	according	to	
the	author,	a	return	to	an	older,	albeit	non-democratic,	referendum	tradition.	Auer	and	
Bützer	(2001)	furthermore	state	that,	in	choosing	to	introduce	referendum	provisions	in	
the	new	democratic	institutions,	these	countries	were	also	strongly	affected	by	positive	
experiences	with	referendums	elsewhere	in	Europe.	
	 Not	only	in	terms	of	institutionalization,	but	also	in	terms	of	use,	it	can	be	argued	
that	when	a	referendum	has	been	held	once,	political	elites	might	more	easily	make	use	
of	the	instrument	in	the	future.	Thus,	one	referendum	sets	a	precedent	for	the	next	one.	
This	argument	is	generally	employed	to	explain	the	increase	in	referendums	on	issues	
related	to	European	integration.	When	faced	with	ratifying	a	EU	Treaty,	political	elites	in	
countries	that	have	already	held	a	referendum	on	a	previous	EU	Treaty	can	be	expected	
to	be	more	liable	to	pledge	a	referendum	on	this	particular	treaty.	Especially	after	the	
various	referendum	pledges	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty,	it	was	assumed	that	
‘the	genie	was	out	of	the	bottle’	(Crum	and	Hollander	2011,	1)	and	that	it	would	be	more	
difficult	for	political	representatives	to	avoid	a	referendum.	Conversely,	the	absence	of	
historical	precedents	 is	 likely	 to	constrain	 future	 referendum	use	because,	at	 critical	
junctures,	 referendums	 are	 not	 seen	 as	 a	 viable	 option,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 previous	
examples.	
	 Hence,	when	countries	have	had	a	constitution	that	included	referendum	provisions,	
or	when	actors	in	these	countries	have	access	to	past	examples	that	referendums	could	
serve	certain	objectives	in	democratic	decision-making,	referendums	are	more	likely	to	
be	seen	as	a	viable	option	for	deciding	on	an	issue.	Thus,	the	expectation	derived	from	
historical	institutionalism	is	that, when there is past referendum experience in a country, 
it is more likely that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
2.4.3 Sociological Institutionalism: Public Demands and Political Values
While	 classical	 institutionalism	and	historical	 institutionalism	 consider	 institutions	 as	
relatively	 isolated	 entities,	 sociological	 institutionalism	 places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	
interrelationship	 between	 institutions	 and	 society	 (Hall	 and	 Taylor	 1996).	 According	
to	 sociological	 institutionalists,	 institutions	 and	 society	 are	 mutually constitutive: 
institutions	 affect	 the	 way	 actors	 perceive	 politics	 as	 they	 provide	 moral	 structure	
and	guidance,	but	at	the	same	time	institutions	themselves	are	a	reflection	of	cultural	
norms	and	values	in	society	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996,	947).	Central	to	this	argument	is	the	
‘logic	of	appropriateness’	(Campbell	1998),	which	implies	that	institutions	–	which	are	
perceived	as	including	both	formal	rules	and	procedures	and	informal	norms	(Hall	and	
Taylor	1996,	947)	–	are	adopted	that	fit	 the	normative	 framework	of	 the	actors	 that	
adopt	them.	Drawing	on	the	pioneering	work	of	Almond	and	Verba	(1963),	sociological	
institutionalism	 claims	 that	 institutions	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	 taking	 into	
account	the	prevailing	political	culture,	 i.e.	the	specific	normative	context	of	 ideas	 in	
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which	 political	 actors	 operate	 and	 that	 determines	 their	 scope	 for	 manoeuvre	 (i.e.	
DiMaggio	 and	 Powell	 1983;	 Katz	 1997;	Guler,	 Guillén	 and	Macpherson	 2002).	When	
political	culture	changes,	political	institutions	will	change	as	well.	
	 Sociological	institutionalism	furthermore	places	strong	emphasis	on	the	notion	of	
political	diffusion,	understood	as	a	transfer	of	democratic	practices	and	ideas	among 
national	polities.	The	underlying	argument	is	that	decision-makers	imitate	policy	solutions	
adopted	elsewhere	(Doorenspleet	2004).	For	example,	Huntington	(1991)	referred	to	a	
‘snowballing’	effect	to	describe	the	state	of	affairs	in	which	countries	encourage	each	
other	to	democratize	‘either	because	they	seem	to	face	similar	problems,	or	because	
successful	democratization	elsewhere	suggests	that	democratization	might	be	a	cure	
for	their	problems	whatever	those	problems	are’	(Huntington	1991,	100).	Closa	(2007,	
1325)	 extended	 this	 argument	 to	 the	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 countries,	 and	
argued	that	 these	countries	adopted	constitutional	solutions	designed	elsewhere	 for	
domestic	constitutional	problems.	The	EU	is	generally	perceived	as	important	catalyst	
for	such	a	process	of	institutional	diffusion	(cf.	Schmidt	2006).	As	Grabbe	(2001,	1014)	
argues,	 the	 EU	 has	 made	 clear	 efforts	 in	 ‘pushing	 the	 applicant	 countries	 towards	
greater	convergence	with	particular	institutional	models	than	has	occurred	within	the	
existing	EU’.
	 As	argued	in	the	introductory	chapter	of	this	book,	most	referendum	research	is	
grounded	 in	 a	 sociological	 institutionalist	 approach,	 and	 rather	 than	 identifying	 and	
explaining	cross-country	variations	in	referendum	practice,	most	referendum	scholars	
assume	 some	 general	 cause	 at	work	 that	 triggers	 a	 general	 direct	 democratic	 shift.	
The	 argument	 goes	 that	 more	 and	 more	 referendums	 are	 being	 held	 in	 European	
democracies,	and	that	this	is	due	to	an	alleged	crisis	of	representative	democracy	that	
‘hits’	most	established	European	democracies	(cf.	LeDuc	2003;	Cain,	Dalton	and	Scarrow	
2003;	Dalton	2004).	These	scholars	argue	that,	due	to	processes	of	Europeanization	and	
globalization,	 national	 representative	 channels	 are	 no	 longer	 sufficient	 to	 guarantee	
the	legitimacy	of	political	decisions,	and	that	alternative	measures,	 like	referendums,	
are	needed	 to	compensate	 for	 this.	As	 countries	 in	 the	EU	 face	 similar	pressures	on	
their	democratic	systems,	a	decision	by	one	country	to	hold	a	referendum	on	a	certain	
European	issue	influenced	decisions	to	hold	referendums	on	the	same	matter	elsewhere	
(Closa	2007,	1325).		
	 However,	 if	 diffusion	 portrays	 the	 general	 factor	 that	 explains	 referendum	 use,	
we	would	expect	referendums	to	be	used	across	Europe	in	the	same	manner	and	with	
the	same	frequency.	Yet	this	is	certainly	not	the	case.	In	other	words,	there	seems	to	
be	variation	in	the	extent	to	which	national	actors	are	susceptible	to	diffusion	effects,	
and	 in	 which	 they	 thus	 indeed	 perceive	 referendums	 as	 legitimate	 decision-making	
tools.	 According	 to	 Jacobs	 (2011,	 23)	 such	 differences	 are	 rooted	 in	 different	 levels	
of	referendum	demands	from	within	society.	Hence,	a	first	expectation	derived	from	
sociological	institutionalism	is	that	the larger the public demands for referendums, the 
more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used. 
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	 A	first	line	of	reasoning	is	that	demands	for	referendums	rise	as	citizens	increasingly	
desire	to	be	politically	active	and	to	participate	in	politics.	This	argument	is	grounded	
in	Ronald	Inglehart’s	‘Silent	Revolution’	thesis	(1971;	1977),	which	claims	that	the	late	
1960s	and	1970s	witnessed	a	major	intergenerational	shift	in	values,	due	to	increased	
economic	 prosperity,	 higher	 levels	 of	 education,	 and	 subsequent	 increased	 political	
awareness.	 Inglehart	 explains	 this	 shift	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Maslov’s	 hierarchy	 of	 basic	
needs	(Maslov	1954),	and	states	that	when	citizens’	resources	increase,	they	will	give	
more	primacy	to	participatory	values	like	freedom	of	expression	and	speech	and	self-
fulfilment,	and	consequently	be	more	critical	towards	authority	(Inglehart	1977,	297).	
Referendum	scholars	have	largely	shared	this	argumentation,	and	on	that	basis	assessed	
a	relationship	between	citizens’	support	for	referendums	and	levels	of	education	and	
primacy	 given	 to	 participatory	 values	 (cf.	 Dalton	 1984;	 Bowler,	 Donovan	 and	 Karp	
2007).	 For	 example,	 Pippa	 Norris	 (1999)	 argues	 that	 support	 for	 direct	 democratic	
reform	comes	especially	from	‘critical	citizens’,	who	support	democracy	as	such	but	are	
discontent	with	the	limited	scope	for	political	influence	that	representative	democracy	
provides.	On	the	basis	of	such	analyses,	 it	 is	thus	easily	assumed	that	the	increase	in	
referendums	 is	 due	 to	 increased	 levels	 of	 political	 interest	 on	 the	 part	 of	 European	
citizenries	(cf.	Budge	1996;	Pállinger,	Kaufmann,	Marxer	and	Schiller	2007).	
	 A	second	line	of	reasoning	is	that	referendums	are	invoked	in	response	to	increased	
political	 dissatisfaction.	 Scholars	 adopting	 this	 argument	 refer	 to	 a	 ‘polarization’	 of	
the	 citizenry	 into	 ‘insiders’	who	 are	 highly	 educated	 and	 politically	 engaged	 citizens	
and	 ‘outsiders’	who	 feel	 largely	 alienated	 from	politics	 and	have	 little	 confidence	 in	
representative	institutions	(Häusermann	and	Schwander	2009,	26-29;	see	also	Hibbing	
and	 Theiss-Morse	 2002;	 Dalton	 2004).	 Accordingly,	 these	 dissatisfied	 citizens	 prefer	
referendums	 as	 instruments	 to	 repair	 the	 irresponsiveness	 of	 political	 parties	 or	 to	
regain	 control	 over	 European	 integration	 (cf.	 Dalton,	 Burklin	 and	 Drummond	 2001;	
Donovan	and	Karp	2006;	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2007).	As	Cronin	(1999,	10)	argues,	
‘demand	 for	more	 democracy	 occurs	when	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 distrust	 of	 legislative	
bodies	and	when	there	is	a	growing	suspicion	that	privileged	interests	exert	far	greater	
influences	on	the	typical	politician	than	does	the	common	voter.’	
	 Based	on	 these	 lines	 of	 argumentation,	 I	would	 expect	 referendums	 to	be	used	
with	 more	 frequency,	 the	 more	 political	 actors	 are	 faced	 with	 public	 demands	 for	
them.	 In	addition,	when	political	 actors	are	 faced	with	a	highly	politically	 interested	
citizenry,	and/or	with	high	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction	with	either	national	or	EU	
politics	on	the	part	of	the	electorate,	they	feel	more	inclined	to	institutionalize	and	use	
referendums.	Thus,	public	demands	are	expected	to	create	a	context	in	which	it	is	more	
likely	that	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used.	
	 However,	 to	 argue	 that	 referendums	 occur	 in	 response	 to	 societal	 demands	
stemming	from	either	participatory	values	or	dissatisfaction	implies	that	political	actors	
are	 susceptible	 to	 such	 claims.	 Sociological	 institutionalists	 would	 therefore	 argue	
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that	political	actors	are	more	susceptible	to	such	demands	when	this	is	in	accordance	
with	their	own	value	orientations	and	that	such	orientations	are	important	drivers	of	
democratic	reforms,	such	as	the	institutionalization	of	referendum	legislation.	Such	an	
argument	is,	for	example,	derived	from	Katz	(2005,	74),	who	argued,	on	the	basis	of	his	
analysis	of	the	factors	that	drive	electoral	reform,	that	political	values	played	a	crucial	
role	in	some	of	the	most	influential	electoral	reform	discussions.	Two	complementary	
arguments	have	been	put	 forward	as	 to	 the	 role	 that	 values	play	 in	political	 actors’	
referendum	 pledges:	 the	 first	 is	 that	 referendums	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 intrinsic,	
participationist	values	associated	with	direct	votes,	and	the	second	is	that	referendums	
are	the	outcome	of	instrumental,	crisis-solving	values	associated	with	them.10 A second, 
referendum-level	 explanation	 derived	 from	 sociological	 institutionalism	 is	 therefore	
that the stronger the intrinsic and instrumental values that political actors attach to 
referendums, the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 The	first	argument	is	that	referendums	are	pledged	when	decision-makers	hold	a	
Rousseauian	perspective	towards	participation,	and	when	they	perceive	referendums	
primarily	 as	 an	 instrument	 that	 boosts	 political	 participation.	 In	 this	 reasoning,	
referendums	are	 valued	 intrinsically	 due	 to	 their	 alleged	positive	effects	 on	political	
engagement	and	individual	empowerment,	which	is	perceived	as	an	end	in	itself.	This	
view	was	extensively	elaborated	by	Carole	Pateman	(1970),	Benjamin	Barber	(1984)	and	
Lee	Ann	Osbun	(1985)	who	argue	that	the	value	of	democracy	lies	in	the	opportunities	
it	presents	for	political	participation.	According	to	this	view,	a	healthy	society	requires	
regular	 and	 active	 participation	 from	 its	 citizenry,	 and	 democratic	 polities	 should	
therefore	 include	 institutions	 for	 mass	 participation,	 such	 as	 referendums.	 The	
argument	goes	that	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used	when	decision-makers	
hold	such	participationist	values.	
	 A	 second	 line	 of	 reasoning	 is	 that	 referendums	 are	 held	 when	 decision-makers	
value	them	instrumentally,	i.e.	as	means	to	solve	a	democratic	crisis.	According	to	this	
reasoning,	referendums	are	perceived	as	crisis-solving	instruments,	capable	of	restoring	
alleged	flaws	in	representative	democracy,	related	to	both	input	and	output	legitimacy.	
It	is	argued	that	advanced	representative	democracies	provide	insufficient	channels	for	
political	participation,	and	that	voting	procedures	are	unable	to	entirely	represent	the	
desires	of	an	increasingly	volatile	and	differentiated	electorate	(i.e.	creating	the	well-
known	Ostrogorski	 paradox).	 Referendums	would	 restore	 such	 flaws	 by	 providing	 a	
means	for	citizens	to	participate	in	decision-making	in	between	regular	elections,	and	
for	citizens	to	be	represented	on	issues	that	cut	across	traditional	party	divisions.	In	this	
vein,	referendums	are	particularly	seen	as	instruments	to	restore	the	alleged	‘democratic	
deficit’	 of	 the	 EU	 (cf.	 Follesdal	 and	Hix	 2006;	 Crum	2012).	 Accordingly,	 referendums	
on	EU	affairs	are	pledged	to	increase	citizens’	involvement	in	EU	decision-making	(i.e.	
10.	 	The	distinction	between	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	has	been	elaborated	by	Bratton	and	Mattes	
(2001),	who	use	the	concepts	to	analyse	support	for	democracy	in	Africa.	
2
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
58
Chapter 2
input-legitimacy)	and	 to	give	 citizens	a	direct	 say	over	 issues	 related	 to	political	 and	
monetary	 integration,	 which	 are	 increasingly	 shielded	 from	 national	 parliamentary	
control	(i.e.	output-legitimacy)	(cf.	WRR	2007).
	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 electoral	 reform,	 Renwick	 (2010,	 38-41)	 distinguishes	 three	
categories	 of	 instrumental	 values	 attached	 to	 such	 reform:	 representation,	
accountability	and	simplicity.	These	can	also	be	applied	to	the	analysis	of	referendums.	
Values	associated	with	representativeness	and	simplicity	are	thus	aimed	at	increasing	
the	 polity’s	 input-legitimacy.	 For	 example,	 referendums,	 especially	 those	 initiated	
by	political	or	citizens’	minorities,	can	thus	be	valued	by	stressing	that	 they	 increase	
the	proportionality	of	political	decision-making	 (Jacobs	2011,	40).	 In	addition,	values	
associated	with	accountability	are	aimed	at	increasing	output	legitimacy.	The	argument	
goes	that	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used	when	decision-makers	hold	such	
instrumental	values.	These	decision-makers	would	thus	point	to	the	necessity	to	use	
referendums	 to	 guarantee	 policy	 outcomes	 that	 are	 legitimized	 by	 the	 majority	 of	
the	 people.	 Any	 problems	with	 the	 legitimization	 of	Western	 democracies	 are	 then	
predominantly	 thought	 to	 stem	 from	 representative	 institutions	 no	 longer	 being	
capable	 of	 guaranteeing	 adequate	 and	 effective	 policy	 outcomes,	 and	 furthermore	
providing	 insufficient	mechanisms	to	offer	citizens	opportunities	to	hold	government	
officials	accountable	for	ineffective	or	undesirable	output.	
	 Some	scholars	have	attempted	to	connect	normative	support	for	referendums	to	
party	 ideology	 (cf.	Lucardie	1997;	2010;	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2002;	2006;	Pilet	
2007;	Jacobs	2011).	For	example,	in	his	analysis	of	party	positions	towards	referendums	
in	the	Netherlands,	Lucardie	(1997;	2010)	found	that	support	for	referendums	comes	
especially	from	the	progressive	left,	while	conservative-liberal,	Christian	democratic	and	
smaller	confessional	parties	consistently	expressed	opposition	towards	the	referendum	
as	an	instrument.	However,	as	Jacobs	(2011,	33)	argues,	‘an	exclusive	focus	on	traditional	
ideologies	is	[…]	unlikely	to	be	fruitful	when	one	tries	to	study	democratic	reform’,	since	
such	traditional	ideologies,	like	liberalism	and	socialism,	focus	primarily	on	ethical	and	
socio-economic	issues,	rather	than	on	the	role	of	citizens	in	political	decision-making	
as	such.	By	contrast,	post-materialism	and	populism	portray	two	‘thin-centre’	(Freeden	
1998)	ideologies	that	do	specifically	emphasize	the	‘right’	form	of	interaction	between	
citizens	and	their	political	representatives	(Jacobs	2011,	33-34)	and	are	more	explicitly	
supportive	of	direct	democratic	reform.	
	 Arguably,	 for	 post-materialist	 parties,	 such	 support	 is	 primarily	 intrinsically	
motivated	because,	as	famously	pointed	out	by	Ronald	Inglehart	(1977,	3),	these	parties	
place	strong	emphasis	on	preserving	individual	liberty,	freedom	of	expression,	better	
quality	of	 life,	and	 limiting	 the	power	of	authority	 (Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2006,	
443).	Accordingly,	referendums	would	ensure	that	people	get	involved	in	politics,	and	
that	 their	 voices	 are	 heard.	 In	 addition,	 by	 emphasizing	 societal	 pluralism,	 it	 can	 be	
assumed	 that	 referendums	 that	provide	minorities	with	a	 tool	 to	 influence	decision-
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making	 –	 i.e.,	 citizen-initiated	 and	 legislative	minority	 referendums	 (Qvortrup	 2005,	
116-117)	–	especially	resonate	with	post-materialist	ideology.
	 Populist	support	for	referendums	is,	by	contrast,	not	easily	captured	by	the	divide	
between	 intrinsic	and	 instrumental	motivations.	Rather	than	perceiving	referendums	
as	beneficial	to	representative	democracy,	populist	support	for	referendums	is	merely	
grounded	in	anti-elitism	and	an	aversion	to	representative	bodies	(Mudde	2007,	153).	
Populist	 parties	 perceive	 society	 as	 divided	 between	 two	 homogeneous	 groups,	
‘the	 pure	 people’	 and	 ‘the	 corrupt	 elite’,	 and	 especially	 oppose	 the	 post-materialist	
emphasis	on	 societal	 plurality	 (Mudde	2004,	543;	Van	Kessel	 2015,	 12).	Accordingly,	
referendums	are	seen	as	instruments	that	truly	reflect	the	will	of	the	ordinary	people	
at	the	expense	of	political	elites	and	intermediary	structures	(Mudde	2004,	543;	2007,	
153;	 Jacobs	 2011,	 34-35).	 Hence,	 populist	 ideology	 underscores	 two	 characteristics	
that	 are	 generally,	 though	 –	 as	 I	 argue	 –	wrongfully,	 attributed	 to	 referendums:	 the	
prevalence	of	popular	sovereignty	over	representative	sovereignty	and	the	prevalence	
of	preference	aggregation	over	preference	integration.
	 Although	 such	 ideological	 arguments	 can	 indeed	 affect	 party	 stances	 towards	
referendums,	I	argue	that	a	focus	on	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	is	more	useful,	
as	 these	might	 also	 be	 found	 among	 non-post-materialist	 and	 non-populist	 parties.	
The	more	such	values	dominate	the	political	debate,	the	more	likely	I	would	therefore	
expect	a	referendum	to	be	held.
2.4.4 Rational Choice Institutionalism: Strategic Interests 
All	 three	 institutionalisms	outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 sections	 tend	 to	 neglect	 the	 role	
of	political	agency.	This	stands	in	sharp	contrast	with	rational	choice	institutionalism,	
which	 states	 that,	 rather	 than	 institutional	 context,	 path	 dependency,	 public	
demands	or	political	values,	institutional	choices	are	above	all	the	outcome	of	actors’	
strategic	 interests	 (cf.	Williamson	1975;	Milgrom	and	Roberts	 1992).	 Rational	 choice	
institutionalism	 draws	 its	 analytical	 tools	 from	 the	 ‘new	 economics	 of	 organization’,	
which	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 rent-seeking,	 transaction	 costs	 and	 efficiency	
to	the	operation	and	development	of	 institutions	(Moe	1984;	Weingast	and	Marshall	
1988).	 Rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 has	 been	 employed	 to	 explain	 a	 wide	 range	
of	 institutional	 phenomena,	 from	 grand	 institutional	 development	 like	 democratic	
transition	(see	for	example	Przeworski	1991;	Marks	1992;	Geddes	1994)	to	the	rise	and	
fall	of	international	organizations	(see	for	example	Martin	1992)	and	the	development	
and	working	of	particular	 institutions,	 like	government	coalitions	 (Tsebelis	1988)	and	
electoral	systems	(Benoit	2004).	
	 While	sociological	institutionalism	derives	from	a	cultural	approach,	rational	choice	
institutionalism	derives	from	a	calculus	approach	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996).	When	it	comes	to	
electoral	and	democratic	reform,	scholars	in	the	field	of	rational	choice	institutionalism	
stress	 that,	while	values	might	be	 important	 in	 the	political	debate,	 interests	usually	
2
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prevail	when	it	comes	to	the	actual	implementation	of	reforms	(Katz	2005,	69;	see	also	
Blais	and	Shugart	2008).	Accordingly,	since	political	action	is	determined	by	 interests	
rather	than	normative	convictions,	institutions	only	change	when	actors	want	them	to.	
As	Hall	and	Taylor	(1996,	945)	summarize,	‘the	process	of	institutional	creation	usually	
revolves	around	voluntary	agreement	by	the	relevant	actors;	and,	 if	the	institution	is	
subject	to	a	process	of	competitive	selection,	it	survives	primarily	because	it	provides	
more	benefits	to	the	relevant	actors	than	alternate	institutional	forms’.	An	example	is	
provided	by	Benoit	 (2004),	who	uses	a	 rational	 choice	approach	 to	explain	electoral	
reform.	He	argues	 that	electoral	 reform	 is	 the	 result	of	parties’	 rational	 cost-benefit	
calculations.	Political	actors	will	support	those	reforms	which	coincide	with	their	pre-
defined	interest	and	which	provide	them	with	the	largest	electoral	benefits	(2004,	367-
379).	Whereas	 Benoit	 has	 specifically	 focussed	 on	 explaining	 party	 stances	 towards	
electoral	 reform,	 Jacobs	 (2011)	 extended	 this	 approach	 by	 analysing	 elites’	 support	
for	 democratic	 reform	 in	 general.	 He	 argues	 that	 ‘Political	 parties	will	 implement	 a	
democratic	 reform	when	a)	 they	have	 the	 required	majority	 to	do	 so,	and	b)	 such	a	
reform	would	maximally	benefit	them’	(2011,	19).	
	 When	extended	to	referendum	practice,	rational	choice	institutionalists	argue	that	
in	 institutionalizing	 and	 pledging	 referendums,	 political	 elites	 are	 rarely	 susceptible	
to	 either	 popular	 demands	 or	 ideological	 conventions.	 Rather,	 politicians	will	 assess	
each	referendum	option	in	itself	and	assess	whether	it	fits	their	immediate	interests.	A	
rational	choice	perspective	to	referendum	practice	has	been	expressed	by,	for	example,	
Butler	and	Ranney	 (1978,	221),	who	argue	 that	 referendums	are	generally	employed	
by	governments	 ‘to	 solve	a	particular	problem	or	 to	 justify	a	particular	 solution’.	As	
Walker	(2003,	13)	argues,	‘Referendums	shift	the	balance	of	power	in	a	political	debate	
by	introducing	the	will	of	the	people’,	and	therefore,	they	provide	political	elites	with	
additional	tools	to	play	the	political	game	that	can	serve	different	purposes	for	governing	
parties	and	opposition	parties.	
	 These	strategic	interests	can	come	in	several	forms.	Based	on	an	extensive	literature	
on	 democratic	 and	 electoral	 reform	 (Reed	 and	 Thies	 2001;	 Benoit	 2004;	 Pilet	 2007;	
Blais	and	Shugart	2008),	Jacobs	(2011,	38)	makes	a	noteworthy	distinction	between	act-
contingent	and	outcome-contingent	motivations	to	support	direct democratic	reform.11 
Outcome-contingent motivations	 imply	 the	anticipation	 that	 the	 reform	 itself	will	 be	
beneficial.	 In	the	case	of	referendums,	this	 implies	the	anticipation	that	referendums	
can	 increase	 the	power	of	 political	 actors	 vis-à-vis	 their	 competitors.	Act-contingent 
motivations,	on	the	other	hand,	 imply	the	anticipation	that	the	act	of	supporting	the	
reform	can	serve	office-	or	vote-seeking	objectives,12	such	as	winning	votes	in	elections	
11.	 	The	distinction	between	outcome-contingent	and	act-contingent	motivations	to	support	electoral	
reform	has	been	elaborated	by	Reed	and	Thies	(2001).
12.	 	The	distinction	between	policy-seeking,	vote-seeking	and	office-seeking	party	objectives	has	been	
elaborated	by	Kaare	Strøm	(1990).	
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or	retaining	coalition	partners	 (Renwick,	Hanretty	and	Hine	2009,	439-440).	Scholars	
in	 the	 field	 of	 electoral	 reform	 tend	 to	 argue	 that	 outcome-contingent	motivations	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 actual	 reforms	 (cf.	 Boix	 1999;	 Benoit	 2004).	 As	 Renwick	
(2010,	214)	 states,	 act-contingent	motivations	might	push	actors	 to	put	a	 reform	on	
the	political	agenda,	but	reforms	will	only	be	implemented	when	the	reform	in	itself	is	
beneficial	to	the	party.	However,	in	his	analysis	of	electoral	and	democratic	reform	in	
Austria,	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands,	Jacobs	(2011,	216-217)	found	that	act-contingent	
motivation	played	an	equally	important	role.	In	my	analysis	of	the	institutionalization	
of	referendum	legislation,	I	will	therefore	assess	the	importance	of	both	outcome-	and	
act-contingent	motivations,	and	contrast	these	with	normative	ones.	The	expectation	
derived	 from	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 is	 therefore	 that	 the stronger the act-
contingent and outcome-contingent interests of political actors to support referendums, 
the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 The	distinction	between	outcome-	and	act-contingent	motivations	is	also	relevant	
in	studying	the	motivations	at	play	in	the	actual	use	of	referendums.	As	I	place	more	
emphasis	 on	 explaining	 cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	 use	 than	 in	 the	
institutionalization	of	referendum	legislation,	outcome-	and	act-contingent	motivations	
are	 further	 disentangled	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 politicians’	 motivations	 for	 pledging	
referendums.	There	is	an	extensive	literature	on	the	strategies	that	may	go	to	explain	
why	 governments	 and	 opposition	 parties	 trigger	 referendums	 (cf.	 Bjørklund	 1982;	
Morel	2001;	Qvortrup	2006;	Closa	2007;	Rahat	2009;	Oppermann	2011;	Dür	and	Mateo	
2011).	Much	of	this	literature	elaborates	on	the	study	by	Bjørklund	(1982),	who	argued	
that	 referendums	 serve	 either	 as	 a	 ‘minority	weapon’	 to	 pursue	policies	 that	would	
otherwise	be	voted	down,	as	a	‘mediation	device’	to	retain	party	or	coalition	unity,	or	as	
a	‘lightning	rod’	to	separate	issues	from	the	electoral	debate	(1982,	247).	Referendum	
scholars	 have	 largely	 underscored	 these	 three	 strategies,	 although	 different	 labels	
have	been	used.	Qvortrup	 (2006)	has	 thereby	added	a	 fourth	 function,	 arguing	 that	
referendums	can	also	serve	as	an	‘empowerment	tool’	to	increase	the	legitimacy	of	the	
actors	that	trigger	them.	While	the	first	(minority	weapon)	thus	portrays	an	outcome-
contingent	 strategy,	 the	 latter	 three	 merely	 represent	 act-contingent	 strategies:	 in	
these	cases	it	is	not	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	that	is	deemed	beneficial,	but	the	
act	of	pledging	one.	
	 Moreover,	 by	 elaborating	 on	 Putnam’s	 two-level	 logic	 of	 international	 decision-
making	 (Putnam	 1988),	 Oppermann	 (2011)	 extended	 two	 of	 these	 strategies	 to	
examining	referendums	on	EU	affairs.	He	argues	that,	for	governments,	referendums	
have	a	particular	function	in	the	EU	context,	either	as	an	empowering	tool	to	strengthen	
a	 government’s	 legitimacy	 among	 its	 EU	 counterparts	 (i.e.	 act-contingent),	 or	 as	 a	
bargaining	tool	in	EU	negotiations	(i.e.	outcome-contingent).	
 Table 2.5	provides	an	overview	of	 these	strategies.	The	first	 strategy	 is	a	policy-
seeking	 one.	 Accordingly,	 political	 actors	 can	 use	 referendums	 to	 pursue	 a	 policy	
2
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outcome	that	is	or	would	be	voted	down	in	parliament	because	the	necessary	majority	
is	lacking	(Bjørklund	1982,	247).	Rahat	(2009)	refers	to	this	as	a	strategy	of	contradiction: 
in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 required	 parliamentary	majority	 or	 supermajority	 for	 a	 desired	
policy	 outcome,	 political	 actors	 can	 use	 referendums	 to	 overrule	 the	 parliamentary	
majority.	When	used	by	governments	in	national	decision-making,	this	strategy	can	be	
considered offensive,	as	it	is	aimed	at	promoting	certain	policy	outcomes.	When	used	
by	the	opposition	–	for	example,	by	triggering	a	minority	veto	–	this	strategy	can	be	
considered defensive,	as	it	is	aimed	at	protecting	minority	interests	against	the	ruling	
majority.13	In	the	EU	context,	governments	can	trigger	a	referendum	from	policy-seeking	
motives	 to	protect	domestic	 interests	against	 the	majority	of	 their	EU	counterparts.	
Oppermann	(2011)	has	referred	to	this	defensive	use	of	the	referendum	as	‘red-lining’,	
which	serves	to	flip	the	power	balance	in	one’s	favour	and	to	get	certain	outcomes	that	
would	otherwise	be	voted	down	in	negotiations.	
Table 2.5: Overview of referendum functions and strategies 
Strategy Aim Who Function
Policy-seeking
Enforcing	a	policy-outcome	by	bypassing	national	
parliamentary	majority
Government	 Offensive
Opposition Defensive
Enforcing	a	policy-outcome	by	bypassing	EU	colleagues	 
(EU bargaining)
Government Defensive
Empowerment
Reinforcing	one’s	position	in	national	arena Both Offensive
Reinforcing	one’s	position	in	EU	arena Government Offensive
Conflict mediation
Retaining party unity Both Defensive
Retaining	coalition	unity Government Defensive
Depoliticization Separating	controversial	issues	from	electoral	campaign Both	 Defensive
Often,	however,	the	motivations	behind	referendum	pledges	go	beyond	policy-seeking	
as	 such	 (Rahat	 2009,	 98).	 Referendums	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	 empowerment	 tool,	 as	 a	
referendum	pledge	can	increase	the	leverage	of	the	triggering	actors	(Qvortrup	2006).	
Rahat	(2009)	refers	to	this	as	a	strategy	of	addition:	a	referendum	is	not	necessary,	as	
the	initiator	already	has	majority	support	for	a	decision,	but	the	referendum	provides	
additional	 legitimacy.	 For	 government	 parties,	 however,	 this	 offensive	 strategy	 only	
works	 when	 the	 initiating	 actor	 is	 certain	 that	 the	 public	 is	 on	 its	 side,	 as	 a	 failed	
referendum	 vote	 would	 undermine	 rather	 than	 reinforce	 a	 government’s	 position.	
Oppermann	(2011)	argues	that	referendums	can	also	be	used	in	the	EU	context	for	the	
same	reasons,	 i.e.	 to	 reinforce	a	European	government’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	EU	arena.	
Referendums	can	also	have	an	empowering	effect	for	opposition	parties	with	a	minority	
13.	 	The	distinction	between	offensive	and	defensive	strategies	has	been	elaborated	by	Kai	Oppermann	
(2011).
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standpoint,	if	a	party	owns	the	issue	that	is	to	be	voted	on	and	aims	to	mobilize	voters	
on	the	basis	of	the	referendum	call.	This,	as	Morel	(2001)	argues,	works	especially	well	
when	other	parties	are	divided	on	the	issue,	and	in	particular	in	the	context	of	upcoming	
elections,	as	such	divisions	are	likely	to	be	revealed	during	the	election	campaign.	
	 A	 third	 referendum	 strategy	 is	 conflict mediation.	 When	 a	 party	 or	 coalition	 is	
internally	divided	on	a	certain	issue,	it	can	prevent	a	split	by	letting	the	electorate	decide	
(Bjørklund	 1982).	 As	 Oppermann	 (2011)	 argues,	 such	 a	 strategy	 is	 thus	 at	 foremost	
defensive,	as	actors	perceive	it	as	risky	when	contested	issues	on	which	parties	or	the	
coalition	 are	 internally	 divided	 enter	 the	 electoral	 realm.	 These	 are	 generally	 issues	
that	cross-cut	the	traditional	socio-economic	dimensions	for	party	competition,	such	
as	ethical	issues	and	issues	related	to	European	integration	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2004).	
Such	an	argument	has	been	put	forward	by	Bogdanor	(1994,	94),	who	maintains	that	
referendums	are	an	attempt	at	‘unfreezing	political	alignments’	and	invoked	because	
political	parties	fail	to	fully	integrate	such	‘new’	issues	into	their	party	programmes.	The	
entrance	of	such	new,	contested	issues	has	led	political	elites	to	resort	to	referendums	
to	keep	these	issues	outside	the	realm	of	electoral	competition.	This	applies	especially	
in	the	EU	context.	As	Hooghe	and	Marks	(2004,	4)	argue,	‘European	integration	leads	to	
divisions	within	governing	political	parties,	so	government	(i.e.	governing	party)	leaders	
are	induced	to	hold	referenda	to	offload	the	issue	to	the	wider	public’.	Rahat	(2009)	has	
referred to this strategy as avoidance,	stating	that	‘when	politicians	fear	that	a	decision	
on	a	certain	issue	might	lead	to	a	split	within	a	unit	of	the	party	or	the	coalition	or	party	
voter	whose	cohesion	they	wish	to	sustain,	 they	may	 initiate	a	referendum	as	a	way	
to	transform	decision-making	and	avoid	the	blame	and	responsibility	for	its	outcome’	
(Rahat	2009,	102).	
	 A	 final	 referendum	 strategy	 is	depoliticization.	When	 a	 party	 or	 coalition	 is	 not	
in	 itself	divided	on	an	 issue,	but	holds	a	different	view	than	 its	 support	base,	calling	
a	 referendum	 can	 be	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 depoliticizing	 the	 issue.	 Accordingly,	 a	
referendum	may	be	used	as	a	‘lightning	rod’	(Bjørklund	1982,	248)	to	depoliticize	certain	
controversial	issues	and	decouple	them	from	the	election	campaign,	by	pledging	that	
the	 issue	will	be	decided	upon	 in	a	separate	vote	 (Rahat	2009:	100).	Dür	and	Mateo	
(2011,	474)	argue	that	this	strategy	 is	specifically	employed	 in	the	context	of	the	EU.	
As	they	put	it,	‘the	larger	the	opposition	among	voters	to	an	EU	treaty,	the	more	likely	
it	is	that	government	parties	support	a	referendum’,	and	this	effect	is	expected	to	be	
stronger	the	closer	the	next	election	looms	(Dür	and	Mateo	2011,	474).
	 On	the	basis	of	this	literature,	it	can	thus	be	expected	that,	when	political	actors	
anticipate	that	holding	a	referendum	will	guarantee	the	survival	of	a	policy	proposal	
that	would	otherwise	be	voted	down,	empower	their	position,	solve	an	intra-party	or	
intra-coalition	conflict,	or	depoliticize	a	controversial	issue,	they	will	be	more	inclined	
to	do	so.	
2
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In	this	chapter,	I	have	discussed	different	types	of	referendum	and	how	they	relate	to	
democratic	theory.	This	classification	is	based	on	who	primarily	controls	the	referendum	
process	 (political	 representatives	 or	 citizens),	 and	 whether	 the	 process	 of	 initiation	
and	decision-making	reinforces	majority	rule	or	allows	for	the	integration	of	minority	
protection.	 Such	 an	 exercise	 is	 necessary	 to	 assess	 whether	 European	 democracies	
have	 indeed	 experienced	 a	 direct	 participatory	 shift,	 as	 is	 generally	 assumed	 in	 the	
referendum	literature,	and	hence	to	answer	my	first	two	research	questions	(see	chapter 
4). To	 explain	 countries’	 decisions	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	 national	 referendums	
and	hence	to	answer	my	third	research	question,	I	have	extended	the	insights	of	four	
institutionalist	theories	(classical	institutionalism,	historical	institutionalism,	sociological	
institutionalism	 and	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism)	 to	 the	 study	 of	 referendum	
practice.	These	four	institutionalisms	offer	different	perspectives	on	understanding	the	
relationship	between	individual	action	and	institutions,	and	therefore,	provide	different	
approaches	 to	 understanding	 referendum	 practice.	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 analytical	
framework	based	on	the	four	institutionalisms	is	provided	in	table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Summary of approaches, variables and general explanations
Approach Variables Expectations
Classical 
Institutionalism
Type of 
democracy
The	better	the	institutional	fit	between	a	country’s	type	of	democracy	and	a	
particular	referendum,	the	more	likely	that	this	type	of	referendum	will	be	
institutionalized	and	used.
Number	of	
veto players
The	fewer	veto	players	there	are	present	in	the	process	of	institutionalizing	
or	triggering	referendums,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	referendums	will	be	
institutionalized	and	used.
Historical	
Institutionalism
Past 
referendum	
experience
When	there	is	past	referendum	experience	in	a	country,	it	is	more	likely	that	
referendums	will	be	institutionalized	and	used.
Sociological	
Institutionalism
Public	
demands
The	larger	the	public	demands	for	referendums,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	
referendums	will	be	institutionalized	and	used.
Political	values	 The	stronger	the	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	that	political	actors	attach	
to	referendums,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	referendums	will	be	institutionalized	
and	used.
Rational	Choice	
Institutionalism
Strategic	
interests
The	stronger	the	act-contingent	and	outcome-contingent	interests	of	political	
actors	to	support	referendums,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	referendums	will	be	
institutionalized	and	used.
Classical,	historical	and	sociological	 institutionalist	approaches	employ	a	structuralist 
approach	 and	 understand	 the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	
terms	 of	 structural	 context.	 To	 sum	 up,	 classical	 institutionalism	 stresses	 that	 the	
institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums,	 and	 how	 that	 varies	 among	 countries,	
can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 democratic	 nature	 of	 the	 polities	 and/or	 the	 number	 of	
veto	 players	 present.	 Historical	 institutionalism	 explains	 referendum	 practice	 in	
terms	 of	 path	 dependency	 and	 countries’	 past	 referendum	 experience.	 Sociological	
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institutionalism	is	either	 interested	in	explaining	referendum	practice	in	terms	of	the	
demands	 for	 referendums	 in	 society,	 or	 in	 explaining	why	political	 actors	 choose	 to	
implement	and	use	referendums,	which	is	perceived	as	the	outcome	of	political	actors’	
normative	value-frameworks.	By	contrast,	rational	choice	institutionalism	employs	an	
agency approach,	and	maintains	that	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used	when	
this	serves	the	interests	of	political	representatives.	
	 I	argue	that,	 in	understanding	why	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used,	 it	
is	important	to	take	into	account	both	structure	and	agency.	In	the	following	chapters,	
the	validity	of	 these	 six	expectations	will	 assessed,	first	by	providing	an	overview	of	
referendum	legislation	and	its	use	in	the	28	EU	member	states,	and	then	by	examining	
referendum	 legislation	 and	 use	 in	 detail	 in	 France,	 Denmark,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	
Sweden	 and	 the	Netherlands.	 Before	 addressing	my	 research	 questions,	 in	 the	 next	
chapter	 I	will	 first	 set	out	how	 I	 operationalize	 the	main	 variables	 in	 this	 study,	 and	
provide	a	justification	of	my	research	design.	 2
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CHAPTER 3. 
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The	 extensive	 referendum	 literature	 has	 not	 provided	 a	 conclusive	 answer	 as	 to	
which	 factors	contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	and	use	of	national	 referendums.	
This	 deficit	 stems	 mainly	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 explaining	 cross-country	 variations	 in	
referendum	legislation	and	use	is	not	the	core	objective	of	referendum	studies.	Many	
scholars	start	by	identifying	an	aggregated	increase	in	the	number	of	referendums	held,	
and	seek	to	explain	this	phenomenon	in	terms	of	a	generic	cause	across	contemporary	
democracies.	The	most	commonly	defined	cause	is	a	crisis	of	representative	democracy,	
and	subsequent	public	demands	to	expand	the	scope	for	direct	participation	by	holding	
referendums	(cf.	Bogdanor	1994;	LeDuc	2003;	Dalton,	Cain	and	Scarrow	2003;	Bowler,	
Donovan	and	Karp	2007).	If	referendum	scholars	do	address	cross-country	variations,	
they	largely	seek	to	explain	them	in	terms	of	differences	in	institutional	context.	Some	
studies	have,	 for	example,	 linked	 referendum	practice	 to	 the	 type	of	democracy	 (cf.	
Jung	 1996;	 Setälä	 1999;	 Vatter	 2000;	 2009;	Marxer	 and	 Pállinger	 2007).	While	 such	
classical	 institutionalist	analyses	explain	why	a	certain	type	of	referendum	 legislation 
is	more	commonly	provided	for	in	certain	countries,	they	tell	us	little	about	the	actual	
use	of	referendums,	or	about	the	political	context	in	which	this	legislation	came	to	be	
adopted.	Therefore,	in	chapter 2,	 I	developed	an	analytical	framework	to	understand	
why	certain	referendum	legislation	is	institutionalized	and	why	referendums	are	used.	
This	 framework	 goes	 beyond	 purely	 structural	 explanations	 in	 terms	 of	 normative	
convictions	and	institutional	context	by	also	allowing	for	an	analysis	of	political	agency.	
	 Whether	 or	 not	 to	 institutionalize	 referendum	 legislation	 is	 a	 decision	made	 by	
political	authorities.	The	same	applies	to	decisions	to	organize	a	referendum	–	with	the	
exception	of	referendums	that	are	initiated	by	citizens	or	required	by	the	constitution.	
Hence,	understanding	 referendum	practice	–	understood	as	 their	 institutionalization	
and	use	–	requires	analysis	of	the	preferences	and	motives	of	these	political	elites,	and	
how	these	motives	are	bound	by	the	 institutional	and	cultural	context,	 including	the	
nature	of	the	referendum	legislation	that	is	available	and	the	way	in	which	political	power	
is	distributed.	My	study	is	therefore	based	on	a	comparative	case-study	design,	which	
allows	for	a	thorough	analysis	of	political	actors’	choices	whether	to	institutionalize	and	
use	referendums,	but	at	the	same	puts	such	case-specific	knowledge	in	a	comparative	
contextual	perspective	(cf.	Qvortrup	2007,	8-9).	In	this	chapter,	I	outline	this	research	
design,	 together	with	 the	 corresponding	 conceptual	 and	methodological	 choices.	 In	
section 3.2,	 I	 outline	my	 case-study	 strategy	 and	 selection	 of	 countries.	 Section 3.3 
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provides	an	overview	of	the	conceptualization	and	operationalization	of	my	dependent	
and	 independent	 variables.	 In	 section 3.4,	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	methods	 of	
analysis,	and	finally,	section 3.5	presents	an	overview	of	the	data	sources.
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGY
In	this	study,	I	aim	to	identify	factors	contributing	to	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	
national	referendums	and	how	that	varies	among	countries.	On	the	one	hand,	I	analyse	
the	impact	of	intentional	factors	identified	at	referendum	level.	I	confront	explanations	
that	derive	from	a	calculus	approach	–	which	maintains	that	political	actors	implement	
and	use	a	certain	referendum	because	they	anticipate	to	gain	from	it	–	with	explanations	
that	follow	a	cultural	approach	–	which	maintains	that	political	actors	 institutionalize	
and	use	a	particular	 type	of	 referendum	because	 they	believe	 it	 is	 appropriate.	 Yet,	
while	 such	 approaches	 might	 explain	 why	 political	 actors	 decide	 at	 a	 certain	 point	
in	time	to	 institutionalize	or	pledge	a	 referendum	or	not	 to	do	so,	neither	provide	a	
satisfactory	answer	to	the	question	as	to	why	referendums	are	more	frequently	used	
in	some	countries	than	 in	others,	nor	why	a	very	small	number	of	countries	have	no	
referendum	legislation	at	all.	For	that	reason,	I	also	analyse	the	impact	of	country-level	
factors	 and	 take	 into	 account	 how	 political	 actors’	 decisions	 to	 institutionalize	 and	
use	 referendums	are	 shaped	by	 the	 type	of	democracy,	 the	number	of	 veto	players	
in	 the	 polity,	 a	 country’s	 past	 referendum	 experience	 and	 the	 level	 of	 demands	 for	
referendums	in	society.		
	 To	examine	the	validity	of	the	expectations	outlined	in	chapter 2,	my	study	is	based	
on	a	comparative	case-study	design.	This	design	is	embedded,	as	it	contains	more	than	
one	sub-unit	of	analysis.	The	primary	cases,	i.e.	referendum	provisions	and	referendum	
instances,	are	grounded	within	 the	 secondary	cases,	 i.e.	 countries	 (Scholz	and	Tietje	
2002;	 Yin	 2003).	 Hence,	 I	 assess	 both	 the	 availability	 of	 referendum	 provisions	 and	
frequency	of	use	within	European	democracies,	and	the	factors	that	impact	on	decisions	
to	 implement	 referendum	 legislation	 and	 pledge	 referendums	 at	 a	 certain	 point	 in	
time.	 Such	an	embedded	and	comparative	design	allows	me	 to	place	 such	decisions	
within	a	broader	context	(George	and	Bennett	2004,	5).	Moreover,	by	focusing	on	this	
broader	context	rather	than	only	on	particular	referendum	cases	(as	most	referendum	
research	does),	I	am	also	able	to	analyse	instances	in	which	referendum	legislation	was	
not	adopted	or	when	a	 referendum	was	not	held	 in	comparable	circumstances.	This	
study	is	based	on	the	notion	that	decisions	whether	to	implement	and	use	referendums	
are	affected	by	factors	at	both	referendum	(or	micro)	level	(i.e.	the	values	assigned	to	
referendums	and	the	strategic	 interests	to	use	them)	and	at	country	 level.	The	latter	
may	be	more	enduring	 (e.g.	 type	of	democracy	and	past	 referendum	experience)	or	
vary	according	to	the	government	 in	office	or	the	nature	of	the	referendum	bill	 (e.g.	
3
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number	of	veto	players	and	extent	of	referendum	demands	in	society).	This	implies	that	
I	analyse	two	types	of	variation:	cross-country	variations	(i.e.	why	have	some	countries	
experienced	more	referendums	than	other	countries?)	and	within-case	variation	(i.e.	
why	was	a	 referendum	held	on	a	 certain	occasion	and	not	on	another?)	 (cf.	Gerring	
2001,	190-191).	
3.2.1 The comparative case study design
This	 study	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 parts. The first	 part	 is	 descriptive	 and	 comprises	 a	
comparison	 of	 all	 28	 EU	 member	 countries	 to	 assess	 cross-country	 variations	 in	
referendum	practice,	understood	as	1)	the	availability	of	national	referendum	provisions	
in	the	countries’	constitutions,14	and	2)	the	democratic	use	of	national	referendums	in	
the	period	between	1950	and	2014.15	This	overview	of	referendum	practice	in	the	28	EU	
member	countries	is	provided	in	chapter 4.	The	second part of this research (chapters 
5-7)	 is	 explanatory	and	consists	of	 an	 in-depth	examination	of	available	 referendum	
provisions	 and	 referendums	 held	 in	 five	 selected	 countries:	 France,	 Denmark,	 the	
United	Kingdom,	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands.	This	part	thus	addresses	a	diverse	set	
of	cases,	namely	available referendum provisions and all referendums held in various 
countries.	 It	 combines	different	 types	of	comparison	 that	 follow	the	 logic	of	either	a	
most different systems design	 (MDSD)	 or	 a	most similar systems design	 (MSSD).	 An	
outline of this research design is provided in table 3.1,	and	is	elaborated	in	section	3.2.2.	
First,	however,	some	reflection	is	required	on	my	choice	for	a	comparative	case	study	
Table 3.1: Research Design
Aim Cases Strategy for comparison
Part 1.
Descriptive	
analysis 
Assessing the 
shift
All	28	EU	member	countries
(Chapter	4)
-
Part 2.
Comparative	
case study 
analysis 
Assessing the 
explanatory	
factors for 
referendum	
practice,	and	
cross-country	
variations
France	and	Denmark
(Chapter	5)
Cross-country	within-cluster	comparison
Different	countries,	same	outcome	(MDSD)
The	United	Kingdom	and	
Sweden
(Chapter	6)
Cross-country	within-cluster	comparison
Different	countries,	same	outcome	(MDSD)
The	Netherlands
(Chapter	7)
Implicit	cross-country	within-cluster	com-
parison
All	28	EU	member	countries
France,	Denmark,	the	United	
Kingdom,	Sweden	and
the	Netherlands
(Conclusion	(Chapter	8))
Cross-country	within-cluster	comparison	+
Cross-country		cross-cluster	comparisons
Different	countries,	same	outcome	(MDSD)	+
Similar	countries,	different	outcome	(MSSD)
14.	 	On	1	January	2015.
15.	 	To	be	more	specific,	from	1	January	1950	-	31	December	2014.	
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design,	rather	than	a	large-N	statistical	analysis.	This	choice	is	grounded	in	the	nature	of	
the	dependent	variable	and	the	research	puzzle	that	I	aim	to	solve	(King,	Keohane	and	
Verba	1994).	As	 I	am	 interested	 in	the	politics	of	 referendum	institutionalization	and	
use,	a	focus	solely	on	the	availability	of	provisions	and	frequency	of	use,	which	are	more	
easily	quantifiable	and	examined	by	large-N	analyses,	is	not	sufficient.	Understanding	
why	referendums	are	–	or	are	not	–	institutionalized	and	used	requires	a	research	design	
that	allows	for	in-depth	knowledge	of	political	actors’	motives	and	how	they	are	shaped	
by	the	institutional,	political	and	cultural	context.	Hence,	rather	than	focusing	only	on	
outcome	(available	referendum	provisions	and	referendums	held),	a	case-study	design	
also	allows	analysis	of	the	debates	that	did	not	lead	to	the	implementation	or	use	of	
referendums.	This	cannot	be	grasped	by	employing	a	variable-oriented	study.
	 There	 are	 four	 justifications	 for	 why	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 dependent	 variables	 –	
referendum	institutionalization	and	referendum	use	–	require	a	case-study	approach	
rather	than	a	statistical	analysis.16	The	first	is	what	Jacobs	(2011,	44)	calls	asymmetrical 
causation,	 meaning	 that	 explanations	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 referendums	 are	 not	
necessarily	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 the	 non-occurrence	 of	 referendums.	 For	 example,	
public	dissatisfaction	might	serve	as	catalyst	for	referendums	to	occur,	but	a	decrease	
in	 the	 level	 of	 public	 dissatisfaction	 in	 a	 country	 does	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 fewer	
referendums	(Jacobs	2011,	44;	Scarrow	2001).	
	 The	second	justification	for	choosing	a	case-study	approach	over	a	statistical	analysis	
is multifinality (Jacobs	2011,	44).	This	means	that	the	same	factors	can	contribute	to	a	
decision	to	hold	a	referendum	and	to	a	decision	not	to.	For	example,	if	a	country	has	
held	a	referendum	before,	this	can	serve	as	precedent	for	future	referendums	but,	if	
the	outcome	of	the	referendum	was	disadvantageous	to	the	ruling	party,	this	could	also	
constrain	future	referendum	use.	
	 A	third	justification	for	a	case-study	design	is	that	referendums	are	rarely	caused	
by	one	particular	 factor,	but	are	rather	the	outcome	of	a	conjuncture	of	explanatory	
variables	 (Jacobs	 2011,	 44;	 Renwick	 2010).	 Moreover,	 these	 factors	 can	 hardly	 be	
considered	independent	(despite	being	labelled	as	independent	variables).	For	example,	
high	demands	for	a	referendum	on	the	EU	in	a	country	that	has	never	held	a	referendum	
on	the	EU	are	likely	to	be	the	outcome	of	the	fact	that	the	country’s	citizens	have	never	
been	able	to	vote	on	the	EU	in	a	referendum.	In	addition,	whether	demands	actually	
lead	to	a	referendum	might	also	depend	on	whether	the	constitution	provides	for	the	
use	of	referendums,	whether	the	referendum	suits	the	interests	of	the	government,	or	
whether	there	is	a	past	democratic	experience	with	referendums	in	general.	
	 Jacobs’	final	justification	is	equifinality	(Jacobs	2011,	45).	This	means	that	different	
16.	 	This	argument	is	borrowed	from	Jacobs	(2011,	44-45)	who,	in	his	study	on	electoral	and	democratic	
reform,	sets	out	four	justifications	to	choose	a	case-study	design	over	a	statistical	analysis:	
asymmetrical causation, multifinality, conjunctural causation and equifinality.	
3
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paths	can	lead	to	the	institutionalization	or	use	of	referendums,	depending	on	political	
context	and	timing.	In	some	countries,	referendum	legislation	can	be	the	outcome	of	
strong	public	demands,	whereas	in	others	it	can	be	the	outcome	of	opposition	parties	
seeking	to	enhance	their	 influence	on	decision-making.	The	nature	of	the	dependent	
variable	thus	requires	a	research	design	that	allows	the	acquisition	and	analysis	of	in-
depth	knowledge	of	the	political	and	historical	context	in	which	referendums	do	or	do	
not	occur.	This	cannot	be	achieved	by	employing	a	statistical	 large-N	analysis.	 In	 the	
next	section,	I	set	out	the	foundations	on	which	such	a	design	is	built.
3.2.2 The cases in the comparative case-study design
The first	part	of	this	study	entails	a	comparison	of	available referendum provisions and 
all referendums held in the current 28 EU member countries.	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 focus	
on	referendum	provisions	and	use	only	in	countries	that	became	members	of	the EU	
between	1950	and	2014	on	practical	grounds	–	in	order	to	make	use	of	Eurobarometer	
data	–	but	primarily	on	methodological	grounds	–	to	allow	for	a	selection	of	countries	
that	are	comparable	in	terms	of	political	and	cultural	background.	Since	the	aim	of	this	
thesis	 is	 to	explain	 referendum	practice	 in	European	democracies,	 I	need	a	selection	
criterion	 that	 guarantees	 that	 countries	 are	 indeed	 democratic.	Membership	 of	 the	
EU	 is	one	such	criterion.17	This	 rules	out	non-EU	countries	 in	Eastern	Europe	such	as	
Belarus,	Moldova	 and	 Ukraine,	 where	 referendums	 are	 also	 held,	 but	 hardly	 under	
democratic	conditions.
	 Arguably,	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	Central	 and	Eastern	European	 countries	 (CEECs)	 is	
problematic	 in	 terms	 of	 comparability.	 Given	 their	 history	 of	 Soviet	 control,	 their	
divergent	 paths	 towards	 democratic	 consolidation	 and	 their	 subsequent	 differences	
in	political	 culture,	 it	 is	 indeed	difficult	 to	 compare	CEEC	 referendums	with	 those	 in	
Western	Europe.	For	 that	 reason,	 I	have	excluded	 the	Central	and	Eastern	European	
countries	from	the	comparative	case	study	analysis.	However,	I	did	choose	to	include	
the	CEECs	in	the	descriptive	overview	of	referendum	practice	in	chapter 4.	The	reason	
for	 this	 is	 that	 claims	 of	 a	 direct	 democratic	 shift	 in	 Europe	 are	 often	 based	 on	 an	
aggregated	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	 referendums.	 Such	analyses	often	 include	 the	
explosive	use	of	referendums	in	the	CEECs	after	1989.	I	therefore	need	to	include	these	
countries	in	my	analysis	to	assess	the	validity	of	such	claims.	However,	in	this	overview,	
I	disconnect	the	analysis	of	the	fifteen	members	that	were	EU	members	prior	to	2000	
plus	Cyprus	and	Malta	 (hereafter	 the	EU17)	 from	that	of	 the	eleven	post-communist	
accession	countries	that	joined	after	2000.
	 Of	course,	the	criterion	of	being	an	EU	member	country	rules	out	several	countries	
that	 are	 considered	 democratic	 and	 comparable	 to	 Western	 EU	 countries,	 such	 as	
Switzerland,	Iceland,	Liechtenstein	and	Norway.	I	exclude	these	countries	nevertheless	
17.	 	This	criterion,	however,	remains	ambiguous,	since	being	a	member	of	the	EU	is	not	necessarily	a		
guarantee	of	democratic	practice.	One	could,	for	example,	question	whether	the	referendums	held	in	
France	under	De	Gaulle	completely	fulfilled	democratic	standards.		
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because	I	need	to	select	countries	that	can	be	considered	susceptible	to	similar	pressures.	
One	 of	 the	 assumptions	 that	 serve	 as	 starting	 point	 for	much	 referendum	 research	
is	 that	 EU	 decision-making	 creates	 a	 mechanism	 that	 encourages	 referendum	 use.	
Scholars	have	come	to	this	conclusion	on	the	basis	of	the	large	number	of	referendums	
held	on	EU	issues,	which	they	have	taken	as	indication	that	apparently	such	decisions	
need	extra	public	 legitimization.	For	example,	Closa	argues	that	 ‘the	European	arena	
nurtured	 discourses	 in	 favour	 of	 referendums	 for	 ratifying	 a	 Constitution	 and	 some	
states	 provided	 a	 paradigm	 of	 this	 decision	 that	 could	 be	 appropriated	 by	 national	
actors’	 (Closa	 2007,	 1316).	 As	 there	 is	 considerable	 variation	 between	 EU	 countries	
regarding	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	held,	such	a	process	of	diffusion	
certainly	 does	 not	 affect	 all	 countries	 and	 hence	 this	 group	 of	 EU	 countries	 allows	
analysis	of	whether,	and	under	what	conditions,	such	norm-setting	by	the	EU	indeed	
applied.	
	 A	study	on	referendums	that	does	not	include	Switzerland	may	seem	remarkable.	
Due	to	its	strong	institutionalization	and	frequent	use	of	referendums,	Switzerland	is	
very	often	referred	to	as	an	extraordinary	case	and	closest	to	the	ideal-type	model	of	
direct	democracy.	As	Vernon	Bogdanor	argues,	‘Switzerland	is,	indeed,	the	only	country	
in	 Europe	 that	 Rousseau	 would	 have	 regarded	 as	 genuinely	 democratic’	 (Bogdanor	
1994,	24).	Switzerland	 introduced	referendum	provisions	as	early	as	1848.	Currently,	
there	are	federal	provisions	for	mandatory	referendums,	citizen-initiated	referendums	
(both	 initiative	and	veto)	and	 legislative	minority	 referendums.18	Moreover,	between	
1950	and	2014,	over	450	federal-level	votes	were	held,	mostly	initiatives	or	mandatory	
referendums.	 Including	 such	 an	 outlier	 in	 a	 comparative	 design	 does	 not	match	 the	
basic	aim	of	this	study,	namely	to	‘test’	different	theories	as	to	why	referendums	are	
institutionalized	and	used,	and	why	this	is	done	more	frequently	in	some	countries	than	
in	others.	
	 A	 first	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 referendum	 use	 in	 Switzerland	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	
country’s	 exceptionally	 early	 and	 recurrent	 experience	with	 direct	 and	 participatory	
institutions.	 The	 origins	 of	 Swiss	 referendums	 should	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	
communal	 forms	 of	 government	 that	 characterized	 the	 Italian	 part	 of	 Switzerland	
in	 the	 thirteenth	 century,	 the	 French	 Revolution	 and	 Switzerland’s	 subsequent	 first	
constitution,	which	 included	 provisions	 for	 the	 use	 of	mandatory	 referendums,	 and	
thirdly,	the	‘Movement	of	Regeneration’	that	was	founded	after	the	French	Revolution	
and	which	strongly	promoted	direct	and	participatory	democracy	(Trechsel	and	Kriesi	
1996,	185-186).	Although	many	countries	in	the	EU	were	exposed	to	similar	influences,	
none	 experienced	 such	 an	 exceptional	 path	 of	 conjunctural	 developments	 in	 which	
direct participatory	institutions	were	promoted.	
	 A	second	reason	why	I	perceive	referendum	practice	in	Swiss	as	too	divergent	to	
include	in	my	comparative	research	design	is	that	the	use	of	referendums	in	Switzerland	
18.	 	A	legislative	minority	referendum	can	be	triggered	by	eight	cantons,	see	article	141	of	the	Swiss	
Constitution.
3
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is	embedded	precisely	in	an	exceptionally	strong	legal	basis.	Indeed,	a	simple	answer	to	
the	question	of	why	Switzerland	has	held	so	many	referendums	is	that	they	are	either	
mandatory	in	many	cases,19	or	can	relatively	easily	be	triggered	by	citizens.20	 In	most	
European	countries,	referendums	are	primarily	triggered	by	political	elites	and	hence,	
when	aiming	to	explain	why	political	elites	do	this	more	often	in	some	countries	than	in	
others,	the	comparison	with	Switzerland	is	not	very	useful.
 The second,	 explanatory,	 part	 of	 my	 research	 is	 based	 on	 five	 country	 studies:	
France,	Denmark,	the	United	Kingdom,	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands.	This	selection	of	
countries	is	based	on	the	comparative	overview	of	available	referendum	provisions	and	
referendum	use	in	28	EU	countries	that	I	present	in	chapter 4.	Countries	were	classified	
according	 to	whether	 referendum	 legislation	 is	provided	 for	 in	 the	 constitution,	and	
whether	referendums	were	used	frequently	or	only	to	a	limited	extent	between	1950	
and	2014.	This	analysis	in	chapter 4 reveals three clusters of countries (see table 3.2):	
1)	 countries	 where	 the	 constitution	 provides	 for	 national	 referendums	 and	 where	
referendums	are	held	relatively	frequently;	2)	countries	where	the	constitution	provides	
for	national	referendums	and	where	they	are	used	only	to	a	limited	extent;	3)	countries	
where	the	constitution	does	not	make	provision	for	the	use	of	national	referendums	and	
there	is	limited	ad	hoc	use	(or	not	at	all,	in	the	case	of	Germany).	The	analysis	revealed	
no	cluster	of	countries	with	no	constitutional	referendum	provisions	and	frequent	ad	
hoc	use	of	referendums.	
	 Following	 George	 and	 Bennett	 (2004,	 5),	 I	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 comparative	 case-
study	design	with	a	diverse	 set	of	embedded	cases	–	namely	 referendum	 legislation	
and	 referendum	 instances	 in	 different	 countries	 –	 allows	me	 to	 test	 my	 theoretical	
propositions.	Such	an	embedded	research	design	also	solves	the	problem	of	‘too	many	
variables,	 too	 few	cases’	 (Landman	2003,	40-43).	 In	particular,	 this	design	allows	 for	
a	combination	of	three	sets	of	comparisons:	within-case comparisons	 (i.e.	comparing	
referendums	within	a	country),	within-cluster comparisons	 (i.e.	comparing	similarities	
in	referendum	practice	between	two	contextually	different	countries)	and	cross-cluster 
comparisons	 (i.e.	 comparing	 differences	 in	 referendum	 practice	 across	 contextually	
similar	countries).	The	selection	of	cases	 in	each	type	of	comparison	depends	on	the	
underlying	logic	for	comparison.	
For	the	within-case	comparisons,	I	select	the	available	provisions	for	holding	national	
referendums	as	well	as	all	formal	referendum	pledges	approved	by	the	actors	whose	
consent	is	required	to	trigger	a	referendum.	Hence,	this	also	includes	referendums	that	
were	scheduled	but	not	held	(for	example	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	after	
the	French	and	Dutch	rejection).		
19.	 	In	the	event	of	a	total	or	partial	revision	of	the	federal	constitution;	in	order	to	join	a	collective	
security	or	supranational	organization;	to	sign	international	treaties;			or	to	introduce	federal	
legislation	for	which	a	constitutional	basis	is	lacking.
20.	 	A	citizens’	veto	can	be	triggered	by	50,000	electors,	which	is	less	than	1	per	cent	of	the	total	
electorate;	a	citizens’	initiative	can	be	triggered	by	100,000	electors.
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Table 3.2: National referendums in three clusters of countries, 1950-201421
Constitutional availability No constitutional availability
Frequent use
Cluster	1
Denmark,	France,	Italy,	Ireland
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary
None
Limited use
Cluster	2
Austria,	Finland,	Greece,	Luxembourg,
Malta,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden,	UK
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Poland, Romania
Cluster	3
Belgium,	Cyprus,21	Germany,	Netherlands
The	within-cluster comparisons	 follow	 the	 logic	of	 an	MDSD.	For	each	comparison,	 I	
select	 countries	 that	 score	 similarly	 on	 the	dependent	 variable	 (when	quantitatively	
defined)	 and	 that	 vary	 in	 many	 other	 aspects	 except	 for	 the	 country-level	 factors	
that	are	expected	to	affect	variation	on	the	dependent	variable	(see	table 3.3 for an 
overview	of	scores	on	the	dependent	factors	and	some	of	the	country-level	factors).22 
For	an	operationalization	of	all	variables,	see	section 3.3.	Although	type	of	democracy	
was	expected	 to	 impact	on	 referendum	practice,	 I	 nevertheless	 chose	 this	 factor	 as	
a	 criterion	 to	 select	 the	 five	 countries.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 comparative	
overview	 of	 referendum	 practice	 in	 the	 EU28	 rules	 out	 type of democracy as a 
determinant	of	variation	in	referendum	use:	both	the	first	and	second	cluster	contain	
majoritarian	and	consensus	democracies.	Hence,	type	of	democracy	does	not	in	itself	
appear	to	be	an	important	determinant	of	whether	a	country	makes	frequent	or	limited	
use	 of	 referendums	 once	 these	 countries	 have	 constitutional	 provisions	 for	 the	 use	
of	 referendums	 (it	 does,	 however,	 affect	 the	 types	 of	 referendum	 provided	 for	 and	
used).	Therefore,	a	comparison	of	countries	with	a	different	democratic	polity	(rather	
than	choosing	one	country	as	representative	case)	allows	the	country-level	factors	to	
be	 identified	that	are	shared	among	these	 institutionally	different	countries	and	that	
can	account	for	the	similar	outcome	(and	which	are,	assumedly,	different	in	the	other	
clusters).	
21.	 	This	study	covers	the	Greek	part	of	Cyprus,	the	Republic	of	Cyprus.	The	northern	part	of	the	island	is	
under	Turkish	control.
22.	 	I	have	not	included	all	country-level	factors,	since	some	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis	
(depending	on	a	particular	referendum).	For	example,	the	number	of	veto	players	is	based	on	how	
easy	it	is,	in	general,	to	change	the	constitution	and	to	pledge	a	referendum,	but	this	also	depends	
on	political	constellations.	In	addition,	I	have	not	included	actual	referendum	demands	from	citizens	
(for	example,	in	the	form	of	petitions)	or	fluctuations	in	political	dissatisfaction	and	political	interests	
at	time	of	a	referendum	pledge.	Hence,	table	3.3	serves	to	give	a	general	idea	of	cross-country	
variations	in	order	to	select	cases	and	is	not	explanatory.			
3
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Table 3.3: Overview of scores on the dependent variables and country-level factors
Dependent variables23 Independent country-level variables
Institutionalization Use Type of 
democracy
Veto players Experience Public 
demands24
France Yes High Majoritarian Medium	|	Low25 Yes High
Denmark Yes High Consensus Medium	|	Low26 Yes High
UK Yes Low Majoritarian Medium	|	Medium27 No Average
Sweden Yes Low Consensus Medium	|	Medium28 Yes Low
Netherlands No No/
Low
Consensus High	|	High29 Yes Low
23.	 	See	Appendices	1-2	for	an	overview	of	referendum	provisions	and	use.
24.	 	As	there	is	no	longitudinal	cross-country	data	that	measures	support	for	referendums,	here	I	only	
used	the	data	from	the	ISSP	Citizenship	module	2004.	This	survey	asked	respondents	whether	they	
agreed	with	the	statement	‘Referendums	are	a	good	way	to	decide	important	political	questions’;	
high	=	above	EU-average;	low=below	EU-average.	In	section	3.3.2	I	conceptualize	more	proxies	to	
infer	the	potential	demand	for	referendums.
25.	 	In	France,	amending	the	constitution	requires	majority	support	in	both	the	National	Assembly	and	
the	Senate,	as	well	as	approval	by	either	a	referendum	or	by	a	three-fifths	majority	in	Congress	.	
Hence,	the	number	of	veto	points	is	relatively	high.	However,	given	the	French	majoritarian	semi-
presidential	system,	the	number	of	partisan	players	is	relatively	low.	Hence,	I	consider	the	number	
of	veto	players	in	the	process	of	institutionalization	as	medium.	As	triggering	a	referendum	only	
requires	the	support	of	the	president,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	process	of	
triggering	a	referendum	as	low.	
26.	 	In	Denmark,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	in	terms	of	institutionalization	as	medium,	as	
amending	the	constitution	requires	the	approval	of	a	simple	majority	in	the	Folketing,	the	Danish	
parliament,	in	two	readings,	with	elections	in	between,	and	as	low	in	terms	of	use	since	referendums	
are	triggered	by	the	constitution	and	can	be	initiated	by	political	minorities	as	well.
27.	 	In	the	UK,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	process	of	institutionalizing	and	triggering	
a	referendum	as	medium.	Both	the	adoption	of	referendum	provisions	and	the	triggering	of	a	
referendum	requires	support	of	a	majority	of	MPs	(yet,	usually	on	one	party)	in	two	houses	of	
parliament.	
28.	 	In	Sweden,	there	are	potentially	more	partisan	veto	players	than	in	the	UK,	given	its	multiparty	
and	proportional	system,	but	fewer	non-partisan	veto	players	given	its	unicameral	parliament.	
Hence,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	also	as	medium.	While	in	1922	–	when	the	advisory	
legislative	majority	referendum	was	introduced	–	Sweden	had	a	bicameral	parliament	and	thus	a	
potentially	higher	number	of	veto	points,	in	1980	–	when	the	legislative	minority	referendum	was	
introduced	–	Sweden	had	a	unicameral	parliament,	which	decreased	the	number	of	veto	points.	In	
both	readings,	a	reform	is	adopted	with	a	simple	majority	(rather	than	a	qualified	majority,	such	as	
in	the	Netherlands).	Since	a	referendum	can	also	be	triggered	by	political	minorities,	but	only	on	
the	constitution,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	process	of	triggering	a	referendum	as	
medium.
29.	 	In	the	Netherlands,	amending	the	constitution	requires	approval	of	both	houses	of	parliament	in	
two	readings,	with	elections	in	between.	In	the	first	reading,	the	amendment	needs	to	be	approved	
by	a	simple	majority;	in	the	second	reading,	it	needs	to	be	approved	by	a	two-thirds	majority.	A	
referendum	can	only	be	triggered	ad	hoc,	which	requires	the	support	of	two	houses	of	parliament.	
Given	the	fragmented	character	of	Dutch	politics,	I	consider	the	number	of	veto	players	for	both	the	
institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	as	high.
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	 In	chapter 5,	I	analyse	referendums	held	in	France	and	Denmark,	as	a	majoritarian	
and	 a	 consensus	 democracy	 with	 constitutional	 referendum	 provisions	 and	 where	
referendums	 have	 been	 relatively	 frequently	 used	 in	 the	 period	 under	 investigation	
(1950-2014).	 In	chapter 6,	 I	 analyse	 referendum	practice	 in	 the	UK	and	Sweden	–	as	
a	majoritarian	 and	 a	 consensus	 democracy	where	 referendums	 are	 institutionalized	
but	 where	 they	 have	 been	 held	 only	 sporadically.	 The	 difference	 between	 France	
(10	 referendums)	 and	 Sweden	 (5	 referendums)	 is	 not	 remarkably	 great,	 especially	
considering	that	four	of	the	French	referendums	were	triggered	by	one	president	(De	
Gaulle)	and	three	votes	were	held	on	France’s	overseas	territories	(which	Sweden	does	
not	have).	Of	course,	any	selection	of	countries	remains	to	a	 large	extent	arbitrary.	 I	
nevertheless	compare	France	with	Denmark,	since	both	have	provisions	for	mandatory	
and	optional	referendums	(whereas	in	Sweden	only	optional	referendums	are	provided	
for),	and	because	in	these	two	countries	referendums	have	been	held	on	a	more	regular	
basis	(in	France	at	least	one	referendum	was	held	in	each	decade,	whereas	in	Sweden,	
two	votes	were	held	in	the	1950s,	but	another	was	not	held	until	1980).  
	 Finally,	in	chapter 7,	I	analyse	referendum	practice	in	the	Netherlands,	as	a	consensus	
democracy	that	–	at	least	until	July	2015	–	does	not	have	legislation	for	holding	national	
referendums	and	where	referendums	are	rare.	In	the	third	cluster	of	countries,	Belgium,	
Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 share	 some	 similar	 polity	 characteristics.	 Except	 for	
Cyprus,	 these	 are	 consensus	 democracies,	 characterized	 by	 relatively	 high	 levels	 of	
corporatism,	 a	 federalist	 (Belgium	 and	 Germany)	 or	 decentralized	 (the	 Netherlands)	
governing	structure,	a	bicameral	parliament,	and	a	relatively	rigid	constitution.	These	
factors	 could	 well	 account	 for	 the	 absence	 of	 national-level	 referendum	 legislation	
in	 these	 countries.	 Hence,	 no	 additional	 within-cluster	 comparison	 is	 necessary	 to	
assess	 whether	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 referendum	 provisions	 and	 use	 is	 absent	 in	
these	countries	applies	 in	different	contexts.	As	Cyprus	 is	classified	as	a	majoritarian	
democracy,	 a	 comparison	 with	 Cyprus	 would	 have	 allowed	 me	 to	 examine	 why	
referendum	 legislation	has	not	been	adopted	 in	 two	different	 institutional	 contexts.	
In	addition,	it	would	also	have	been	interesting	to	examine	under	which	conditions	a	
referendum	is	used	in	a	context	that	is	not	familiar	with	referendums.	However,	given	
the	 exceptional	 political	 context	 of	 it	 being	 a	 divided	 country,	 I	 do	 not	 perceive	 a	
comparison	with	Cyprus	suitable.	Moreover,	the	only	referendum	held	in	Cyprus	was	
triggered	by	the	UN,	and	this	is	not	comparable	with	motivations	elsewhere.
FRANCE	AND	DENMARK.	 The	 constitutions	of	 both	 France	and	Denmark	provide	 for	
the	holding	of	national-level	referendums.	Moreover,	both	prescribe	that	a	referendum	
should	be	held	in	case	of	constitutional	revision.	In	both	countries,	referendums	have	
been	organized	on	a	more	regular	basis	than	in	most	other	EU	countries.	Countries	with	
comparable	referendum	practice	are	Ireland,	Italy,	Lithuania,	Slovenia,	Slovakia,	Hungary	
and	Latvia.	Of	 these,	 I	have	excluded	 the	CEECs	due	 to	 their	diverging	path	 towards	
3
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democratic	consolidation.	In	addition,	I	have	also	ruled	out	Ireland	and	Italy,	as	these	are	
rather	exceptional	cases	that	are	not	particularly	suitable	for	explaining	cross-national	
differences	in	referendum	practice.	The	large	number	of	Irish	referendums	is	due	to	the	
high	number	of	constitutional	revisions	that,	according	to	the	Irish	constitution,	require	
approval	by	popular	vote,	while	Italy	is	the	only	old	EU	country	where	a	high	number	of	
abrogative	citizens’	vetoes	explain	the	exceptionally	high	referendum	frequency.	
	 France	and	Denmark	differ	in	terms	of	democracy	type.	France	can	be	classified	as	a	
semi-presidential	system	that	shares	many	of	Lijphart’s	majoritarian	elements	(Lijphart	
1999).	The	French	constitution	outlines	a	dual	executive	composed	of	 the	president,	
whose	legitimacy	is	derived	from	popular	direct	elections,	and	a	prime	minister,	who	
is	 supported	by	 a	majority	 of	 the	members	 in	 parliament.	 For	 a	 long	time,	 the	 run-
off	voting	system	for	the	legislative	and	presidential	elections,	in	which	candidates	are	
chosen	on	 the	basis	of	majority,	or	plurality,	 rule,	 resulted	 in	a	bipolar	party	 system	
consisting	of	a	centre-left	bloc	and	a	centre-right	bloc	competing	for	office	(Cole	2003,	
12).	By	 contrast,	Denmark	 is	 characterized	as	 typical	 consensual	democracy,	marked	
by	 a	 multiparty	 system,	 an	 electoral	 system	 based	 on	 proportional	 representation	
(PR)	and	a	balanced	relationship	between	the	legislature	and	the	executive.	Denmark’s	
parliamentary	tradition	is	characterized	by	the	principle	of	negative	parliamentarianism,	
which	implies	that	governments	are	not	dependent	on	majority	support	in	parliament	
and	 that	minority	 governments	 are	 therefore	often	 formed.	 This	means	 that	Danish	
decision-making	 is	 strongly	 consensus-	 and	 opposition-oriented.	 By	 ruling	 out	 these	
differences,	I	can	analyse	what	similar	factors	lead	to	the	fact	that	referendums	have	
been	held	in	both	countries	on	a	rather	frequent	basis.
	 As	 they	 are	 two	 different	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 type	 of	 democracy,	 comparing	
France	and	Denmark	allows	me	to	distil	the	corresponding	factors	that	might	explain	
why	referendums	are	held	in	these	two	countries	more	frequently	than	in	most	of	their	
European	counterparts,	regardless	of	the	type	of	referendum	provided	for	per	se.	As	
shown	 in	table 3.3,	such	corresponding	factors	that	could	–	but	not	necessarily	do	–	
account	for	the	similar	outcome	include	the	relatively	few	veto	players	in	the	process	
of	institutionalizing	and	triggering	referendums,	past	referendum	experience	(albeit	in	
France	not	an	overall	democratic	one)	and	relatively	high	levels	of	public	support	for	
referendums.	
  
THE	 UNITED	 KINGDOM	 AND	 SWEDEN.	 The	 second	 within-cluster comparison	 that	
follows	a	MDSD	logic	is	between	the	UK	and	Sweden,	two	countries	that	belong	to	the	
cluster	of	countries	where	referendums	are	institutionalized	but	held	only	sporadically.	
Other	 countries	 in	 this	 cluster	 are	 Spain,	 Austria,	 Malta,	 Portugal,	 Finland,	 Greece,	
Luxembourg,	 Poland,	 Romania,	 Estonia,	 Croatia,	 and	 Bulgaria.	 The	 countries	 in	 this	
cluster	 also	 score	 differently	 in	 terms	 of	 Lijphart’s	 majoritarian	 versus	 consensus	
divide,	with	Spain,	Greece,	Malta	and	the	UK	representing	(although	in	varying	degrees)	
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majoritarian	 countries,	 and	 Finland,	 Luxembourg	 and	 Sweden	 being	 consensus	
democracies.	
	 The	choice	for	the	UK	and	Sweden,	rather	than	the	other	countries	in	this	cluster,	
is	less	straightforward	than	the	choice	for	France	and	Denmark,	as	the	second	cluster	
in	principle	provided	more	comparable	cases.	I	have	chosen	the	UK	and	Sweden	on	the	
grounds	that	both	countries	have	held	an	EU-membership	referendum	but	have	also	
experienced	one	or	more	non-EU	related	referendums,	and	on	the	grounds	that	in	both	
countries	referendums	can	only	be	initiated	by	parliament	(for	that	reason,	it	would	not	
have	been	valid	to	compare	the	UK	with	Austria	–	where	mandatory	referendums	are	
also	provided	for).	Nevertheless,	the	choice	for	Sweden	is	somewhat	problematic,	since	
it	did	not	join	the	EU	until	1994,	which	obviously	explains	why,	prior	to	that	time,	no	
referendums	were	held	on	the	EU	(as	compared	to	Denmark	and	France,	for	example).	
Yet,	the	fact	that	Sweden	held	only	two	EU	referendums	(accession	and	euro)	and	no	
referendum	 on	 subsequent	 EU	 treaty	 reforms	 (Nice,	 TCE	 and	 Lisbon)	 suggests	 that	
referendums	on	‘Europe’	are	by	no	means	a	recurring	event	.	Hence,	this	choice	does	
not	bias	the	comparison	as	such.	
	 To	 a	 significant	 extent,	 the	 UK	 is	 an	 ambiguous	 case,	 as	 referendum	 provisions	
were	not	 	 formalized	until	2000.	This	 could	well	be	 the	 reason	why	 the	UK	has	held	
only	 two	 nationwide	 referendums.	 However,	 given	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 an	 uncodified	
constitution,	 referendums	 could	 always	 be	 triggered	 by	 parliamentary	 act.	 More	
importantly,	 recurring	 referendums	have	been	held	 in	 the	 separate	 countries	 of	 the	
UK	 on	 issues	 concerning	 devolution.	 However,	 although	 I	 devote	 some	 attention	 to	
these	referendums	in	the	UK	case-study	chapter,	I	exclude	them	from	the	cross-country	
analysis	on	the	grounds	that	these	referendums,	and	the	reasons	with	which	they	are	
pledged,	are	not	comparable	to	referendums	pledged	or	held	in	sovereign states.	Thus,	
when	considering	only	referendums	held	between	1950	and	2014	that	have	applied	to	
the	UK	as	a	whole,	the	total	number	is	two. 
	 The	 UK	 and	 Sweden	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 type	 of	
democracy.	For	a	long	time,	the	British	Single	Member	Plurality	(SMP)	–	or	‘first-past-
the-post’	–	electoral	system	enabled	the	dominance	of	two	major	political	parties	 in	
competing	for	office	–	the	centre-right	Conservative	Party	and	the	centre-left	Labour	
Party	(Lijphart	1999).	This	electoral	system,	at	least	until	2010,	led	to	one	party	gaining	
a	majority	 in	 the	House	 of	 Commons,	 and	 hence,	 being	 able	 to	 form	 a	 government	
on	its	own.	This	stands	in	sharp	contrast	with	Sweden.	Sweden	is	considered	a	typical	
consensus	country,	with	a	PR	electoral	system	that	has	resulted	in	a	multi-party	system.	
Yet,	the	notion	of	negative	parliamentarism	–	signifying	that	new	governments	are	not	
dependent	on	the	majority	approval	of	the	Riksdag,	the	Swedish	parliament,	and	can	
stay	on	as	long	as	they	do	not	get	a	vote	of	no-confidence	against	(absolute	majority)	
them	 (Bergman	 1993;	 Louwerse	 2014)	 –	 has	 led	 to	 a	 tendency	 to	 form	 single-party	
minority	 governments.	 As	 in	 Denmark,	 the	 government	 is	 strongly	 dependent	 on	
3
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seeking	ad	hoc	coalitions	with	opposition	parties.	
	 This	places	the	referendum	in	a	quite	different	institutional	context	than	in	the	UK.	
That	allows	an	examination	of	explanatory	 factors	 that	apply	across	 the	 institutional	
context,	and	 to	distil	 the	common	denominators	 that	could	–	but	not	necessarily	do	
–	explain	why	referendums	are	held	with	lower	frequency	in	these	countries	than,	for	
example,	in	France	and	Denmark.	As	shown	in	table 3.3,	such	common	denominators	
are	the	relatively	higher	number	of	veto	players	involved	in	the	process	of	triggering	a	
referendum	than	in	France	and	Denmark,	and	relatively	lower	levels	of	public	support	
for	referendums.
THE	 NETHERLANDS.	 The	 Netherlands	 represents	 an	 exceptional	 cluster	 of	 EU	
countries	 (also	 consisting	 of	 Belgium,	 Cyprus	 and	 Germany)	 where	 the	 constitution	
does	 not	 contain	 provisions	 for	 holding	 national	 referendums.	 For	 that	 reason,	 only	
one	national	referendum	has	been	held	 in	the	Netherlands	between	1950	and	2014,	
namely	in	2005	on	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty,	although	the	country	did	experience	
a	number	of	 referendums	 in	 the	 late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	centuries.	The	
institutionalization	of	referendums	has	been	a	recurrent	issue	on	the	political	agenda,	
and	several	initiatives	to	implement	it	have	failed.	The	Netherlands	therefore	provides	
an	 interesting	 explorative	 case	 to	 analyse	 such	 failures,	 and	 to	 ‘check’	whether	 the	
conclusions	 drawn	 from	 the	 two-country	 comparisons	 are	 valid.	 After	 all,	 if	 the	
conclusions	 are	 externally	 valid,	 it	 could	 be	 assumed	 that	 the	 factors	 that	 explain	
why	referendum	legislation	was	adopted	in	the	other	four	countries	are	absent	in	the	
Netherlands.	
	 Moreover,	in	contrast	to	Belgium,	Cyprus	and	Germany,	the	Netherlands	provides	
an	interesting	case	to	examine	why	breakthroughs	did	occur	at	certain	moments,	like	
in	2004,	when	parliament	approved	a	bill	to	allow	for	the	referendum	on	the	European	
Constitutional	Treaty	or,	more	recently,	parliamentary	approval	of	a	bill	in	2014	allowing	
for	 the	 organization	 of	 advisory	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 Moreover,	 since	 the	
Netherlands	has	a	multiparty	and	proportional	system,	it	provides	an	excellent	example	
to	analyse	some	of	the	theoretical	assumptions	about	the	role	of	party	ideology	during	
referendum	debates	and	‘breakthroughs’.		
	 Besides	the	within-cluster	comparisons,	my	research	design	also	allows	for	a	cross-
country cross-cluster	 comparison.	 This	 comparison	 of	 similar	 countries	 that	 score	
differently	in	terms	of	referendum	practice	follows	the	logic	of	a	most	similar	systems	
design	(MSSD):	it	is	aimed	at	identifying	the	factors	that	contribute	to	different	outcomes	
in	similar	contexts.	Thus,	 to	 increase	the	validity	of	my	findings,	 in	 the	conclusion	of	
this	book	I	draw	comparisons	between	countries	with	a	different	outcome	but	that	are	
comparable	in	terms	of	type	of	democracy,	in	order	to	identify	the	factors	that	account	
for	the	different	outcome.	Such	an	exercise	serves	as	‘check’	to	see	whether	countries	
with	a	different	outcome	but	similar	institutional	context	indeed	‘score’	differently	in	
terms	of	the	explanatory	factors	identified	in	the	within-cluster	comparisons.	While	the	
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within-cluster	comparisons	are	conducted	explicitly	in	separate	chapters	(chapters 5-7),	
the	cross-cluster	comparison	is	performed	more	implicitly	in	the	conclusion	of	this	book,	
and	is	based	on	the	findings	of	the	country	studies.	The	combination	of	different	types	
of	comparisons	that	are	either	based	on	identifying	similarities	(MDSD)	or	identifying	
differences	(MSSD)	allows	me	to	provide	a	comprehensive	story	of	which	factors	are	
likely	to	affect	referendum	practice,	and	how	it	varies	among	countries.	
3.3 CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION
After	having	outlined	my	research	design	and	case	selection,	 in	 this	section	 I	outline	
the	 conceptualization	 and	 operationalization	 of	 the	 dependent	 variables	 –	 the	
institutionalization	and	use	of	national	referendums	–	and	independent	variables	–	type	
of	 democracy,	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	
values	and	strategic	interests.	
3.3.1 The dependent variables
My	dependent	variable	 is	 two-fold,	 comprising	 the	 institutionalization of referendum 
provisions and the democratic use of referendums.	 This	 distinction	 between	 the	
availability	of	constitutional	referendum	provisions	and	their	use	is	important.	Although	
I	 expect	 the	 independent	 variables	 to	 affect	 both	 institutionalization	 and	 use,	 I	 also	
expect	those	effects	to	come	in	different	degrees,	because	having	a	constitution	that	
provides	 for	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums	 is	 certainly	 not	 the	 same	 as	 actually	
using	these	provisions.	Both	the	institutionalization	of	referendum	provisions	and	use	
of	referendums	have	a	quantitative	and	a	qualitative	component	(see	table 3.4 for an 
overview).	
3
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Table 3.4: Conceptualization of referendum institutionalization and use
Dependent variables Quantitative component Qualitative component
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Availability	of	national	
referendum	provisions	in	
constitution	(yes/no)
1.	 Mandatory	referendum,	legislative	majority	
referendum,	legislative	minority	referendum,	
presidential	referendum	and	citizen-initiated	
referendum
2.	 Decision-promotive	referendum/decision-
controlling	referendum
3.	 Referendum	with	quorum/referendum	
without	quorum
4.	 Referendum	on	any	type	of	legislation;	
referendum	on	major	political	issues;	subject	
exclusions
5.	 Binding	referendum	/	advisory	referendum
USE
Democratic	use	of	national	
referendums	(yes/no	+	
frequency)
1.	 Mandatory	referendum,	legislative	majority	
referendum,	legislative	minority	referendum,	
presidential	referendum	and	citizens-initiated	
referendum
2.	 Decision-promotive	referendum/decision-
controlling	referendum
3.	 Referendum	with	quorum/referendum	
without	quorum
4.	 Referendum	on	any	type	of	legislation;	
referendum	on	major	political	issues;	subject	
exclusions
5.	 Binding	referendum	/	advisory	referendum
Besides	whether	 referendums	are	 constitutionally	 provided	 for	 (i.e.	 yes	 or	 no),	 both	
referendum	 institutionalization	and	use	also	possess	a	qualitative	component,	which	
entails	the	available	types	of	referendum	and	the	associated	procedures.	In	chapter 2,	I	
broadly	distinguished	five	different	types	of	referendum	on	the	basis	of	who	triggers	the	
vote:	mandatory,	presidential,	legislative	majority	and	legislative	minority	referendums,	
and	citizen-initiated	referendums.	Besides	analysing	whether	referendum	provisions	are	
available	in	a	country,	what	types	of	referendum	available	is	also	assessed.	Moreover,	
in	addition	to	explaining	why	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	are	or	are	not	used	
(the	quantitative	component),	why	certain	types	are	institutionalized	and	used	and	not	
others	(i.e.	the	qualitative	component)	is	also	assessed.	In	addition,	it	is	also	important	
to	take	into	account	the	exact	provisions	when	it	comes	to	the	nature	of	the	legislation	
and	use.	 These	 relate	 to	 four	 additional	 aspects:	 1)	 The	 function	of	 the	 referendum	
(decision-promotive	 or	 decision-controlling);	 2)	 The	 applicability	 of	 quorums;	 3)	 The	
issues	on	which	referendums	can	be	held;	and	4)	The	effect	of	the	outcome	(binding	
or	 advisory).	 These	 questions	 are	 important	 in	 determining	whether	 there	 is	 a	 shift	
from	national	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	
participation.
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	 The	 same	 differentiation	 applies	 to	 referendum	 use,	 which	 entails	 not	 only	 the	
frequency	with	which	 referendums	are	used	but	also	 the	 types	used.	Of	course,	 the	
nature	of	 the	 referendum	provisions	 and	nature	of	 referendum	use	 largely	 interact:	
after	 all,	 mandatory	 referendums	 are	 held	 precisely	 because	 they	 need	 to	 be	 held.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	having	a	constitutional	requirement	does	not	necessarily	
lead	 to	 this	 type	 of	 referendum	 being	 held:	Malta	 and	 Spain,	 for	 example	 –	 where	
the	constitution	provides	 for	a	mandatory	 referendum	 in	 the	event	of	constitutional	
revision	–	have	not	held	referendums	on	the	basis	of	this	 legislation,	while	 in	Ireland	
mandatory	referendums	are	held	on	a	regular	basis.	It	therefore	makes	sense	to	make	
this	differentiation	in	the	case-study	analyses,	which	allows	me	to	analyse	the	effect	of	
referendum	type	on	actual	use.	Though	I	mainly	focus	on	explaining	actual	referendums,	
for	a	comprehensive	explanation	of	referendum	use	it	is	relevant	to	include	instances	
in	which	referendums	are	 formally	pledged	but	not	held.	The	within-country	studies	
allow	for	this	addition	and	hence,	in	chapter	5-7,	I	also	include	some	instances	in	which	
a	referendum	was	formally	pledged	(i.e.	meaning	that	there	has	been	a	formal	proposal	
to	organize	a	referendum	voted	upon	by	parliament	or	approved	by	the	government)	
but	eventually	not	held.	
3.3.2 The independent variables  
In	chapter	2,	I	outlined	six	factors	that	are	assumed	to	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	
and	use	of	referendums:	type	of	democracy,	number	of	veto	players,	past	referendum	
experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	 values	 and	 strategic	 interests.	 These	 variables	
are	measured	 on	 different	 levels:	 type	 of	 democracy,	 number	 of	 veto	 players,	 past	
referendum	 experience	 and	 public	 demands	 are	 measured	 at	 country	 level,	 while	
political	values	and	strategic	interests	are	measured	at	referendum	level.	This	section	
provides	an	overview	of	the	six	variables	and	their	conceptualization	(see	table 3.5 for 
an	overview).	
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Table 3.5: Overview of independent variables and conceptualization
Variables Conceptualization
Country level
Type	of	democracy - Majoritarian	versus	consensus	democracy	
Veto	players - Number	of	actors	(partisan	and	non-partisan)	necessary	to	approve	a	bill	to	
institutionalize	referendum	legislation	
- Number	 of	 potential	 actors	 (partisan	 and	 non-partisan)	 necessary	 to	
approve	a	bill	to	trigger	a	referendum
Past	referendum	
experience
- Availability	of	pre-WWII	referendum	provisions	(yes/no)	
- Pre-WWII	referendum	use	(yes/no)	
- Referendum	precedent	(yes/no)	
Public	demands - Referendum	provisions	or	use	demanded	by	public	petition	(yes/no)
- Average	level	of	support	for	referendums	
- Average	level	of	support	for	a	particular	referendum	
- Average	level	of	democratic	dissatisfaction	(dissatisfaction	with	democracy,	
distrust	political	parties,	distrust	parliament,	distrust	government)	
- Average	level	of	Euroscepticism	(no	support	for	EU	membership;	no	benefits	
from	EU	membership;	dissatisfaction	with	EU	democracy;	distrust	of	EU)
- Average	level	of	political	interest	
Referendum level
Political	values	 - Assignment	of	instrumental	values	to	referendums	(accountability,	
representation,	simplicity,	legitimacy,	public	satisfaction)	
- Assignment	of	intrinsic	values	to	referendums	(involvement,	empowerment,	
participation,	self-expression,	individual	development)
- Assignment	of	populist	values	to	referendums	(anti-elitism,	anti-pluralism,	
reflection	of	will	of	the	ordinary	people)
Strategic	interests - The	presence	of	strategic	interests	to	support	referendum	provisions	
	(act-contingent	and	outcome-contingent	interests)
	 Act-contingent:	the	anticipation	that	the	act	of	supporting	the	reform	
has	political	or	electoral	benefits
	 Outcome-contingent:	the	anticipation	that	the	reform	in	itself	will	be	
beneficial
- The	presence	of	strategic	interests	to	support	referendum	use
	 Policy-seeking:	 Enforcing	 policy	 outcome	 by	 bypassing	 national	
parliamentary	majority	or	EU	colleagues	(in	case	of	EU	referendums)
	 Empowerment:	 Reinforcement	 of	 one’s	 position	 in	 national	 or	 EU	
arena
	 Conflict-mediation:	Retaining	party	or	coalition	unity
	 Depoliticization:	Separating	controversial	issues	from	electoral	
campaign
TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY.	The	impact	of	the	type	of	democracy	on	referendum	practice	is	
analysed	in	terms	of	institutional	fit	between the referendum and a country’s democracy 
type.	With	respect	to	this	independent	variable,	it	is	important	to	differentiate	between	
the	two	dependent	variables,	as	I	expect	that	the	degree	of	institutional	fit	impacts	on	
the	type	of	referendum	that	is	institutionalized,	and	not	as	much	upon	whether	or	not	
referendums	in	are	institutionalized	and	used	as	such.	I	use	Lijphart’s	(1999)	distinction	
between	majoritarian	and	consensus	democracy	 to	assess	 the	 type	of	democracy	 in	
EU	countries.	Following	Lijphart’s	classification,	for	the	period	1950-2014	I	categorize	
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France,	Greece,	Ireland,	Malta,	Spain	and	the	UK	as	majoritarian	democracies,	and	the	
rest	of	the	countries	as	consensus	democracies	(see	also	Kriesi	2014,	305).	Like	Kriesi	
(2014,	305),	I	did	not	classify	the	CEECs	as	either	majoritarian	or	consensus	countries,	
since	 these	 countries	 combine	elements	of	both	 and	 there	 are	 too	 few	countries	 to	
make	reliable	distinctions	(see	also	Roberts	2006,	38).	In	chapter 2,	I	placed	Lijphart’s	
models	 within	 a	 two-dimensional	 framework	 to	 demarcate	 between	 different	
democratic	repertoires:	the	dimension	of	representation	versus	participation,	and	the	
dimension	 of	 preference	 aggregation	 versus	 preference	 integration.	 Both	 consensus	
and	majoritarian	democracy	 ‘score’	high	on	representation;	 in	 these	 ideal	 types,	 the	
notion	of	representative	sovereignty	prevails	over	popular	sovereignty;	yet	the	two	can	
be	distinguished	on	the	grounds	that,	in	a	majoritarian	democracy,	decisions	are	made	
on	the	basis	of	an	aggregation	of	individual	preferences	while,	in	consensus	democracy,	
they	are	made	on	the	basis	of	an	integration	of	individual	preferences.	
	 I	also	classified	the	five	different	types	of	referendum	along	these	two	dimensions.	
In	 referendums	 triggered	 and	 controlled	 by	 representatives	 (legislative	 majority,	
legislative	 minority	 and	 presidential	 referendums,	 and	 some	 referendums	 that	 I	
labelled	as	mandatory	but	which	are	in	practice	not	strictly	required),	representative	
sovereignty	prevails	over	popular	sovereignty,	while	the	latter	prevails	in	referendums	
that	 are	 initiated	 by	 citizens	 themselves	 or	 are	 strictly	 required	 by	 the	 constitution.	
This	is,	however,	also	affected	by	the	effect	of	the	vote	(binding	or	advisory),	whether	
or	 not	 a	 quorum	applies,	 and	whether	 or	 not	 there	 are	 restrictions	 on	 the	 subjects	
on	which	referendums	can	be	held.	 In	addition,	 in	referendums	that	can	be	 initiated	
by	 minorities	 (legislative	 minority	 and	 citizen-initiated	 referendums),	 the	 notion	 of	
preference	 integration	prevails	over	 that	of	preference	aggregation,	despite	 the	 fact	
that,	in	the	end,	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	depends	on	which	alternative	receives	
the	majority.	The	scope	for	preference	integration	is	also	higher	when	a	quorum	applies	
than	when	this	is	not	the	case.	By	contrast,	in	referendums	triggered	by	the	majority	or	
by	the	constitution,	the	notion	of	majority	rule	prevails	over	the	integration	of	minority	
views	 in	 political	 decision-making.	 The	more	 aspects	 of	 the	 referendum	 that	 fit	 the	
particular	type	of	democracy	in	a	country,	the	better	the	institutional	fit	and	the	more	
likely	that	this	type	of	referendum	will	be	institutionalized	and	used.
VETO	PLAYERS.	In	this	study,	I	adopt	the	definition	of	veto	players	used	by	Tsebelis	(2002,	
36),	who	defines	them	as	‘individual	or	collective	actors	whose	agreement	is	necessary	
for	 a	 change	of	 the	 status	quo’.	 Related	 to	 referendum	practice,	 I	 conceptualize	 the	
number	of	veto	players	present	in	a	country	as	the	number	of	actors	whose	consent	is	
needed	to	initiate	referendum	legislation	or	to	trigger	a	referendum.	Veto	players	can	
be	partisan	(political	parties)	or	non-partisan	(e.g.	the	constitutional	court).	The	number	
of	veto	players	involved	in	decisions	to	institutionalize	and	use	referendums	depends	
to	a	significant	extent	on	the	character	of	the	polity,	and	hence	represents	a	variable	
3
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that	can	be	assessed	at	country	level.	In	majoritarian	systems,	the	only	partisan	actor	
necessary	 to	approve	a	 referendum	bill	 is	 the	government	party,	as	 this	party	holds	
a	 parliamentary	majority.	 In	 consensus	 democracies,	where	 power	 is	 shared	 among	
different	actors,	there	are	usually	more	veto	players;	not	only	are	more	parties	needed	
to	approve	a	referendum	bill,	but	this	often	also	requires	approval	 in	other	potential	
veto	arenas,	such	as	the	Upper	House.	
	 The	 character	 of	 the	 polity	 is	 not	 the	 only	 determinant	 of	 the	 number	 of	 veto	
players.	 The	 number	 of	 players	 able	 to	 veto	 a	 decision	 to	 institutionalize	 or	 use	
a	 referendum	 is	 also	 determined	 by	 the	 rules	 by	 which	 referendum	 legislation	 is	
institutionalized	 (i.e.	 whether	 it	 can	 also	 be	 initiated	 by	 the	 legislature,	 whether	 it	
requires	a	constitutional	revision,	and	if	so,	by	which	procedures	the	constitution	can	
be	changed)	or	the	procedures	by	which	a	referendum	can	be	triggered	(and	hence,	the	
type	of	referendum).	Although	I	assume	that	both	are	related	to	the	character	of	the	
democratic	polity	 (majoritarian	or	consensus),	 there	 is	a	wide	variety	of	 institutional	
set-ups	in	both	majoritarian	and	consensus	countries,	and	the	actual	number	of	veto	
players	can	therefore	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	 If	 the	 legislature	has	
the	power	to	initiate	legislation,	government	parties	are	not	necessarily	veto	players.	
And	the	fewer	actors	needed	to	trigger	a	referendum	(for	example	in	case	of	legislative	
minority	referendums),	the	fewer	veto	players	there	are.	In	addition,	whether	an	actor’s	
approval	is	necessary	for	such	a	bill	also	depends	on	the	number	of	parliamentary	seats	
that	it	holds,	in	both	the	Lower	and	Upper	House,	and	whether	voting	in	parliament	takes	
place	by	party	or	MP.	Assessing	the	number	of	veto	players	present	during	decisions	to	
institutionalize	or	use	referendums	requires	information	about	the	nature	of	the	polity,	
but	also	on	the	composition	of	government	and	parliament,	and	on	voting	procedures	
in	parliament.	Hence,	it	is	a	variable	analysed	at	both	country	level	and	the	level	of	the	
referendum	process.		
PAST	 REFERENDUM	 EXPERIENCE.	 The	 third	 variable	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 affect	 the	
availability	and	nature	of	referendum	provisions	and	the	actual	use	of	referendums	is	
past	referendum	experience	in	a	country.	I	look	at	the	role	of	experience	in	two	ways.	
The	first	is	historic	experience	with	the	availability	of	referendum	provisions	and	use	of	
referendums.	Historic	implies	the	period	prior	to	the	period	under	investigation,	namely	
1950-2014.	Hence,	when	looking	at	a	country	where	a	referendum	has	or	has	not	been	
held,	I	 look	at	whether the pre-WWII constitution of the country included referendum 
provisions and whether the country had experience with holding a referendum prior 
to WWII.	 The	 expectation	 is	 that	 when	 a	 country’s	 pre-WWII	 constitution	 already	
contained	referendum	provisions	and/or	when	the	country	experienced	referendums	
prior	to	WWII,	it	is	more	likely	that	referendum	provisions	were	available	and/or	used	
in	the	period	1950-2014.	Whether	referendum	experience,	either	a	positive	of	negative	
one,	plays	a	role	 in	 later	referendum	choices	can	only	be	analysed	by	the	method	of	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
85
Research strategy and methodology
process-tracing,	by	which	the	motivations	of	political	actors	are	unravelled.	The	second	
way	 to	 define	 experience	 is	 in	 terms	 of	 contemporary	 experience.	 Thus,	 I	 examine	
whether	the	actors	in	a	particular	country	are	faced	with	a	referendum precedent in the 
period under investigation.	The	expectation	here	is	that	the	institutionalization	and	use	
of	referendums	is	influenced	by	the	availability	of	referendum	precedents.	For	example,	
when	a	country	has	held	a	referendum	on	EU	accession,	it	might	be	more	likely	to	hold	
more	EU	referendums	in	the	future.	
PUBLIC	 DEMANDS.	 The	 fourth	 factor	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 impact	 upon	 the	
institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums,	 is	 the	 level	 of	 public demands for 
referendum	provisions	or	use	(or	for	a	particular	referendum)	in	a	country	at	a	certain	
moment	in	time.	This	 is	a	complex	variable	to	measure.	Firstly,	because	of	ambiguity	
about	what	specifically	constitutes	the public.	In	the	case	studies,	I	examine	referendum	
demands	in	the	form	of	petitions	and	debate.	Yet,	such	demands	sometimes	come	from	
relatively	small	groups	in	society,	which	thus	hardly	represent	‘the	public’.	Therefore,	
such	 information	 is	 combined	 with	 aggregated	 public	 opinion	 data.	 In	 these	 cases,	
referendum	demands	are	measured	by	using	country-level	proxies.	I	use	five	proxies	to	
assess	the	level	of	potential	public	referendum	demands:	
1)	 average	level	of	support	for	referendums	
2)	 average	level	of	support	for	a	particular	referendum	
3)	 average	level	of	political	interest	
4)	 average	level	of	public	dissatisfaction	(i.e.	dissatisfaction	with	democracy,	distrust	
political	parties,	distrust	parliament,	distrust	government)
5)	 average	 level	of	Euroscepticism	 (lack	of	 support	 for	a	country’s	EU	membership;	
perception	that	country	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership;	dissatisfaction	
with	EU	democracy;	and	distrust	EU)	(Nb.	This	only	applies	to	referendums	on	the	
EU)
The	last	three	proxies	(political	interest,	public	dissatisfaction	and	Euroscepticism)	are	
derived	from	the	literature	that	argues	that	support	for	referendums	either	comes	from	
individuals	who	are	engaged	with	politics	and	aim	to	increase	their	opportunities	to	be	
politically	active	(Norris	1999;	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2007)	or	from	individuals	who	
are	highly	dissatisfied	with	national	and	EU	politics	(Cronin	1999;	Dalton,	Burklin	and	
Drummond	2001;	Donovan	and	Karp	2006;	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2007).	Although	
these	proxies	do	not	by	themselves	signify	support	for	referendums,	let	alone	demands, 
they	 can	 be	 used	 to	 infer	 the	 potential	 level	 of	 referendum	 demands	 by	 assessing	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 social	 climate	 that	pressures	political	 representatives	 to	organize	
referendums.		
3
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
86
Chapter 3
	 These	proxies	are	all	based	on	an	aggregation	of	individual	data	and	hence	bear	the	
risk	of	 individualistic	fallacy	(Landman	2003,	53-55):	 I	use	data	collected	at	 individual	
level	to	make	inferences	about	countries	in	a	certain	period	of	time.	However,	I	believe	
that	 the	 bias	 this	 engenders	 is	 limited	 due	 to	 the	 combination	 of	 data	 sources	 and	
methods	of	analysis	(see	next	section)	that	I	use	in	the	case	studies.	This	combination	
allows	me	 to	 assess	 the	potential	 level	 of	 public	 referendum	demands	 in	 society.	 In	
addition,	 by	 the	 method	 of	 process-tracing,	 I	 assess	 the	 likelihood	 that	 politicians’	
decisions	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums	is	a	response	to	public	demands.	
POLITICAL	 VALUES.	 The	 fifth	 variable	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 affect	 the	 availability	 and	
nature	of	referendum	provisions	and	the	actual	use	of	referendums	is	political values.	
By	 elaborating	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Bratton	 and	Mattes	 (2001),	 who	 made	 a	 distinction	
between	 intrinsic	 and	 instrument	 support	 for	 democracy,	 I	 differentiate	 between	
intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	to	support	referendums.	I	argue	that	referendums	are	
intrinsically	valued	when	political	actors	adopt	arguments	associated	with	Rousseau’s	
developmental	republicanism.	Such	arguments	maintain	that	referendums,	 like	other	
direct	participatory	instruments,	need	to	be	implemented	to	boost	the	involvement	of	
an	 increasingly	better	educated	and	politically	skilled	electorate	 in	political	affairs,	 in	
order	for	them	to	be	empowered	and	to	boost	their	individual	development	(cf.	Pateman	
1970;	Barber	1984;	Budge	1996).	Following	the	argument	put	forward	by	Renwick	(2010,	
38-41),	who	made	a	distinction	between	three	sets	of	instrumental	arguments	in	favour	
of electoral	reform	(related	to	increasing	representation, accountability or simplicity),	I	
argue	that	political	actors	value	referendums	instrumentally	when	they	perceive	them	
as	a	means	to	another	end,	for	example,	of	strengthening	the	polity’s	input	(Renwick’s	
representation and simplicity)	 or	 output	 legitimacy	 (Renwick’s	 accountability)	 (the	
distinction	 between	 input	 and	 output	 legitimacy	 is	 adopted	 from	 Scharpf	 1999).	 I	
operationalized	such	motivations	in	terms	of	whether	positive	values	were	assigned	to	
a	referendum	bill	and	the	emphasis	placed	on	this	value	by	the	political	actor.	
	 In	addition,	 following	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	 (2002,	733),	 I	 also	analyse	how	
such	values	relate	to	party	ideology	(either	post-materialism	or	populism).	As	I	argued	
in chapter 2,	 post-materialist	 values	 to	 support	 referendums	 coincide	 with	 intrinsic	
values,	as	they	emphasize	the	preservation	of	individual	liberty,	freedom	of	expression,	
a	better	quality	of	life,	and	limiting	the	power	of	authority	(Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	
2006,	443).	By	contrast,	populist	support	for	referendums	is	grounded	in	anti-elitism	
and	anti-pluralism.	Accordingly,	they	are	seen	as	instruments	that	truly	reflect	the	will	
of	the	ordinary	people	at	the	expense	of	the	political	elites	(cf.	Jacobs	2011,	57).	
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS.	The	final	factor	that	is	expected	to	affect	the	institutionalization	
of	 referendum	 provisions	 and	 the	 actual	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 strategic	 interests.	
Strategic	referendum	motivations	are	conceptualized	in	terms	of	the	anticipated	effects	
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that	political	actors	attach	to	a	decision	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums.	Here,	it	is	
important	to	differentiate	between	strategic	motivations	to	institutionalize	referendums	
and	strategic	motivations	to	use	them.	Motivations	to	support	referendum	provisions	
can	either	be	act-contingent	or	outcome-contingent	(Reed	and	Thies	2001;	Jacobs	2011,	
38).	Outcome-contingent	motivations	 to	 institutionalize	 referendum	provisions	 imply	
that	political	representatives	anticipate	that	the	outcome	of	referendum	legislation	will	
benefit	them,	for	example	because	they	anticipate	making	use	of	it	in	the	future.	Act-
contingent	motivations	imply	that	political	actors	anticipate	that	the	act	of	supporting	
referendum	 legislation	has	electoral	benefits.	For	example,	at	election	time,	support	
for	 referendum	 legislation	might	become	a	 strategy	 to	win	votes.	When	 it	 comes	 to	
the	actual	 triggering	of	 referendums,	 the	differentiation	between	outcome-	and	act-
contingent	 motivations	 is	 too	 limited.	 Therefore,	 in	 chapter 2,	 I	 further	 distinguish	
outcome-	 and	 act-contingent	 referendum	 motivations	 into	 four	 broad	 motivations:	
one	outcome-contingent	motivation,	namely	policy-seeking,	and	three	act-contingent	
motivations,	namely	empowerment,	conflict	mediation	and	depoliticization.	
	 Based	on	the	classification	of	referendum	strategies	that	I	presented	in	chapter 2,	I	
am	able	to	infer	a	number	of	conditions	that	need	to	be	present	in	order	for	a	strategy	
to	have	likely	been	in	place.	An	overview	is	provided	in	table 3.6.	When	actors	employ	
a	policy-seeking	strategy,	necessary	conditions	for	this	strategy	are	the	absence	of	a	
necessary	parliamentary	majority	(in	case	of	referendums	on	national	issues)	or,	in	the	
case	of	 EU	 referendums,	 a	division	between	 the	 view	of	 the	government	and	 its	 EU	
counterparts.	As	a	‘no’	in	the	referendum	implies	an	undermining	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	
initiators,	and	for	governments	even	a	vote	of	‘no-confidence’,	governments	especially	
will	only	employ	such	a	strategy	when	they	are	more	or	less	certain	to	have	the	public	
on	their	side.	For	a	referendum	to	be	pledged	as	an	empowerment	tool,	a	necessary	
condition	 is	 that	 there	 is	already	sufficient	approval	 in	 the	decision-making	arena	(at	
national	or	EU	level).	Again,	government	parties	are	only	 likely	to	adopt	this	strategy	
when	the	they	are	certain	that	the	public	is	on	their	side,	as	a	failed	referendum	vote	
would	undermine	rather	than	reinforce	their	position.	For	opposition	parties,	it	is	not	
important	for	them	to	be	certain	that	a	majority	of	the	public	is	on	their	side,	but	that	
there	is	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	public	with	the	same	view.	For	a	referendum	
to	be	pledged	as	a	conflict-mediation	tool,	a	necessary	condition	is	that	the	triggering	
actors	are	divided	on	the	 issue	at	stake	and	that	 they	anticipate	 that	 the	majority	 is	
on	their	side.	Upcoming	elections	provide	an	extra	incentive.	For	a	referendum	to	be	
pledged	as	a	depoliticization	instrument,	a	necessary	condition	is	that	the	initiator	faces	
upcoming	elections	and	that	the	issue	is	highly	controversial	among	the	electorate.
3
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Table 3.6: Conditions for assessing referendum strategies
Initiator faces 
sufficient support for 
legislative proposal 
in decision-making 
arena
Initiator faces  
internal party/
coalition divisions
Anticipated 
public support 
for initiator’s 
stance
Initiator faces 
upcoming 
elections
Policy-seeking	–	nat. NO Not	relevant YES Not	relevant
Policy-seeking	–	EU	/	
EU	bargaining
NO Not	relevant YES Not	relevant
Empowerment	–	nat. YES Not	relevant YES If	yes,	extra	
motivation
Empowerment	–	EU	 YES Not	relevant YES Not	relevant
Conflict	mediation Not	relevant YES YES If	yes,	extra	
motivation
Depoliticization Not	relevant If	yes,	extra	
motivation
NO	or	uncertain YES
3.4 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
As	I	stated	above,	the	aim	of	my	research	is	four-fold.	First,	I	aim	to	provide	a	classification	
of	 referendums.	Second,	based	on	 this	 classification,	 I	 aim	 to	provide	a	comparative	
overview	of	the	availability	and	use	of	these	referendums	in	EU	countries	and,	on	the	
basis	of	this	overview,	to	assess	whether	there	is	a	shift	from	national	decision-making	
by	representation	towards	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.	Third,	I	aim	
to	assess	which	factors	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	in	
European	democracies.	And	finally,	I	explain	why	referendum	practice	is	more	strongly	
embedded	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	 Hence,	 this	 study	 comprises	 two	main	
analyses:	a	descriptive	one	 to	assess	 the	shift,	and	an	explanatory	one	 to	assess	 the	
determinants	of	referendum	practice	and	how	it	varies	among	countries.	This	required	
collecting	data	on	countries	(to	assess	the	shift	and	country-level	factors	that	influence	
the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums)	 and	 on	 referendum	 provisions	 and	
referendum	 instances	 (to	 assess	 the	 micro-level	 factors	 that	 influence	 referendum	
practice).	 To	 assess	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	 referendum	 practice,	 I	 formulated	 six	
expectations	 in	chapter 2,	which	are	examined	in	chapters 5-8.	As	mentioned	above,	
to	assess	the	validity	of	these	expectations,	I	conduct	two	types	of	comparisons:	cross-
country	and	within-country	comparisons.	Each	type	of	comparison	requires	a	different	
method	of	analysis.
3.4.1 Methods of comparison
The	first	comparison	is	descriptive.	For	all	28	EU	member	countries,	I	collected	data	on	
the	available	referendum	provisions	and	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	have	
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been	used.	I	also	collected	data	on	the	five	components	that	describe	the	nature	of	the	
referendum	provisions	and	referendum	use	(recall	table 3.4).	These	are:
1)	 Type	of	referendum	
2)	 Function
3)	 Applicability	of	quorums
4)	 Issues		
5)	 Effect	of	the	vote	
  
These	data	are	used	to	answer	the	first	two	research	questions:	1) Did Europe experience 
an increase in the institutionalization and the use of national referendums between 
1950 and 2014? And 2) If so, does this increase mark a shift from national decision-
making by representation to decision-making by direct citizens’ participation? The data 
are	 also	 used	 to	 select	 the	 cases	 examined	 in	 chapters	 5-7	 (countries,	 referendum	
provisions	 and	 referendum	 instances).	 Although	 this	 cross-country	 comparison	 is	
mainly	descriptive,	chapter 4	also	provides	information	to	assess	the	validity	of	these	
expectations	 concerning	 two	 country-level	 factors:	 type	 of	 democracy	 and	 past	
referendum	experience.	
	 To	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 referendum-level	 factors,	 I	 conduct	 within-country	
comparisons	of	decisions	on	whether	to	institutionalize	and	pledge	referendums.	I	do	
this	by	the	method	of	process-tracing,	 in	which	I	reconstruct such decisions, and test 
my	theoretical	expectations	(see	George	and	Bennett	2004).	In	the	country	chapters,	I	
first	provide	a	narrative	of	the	context	surrounding	decisions	to	institutionalize	and	use	
referendums,	by	analysing	how	the	factors	type of democracy, number of veto players, 
past referendum experience and public demands	might	have	affected	such	decisions.	A	
second	step	is	to	analyse	the	motivations,	in	terms	of	either	political values or strategic 
interests,	 by	 which	 political	 actors	 decided	 to	 institutionalize	 or	 use	 referendums.	
Combining	these	findings	allows	me	to	provide	a	causal	narrative	of	why	referendums	
in	 each	 particular	 country	 became	 institutionalized	 and	 used.	 To	 establish	 such	 a	
narrative,	three	steps	need	to	be	taken	into	account	(see	Jacobs	2011,	62-63),	namely	
the	 initiation	of	 the	referendum	legislation	or	the	referendum	pledge,	 the	treatment	
of	the	referendum	proposal,	and	the	final	vote	on	the	legislation	or	referendum	bill.	If	
referendums	were	actually	held,	this	distinction	is	not	relevant;	after	all,	the	reasons	why	
the	referendum	was	held	can	be	traced	back	to	the	reason	it	was	initiated.	Important	
in	these	cases	are	the	enabling	factors	that	determine	whether	the	pledge	moved	from	
initiation	 to	an	actual	 vote.	An	example	of	 such	an	enabling	 factor	 is	 the	availability	
of	referendum	provisions	or	past	experience	of	democratic	referendums.	In	addition,	
the	distinction	between	 initiation,	parliamentary	treatment	of	the	bill	and	the	actual	
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decision	 to	 schedule	 the	 referendum	becomes	vitally	 important	when	 initiation	or	a	
pledge	did	not	lead	to	an	actual	referendum.	The	method	of	process-tracing	allows	me	
to	analyse	these	different	steps	and	assess	which	factors	contribute	to	the	final	decision	
on	whether	to	hold	a	referendum	or	not.
	 Each	within-country	study	has	the	same	structure.	I	start	by	providing	an	overview	
of	 the	 available	 referendum	 provisions and	 number	 of	 referendum	 instances.	 After	
that,	 I	provide	an	analysis	of	the	extent	to	which	the	six	factors	contributed	to	both.	
Given	that	my	explanatory	factors	have	different	 levels	of	analysis	 (either	country	or	
referendum	level),	I	structure	these	chapters	on	the	basis	of	explanatory	factors	rather	
than	discussing	each	referendum	instance	separately.	In	each	analysis,	I	start	with	the	
country-level	 factors	 and	 then	provide	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 referendum-level	
factors.	
3.4.2. Assessing the impact of the country-level and referendum-level factors 
To	answer	the	third	research	question	(Which factors contribute to the institutionalization 
and use of national referendums in European democracies?), I	assess	the	impact	of	both	
country-level	 and	 referendum-level	 factors.	 The	 hypotheses	 in	 this	 study	 allow	 for	
probabilistic	inferences	(Gerring	2001,	132).	This	implies	that	I	can	only	infer	that,	under	
certain	conditions	 (for	example,	a	particular	democracy	 type,	a	high	number	of	veto	
players,	past	 referendum	experience,	a	high	 level	of	public	demands,	positive	values	
assigned	to	referendums	and	strategic	incentives	to	do	so),	referendums	are	more	likely	
to	be	institutionalized	and	used.	Yet,	none	of	these	factors	are	sufficient	or	necessary	
to	bring	about	referendum	legislation	or	use.	For	example,	referendums	(Y)	can	be	used	
without	the	incentives	(X)	being	there	(hence,	X	is	not	necessary),	and	we	can	also	find	
referendum	incentives	(X)	without	(Y)	referendums	actually	being	held	(hence,	X	is	not	
sufficient).	
	 When	it	comes	to	the	country-level	factors,	assessing	their	presence	and	possible	
impact	upon	referendum	practice	is	straightforward.	Either	there	is	an	institutional	fit	
or	there	is	not,	or	a	country	either	has	past	democratic	referendum	experience	or	it	has	
not.	This	 is	different	 for	 the	referendum-level	 factors.	 Indeed,	analysing	motives	 is	a	
daunting	task.	Hence,	I	am	only	able	to	conclude	that	certain	motivations	likely	played	
a	 role,	 but	 such	 conclusions	 cannot	 be	 completely	 validated.	 Although	 both	 values	
and	strategic	motives	can	play	a	role	in	an	actor’s	choice	to	institutionalize	or	trigger	a	
referendum,	I	am	interested	in	which	of	these	motives	are	most	likely	to	play	a	decisive	
role.	To	assess	this,	I	use	the	work	of	Van	Evera	(1997,	30-32),	who	outlines	four	tests	
of	predictions	to	be	used	in	process-tracing	analyses:	straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking 
gun, and doubly decisive.	The	tests	can	be	differentiated	on	the	basis	of	two	criteria:	
whether	a	test	is	necessary	to	infer	a	causal	connection,	and	whether	it	is	sufficient	to	
infer	a	causal	connection.	
	 To	describe	these	four	tests,	Collier	(2011,	826-828)	uses	the	example	of	a	fictitious	
detective	 story,	 in	 which	 the	 four	 tests	 are	 used	 to	 solve	 a	 murder	 case	 by	 using	
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counterfactual reasoning (see table 3.7).	In	examining	whether	a	suspect	is	guilty	of	a	
murder,	the	straw in the wind test	would	be	passed	if	the	suspect	was	with	the	victim	
prior	to	the	murder.	Passing	this	test	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	to	infer	a	causal	
link.	The	hoop test	would	be	passed,	 for	example,	 if	 the	suspect	was	near	 the	crime	
scene	at	the	time	of	the	murder.	This	is	necessary	for	the	suspect	to	have	been	able	to	
murder	the	victim.	Yet,	being	at	the	crime	scene	is	not	sufficient	evidence.	Hence,	when	
a	hoop	test	is	passed,	this	implies	that	the	hypothesis	is	relevant	but	does	not	confirm	
it;	if,	however,	the	test	is	a	failure,	the	hypothesis	is	proved	false.	The	smoking gun test 
would	be	passed	 if	 the	suspect	was	 literally	caught	with	a	smoking	gun.	Passing	 this	
test	is	not	necessary	to	infer	a	causation	(the	suspect	could	have	murdered	the	victim	
with	another	weapon),	but	it	is	sufficient.	Hence,	if	the	test	is	passed,	the	hypothesis	is	
confirmed;	but	if	it	is	failed,	the	hypothesis	is	not	eliminated.	The	double decisive test 
would	be	passed	if	the	suspect	was	recorded	on	camera	while	murdering	the	victim:	
this	 is	 both	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 to	 infer	 that	 the	 suspect	murdered	 the	 victim.	
Hence,	if	the	test	is	passed	it	confirms	the	hypothesis	and,	if	it	is	failed	the	hypothesis	is	
eliminated.	Passing	the	test	also	implies	that	alternative	hypotheses	are	eliminated.	
Table 3.7: Four tests of process-tracing for causal inference
Sufficient for inferring a causal connection
No Yes
Necessary 
for inferring 
a causal 
connection
No
STRAW	IN	THE	WIND
a.	Passing:	Affirms	relevance	of	
hypothesis,	but	does	not	confirm	it
b.	Failing:	Hypothesis	is	not	
eliminated,	but	is	slightly	weakened
SMOKING	GUN
a.	Passing:	Confirms	hypothesis
b.	Failing:	Hypothesis	is	not	eliminated,	but	is	
somewhat	weakened
Yes
HOOP
a.	Passing:	Affirms	relevance	of	
hypothesis,	but	does	not	confirm	it.
b.	Failing:	Eliminates	hypothesis
DOUBLE	DECISIVE
a.	Passing:	Confirms	hypothesis	and	eliminates	
others.
b.	Failing:	Eliminates	hypothesis
Source:	Collier	2011,	825,	see	also	Van	Evera	1997,	31–32;	Bennett	2010,	210;	Jacobs	2011,	61.	
An	analysis	of	the	motives	of	political	actors	to	institutionalize	or	to	use	referendums	
allows	for	the	use	of	hoop tests.	After	all,	 if	political	actors	assigned	strong	values	 in	
favour	 of	 a	 referendum,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 that	 the	 referendum	 was	
indeed	motivated	by	such	values,	but	it	is	at	least	likely.	If	such	values	were	not	assigned	
to	the	referendum,	however,	it	is	unlikely	that	it	was	motivated	by	these	values	(since	
this	 condition	 is	 necessary).	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 strategic	 interests:	 if	 I	 find	 that	 a	
referendum	fitted	a	certain	political	strategy	on	the	basis	of	the	conditions	that	I	outlined	
in table 3.6,	this	is	not	a	sufficient	condition	that	the	referendum	was	motivated	by	this	
strategy,	but	it	is	at	least	likely.	In	addition,	if	the	conditions	are	not	met,	I	can	be	certain	
that	the	referendum	was	not	motivated	by	it	(for	example,	if	a	party	was	not	divided	
3
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on	‘Europe’	and	elections	were	not	upcoming,	the	referendum	was	not	motivated	by	
conflict	mediation	and	depoliticization	strategies).	
	 In	 some	 cases,	 I	 can	 contrast	 values	 with	 strategic	 interests,	 thereby	 inferring	
which	of	the	two	is	 likely	to	have	been	decisive.	 If	a	government	decides	to	organize	
a	 referendum	 on	 ratification	 of	 an	 EU	 treaty,	 it	 can	 claim	 that	 this	 is	 because	 such	
a	 referendum	 could	 increase	 citizens’	 involvement	 in	 EU	 affairs.	 However,	 at	 the	
same	time,	the	government	coalition	might	be	 internally	divided	on	the	treaty	and	a	
referendum	could	serve	to	flip	the	coin	to	one	side	or	the	other	without	invoking	a	split	
in	the	coalition.	Which	motive	is	likely	to	be	decisive,	the	normative	or	strategic	one?	
Counterfactual	reasoning	is	useful	in	answering	this	question.	If,	for	example,	the	same	
government	coalition	(or	parties)	have	not	pledged	a	referendum	on	a	previous	treaty	
ratification,	this	implies	that	normative	support	for	referendums	or	increasing	citizens’	
involvement	was	not	important	previously.	Indeed,	if	normative	motives	were	decisive,	
one	would	expect	a	referendum	to	have	been	held	in	similar	circumstances.	Moreover,	
if	 the	government	would	have	been	certain	to	 lose	the	referendum	in	this	case	 (and	
hence,	if	the	referendum	were	not	in	the	government’s	interest),	this	gives	additional	
leverage	to	the	claim	that	strategic	interests	were	decisive.
3.5 DATA SOURCES
In	this	section,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	data	sources	used	in	this	study.	To	assess	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 towards	 intensified	 national-level	 referendum	 practice	 in	
Europe,	 I	 first	 provide	 an	 outline	 (in	 chapter 4)	 of	 the	 availability	 of	 referendum	
provisions	in	the	28	EU	countries	and	the	moment	at	which	these	were	introduced.	For	
this	analysis,	I	make	use	of	the	country’s	constitutions	and	the	database	of	the	Direct 
Democracy Navigator.30	To	do	this,	 I	collected	data	on	all	five	referendum	types	that	
were	distinguished	in	chapter 2 and	analyse	in	which	countries	these	are	provided	for.	
After	having	outlined	the	availability	of	referendum	provisions,	I	provide	an	overview	
of actual	use	of	referendums.	To	do	this,	 I	count	referendum	votes	by	country	in	the	
period	between	1950	and	2014,	also	explaining	what	type	of	vote	this	was	(presidential,	
legislative	 majority,	 legislative	 minority;	 mandatory	 or	 citizen-initiated	 –	 veto	 or	
initiative).	For	this	assessment,	I	use	the	database	of	the	Centre for Research on Direct 
Democracy.31 
	 To	assess	the	presence	and	strength	of	the	six	factors	(type	of	democracy,	number	
of	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	 values	 and	
strategic	 interests)	 that	 are	 expected	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	 and	
use	of	national	referendums	in	European	democracies	(chapters 5-7),	I	used	different	
30.	 	See	website:	http://www.direct-democracy-navigator.org/
31.	 	See	website:	http://www.c2d.ch/
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types of data sources. A	detailed	overview	of	all	sources	used	in	the	country	studies	in	
chapters 5-7 is provided in appendix 3.	To	determine	a	country’s	type	of	democracy,	I	
use	Lijphart’s	majoritarian-consensus	division	(see	appendix 1 for an	overview	of	some	
institutional	 characteristics	 per	 EU	 country).	 To	 assess	 the	 institutional	 fit	 between	
referendum	provisions	and	type	of	democracy,	I	compare	referendum	provisions	in	28	
EU	countries,	based	on	data	from	the	Direct Democracy Navigator. In	addition,	country	
studies	allow	me	to	examine	the	relationship	between	type	of	democracy	and	the	nature	
of	referendum	provisions	in-depth.	The	factor	type of democracy is considered relevant 
in	assessing	cross-country	variations	in	the	type	of	referendum	legislation	provided	for	
and	the	types	of	referendum	used. Thus,	type	of	democracy	is	not	expected	to	influence	
whether	referendums	are	institutionalized	or	not,	nor	the	frequency	with	which	they	
are	used.
	 A	second	factor	that	 is	expected	to	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	and	use	
of	 referendums	 is	 the	number	of	veto	players.	Although	 I	 labelled	 this	as	a	 country-
level	 factor,	 the	 number	 of	 veto	 players	 cannot	 solely	 be	 assessed	 by	 analysing	 a	
country’s	institutions	(such	as	government	type,	provisions	to	revise	the	constitution,	
referendum	legislation	etc.).	The	number	of	players	required	to	adopt	a	referendum	bill,	
for	example,	also	depends	on	the	parties’	share	of	seats	in	parliament	(when	parliament	
is	fragmented,	there	are	more	potential	veto	players).	In	addition,	to	analyse	the	role	
played	by	these	potential	veto	players,	it	 is	also	important	to	know	their	referendum	
preferences.	Hence,	in-depth	case-study	knowledge	is	needed	to	assess	the	potential	
number	of	 veto	players	 in	 the	case	of	particular	decisions	 to	 initiate	 (or	not	 initiate)	
referendum	bills.	I	used	election	outcomes	on	the	effective	number	of	parliamentary	
parties	 and	 information	 about	 government	 compositions	 to	 gather	 this	 data.	 I	 also	
needed	 information	 about	 parties’	 preferences	 regarding	 referendums	 in	 general	
and	on	particular	referendum	bills.	This	information	was	gathered	by	using	secondary	
literature	and	official	documents,	such	as	party	manifestos	and	parliamentary	reports.
To	 assess	 whether	 a	 country	 has	 a	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 I	 mainly	 use	
secondary	 literature	and	official	political	documents,	 such	as	past	 constitutions.	 The	
conceptualization	 of	 experience as	 a	 binary	 variable	 is	 highly	 problematic,	 as	 this	
also	 includes	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	 referendum	was	held	 and	 the	outcome,	 how	
this	 experience	 is	 perceived	 both	 by	 the	 authorities	 and	 citizens,	 and	 the	 role	 that	
referendums	have	played	in	the	political	debate.	For	this	reason,	I	analyse	this	variable	
in-depth	 in	 the	 country	 studies	 to	 obtain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 that	
referendum	experience	plays	in	a	country’s	current	referendum	conduct.
	 I	 operationalized	 public	 demands	 in	 terms	 of	 five	 proxies:	 the	 level	 of	 support	
for	referendums,	the	 level	of	support	for	a	particular	referendum,	the	level	of	public	
dissatisfaction	 (dissatisfaction	 with	 democracy,	 and	 distrust	 of	 political	 parties,	
parliament	 and	 government),	 average	 level	 of	 Euroscepticism	 (lack	 of	 support	 for	
a	 country’s	 EU	 membership;	 perception	 that	 country	 has	 not	 benefitted	 from	 EU	
3
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membership;	 dissatisfaction	 with	 EU	 democracy;	 and	 distrust	 of	 EU),	 and	 the	 level	
of	 political	 interest.	 Comparative	 longitudinal	 data	 that	 assesses	 public	 support	 for	
referendums	in	Europe	is	absent.	Various	separate	opinion	surveys	have	tapped	citizens’	
support	for	the	referendum	as	an	instrument,	but	not	on	a	cross-country	and	longitudinal	
basis.	To	measure	the	level	of	support	for	referendums,	I	used	the	International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) Citizenship Module 2004,	which	asked	respondents	to	what	extent	
they	agreed	or	disagreed	with	the	statement:	‘Referendums	are	a	good	way	to	decide	
important	political	questions.’32	To	assess	cross-country	support	for	EU	referendums	in	
particular,	I	used	the	2009	European Election Studies	(EES),	which	asked	respondents	to	
what	extent	they	agreed	or	disagreed	with	the	statement:	‘EU	treaty	changes	should	
be	 decided	 by	 referendum’.	 I	 also	 used	 national	 public	 opinion	 survey	 data-sets	 to	
assess	average	support	in	a	country	for	referendums	in	general.	Support	for	a	particular	
referendum	is	also	measured	by	national	survey	data,	if	available.	Dissatisfaction	with	
democracy,	 and	 distrust	 of	 political	 parties,	 parliament	 and	 government,	 as	 well	 as	
levels	of	Euroscepticism,	are	based	on	data	from	the	Eurobarometer	surveys.	Finally,	
average	levels	of	political	interest	are	assessed	by	using	the	data	of	the	European Values 
Study	(EVS).	An	overview	of	the	data	sources	used	to	measure	these	proxies	is	provided	
in table 3.8.	
	 Conclusions	on	 the	basis	of	 these	data	bear	 the	 risk	of	 individual	 fallacy:	 results	
obtained	 through	 analysis	 of	 individual-level	 data	 are	 used	 to	 make	 inferences	
about	 aggregate-level	 phenomena,	 i.e.	 the	 occurrence	 of	 referendums.	 Therefore,	 I	
particularly	look	at	the	level	of	demands	at	a	certain	moment	in	time	(for	example,	a	
decision	to	invoke	a	referendum)	and	see	how	likely	it	is	that	politicians	responded	to	
referendum	demands,	for	example	by	using	more	context-specific	data	in	the	form	of	
media	articles	(by	using	LexisNexis	and	online	sources)	and	public	statements.		
32.	 	The	ISSP	Citizenship	II	2014	also	includes	the	referendum	question,	but	these	data	were	not	available	
when	writing	this	book.
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Table 3.8: Operationalization of proxies for public demands
Proxy Data sources
Support	for	referendums	 ISSP	Citizenship	Module	2004
European	Election	Studies	2009
National	survey	data	(see	Chapters	5-7)
Support	for	a	particular	referendum	 National	survey	data	(see	Chapters	5-7)
Level of 
democratic	
dissatisfaction:
Dissatisfaction	with	
democracy
Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	1973-2015	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	1974,	2006,	2010,	2015;	1992	
September	wave;	1997	(autumn)	+	1998	(spring)	Standard	
Eurobarometer	report	(48	and	49)
European	Values	Study	1999,	2008
Distrust	of	political	parties Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	2003-2014	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	2010,	2015)
Distrust	of	parliament Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	2003-2014	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	2010,	2015)
Distrust	of	government Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	2003-2014	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	2010,	2015)
Average level of 
Euroscepticism:
Lack	of	support	for	EU	
membership
Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	1983-2011	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	2010,	2011)
No	perceived	benefits	from	
EU	membership
Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	1983-2011	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	1983,	2010,	2011)
Dissatisfaction	EU	democracy Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	1993-2015	(spring	
surveys	for	1995,	2005,	2006,	2010)
Distrust	of	EU Eurobarometer	Interactive	Search	System	2003-2015	(autumn	
surveys;	spring	surveys	for	2010,	2015)
Average	level	of	political	interest European	Values	Study	1999,	2008
To	 assess	 the	 effect	 of	 political	 values	 on	 referendum	 practice,	 I	 needed	 to	 gather	
information	on	the	referendum	level.	I	needed	to	know	whether	political	actors	indeed	
assigned intrinsic and instrumental	 values	 to	 referendums,	 but	 also	 whether	 their	
decisions	to	implement	or	use	referendums	(or	not	to	do	so)	were	likely	to	be	driven	by	
such	values.	To	do	this,	I	used	a	number	sources:	official	party	documents	(by	using	the	
Manifesto Project Database and	for	the	Dutch	case	the	database	of	the	Documentation 
Centre for Dutch Political Parties),	 political	 statements,	 media	 articles	 (by	 using	
LexisNexis)	and	secondary	 literature.	For	the	Dutch	case,	 in	which	 I	more	thoroughly	
assess	 the	 role	 of	 political	 ideology,	 I	 also	 made	 use	 of	 minutes	 of	 parliamentary	
debates	and	interviews	conducted	by	Kristof	Jacobs	when	writing	his	dissertation	The 
Power or the People: Direct Democratic and Electoral Reforms in Austria, Belgium and 
the Netherlands	(2011).	This	is	possible	since	referendum	legislation	was	only	recently	
implemented	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 a	 referendum	 only	 recently	 held.	 The	 other	
countries	have	experienced	earlier	 instances	of	 referendums,	 and	hence	analyses	of	
parliamentary	debates	and	conducting	 interviews	would	not	have	been	consistent	 in	
the	other	chapters. 
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 To assess the role of strategic interests,	 I	 use	 a	 number	 sources:	 official	 party	
documents	to	assess	preferences	of	parties,	political	statements	and	speeches,	minutes	
of	parliamentary	debates,	media	articles	(by	using	LexisNexis)	and	secondary	literature.
In	this	chapter,	I	have	outlined	and	given	reasons	for	the	methodological	choices	that	I	
made	in	this	study.	I	presented	an	overview	of	my	research	design,	the	case	selection,	
the	conceptualization	and	operationalization	of	the	main	variables,	and	the	methods	of	
analysis	 I	used	to	collect	 information	on	referendum	provisions	and	referendum	use.	
The	next	chapter	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	availability	of	referendum	provisions	
in	the	28	EU	member	countries,	and	of	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	held	
in	these	countries.	This	exercise	serves	two	goals.	The	first	is	to	assess	whether	Europe	
is	 indeed	experiencing	a	shift	towards	 intensified	national-level	referendum	practice,	
and	the	second	is	to	distil	the	case	selection	for	the	remaining	empirical	chapters,	which	
I	justified	in	this	chapter.	The	case-study	chapters	include	a	comparison	of	France	and	
Denmark	 (chapter 5)	 as	 two	 countries	with	 different	 types	 of	 democracy	 and	which	
held	a	relatively	large	number	of	referendums	in	the	period	between	1950	and	2014;	
a	 comparison	of	 the	United	Kingdom	and	Sweden	 (chapter 6)	 as	 two	 countries	with	
different	types	of	democracy	and	where	relatively	 few	referendums	have	been	held,	
despite	referendum	provisions	being	available;	and	a	country	study	of	the	Netherlands	
(chapter 7)	as	a	country	without	referendum	legislation	(at	least	until	2015)	and	where	
only	one	referendum	has	been	held	between	1950	and	2014.	
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CHAPTER 4. 
REFERENDUM PROVISIONS AND USE IN EU COUNTRIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As argued in chapter 2,	most	 referendum	 literature	assumes	 that,	 together	with	 the	
consolidation	 and	 endurance	 of	 democracy,	 twentieth-century	 Europe	 witnessed	
an	 increase	 in	the	use	of	referendums.	At	the	same	time,	scholars	acknowledge	that	
referendums	 are	 not	 used	 in	 all	 countries	with	 similar	 frequency,	 and	 that	 in	many	
countries national	referendums	remain	an	anomaly	(cf.	Gallagher	1996b;	Qvortrup	2014).	
However,	the	aggregated	increase	in	referendums	is	generally	taken	as	signifying	a	trend	
towards	direct	democracy	that	marks	a	new	reality,	and	which	needs	to	be	explained.	
This	 study	 takes	 instead	 cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	practice	as	 its	point	
of	departure.	 I	 analyse	whether	 referendum	practice	 in	Europe	 indeed	marks	a	 shift	
from	national	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	
participation.	In	addition,	I	examine	how	choices	relating	to	the	institutionalization	and	
use	of	referendums,	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	can	be	explained.	This	chapter	
deals	with	my	first	two	research	questions,	assessing	whether	Europe	experienced	an	
increase	in	the	institutionalization	and	the	use	of	national	referendums	between	1950	
and	2014	and,	if	so,	whether	this	indeed	marks	such	a	shift	in	national	decision-making.	
In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	this	chapter	provides	a	comparative	overview	of	
national-level	referendum	provisions	in	the	28	countries	of	the	EU	(hereafter	the	EU28),	
and	the	actual	use	of	national	referendums	from	the	1950s	onward.
	 I	argue	that,	to	assess	the	alleged	shift	in	decision-making,	it	is	not	only	important	
to	examine	whether	countries	have	referendum	provisions	 in	 their	constitutions	and	
the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	used,	but	also	what type of referendums are 
provided for and used.	 I	 therefore	examine	cross-country	differences	 in	who	triggers	
referendums,	 the	 functions	 that	 referendums	have	 in	 the	decision-making	process	 is	
(decision-promotive	or	decision-controlling),	whether	the	provisions	prescribe	specific	
quorums,	whether	 subject	 restrictions	 are	 applicable,	 and	whether	 referendums	are	
binding	or	advisory.	The	analysis	presented	 in	this	chapter	provides	the	basis	 for	the	
remaining	 empirical	 chapters	 in	 this	 study.	 Section	 4.2	 analyses	 the	 constitutional	
availability	of	referendum	provisions,	and	the	nature	of	these	provisions	and	associated	
procedures	in	the	EU28.	In	section	4.3,	I	examine	the	actual	use	of	referendums	on	an	
aggregated	 level	 and	 in	 section	 4.4,	 I	 disaggregate	 these	 findings	 by	 country,	 taking	
into	 account	 the	 types	 of	 referendum	 that	 are	 used	 and	 the	 issues	 on	 which	 they	
are	held.	 In	particular,	 I	make	a	distinction	between	 the	 ‘old’	EU	member	countries,	
plus	Malta	and	Cyprus	(hereafter	the	EU17),	and	the	new	democracies	of	the	Central	
and	Eastern	European	countries	(hereafter	the	CEECs).	Finally,	 in	section	4.5,	 I	assess	
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the	 participatory	 nature	 of	 referendum	 use,	 and	 outline	 in	what	way	 cross-country	
differences	in	provisions	and	use	correspond	to	the	nature	of	the	democratic	polity.	
4.2 REFERENDUM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE 28 EU MEMBER STATES
The	first	objective	of	this	study	is	to	examine	whether	Europe	has	experienced	a	direct	
participatory	shift	in	terms	of	an	increase	in	the	availability	of	referendum	provisions	
from	the	1950s	onward.	To	answer	this	question,	it	is	important	to	first	examine	when	
and	 in	what	context	referendum	provisions	were	adopted	 in	European	constitutions.	
In	 addition,	 to	assess	whether	 the	nature	of	 the	 referendum	provisions	 in	 European	
constitutions	marks	such	a	shift	in	national	decision-making,	this	section	also	provides	
an	overview	of	the	types	of	referendum	provided	for.	
4.2.1 The context of referendum institutionalization
Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	a	growing	number	of	EU	member	states	adopted	
referendum	 provisions	 in	 their	 democratic	 constitutions.	 Currently,	 there	 are	 only	
four	EU	countries	where	the	constitution	does	not	make	explicit	reference	to	the	use	
of	 national	 referendums,	 namely	 Belgium,	 Cyprus,	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands.33 
Table 4.1	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 current	 EU	 members	 and	 the	 moment	 at	 which	
they	adopted	referendum	provisions	under democratic rule.	Hence,	the	table	does	not	
include	institutionalization	at	times	when	countries	were	not	considered	democratic.	
In	addition	to	these	four	countries,	four	additional	groups	of	countries	can	largely	be	
distinguished	where	the	constitution	currently	makes	explicit	reference	to	the	use	of	
national	referendums.	
	 The	first	group	consists	of	democracies	where	referendum	provisions	were	already	
in	place	prior	to	the	Second	World	War	(Luxembourg,	Denmark,	Sweden,	Austria	and	
Ireland).	 The	 second	 group	 consists	 of	 countries	where	 referendum	provisions	were	
(re-)adopted	 in	 the	constitution	between	1945	and	1990	 (Italy,	France,	Malta,	Spain,	
Greece,	Finland	and	Portugal).	The	third	group	consists	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	
countries	 where	 referendum	 provisions	 were	 (re-)adopted	 in	 the	 new	 post-1989	
constitutions.	Finally,	in	the	United	Kingdom,	referendum	legislation	was	not	introduced	
until	the	twenty-first	century.	
	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 five	 EU	 members	 countries	 where	 referendum	
legislation	was	 in	 place	 prior	 to	 the	 Second	World	War,	 a	 first	wave	 of	 referendum	
institutionalization	 spread	 through	 Europe	 in	 the	 post-WWII	 decades.	 In	 France,	
33.	 	The	Netherlands	introduced	legislation	for	citizen-initiated	referendums	in	July	2015.	This	is	outside	
the	time	frame	of	this	study.	However,	Dutch	referendum	law	provides	for	an	advisory	referendum,	
and	is	not	enshrined	in	the	constitution.	Between	2002	and	2005,	the	Temporary	Referendum	Law	(in	
Dutch:	Tijdelijke	Referendumwet)	was	in	force,	which	also	provided	for	an	advisory	referendum	and	
was,	as	such,	not	enshrined	in	the	constitution.
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referendum	provisions	became	constitutionally	adopted	with	the	coming	into	force	of	
the	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	in	1946	and	were	extended	in	1958.	For	France,	
referendums	were	not	a	new	phenomenon,	since	referendums	on	constitutional	issues	
were	already	 introduced	during	 the	French	Revolution,	and	were	 frequently	used	by	
Napoleon	I	and	Napoleon	III.	1946,	however,	marked	the	first	time	France	had	adopted	
a	democratic	constitution	that	 included	referendum	provisions.	 In	 Italy,	referendums	
were	institutionalized	in	1948	with	the	coming	into	force	of	the	democratic	constitution	
after	 fascist	 rule	 and	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Second	World	War,	 and	 these	 provisions	
were	extended	 in	1970.	Despite	 this	being	 the	first	time	 that	 referendum	provisions	
were	adopted	in	the	constitution,	referendums	as	such	were	not	new	to	Italy,	as	two	
were	held	by	fascist	leader	Benito	Mussolini	in	1929	and	1934.	Also	for	Greece,	Spain	
and	Portugal,	the	adoption	of	referendum	provisions	in	the	1970s	coincided	with	the	
adoption	of	a	democratic	constitution	after	dictatorial	rule.	As	in	Italy,	in	these	countries	
referendums	 as	 such	 were	 certainly	 not	 a	 new	 phenomenon,	 as	 they	 were	 already	
constitutionally	provided	 for	 (in	Portugal	and	Spain)	and	used	 (in	all	 three	countries)	
under	dictatorial	 rule.	Malta	 implemented	 the	 referendum	 in	 1964	with	 the	 coming	
into	force	of	its	constitution,	after	gaining	independence	from	the	UK.	Finally,	Finland	
introduced	referendum	provisions	by	specific	constitutional	amendment	in	1987.	
Table 4.1: Referendum institutionalization in European democracies 
pre-WWII post-1945 post-1989 post-2000
No 
constitutional 
referendum  
provisions
Luxembourg	(1868)
Denmark	(1915,	1953)
Ireland	(1922,	1937)
Sweden	(1922,	1980)
Austria	(1929)
France	(1946,	1958,	2015)
Italy	(1948,	1970)
Malta	(1964)
Greece	(1975,	1986)
Portugal	(1976)
Spain	(1978)
Finland	(1987)
Hungary	(1989)
Croatia	(1990,	2010)
Bulgaria	(1991,	2010)
Latvia	(1991)
Romania	(1991)
Slovenia	(1991)
Czech	Republic	(1992)
Estonia	(1992)
Lithuania	(1992)
Poland	(1992)
Slovakia	(1992)
United	
Kingdom	
(2000,	2011)
Belgium
Cyprus
Germany
Netherlands
A	second	wave	of	referendum	institutionalization	came	with	the	coming	into	force	of	
the	democratic	constitutions	of	the	CEECs	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union.	For	
most	 CEECs,	 referendums	 as	 such	were	not	 a	 new	phenomenon	either	 but	 in	 these	
countries,	too,	they	were	closely	connected	to	authoritarianism.	In	the	Baltic	countries,	
referendums	were	already	constitutionally	provided	for	and	used	prior	to	Soviet	rule.	In	
Poland,	Czechoslovakia	and	Bulgaria,	referendums	were	held	to	consolidate	communist	
rule	between	1945	and	1989.	The	(re-)adoption	of	referendum	legislation	in	the	CEECs	
after	1989	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	‘critical	juncture’	imposed	by	the	end	
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of	 communist	 rule	 and	 the	 subsequent	 necessity	 to	 adopt	 a	 new	 constitution	 (Albi	
2005).	Following	 the	many	examples	of	 their	European	counterparts,	 it	was	a	 logical	
step	 for	 the	CEECs	 to	 adopt	 referendum	provisions	 in	 their	 constitutions	 (Council	 of	
Europe	1998).	
	 In	 the	UK,	 referendums	had	no	 formal	 status	until	 the	beginning	of	 the	 twenty-
first	century.	As	the	UK	has	an	uncodified	constitution,	referendums	are,	and	were	also	
prior	 to	 that	 period,	 triggered	 by	 Parliamentary	Act.	 From	2000	onward,	 the	 use	 of	
referendums	has	been	 regulated	by	a	 specific	Referendum	Act,	which	 sets	out	basic	
regulations	to	organize	referendums.	Moreover,	referendum	provisions	were	extended	
in	2011	with	the	reform	of	the	European	Union	Act	(EUA),	which	prescribes	the	use	of	
a	referendum	on	most	extensions	of	EU	competences	(see	chapter 6).	Finally,	in	2010,	
both	Bulgaria	and	Croatia	introduced	citizens’	initiatives	and,	in	January	2015,	France	
introduced	minority	referendums.
	 The	constitutional	(re-)adoption	of	referendum	provisions	usually	takes	place	when	
countries	 adopt	 a	new	 constitution.	As	 shown	 in	 table 4.2,	 this	 applies	 to	Denmark,	
Ireland	and	Luxembourg,	where	referendums	were	institutionalized	prior	to	the	Second	
World	War	with	the	coming	into	force	of	a	new	democratic	constitution	that	replaced	a	
previous	democratic	one.	In	Ireland,	the	constitution	of	1922	also	provided	for	national	
referendums,	and	even	 for	citizens’	 initiatives.	This	 latter	provision	was	however	not	
re-adopted	 in	 the	1937	constitution,	making	 Ireland	one	of	 the	 few	countries	where	
referendum	legislation	was	restricted	rather	than	extended	(Gallagher	1996a).	In	most	
countries,	for	example	the	Mediterranean	countries	and	the	CEECs,	referendums	were	
institutionalized	with	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitution	after	regime	change	or	shortly	
after	 independence.	Only	 in	Austria,	 Finland,	 Sweden	and	 the	UK	were	 referendums	
introduced	for	the	first	time	by	specific	constitutional	amendment	or	act.	Though	this	
is	not	shown	in	table 4.2,	an	extension	of	available	referendum	provisions	(such	as	in	
Italy	in	1970,	Sweden	in	1980,	in	Greece	in	1986,	and	France	in	2015)	largely	takes	place	
by	constitutional	amendment,	rather	than	during	a	full	revision	of	the	constitution;	the	
only	exceptions	are	the	introduction	of	minority	referendums	in	Denmark	in	1953	and	
of	presidential	referendums	in	France	in	1958,	as	these	were	introduced	during	a	full	
revision	of	the	constitution.
	 In	sum,	the	period	between	1950	and	2014	shows	referendum	provisions	coming	into	
effect	in	a	growing	number	of	European	democracies.	In	some	countries,	referendum	
provisions	were	already	available	before	these	countries	became	democratic,	while	in	
other	countries	referendums	were	introduced	at	the	moment	of	adopting	a	democratic	
constitution.	In	most	countries	where	referendum	provisions	were	(re-)adopted	after	the	
Second	World	War,	this	ran	parallel	with	the	adoption	of	a	first	democratic	constitution	
after	authoritarian	 rule,	 independence	or	 regime	change;	 the	exceptions	are	France,	
Finland	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 where	 referendum	 legislation	 was	 adopted	 after	
democratic	consolidation.	This	increased	institutionalization	of	referendums	is	closely	
4
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connected	 to	 country-specific	 processes	 of	 constitutional	 consolidation	 or	 change,	
and	does	 not	 as	 such	mark	 a	 universal,	 direct	 and	democratic	Zeitgeist that pushed 
countries	towards	adopting	or	re-adopting	referendum	provisions.	This	is	underscored	
by	the	nature	of	the	referendum	legislation	in	most	EU	countries,	which	primarily	allows	
political	representatives	rather	than	citizens	to	control	the	referendum	process.	This	is	
outlined	in	the	next	section.	
4.2.2 Nature of referendum provisions
In	chapter 2,	 I	 provided	a	 classification	of	five	different	 referendums	on	 the	basis	of	
the	actor	who	ultimately	decides	whether	or	not	 the	 referendum	 is	held.	When	 the	
constitution	 prescribes	 that	 a	 referendum	 is	 held	 on	 certain	 type	 of	 issues,	 these	
are considered mandatory	 referendums.	 Optional	 referendums	 pledged	 by	 political	
representatives	can	be	divided	into	presidential	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	
the	president	 (and	for	which,	 in	principle,	 the	consent	of	a	parliamentary	majority	 is	
not	required);	legislative	majority	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	
majority	 (i.e.	 in	 most	 cases,	 but	 not	 necessarily,	 the	 government);	 and	 legislative	
minority	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority.	Finally,	there	
are citizen-initiated	referendums,	optional	referendums	directly	triggered	by	a	certain	
proportion	 of	 the	 citizenry.	 When	 placing	 these	 five	 referendum	 types	 on	 a	 scale	
ranging	 from	 less	 to	 more	 direct	 citizens’	 participation,	 the	 presidential,	 legislative	
majority	and	legislative	minority	referendums	are	situated	on	the	left	of	the	axis	(i.e.	
they	are	representative	instruments)	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	on	the	right	(i.e.	
they	are	direct	participatory	instruments).	The	first	three	referendums	do allow	citizens	
to	influence	decision-making,	but	only	on	the	initiative	of	political	representatives.	By	
contrast,	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 provide	 citizens	 with	 a	 tool	 with	 which	 they	
themselves	can	trigger	referendums	on	existing	legislative	proposals	(citizens’	vetoes),	
or	on	proposals	that	they	themselves	have	formulated	(citizens’	initiatives).	The	position	
of	mandatory	referendums	on	this	scale	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	authorities	
are	able	to	interpret	the	constitution	as	they	see	fit.	
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Figure 4.1: Actors able to trigger national referendums by country34 
 
 
  
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions.
Figure 4.1	provides	an	overview	of	available	referendum	provisions	in	the	28	EU	member	
countries	based	on	whether	referendums	are	triggered	by	citizens,	the	constitution,	or	
political	representatives.	As	shown,	there	are	significant	cross-country	differences	in	the	
types	of	referendum	constitutionally	provided,	and	thus	in	the	extent	to	which	citizens	
are	able	to	directly	participate	in	democratic	decision-making	by	triggering	and	voting	
in	referendums	(a	detailed	overview	by	country	is	provided	in	appendix 1). Referendums	
initiated	 by	 representative	 bodies	 are	 most	 common:	 they	 are	 constitutionally	
provided	 for	 in	 all	 the	 24	 countries	where	 the	 constitution	makes	 explicit	 reference	
to	the	use	of	national	referendums.	 In	the	Czech	Republic,35	Finland,	Greece,	Poland,	
Portugal,	and	Sweden	the	constitution	only	specifies	the	use	of	referendums	triggered	
by	representatives	 (not	by	the	constitution	or	citizens).	 In	Austria,	Denmark,	Estonia,	
France,	Ireland,	Romania,	Spain	and	the	UK,	mandatory	referendums	are	also	provided	
for.
	 There	are	ten	countries	where	citizens	can	trigger	referendums,	either	on	existing	
legislative	proposals	or	proposals	submitted	by	citizens	themselves.	As	shown	in	figure 
4.1,	such	referendums	are	 largely	restricted	to	the	CEECs.	 In	fact,	of	these	countries,	
only	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Poland,	 Romania	 and	 Estonia	 have	 no	 constitutional	 basis	
34.	 	As	provided	in	the	countries’	constitutions	on	1	January	2015;	AU=Austria,	BU=Bulgaria,	CR=Croatia,	
DEN=Denmark,	EST=Estonia,	FI=Finland,	FR=France,	GR=Greece,	HU=Hungary,	IRL=Ireland,	IT=Italy,	
LT=Latvia,	LI=Lithuania,	LU=Luxembourg,	MLT=Malta,	POL=Poland,	POR=Portugal,	RO=Romania,	
SLK=Slovakia,	SLV=Slovenia,	SP=Spain,	SWE=Sweden,	UK=United	Kingdom;	In	Belgium,	Cyprus,	
Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	the	constitution	makes	no	reference	to	the	use	of	national	
referendums,	and	therefore	these	countries	are	not	included.	In	these	countries,	referendums	can	be	
triggered	by	representatives	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	
35.	 	In	the	Czech	Republic,	this	only	applies	to	the	ratification	of	international	treaties	that	signify	a	
transfer	of	national	sovereignty.	In	that	case,	the	referendum	is	regulated	by	constitutional	act,	and	
as	such,	provisions	are	not	specified	in	the	constitution.	
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for	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 In	 the	 EU17	 countries,	 it	 is	 largely	 impossible	 for	
citizens	 to	 trigger	 a	 national	 referendum,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Malta,	 Italy	 and	
Luxembourg.36	All	three	referendum	categories	are	provided	for	in	only	a	small	group	
of	five	countries.	Hence,	on	the	basis	of	this	overview,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	fact	
that	referendums	became	institutionalized	in	an	increasing	number	of	EU	countries	in	
the	twentieth	century	does	not	straightforwardly	mark	an	overall	shift	towards	direct	
citizens’	participation.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that,	in	most	EU	countries,	the	power	to	
trigger	referendums	lies	in	the	hands	of	political	representatives,	making	them	above	all	
institutions	of	representative	decision-making.
	 To	 link	 referendums	 to	various	democratic	 traditions,	 I	argued	 in	chapter 2 that, 
besides	 the	question	of	whether	 the	 referendum	process	 is	 controlled	by	citizens	or	
representatives,	 the	question	of	whether	 it	 is	 controlled	 by	 the	political	majority	 or	
by	minorities	 is	 also	 important.	 I	 therefore	 further	 divided	 referendums	 initiated	by	
representatives	 into	 three	 categories,	 based	 on	 who	 ultimately	 decides	 whether	 a	
referendum	 is	 held:	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	 (legislative	
majority	referendums),	referendums	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority	(legislative	
minority	referendums)	and,	finally,	referendums	triggered	by	the	president	(presidential	
referendums).	Table 4.3	provides	an	overview	of	 the	availability	of	 the	 four	 types	of	
referendum	 triggered	by	 actors	 (rather	 than	 the	 constitution)	 in	 the	 28	 EU	member	
countries	 and	 the	 position	 of	 these	 referendums	 within	 this	 two-dimensional	
classification.	
	 Legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 most	 commonly	 provided	 for,	 in	 17	 EU	
countries.	 In	 the	Czech	Republic,	 the	 constitution	only	 specifies	 that	 parliament	 can	
decide	 to	 organize	 a	 referendum	 on	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 by	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	
constitutional	act.	Given	this	exceptional	character,	this	country	 is	placed	 in	 italics	 in	
table 4.3.	 Presidential	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 three	 semi-presidential	
countries	 in	 the	 EU28	 (France,	 Portugal	 and	 Romania),	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Croatia	 and	
Poland.	 Legislative	minority	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 only	 eleven	 countries,	
most	of	them	consensus	democracies.	The	exceptions	are	France	(since	2015),	Ireland	
and	 Spain,	 which	 are	 majoritarian	 democracies.	 However,	 in	 Spain	 a	 parliamentary	
minority	 can	 only	 trigger	 a	 vote	 on	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution,	 and	 these	
votes	are	advisory.	In	addition,	in	France,	a	parliamentary	minority	needs	the	additional	
support	of	one-tenth	of	the	electorate	(by	means	of	a	signature	petition)	to	trigger	a	
referendum;	 this	 is	 therefore	also	 referred	 to	as	a	 shared	 initiative	 (see	chapter	5).37 
36.	 	In	the	Netherlands,	a	bill	that	allows	advisory	citizen-initiated	referendums	to	be	held	was	passed	by	
parliament	in	2014;	however,	on	1	January	2015,	the	bill	had	not	yet	passed	into	law	(that	happened	
on	1	July	2015).	Moreover,	provisions	for	this	type	of	referendum	have	not	been	implemented	in	the	
constitution,	since	this	would	have	required	a	constitutional	revision.
37.	 	For	that	reason,	it	is	not	a	legislative	minority	referendum	in	the	strictest	sense.	However,	since	the	
initiating	power	resides	in	the	legislative	minority	rather	than	citizens	as	such,	I	nevertheless	label	it	
as	a	legislative	minority	referendum	rather	than	a	citizen-initiated	referendum.
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Citizen-initiated	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 only	 ten	 countries,	 most	 of	 them	
CEECs.	Finally,	mandatory	referendums	(not	included	in	table 4.3 as they are triggered 
by	the	constitution	rather	than	by	political	actors	as	such)	are	provided	for	in	thirteen	
countries.	In	the	EU17	countries,	these	referendums	are	more	common	in	majoritarian	
polities	than	consensus	ones,	with	the	exception	of	Austria	and	Denmark.
Table 4.3: Constitutional availability of four referendum types in EU38
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
As	I	argued	in	chapter 2,	to	assess	more	comprehensively	who	controls	the	referendum	
and	 the	ultimately	decision-making	processes,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 four	other	
questions	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 question	 which	 actor	 ultimately	 decides	 whether	 a	
referendum	is	held:
1)	 Is	the	function	of	the	referendum	decision-promotive	or	decision-controlling?
2)	 On	what	issues can	a	vote	be	held?
3)	 Is	a	quorum	applicable?
4)	 Is	the	effect	of	the	vote	binding	or	advisory?
 
Below,	I	outline	more	extensively	the	availability	of	the	five	referendums	in	the	28	EU	
member	countries,	whereby	I	make	a	further	distinction	on	the	basis	of	these	additional	
four	questions.
38.	 	On	1	January	2015.
Representation 
Representative sovereignty
Participation 
Popular sovereignty
Aggregation 
Majority protection
LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY REFERENDUM
Austria,	Greece,	Finland,	Malta,	
Luxembourg,	Spain,	Sweden, UK,	Bulgaria,  
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM
France,	Portugal,	Croatia, Poland, 
Romania
Integration 
Minority protection
LEGISLATIVE MINORITY REFERENDUM
Austria,	Denmark,	France,	Ireland,	Italy,	
Luxembourg,	Spain,	Sweden,	Lithuania,  
Poland, Slovenia
CITIZEN-INITIATED REFERENDUM
Italy,	Malta,	Luxembourg,	Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia
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LEGISLATIVE	 MAJORITY	 REFERENDUMS.	 As	 shown	 in	 table 4.3,	 in	 seventeen	 EU	
countries	the	constitution	contains	provisions	for	holding	referendums	triggered	by	a	
parliamentary	majority.	 In	 all	 countries,	 national	 referendums	 can	be	held	 on	 an	 ad	
hoc	basis,	initiated	by	a	regular	parliamentary	act	rather	than	on	the	basis	of	available	
referendum	provisions.	Thus,	in	all	countries	referendums	can	in	principle	be	triggered	
by	a	parliamentary	majority.	In	the	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Greece,	Finland,	and	the	UK,	
optional	referendums	(referendums	triggered	by	political	elites)	can	only	be	triggered	by	
parliamentary	majorities.	In	Austria,	Luxembourg,	Poland,	Slovenia,	Spain	and	Sweden,	
this	type	of	referendum	is	complemented	by	a	legislative	minority	referendum	either	
only	 in	 case	 of	 constitutional	 revision	 or	 (also)	 on	 regular	 policy	 issues	 (see	 below).	
Finally,	in	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Malta,	and	Slovakia,	referendums	can	be	
initiated	 by	 parliamentary	majorities,	and	 by	 opposition	 parties	when	 supported	 by	
citizens’	signatures	(citizen-initiated	referendums,	see	below).		
	 Legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 most	 commonly	 triggered	 by	 a	 simple	 or	
absolute	 majority.	 This	 is	 a	 qualified	majority	 of	 three-fifths	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	
Estonia	(in	the	case	of	referendums	on	constitutional	revisions;	referendums	on	regular	
enactments	require	the	support	of	a	normal	majority)	and	Greece.	When	triggered	by	a	
parliamentary	majority,	the	function	of	the	referendum	is	usually	decision-promotive.	
However,	 in	 consensus	 countries,	 and	 most	 notably	 countries	 where	 minority	
governments	 are	 common,	 such	 as	 in	 Sweden,	 the	 function	 of	 legislative	 majority	
referendums	 can	 also	 be	 decision-controlling:	 i.e.	 referendums	 are	 not	 necessarily	
triggered	by	the	parliamentary	majority	that	approved	the	proposal,	but	potentially also 
by	a	majority	in	opposition.	
	 In	most	 countries	where	a	 referendum	 is	 triggered	by	 a	parliamentary	majority,	
this	can	be	done	in principle	on	any	type	of	legislation.	This	is	shown	in	table 4.4.	This	
gives	 political	 representatives	 considerable	 power	 to	 control	 the	 agenda.	 There	 is,	
however,	a	difference	between	EU17	countries	and	the	CEECs	in	this	respect.	In	most	
EU17	countries,	political	representatives	can	indeed	pledge	referendums	on	any	type	of	
legislation,	sometimes	with	the	exception	of	certain	constitutional	issues.	In	most	of	the	
Adoption of new constitution Amendment 
of democratic 
constitutionFull revision of democratic 
constitution
Adoption of constitution after regime change
Denmark
Ireland
Luxembourg
Italy
France
Greece
Malta
Spain
Portugal
11	CEECs
Austria
Finland
Sweden
United	Kingdom
Table 4.2: Context of referendum institutionalization in European democracies
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CEECs,	the	power	of	the	majority	to	trigger	a	referendum	is	restricted	by	specific	subject	
requirements:	 either	 referendums	 can	only	be	pledged	on	politically	weighty	 issues,	
such	as	the	constitution	or	the	EU,	or	there	are	considerable	exceptions	regarding	the	
issues	on	which	a	referendum	can	be	held,	as	is	the	case	in	Hungary	and	Slovakia.
Table 4.4: Legislative majority referendums: issues
EU17 CEECs
Politically weighty issues Greece 
Spain
Bulgaria 
Czech	Republic 
Latvia 
Poland 
Slovenia
Any type of legislation
Austria 
Finland 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Sweden 
UK
Croatia 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Slovakia
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
There	are	also	differences	between	the	EU17	countries	and	CEECs	when	it	comes	to	the	
applicability	of	quorums	and	the	effect	of	the	referendum	outcome.	This	 is	shown	in	
table 4.5.	The	table	does	not	include	the	Czech	Republic,	since	referendum	provisions	
there	are	 regulated	by	a	 specific	 constitutional	 act.	 The	UK	 is	placed	 in	 italics,	 since	
referendum	 provisions	 are	 not	 unequivocal.	 UK-wide	 referendums	 are	 in	 principle	
advisory	 and	 held	 prior	 to	 the	 parliamentary	 vote,	 unless	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	
decides	 to	 hold	 a	 post-legislative	 binding	 referendum.	 Also,	 in	 principle,	no quorum 
is	specified,	but	a	majority	in	parliament	can	decide	otherwise.	Indeed,	in	most	EU17	
countries,	 legislation	on	 legislative	majority	 referendums	does	 not	 specify	 quorums,	
and	 these	 referendums	are	advisory.	 In	Greece,	however,	 these	 referendums	have	a	
turnout	quorum	(of	either	40	per	cent	for	referendums	on	‘issues	of	national	interests’	
or	50	per	cent	 for	referendums	on	 ‘important	social	matters’),	and	they	are	binding.	
By	contrast,	 in	most	CEECs,	 legislative	majority	referendums	are	binding	and	as	such	
do	 require	 a	 quorum.	 Only	 in	 Bulgaria	 and	 Slovakia	 do	 advisory	 legislative	majority	
referendums	have	a	quorum.
4
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Table 4.5: Legislative majority referendums: quorums and effect
Yes No
Quorum
Greece Austria,	Finland,	Luxembourg,	Malta,	
Spain,	Sweden, UK
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia
Estonia, Latvia, Croatia
Binding
Greece Austria,	Finland,	Luxembourg,	Malta,	
Spain,	Sweden,	UK
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia
Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
PRESIDENTIAL	REFERENDUMS.	In	the	three	semi-presidential	systems	in	the	EU	(France,	
Portugal	 and	 Romania)	 the	 president	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Only	 in	 Romania	
are	 presidential	 referendums	 non-binding.	 The	 president	 can	 also	 trigger	 a	 binding	
referendum	in	Croatia	and	Poland.	But	 in	Croatia	the	president	needs	the	support	of	
the	prime	minister	to	do	so.	In	Poland,	the	president	can	only	do	this	alone	in	the	case	of	
constitutional	amendments;	the	support	of	the	Senate	is	needed	to	trigger	a	referendum	
on	issues	of	national	interest.	In	addition,	other	than	in	the	semi-presidential	countries	
(with	 the	 exception	 of	 France	 since	 2015),	 in	 these	 two	 countries,	 parliamentarians	
can	also	trigger	a	 referendum.	 In	most	cases,	presidential	 referendums	are	decision-
promotive,	 as	 the	 president	 usually	 belongs	 to	 the	 party	 that	 holds	 the	majority	 in	
parliament.	However,	presidential	referendums	can	also	be	decision-controlling,	when	
they	serve	to	veto	a	proposal	submitted	by	a	parliamentary	majority.	This	is,	however,	
only	 plausible	 in	 periods	 of	 cohabitation,	 when	 the	 president	 comes	 from	 another	
political	party	than	the	party	that	holds	the	parliamentary	majority.	The	2007	Romanian	
referendum	 initiated	by	president	Basescu	 is	 an	example.	 This	 referendum	was	held	
on	 a	 proposal	 that	 did	 not	 have	 the	 support	 of	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	 and	 was	
hence	decision-controlling.	In	principle,	in	countries	where	the	president	can	initiate	a	
referendum,	he	or	she	is	expected	to	do	so	in cooperation with	the	entire	government	
or	parliament,	making	the	referendum	primarily	decision-promotive.
  
LEGISLATIVE	MINORITY	REFERENDUMS.	As	shown	in	table 4.3 and table 4.6,	legislative	
minority	referendums	are	provided	for	only	in	eleven,	mainly	consensus,	democracies.	
Interestingly,	in	the	CEECs,	such	referendums	aimed	at	controlling	the	decision-making	
process	are	rare,	only	being	possible	in	Lithuania,	Poland	and	Slovenia.	In	most	CEECs,	
political	representatives	can	be	involved	in	initiating	a	citizens’	veto	or	citizens’	initiative.	
	 Minority	referendums	are	usually	decision-controlling,	meaning	that	the	minority	
can	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 on	 legislative	 proposals	 submitted	 by	 the	 parliamentary	
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majority.	 This	 generally	 implies	 legislative	 proposals	 or	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	
constitution	 that	 are	 not	 yet	 in	 effect	 (rejective	 referendums).	 In	 Italy,	 five	 regional	
councils	can	trigger	a	referendum	to	veto	decrees	that	have	already	been	implemented	
(abrogative	 referendums).	 Such	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 regional	 councils	 are	 of	
course	not	strictly	speaking	legislative	minority	referendums,	as	they	are	not	triggered	
by	a	minority	in	the	national	parliament.	Yet	I	nevertheless	include	them	in	table 4.6, as 
they	are	triggered	by	a	minority	of	regional	councils	(and	hence,	a	minority	of	regional 
representatives).	In	January	2015,	France	institutionalized	decision-promotive	legislative	
minority	referendums,	to	be	held	on	proposals	drafted	by	one-fifth	of	the	members	of	
parliament	and	supported	by	one-tenth	of	the	electorate.	This	is	an	anomaly:	not	only	is	
this	form	of	a	decision-promotive	minority	referendum	not	provided	for	elsewhere,	but	
legislative	minority	referendums	on	regular	policy	 issues	are	not	commonly	provided	
for	in	majoritarian	democracies	like	France.39 
 
Table 4.6: Legislative minority referendums: quorums and effect
Yes No
Quorum
Denmark,	Ireland,	Italy	(reg.),	Luxembourg,	
Sweden
Austria,	France,	Italy	(const.),	Spain,
Lithuania, Slovenia (const.)  Poland, Slovenia (reg.)
Binding
Austria,	Denmark,	France,	Ireland.	Italy	
(reg.),	Luxembourg,	Sweden,	Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Poland
Italy	(const.),	Spain
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
When	 referendums	can	be	 triggered	by	a	minority	 in	opposition,	 this	 can	usually	be	
done	on	a	wide	range	of	issues	and	the	effect	of	the	votes	is	usually	binding.	In	some	
countries,	 such	 as	 Austria,	 Luxembourg,	 Poland,	 Spain	 and	 Sweden,	 parliamentary	
minorities	can	trigger	a	referendum	only	on	proposals	to	amend	the	constitution,	and	
not	 on	 regular	 legislation.	 In	 addition,	 in	 binding	 legislative	 minority	 referendums,	
simple	 majority	 rule	 in	 the	 vote	 is	 often	 restricted	 by	 a	 quorum,	 a	 finding	 that	 is	
consistent	with	the	‘institutional	fit’	hypothesis	(see	table 4.6	for	an	overview).	Hence,	
when	binding	referendums	are	initiated	by	opposition	minorities,	simple	majority	rule	
in	the	vote	itself	is	restricted	by	the	requirement	of	specific	turnout	quorums,	meaning	
that	a	large	number	of	citizens	should	participate	in	such	a	referendum	or	approve	of	
a	specific	outcome	for	it	to	be	valid.	Exceptions	are	Austria,	France,	and	Poland	where	
39.	 	In	France,	a	legislative	minority	of	two-fifths	plus	one	can	also	trigger	a	referendum	on	EU	
enlargement	indirectly.	It	can	only	do	this	by	not	supporting	a	motion	triggered	by	the	majority	that	
states	that	the	enlargement	treaty	must	be	ratified	by	a	parliamentary	act.	Hence,	this	is	strictly	
speaking	not	a	legislative	minority	referendum.
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minority	 referendums	are	binding	 in	effect	and	never	 require	a	quorum.	 In	 Italy	and	
Spain,	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 reform	 are	 advisory,	 and	
subsequently,	do	not	require	a	quorum.	
CITIZEN-INITIATED	 REFERENDUMS.	 The	 number	 of	 countries	 where	 citizens	 can	
initiate	a	 referendum	 is	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	number	 that	have	provisions	 for	
constitutional	 referendums	or	referendums	triggered	by	political	authorities.	Citizen-
initiated	referendums	are	provided	for	in	only	ten	countries	(Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Hungary,	
Italy,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Luxembourg,	Malta,	Slovakia	and	Slovenia).40	In	Latvia,	they	can	
be	either	decision-controlling	or	decision-promotive:	citizens	can	trigger	a	referendum	
on	legislative	proposals	drafted	by	parliament	(i.e.	citizens’	vetoes,	which	are	decision-
controlling),	as	well	as	on	proposals,	either	legislative	ones	or	proposals	to	amend	the	
constitution,	drafted	by	themselves	(citizens’	initiatives,	which	are	decision-promotive).	
	 In	four	of	these	countries	(Italy,	Luxembourg,	Malta	and	Slovenia),	the	function	of	
these votes is only decision-controlling.	 Such	vetoes	can,	 in	principle,	deal	with	both	
constitutional	 issues	 and	 regular	 legislative	 proposals.	 Exceptions	 are	 Luxembourg	 –	
where	citizens	can	only	veto	proposals	on	constitutional	revision	–	and	Malta	–	where	
constitutional	 amendment	 proposals	 are	 specifically	 excluded	 from	 the	 citizens’	
referendum.	 In	 Latvia,	 Luxembourg	 and	 Slovenia,	 a	 veto	 referendum	 can	 only	 be	
triggered	by	citizens	on	recently	approved	legislative	proposals	that	are	not	yet	in	effect;	
hence,	these	vetoes	are	rejective.	In	Italy	and	Malta,	referendums	can	be	initiated	on	
laws	that	are	already	in	effect;	these	vetoes	are	therefore	abrogative.	Besides	Latvia,	
decision-promotive	 citizens’	 referendums	 (or	 citizens’	 initiatives)	 are	 provided	 for	
in	 Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	Hungary,	 Lithuania	 and	 Slovakia.	Hence,	 in	 none	of	 the	 ‘old’	 EU	
member	states	do	citizens	themselves	have	the	right	to	initiate	a	referendum	on	a	self-
written	policy	proposal.	
	 Regulations	 for	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	are	 stricter	 than	 for	other	 types	of	
referendum.	In	all	countries,	the	constitution	explicitly	prescribes	the	issues	on	which	
such	referendums	cannot	be	held.	Also	turnout	quorums	are	usually	specified.	Citizens’	
referendums	 are	 binding	 in	 all	 countries	 when	 the	 quorum	 is	 reached.	 Italy	 is	 an	
exception:	here,	citizens’	vetoes	on	a	constitutional	reform	proposal	are	advisory	and	
hence	do	not	require	a	quorum.	There	is	considerable	variation	in	the	ease	with	which	
citizens	can	trigger	a	referendum.	In	Croatia,	this	is	the	most	difficult:	the	signatures	of	
10	per	cent	of	the	electorate	(approximately	400,000	signatures)	need	to	be	collected	
within	a	period	of	only	15	days.	In	Bulgaria,	Latvia,	Luxembourg,	Malta,	Lithuania	and	
Slovakia,	triggering	a	citizen-initiated	referendum	also	requires	the	signatures	of	roughly	
7-10	per	cent	of	the	electorate,	albeit	within	a	more	extensive	time	frame,	ranging	from	
2	to	3	months.	By	contrast,	in	Italy,	Hungary	and	Slovenia,	it	is	relatively	easy	to	trigger	a	
40.	 	And	in	the	Netherlands,	from	July	2015	onwards.
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referendum.	For	example,	in	Italy,	500,000	signatures	(approximately	1	per	cent	of	the	
electorate)	need	to	be	collected	in	a	period	of	three	months.
MANDATORY	REFERENDUMS.	As	shown	in	table 4.7,	as	on	1	January	2015,	mandatory	
referendums	are	provided	for	in	13	countries.	Mandatory	referendums	generally	deal	
with	politically	weighty	issues,	such	as	constitutional	revision	or	transfer	of	sovereignty	
to	international	or	transnational	organizations.	In	the	strictest	sense,	such	referendums	
serve	as	a	check	to	ensure	that	the	ruling	majority	cannot	impose	a	decision	on	these	
matters	on	the	other	parties.	Yet,	as	I	argued	in	chapter 2,	the	ruling	majority	usually	has	
considerable	leeway	to	interpret	the	constitution	and	hence	to	influence	the	triggering	
process.	To	place	these	referendums	in	the	two-dimensional	framework,	two	elements	
are	 important:	1)	 is	the	referendum	strictly	mandatory	or	do	representatives	control	
the	triggering	process?	and	2)	do	the	ruling	majority	or	political	minorities	have	scope	
to	control	this	process?	
Table 4.7: Mandatory referendums: issues and introduction
Mandatory referendum on 
constitution
Mandatory referendum on EU Other
Austria 
Denmark	
France	
Ireland	
Malta	
Spain	
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Denmark	
France	(2005-2008)
UK
Lithuania
Slovakia 
Croatia
Hungary (1989-2011)
Austria	‘impeachment’	
Denmark	‘voting	age’	
Romania ‘impeachment’ 
Latvia ‘dissolution of 
parliament’ 
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
Strictly	 mandatory	 referendums	 are	 usually	 held	 on	 constitutional	 revision,	 which	
is	provided	for	 in	ten	EU	countries.	 In	the	case	of	such	referendums,	representatives	
exercise	no	direct	control	over	the	triggering	process.	In	practice	though,	governments	
have	considerable	leeway	to	interpret	the	constitution	–	and	to	judge	whether	an	act	
requires	an	amendment.	Hence,	contrary	to	what	is	usually	assumed,	formal	mandatory	
referendums	do	not	automatically	 sideline	governments.	The	actual	 control	 that	 the	
government	 exercises	 over	 the	 triggering	 of	 such	 constitutional	 referendums	 is,	
however,	difficult	 to	assess	and	depends	on	 the	political	 context	and	public	opinion.	
For	example,	not	 treating	a	 legislative	proposal	on	an	 issue	 that	 is	 contested	among	
4
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both	political	parties	and	the	public	as	a	constitutional	amendment	could	well	mean	
political	suicide.	This	means	that	such	referendums	can	only	be	placed	within	my	two-
dimensional	framework	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
	 In	addition,	the	agenda-setting	power	usually	lies	in	the	hands	of	the	ruling	majority,	
since	it	is	usually	the	ruling	majority	that	takes	the	initiative	to	revise	the	constitution,	
thereby	indirectly	triggering	a	referendum.	In	Ireland,	for	example,	most	constitutional	
referendums	were	held	on	proposals	initiated	by	a	majority	in	parliament	(cf.	Gallagher	
1996a,	 100).	 Moreover,	 in	 some	 countries,	 legislation	 is	 crafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	
a	 referendum	 is	 only	 required	 in	 the	event	of	 certain	 amendments.	 For	 example,	 in	
Estonia,	 Lithuania	and	Spain,	a	 referendum	 is	only	 required	 in	 the	case	of	a	 revision	
of certain constitutional	 articles,	 while	 in	 Austria	 a	 referendum	 is	 only	 mandatory	
in the event of a full	 revision	of	 the	constitution.	There	are	some	countries	where	a	
referendum	must	be	held	in	exceptional	cases,	such	as	on	a	change	in	the	voting	age	
in	Denmark,	on	impeachment	of	the	president	in	Austria	and	Romania,	and	when	the	
president	wants	to	dissolve	parliament	in	Latvia.41	France	is	an	exception;	a	referendum	
is	only	mandatory	there	if	a	proposal	to	amend	the	constitution	is	drafted	by	parliament,	
rather	than	by	the	government.	In	case	of	the	latter,	the	president	can	decide	not	to	call	
a	 referendum	and	 instead	submit	 the	bill	 to	Congress,	 the	 joint	assembly	of	 the	two	
houses	of	parliament.
	 Referendums	 on	 a	 transfer	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 five	 EU	
countries	(Croatia,	Denmark,	Lithuania,	Slovakia	and	the	UK).42	In	these	countries,	such	
referendums	on	the	EU	are	decision-promotive	rather	than	decision-controlling,	as	the	
government	has	considerable	leeway	to	interpret	the	constitution	and	decide	whether	a	
treaty	reform	indeed	implies	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	and	hence	whether	a	referendum	
is	 indeed	required.	Thus,	 these	votes	are	not	strictly	 speaking	mandatory.	As	will	be	
shown	in	the	case-study	chapters,	there	are	many	cases	in	which	governments	decided	
that	a	 specific	EU	 treaty	 ratification	did	not	 signify	 a	 transfer	of	 sovereignty.	Hence,	
in	 these	 cases,	 the	 ruling	majority	exercises	 considerable	 control	over	 the	 triggering	
process.	
	 A	 second	 element	 is	 whether	 indirect	 control	 over	 the	 triggering	 of	 the	 vote	 is	
exercised	by	the	ruling	majority	or	whether	opposition	parties	also	play	a	role	in	this	
process.	 As	 I	 argued	 in	 chapter 2,	 this	 depends	 on	 how	 parliament	 decides	 on	 the	
proposal	before	 it	 is	submitted	to	a	referendum.	 In	countries	where	the	constitution	
41.	 	In	impeachment	referendums,	citizens	vote	on	representatives	rather	than	issues.	I	have	not	classified	
such	referendums	separately	since	they	are	rare	in	Europe.	When	direct	votes	on	representatives	are	
triggered	by	citizens,	they	are	labelled	as	recall referendums.	As	the	impeachment	referendums	in	
Austria,	Latvia	and	Romania	are	initiated	by	representatives	(either	parliament	or	president),	they	are	
not	considered	as	pure	recalls.	Thus,	I	include	these	provisions	in	the	analysis	and	consider	them	as	
mandatory	referendums,	because	they	differ	substantively	from	the	recall	procedure.
42.	 	In	Hungary,	a	referendum	on	sovereignty	transfer	was	provided	for	in	the	pre-2011	constitution	but	
was	abandoned	afterwards.
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prescribes	a	referendum	in	the	event	of	constitutional	revision,	such	decisions	are	made	
by	a	qualified	majority	in	Austria,	Malta,	Spain,	Estonia,	Latvia,	Lithuania	and	Romania	
(see appendix 1	for	an	overview).	In	these	countries,	opposition	parties	play	a	role	in	
triggering	a	referendum	because	their	support	might	be	necessary	to	pursue	a	revision	
and hence to indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Such	 decisions	 are	made	 by	 a	 simple	
majority	in	Denmark,	France	and	Ireland.	In	these	countries,	triggering	the	referendum	
lies	 primarily,	 albeit	 indirectly,	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 political	 majority.	 Yet,	 given	 the	
proportionality	of	 the	Danish	polity,	Danish	opposition	parties	do	play	an	 important	
role	in	this	process	as	well,	since	the	support	of	a	relatively	large	number	of	parties	is	
necessary	to	form	a	political	majority.	
	 This	also	applies	to	Danish	referendums	on	the	transfer	of	sovereignty	to	the	EU,	
in	which	opposition	parties	have	an	even	more	obvious	role.	Although	the	government	
party	or	coalition	determines	whether	a	referendum	is	necessary	under	Article 20, once 
this	 has	 been	 decided,	 opposition	 parties	 have	 an	 important,	 albeit	 indirect,	 role	 in	
actually	triggering	a	referendum.	In	Denmark,	a	referendum	on	sovereignty	transfer	is	
not	mandatory	when	there	is	a	5/6	parliamentary	majority	in	favour.	This	implies	that	a	
parliamentary	minority	of	1/6	plus	one	controls	the	triggering	of	this	referendum.	This	
applies	to	a	lesser	extent	to	France	in	the	case	of	EU	accession.	From	2005	to	2008,	a	
referendum	was	mandatory	 in	 the	case	of	 ratifying	 the	accession	of	other	 countries	
to	 the	 EU.	 In	 2008,	 a	 clause	was	 introduced	which	 stated	 that	 a	 referendum	on	 EU	
enlargement	is	not	held	when	the	motion	is	adopted	in	Congress	(the	joint	assembly	of	
the	two	houses	of	parliament)	by	a	three-fifths	majority.	Rather	than	strictly	mandatory,	
it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 since	 2008	 this	 type	 of	 referendum	 is	 controlled	 by	 parliament,	
whereby	the	support	of	opposition	parties	is	necessary	to	avoid	a	referendum.	However,	
given	the	disproportionality	of	the	French	polity,	a	three-fifths	majority	is	easily	reached	
and	in	practice	constitutes	only	slightly	more	seats	than	the	presidential	majority.	
	 The	 EU17	 countries	where	mandatory	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 are	mainly	
majoritarian	 democracies,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Austria	 and	 Denmark.	 This	 finding	
is	 consistent	with	 a	 study	by	Anckar	 (2014,	 15),	who	 concludes	 that	 ‘if	 the	electoral	
system	carries	 in	 its	wake	 situations	 in	which	one	 single	party	may	decide	alone	on	
constitutional	 reform,	 the	 need	 for	 corrections	 and	 balancing	 counter-measures	
becomes	 obvious’.	Hence,	 as	 he	 continues,	 ‘countries	 that	 have	 installed	 in	 national	
lower	House	elections	plurality	election	methods	are	more	prone	than	other	countries	
to	resort	to	the	constitutional	referendum’.	The	analysis	reveals	that	there	are	indeed	
only	a	few	European	majoritarian	democracies	where	mandatory	referendums	are	not	
provided	for.	Greece	and	Cyprus	are	exceptions.	Moreover,	countries	where	mandatory	
referendums	 are	 not	 provided	 for	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 consensual	 democracies.	
Denmark	 and	 Austria	 are	 then	 the	 only	 EU17	 consensus	 democracies	 where	 the	
constitution	provides	for	a	mandatory	referendum.	
	 In	all	countries,	mandatory	referendums	are	obviously	binding.	As	shown	in	table 
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4.8,	of	the	EU17	countries	where	the	mandatory	referendum	is	provided	for,	quorums	
only	apply	in	Denmark.	As	Denmark	is	a	consensus	democracy,	this	finding	is	consistent	
with	the	institutional	fit	hypothesis.	A	quorum	also	applies	in	Latvia	and	Lithuania.	
Table 4.8: Mandatory referendums: quorums and effect
Yes No
Quorum Denmark,	Latvia, Lithuania Austria,	France,	Ireland,	Malta,	Spain,	UK,	
Croatia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia
In	 sum,	 the	analysis	of	 available	 referendum	provisions	 in	 the	EU28	 reveals	 that	 the	
institutionalization	of	referendums	in	the	twentieth	century	in	Europe	does	not	mark	
a	 direct	 democratic	 shift.	 In	 this	 period,	 referendums	were	 introduced	 in	 a	 growing	
number	of	democracies.	When	countries	made	the	transition	to	democracy,	this	usually	
also	implied	adoption	or	re-adoption	of	referendum	provisions	and,	currently,	most	EU	
countries	have	adopted	referendum	provisions	 in	their	constitutions.	However,	these	
largely	entail	provisions	for	referendums	triggered	by	parliamentary	majorities,	rather	
than	 by	 citizens.	 Citizen-initiated	 referendums	 are	mainly	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 ‘new’	
democracies	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Moreover,	the	way	in	which	referendum	
provisions	are	crafted	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	existing	institutional	framework.	Most	
referendums	are	thus	decision-confirming	rather	than	decision-controlling	and,	when	
they	are	decision-controlling,	they	are	primarily	provided	for	in	consensus	democracies.	
This	 suggests	 that,	 in	 terms	 of	 legislation,	 referendums	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	
representative	decision-making,	rather	than	providing	citizens	with	additional	control	
mechanisms.	The	next	section	will	assess	whether	this	conclusion	also	applies	to	the	
use	of	referendums.	
4.3 USE OF REFERENDUMS IN THE 28 EU MEMBER STATES
The	second	objective	of	this	study	is	to	examine	whether	Europe	experienced	a	direct	
participatory	shift	in	terms	of	an	increase	in	the	use	of	national	referendums	from	the	
1950s	onward.	To	answer	this	question,	it	is	important	to	assess	whether	the	increase	
in	available	referendum	provisions	across	Europe	has	likewise	resulted	in	an	aggregated	
increase	in	the	number	of	referendums	held.	Moreover,	it	is	also	important	to	examine	
the	nature	of	referendum	use	in	EU	democracies.	Given	the	small	number	of	countries	
with	formal	provisions	for	holding	citizens’	vetoes	and	the	citizens’	initiatives,	it	is	unlikely	
that	 Europe	would	 have	witnessed	 an	 increase	 in	 referendums	 directly	 triggered	 by	
citizens	themselves.	If	so,	this	shift	would	be	restricted	to	only	a	few	countries.	Hence,	
what	types	of	referendum	have	been	used	most	frequently,	and	are	these	votes	more	
likely	to	have	empowered	citizens	or	representatives?
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4.3.1 Referendum use over time
On	the	aggregated	level,	national	referendums	were	indeed	increasingly	used	in	the	EU	
member	countries	between	1950	and	2014,	but	this	increase	is	closely	linked	to	specific	
developments	like	processes	of	constitution-building	and	European	integration.	Figure 
4.2	provides	an	overview	of	referendums	held	in	the	‘old’	EU	member	states,	plus	Malta	
and	Cyprus	(hereafter	the	EU17)	and	the	eleven	CEECs.43	The	frequencies	in	the	figure	
are	referendum	votes	and	not	referendum	dates.	As,	 in	some	countries	–	 like	Ireland	
and	Italy	–	it	is	usual	to	subject	several	votes	to	one	ballot	round,	frequencies	would	be	
lower	if	expressed	in	terms	of	dates	rather	than	votes.	Appendix 2	provides	an	extensive	
overview	 of	 democratic	 referendums	 held	 in	 the	 EU28,	 including	 date,	 number	 of	
issues,	type,	legal	basis,	function,	subject	and	effect.	As	shown	in	figure 4.2,	in	the	EU17	
(blue	bars),	the	number	of	referendum	votes	per	five	years	 indeed	increased.	Hence,	
the	increase	in	availability	of	referendum	legislation	is	associated	with	a	growing	use	
of	referendums.	However,	there	is	certainly	no	evidence	for	a	continuous	increase.	For	
example,	 the	 second	half	of	 the	1990s	 saw	29	 referendums	and	 this	number	halved	
between	2010	and	2014.	
	 Moreover,	the	increase	between	1950	and	2000	is	particularly	due	to	two	outlier	
cases,	 Italy	and	 Ireland.	The	 largest	number	of	votes	were	held	 in	 Italy.	This	country	
introduced	 the	 citizens’	 veto	 in	 1970	 (prior	 to	 that,	 only	 referendums	 initiated	 by	
political	representatives	were	provided	for).	This	was	the	outcome	of	a	deal	between	
the	dominant	Christian	democrats,	who	wanted	to	prevent	a	law	on	divorce,	and	their	
smaller	secular	coalition	partners,	who	wanted	to	 implement	a	 law	that	would	allow	
divorce	(Uleri	1996b,	111).	In	return	for	their	support	for	the	divorce	law,	the	Christian	
democrats	 called	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 veto	 referendum,	 hoping	 that	 the	 law	
would	eventually	be	abrogated	by	a	referendum	without	risking	a	coalition	split.	From	
1970	onwards,	Italy	held	69	referendums	in	nineteen	ballot	rounds,	and	most	of	these	
votes	were	indeed	citizens’	vetoes.	
	 Ireland	 is	 also	 an	 extreme	 case,	 as	 mandatory	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	
revisions	are	a	recurrent	event	in	the	country:	between	1950	and	2014,	Ireland	held	36	
referendums	in	26	ballot	rounds.	If	Italy	and	Ireland	are	excluded	from	the	count	(the	
red	bars	in	figure 4.2),	no	increase	is	visible	whatsoever	and	referendum	use	remains	
consistent	around	the	five	to	ten	issues	submitted	to	a	vote	per	ten	years.	Moreover,	
without	 Italy	 and	 Ireland	 (i.e.	 the	 EU15),	 remarkably	more	 issues	were	 submitted	 to	
a	referendum	in	the	CEECs	(the	green	bars	in	figure 4.2)	than	in	the	‘old’	EU	member	
countries.	Between	1990	and	2014,	94	votes	were	held	in	the	eleven	CEECs,	compared	
to	24	in	the	EU15	in	the	same	period.	Notably,	while	between	2010	and	2014,	22	votes	
were	held	in	the	CEECs,	only	4	referendums	were	held	in	the	EU15	in	the	same	period.
43.	 	I	have	made	a	distinction	between	the	EU17	and	the	CEECs	according	to	their	period	of	
democratization	and	EU	membership.	For	the	EU17,	all	referendums	held	in	democratic	regimes	from	
1950	onwards	were	counted,	while	for	the	CEECs	only	those	referendums	were	counted	that	were	
held	from	1989	onwards.
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Figure 4.2: Referendum frequency (in votes)
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
4.3.2 Nature of aggregated referendum use
In	terms	of	the	nature	of	referendum	use	 in	Europe,	there	 is	also	no	straightforward	
direct	participatory	 shift,	 as	 aggregated	numbers	 for	 the	EU28	 in	 total	 are	distorted	
by	outlier	cases.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 total	EU28,	113	of	 the	256	votes	held	between	1950	
and	2014	were	 triggered	by	 citizens	 (44%),	 compared	 to	66	mandatory	 referendums	
(26%),	and	77	referendums	triggered	by	political	elites	 (30%).	Hence,	 in	 terms	of	 the	
types	of	referendum	used,	the	largest	number	of	votes	in	the	EU28	on	aggregate	were	
indeed	 controlled	 by	 citizens	 rather	 than	 representatives.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 some	
of	 the	 other	 four	 components	 (function,	 quorums,	 effect	 and	 issues)	 important	 in	
assessing	the	nature	of	referendum	use	(see	appendix 2	for	an	overview).	In	total,	nearly	
60	per	cent	of	the	votes	held	in	the	EU28	were	decision-controlling	and	hence	served	
to	veto	decisions	by	 the	political	majority.	 In	addition,	over	60	per	cent	of	 the	votes	
were	binding,	thus	committing	the	political	majority	to	a	certain	outcome.	At	the	same	
time,	in	over	60	per	cent	of	the	referendums,	a	quorum	was	applicable,	meaning	that	
the	votes	were	only	valid	if	a	specific	threshold	was	reached.	Moreover,	while	slightly	
over	 half	 the	 votes	were	 dedicated	 to	 one-off	politically	weighty	 issues,	 almost	 half	
dealt	with	more	regular	policy	 issues.	All	 in	all,	when	the	referendums	held	 in	all	28	
EU	countries	are	aggregated,	there	are	clear	indications	that	citizens	indeed	exercised	
considerable	control	over	referendum	use.
	 This	conclusion	 is,	however,	disqualified	when	a	differentiation	 is	made	between	
the	CEECs	and	the	EU17	and	when,	for	the	latter	group,	the	outlier	cases	of	Italy	and	
Ireland	are	excluded.	Table 4.9	shows	the	nature	of	referendum	use	by	referendum	type	
for	the	EU17.	A	disaggregation	of	the	referendums	held	reveals	that	the	large	number	
of	citizen-initiated	referendums	is	mainly	due	to	the	large	number	of	such	referendums	
held	in	the	CEECs	(47	in	total).	Moreover,	all	66	citizen-initiated	referendums	held	in	the	
EU17	were	held	 in	 Italy.	 If	 Italy	 is	discounted,	most	 referendums	were	mandatory	or	
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triggered	by	political	elites.	As	shown	in	table 4.9,	51	of	the	158	votes	in	the	EU17	(32%)	
were	mandatory,	compared	to	41	(26%)	triggered	by	political	elites	(23	by	the	legislative	
majority,	six	by	a	legislative	minority	and	twelve	by	a	president).	
Table 4.9: Types of referendum EU17 
EU17 Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 23	(14%) 3 20
Mandatory 51	(32%) 51 0
Presidential 12	(8%) 9 3
Legislative minority 6	(4%) 4 2
Citizen-initiated 66	(42%) 39 27
Total 158 106	(67%) 52	(33%)
When	 the	 two	EU17	outlier	 countries	 Italy	 and	 Ireland	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 count	
(see table 4.10)	 the	 numbers	 are	 significantly	 different.	 In	 the	 EU15,	 none	 of	 the	
referendums	held	were	triggered	by	citizens.	 In	addition,	only	fifteen	of	the	53	votes	
(28%)	were	mandatory,	compared	to	38	(72%)	that	were	triggered	by	political	elites	(22	
by	a	legislative	majority,	four	by	a	legislative	minority	and	twelve	by	presidents).	This	
is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	Ireland,	no	less	than	36	mandatory	votes	were	held.	Hence,	
without	Italy	and	Ireland,	the	largest	number	of	referendums	held	were	triggered	by	the	
political	majority.	Italy	and	Ireland	also	distort	the	numbers	of	binding	versus	advisory	
votes.	In	the	EU17,	106	of	the	158	votes	(67%)	were	binding.	Yet,	as	table 4.10	shows,	
this	is	mainly	due	to	the	high	number	of	mandatory	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	in	
Ireland	and	Italy,	respectively,	since	these	votes	are	usually	binding	(in	Italy,	at	least	on	
regular	legislation	when	the	electoral	threshold	is	reached).	Without	these	countries,	a	
considerably	lower	number	of	referendums	were	binding	(58%).	This	is	also	due	to	the	
fact	that,	when	the	legislative	majority	triggers	a	referendum,	they	are	usually	advisory.	
Table 4.10: Types of referendum EU15 (EU17 excl. Ireland and Italy) 
EU15 Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 22	(42%) 3 19
Mandatory 15	(28%) 15 0
Presidential 12	(23%) 9 3
Legislative minority 4	(7%) 4 0
Citizen-initiated 0	(0%) 0 0
Total 53 31	(58%) 22	(42%)
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Hence,	 for	 the	EU17,	 these	numbers	do	not	point	 to	a	direct	participatory	shift.	This	
is	 different	 for	 the	CEECs	 (table 4.11).	 Almost	 half	 the	 votes	 held	 in	 the	CEECs	were	
triggered	 by	 citizens	 themselves.	 Moreover,	 they	 were	 held	 in	 a	 large	 number	 of	
countries	and	not,	as	in	the	EU17,	only	in	one	particular	country.	In	addition,	in	some	
CEECs,	citizens	can	also	trigger	a	referendum	on	a	policy	proposal	drafted	by	citizens	
themselves.	In	total,	37	of	such	decision-promotive	initiatives	were	held	(compared	to	
10	vetoes).	This	is	a	relevant	observation,	since	this	type	of	referendum	gives	citizens	
considerable	control	over	political	decision-making.	Only	36	of	the	98	votes	(37%)	were	
triggered	 by	 political	 elites	 (22	 by	 a	 legislative	majority,	 12	 by	 a	 legislative	minority	
and	 two	by	a	president),	 and	only	15	were	mandatory	 (15%).	Although	 it	 could	well	
be	argued	that	the	CEECs	indeed	witnessed	a	shift	towards	decision-making	by	direct	
citizens’	participation,	it	is	striking	that	almost	half	the	total	votes	were	advisory.	This	is	
due	to	the	fact	that	30	of	the	47	citizen-initiated	votes	were	non-binding	because	of	an	
insufficient	turnout.
Table 4.11: Types of referendum CEECs 
CEECs Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 22	(23%) 10 12
Mandatory 15	(15%) 14 1
Presidential 2	(2%) 1 1
Legislative minority 12	(12%) 9 3
Citizen-initiated 47	(48%) 17 30
Total 98 51	(52%) 47	(48%)
The	nuanced	nature	of	the	direct	participatory	shift	also	emerges	when	assessing	the	
issues	 on	 which	 referendums	 were	 held.	 In	 the	 EU17	 countries,	 referendum	 use	 is	
largely	restricted	to	specific	major	events.	As	shown	in	figure 4.3,	when	Italy	and	Ireland	
are	excluded	from	the	analysis,	referendums	are	held	mainly	on	the	EU	(19	in	total)	and	
institutional	reform	(16	in	total)	(for	example	the	adoption	of	the	constitution).	Including	
Ireland	and	Italy	results	in	an	even	higher	number	of	votes	on	institutional	issues	(49	in	
total)	and	the	EU	(29	in	total).	This	high	number	of	referendums	on	institutional	reform	
and	the	EU	is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	some	countries	the	constitution	mandates	the	use	
of	a	referendum	in	these	cases.	Other	subjects	on	which	referendums	have	been	held	
are	ethical	issues	(such	as	abortion	or	divorce),	law	and	order	and	economic	policy.		
	 Especially	 from	1990	onwards,	the	EU	was	a	regular	referendum	issue:	of	the	24	
referendums	held	between	1990	and	2014	in	the	EU15,	no	less	than	fifteen	were	held	
on	the	EU.	This	was	due	to	the	several	treaty	changes	in	this	period:	four	referendums	
were	held	on	accession	(in	Austria,	Finland,	Malta	and	Sweden),	three	on	the	Treaty	of	
Maastricht	(two	in	Denmark	and	one	in	France),	one	on	Amsterdam	(Denmark),	two	on	
the	euro	(Denmark	and	Sweden),	four	on	the	TCE	(France,	the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg	
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and	Spain),	 and	one	on	 the	EU	patent	 court	 (Denmark).	On	 top	of	 that,	 in	 the	 same	
period,	 Ireland	 held	 seven	 EU	 referendums,	 on	 Maastricht,	 Amsterdam,	 Nice	 (2x),	
Lisbon	(2x)	and	the	EMU.		
Figure 4.3: Issues of referendum votes EU15, 1950-2014 
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	overview.	
In	 the	 CEECs	 (see	 figure	 4.4),	 referendum	 use	 largely	 evolved	 around	 state-	 and	
constitution-building	processes.	The	referendums	held	in	these	countries	in	the	1990s	
mainly	dealt	with	affirmation	of	these	countries’	change	in	political	regime,	illustrated	by	
the	high	number	of	referendums	on	independence,	adoption	of	a	new	constitution	and	
laws	to	undo	communist	expropriations.	Unlike	in	the	EU17,	a	relatively	high	number	of	
referendums	(especially	citizen-initiated	ones)	related	to	general	legislative	proposals,	
rather	than	institutional	change	or	the	EU.	The	latter	is,	however,	self-evident	as	these	
countries	did	not	join	the	EU	until	2004.	Of	particular	importance	are	the	referendums	
that	dealt	with	privatization	laws:	roughly	31	of	such	votes	were	held.	All	CEECs	held	
a	referendum	on	EU	membership,	except	for	Bulgaria	and	Romania	(though	the	2003	
referendum	on	the	Romanian	Constitution	did	have	a	prominent	EU	component).	None	
of	 the	 CEECs	 held	 a	 referendum	 on	 subsequent	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications,	 although	 a	
referendum	on	the	TCE	was	pledged	but	not	held	in	the	Czech	Republic.
	 It	 can	 thus	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 referendum	 institutionalization	 is	
associated	with	an	increase	in	the	number	of	referendums	held.	However,	referendum	
use	 is	closely	connected	to	specific	one-off	events	 like	regime	change,	adoption	of	a	
new	constitution,	and	EU	accession	and	treaty	reform.	Moreover,	the	analysis	suggests	
that	the	peaks	 in	referendum	use	are	mainly	due	to	explosive	use	of	referendums	in	
some	countries,	as	there	are	still	countries	where	only	one	referendum	has	been	held,	
or	none	at	all.	In	addition,	most	referendums	held	in	the	EU15	were	in	fact	triggered	by	
representatives,	mainly	a	parliamentary	majority.	This	is	different	in	the	CEECs,	where	
most	referendums	were	triggered	by	citizens.	However,	many	votes	were	invalid,	as	the	
quorum	was	not	reached.
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Figure 4.4: Issues of referendum votes CEECs, 1989-2014
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4.4 CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN REFERENDUM USE
Until	now,	I	have	mainly	focused	on	aggregated	referendum	use.	In	this	section,	I	will	
therefore	 analyse	 referendum	use	 by	 country.	 There	 are	 indeed	 considerable	 cross-
country	variations	in	the	extent	to	which	referendums	are	used.	In	fact,	referendums	
are	part	of	day-to-day	politics	only	 in	countries	where	they	can	be	 initiated	by	small	
groups	of	citizens,	or	where	the	constitution	explicitly	prescribes	 their	use	 in	certain	
cases.	This	only	applies	to	very	few	EU17	countries	and	a	slightly	larger	group	of	CEECs.	
The	analysis	largely	reveals	three	clusters	of	countries,	which	are	shown	in	table 4.12.	
The	first	cluster	consists	of	countries	where	the	constitution	makes	explicit	reference	
to	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums,	 and	 where	 referendums	 were	 frequently	 held	
between	1950	and	2014.	Of	the	EU17	countries,	these	are	Italy,	Ireland,	Denmark	and,	to	
a	lesser	extent,	France.	The	CEECs	in	this	cluster	are	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Slovenia,	Slovakia	
and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	Hungary.	In	these	countries,	referendums	were	largely	held	on	
politically	weighty	issues	like	constitutional	adoption	and	reform	and	EU	affairs,	but	also	
on	more	regular	policy	issues	like	ethical	issues	and	economic	policy.	In	countries	where	
referendums	are	held	most	 frequently,	 they	are	 in	many	cases	mandatory	 (Denmark	
and	Ireland)	or	the	result	of	citizens’	petitions	(Italy	and	Lithuania),	which	partly	explains	
why	referendums	are	used	more	frequently.	
	 The	 second	 cluster	 consists	 of	 countries	 where	 referendums	 are	 infrequently	
pledged,	despite	the	fact	that	the	constitution	makes	reference	to	the	use	of	referendums.	
Of	the	EU17,	these	are	Sweden,	Spain,	Austria,	Malta,	Portugal,	the	UK,	Finland,	Greece	
and	Luxembourg;	the	CEECs	in	this	cluster	are	Bulgaria,	Poland,	Estonia,	Romania	and	
Croatia.	 In	these	countries,	 referendums	predominantly	related	to	politically	weighty	
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issues,	such	as	constitutional	revision	or	EU	affairs	(partly	because	in	some	countries,	
referendums	can	only	be	held	on	certain	issues).	
Table 4.12: National referendums in three clusters of countries, 1950-201444
Constitutional availability No constitutional availability
Frequent use
Cluster	1
Denmark,	France,	Italy,	Ireland
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Hungary
None
Limited use
Cluster	2
Austria,	Finland,	Greece,	
Luxembourg,	Malta,	Portugal,	Spain,	
Sweden,	UK
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Romania
Cluster	3
Belgium,	Cyprus,	Germany,	Netherlands
The	 third	 cluster	 consists	 of	 countries	 where	 the	 constitution	 does	 not	 provide	 for	
national	referendums	and	where	referendums	have	never	–	or	only	once	–	been	held	
on	ad	hoc	basis.	One-off	referendums	in	these	countries	related	to	politically	weighty	
issue	like	the	political	regime	(Belgium	and	Cyprus),	and	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	
(the	Netherlands).	There	are	thus,	rather	obviously,	no	countries	where	the	constitution	
does	 not	 make	 reference	 to	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums,	 but	 where	 they	 are	
nevertheless	frequently	held	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	discuss	
these	clusters	separately	for	the	EU17	(section	4.4.1)	and	the	CEECs	(section	4.4.2).
4.4.1 The EU17
The	 only	 EU17	 countries	 where	 referendums	 are	 a	 recurring	 event	 are	 Italy	 (69	
referendums),	Ireland	(36	referendums),45	Denmark	(18	referendums)	and,	to	a	lesser	
44.	 	This	table	is	identical	to	table 3.2 in chapter 3.
45.	 	Ireland	is,	however,	an	odd	case.	Legal	provisions	for	holding	referendums	are	available,	and	are	
indeed	widely	used,	but	no	optional	institutional	referendums	have	been	held	whatsoever.	All	
referendums	held	were	mandatory.	The	triggering	of	these	referendums	can,	however,	also	be	
influenced		by	politicians.	For	example,	during	the	1981	and	1982	elections	in	Ireland,	there	was	a	
clear	deal	between	the	Fianna	Fáil	Party,	which	had	committed	itself	to	a	referendum	on	the	sensitive	
issue	of	abortion,	and	specific	pressure	groups	on	abortion,	which	–	in	exchange	–	promised	not	
to	raise	the	abortion	issue	during	the	coming	election	campaign	(Morel	1993,	233).	Governmental	
control	over	the	use	of	the	mandatory	referendum	is,	however,	restricted	by	the	Supreme	Court.
4
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extent,	France	(10).46	Only	in	Ireland	and	Denmark	were	referendums	institutionalized	
prior	to	the	Second	World	War.	With	the	exception	of	France,	these	are	also	the	few	
EU17	 countries	where	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	mandatory	 referendums	 (Ireland	
and	Denmark)	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	(Italy)	were	held.47	Most	EU17	member	
states	 belong	 to	 the	 second	 cluster	 of	 countries	 and,	 despite	 available	 referendum	
provisions,	 have	only	held	one	or	 a	 few	 referendums.	 This	 applies	 to	 Spain,	Austria,	
Malta,	Portugal,	Sweden,48	the	UK,	Finland,	Greece	and	Luxembourg.	Of	these	countries,	
the	UK	 is	 a	notable	 case,	 as	 several	 referendums	have	been	held	on	devolution	and	
independence	 issues	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Scotland,	 Wales	 and	 Northeast	 England.	
Nevertheless,	only	 two	UK-wide	votes	were	held	between	1950	and	2014.	Finally,	 in	
Belgium,	Cyprus,	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	the	constitution	does	not	provide	for	
national	referendums.	Except	for	Germany,	the	countries	where	the	constitution	does	
not	mention	 referendum	 provisions,	 did	 experience	 at	 least	 one	 referendum	 in	 the	
post-war	era,	meaning	that	these	referendums	were	held	on	ad	hoc	basis.	
	 Only	in	the	cluster	of	countries	where	referendums	are	held	frequently	does	this	
also	include	referendums	triggered	by	the	constitution,	by	parliamentary	minorities	or	
citizens.	This	is	shown	in	table 4.13, which	provides	an	overview	of	referendum	use	by	
type	of	referendum	in	the	three	clusters	of	EU17	countries.49 As stated in the previous 
section,	citizen-initiated	referendums	have	been	held	only	in	Italy.	This	is	notable,	as	this	
type	of	referendum	is	also	provided	for	in	Malta	and	Luxembourg.50	Decision-controlling	
legislative	minority	referendums	have	only	been	held	in	Italy	(2)	and	Denmark	(4),	which	
is	also	striking,	as	this	type	of	referendum	is	also	provided	for	in	Ireland,	Sweden,	Spain,	
Austria	and	Luxembourg.	In	France,	all	but	one	of	the	referendums	held	were	triggered	
by	the	president.
46.	 	One	could	argue	that	ten	referendums	in	65	years	is	not	very	frequent,	particularly	not	when	
compared	to	Italy	and	Ireland.	But	France	has	held	considerably	more	referendums	than	the	
countries	in	the	second	cluster,	even	Sweden,	where	five	referendums	were	held	in	the	same	period.	
In	France,	referendums	were	held	at	least	once	per	decade,	while	in	Sweden,	they	were	much	more	
irregular;	two	were	held	in	the	1950s,	but	another	was	not	held	until	1980.		
47.	 	It	is	important	to	note	that,	in	all	these	countries	except	France,	several	issues	can	be	put	to	a	popular	
vote	at	once.	Therefore,	the	numbers	shown	in	the	table	are	the	number	of	issues	put	to	popular	
vote.	For	example,	in	the	time	period	under	investigation,	the	referendum	polls	were	opened	to	
Italian	citizens	on	19	occasions,	on	which	they	could	vote	on	a	striking	number	of	69	issues.
48.	 	I	included	Sweden	in	this	cluster	rather	than		in	the	first	cluster	because,	although	five	referendums	
were	held	(which	is	more	than	in	the	other	countries	in	the	second	cluster),	two	of	these	were	already	
held	in	the	1950s.
49.	 	As	I	only	counted	referendums	in	democratic	regimes,	the	table	is	slightly	biased,	since	it	implies	that,	
for	the	Southern	European	countries	(Greece,	Portugal	and	Spain),	the	period	is	shorter.	The	time	
frame	is	also	slightly	shorter	for	Cyprus	and	Malta,	as	only	referendums	after	independence	were	
counted	for	these	countries.
50.	 	On	11	April	2015,	Malta	held	its	first	citizens’	referendum	on	an	abrogation	of	legislation	on	the	
spring	hunting	season.
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Table 4.13: Referendum votes in the EU17, 1950-2014
Total Majority Minority Presidential Mandatory Citizens
Cluster 1
Italy 69 1 2 - - 66
Ireland 36 - 0 - 36 -
Denmark 18 2 4 - 12 -
France 10 - - 9 1 -
Cluster 2
Sweden 5 5 0 - - -
Spain 3 2 0 - 1 -
Austria 3 2 0 - 1 -
Malta 3 3 - - 0 0
Portugal 3 - - 3 - -
UK 2 2 - - 0 -
Finland 1 1 - - - -
Greece 1 1 - - - -
Luxembourg 1 1 0 - - 0
Cluster 3
Belgium 1 1 - - - -
Cyprus 1 1 - - - -
Netherlands 1 1 - - - -
Germany 0 - - - - -
Total 158 23 6 12 51 66
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	0=	provided	for,	but	not	used;	-	=	not	provided	for;	see	
appendix	2	for	an	overview.		
In	countries	where	referendums	were	held	only	occasionally,	they	were	largely	triggered	
by	 a	 parliamentary	majority.	 This	 is	 remarkable,	 as	 legislative	minority	 referendums	
are	also	provided	for	 in	some	of	these	countries,	such	as	Sweden,	Spain,	Austria	and	
Luxembourg.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 Austria	 and	 Spain	 –	 which	 also	 experienced	 a	
mandatory	referendum	–	all	referendums	held	in	this	group	of	countries	were	triggered	
by	political	representatives.	 In	Portugal,	all	 three	referendums	were	triggered	by	the	
president.	Interestingly,	this	group	also	contains	countries	where	referendum	provisions	
have	existed	for	a	long	time	(Austria,	Luxembourg	and	Sweden).	For	example,	despite	
referendums	being	constitutionally	provided	for	in	its	pre-WWII	constitution,	the	first	
referendum	ever	held	in	Luxembourg	was	on	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	in	2005.	
	 Obviously,	the	more	referendums	held	 in	a	country,	the	more	are	held	on	 issues	
other	than	institutional	reform	and	EU	affairs.	The	four	frequent	users	of	referendums	
in	 the	first	cluster	have	all	held	 referendums	on	politically	weighty	 issues,	as	well	as	
more	regular	policy	issues.	This	is	shown	in	figure 4.5.	Of	all	the	69	referendums	held	in	
4
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Italy	(in	19	ballot	rounds),	66	were	triggered	by	citizens.	These	were	decision-controlling	
abrogative	referendums	that	served	to	veto	legislation.	Especially	since	the	1980s,	such	
vetoes	have	been	filed	predominantly	by	political	parties	rather	than	by	citizens’	groups.	
This	leads	Uleri	(1996b,	114)	to	suggest	that	the	Italian	abrogative	referendum	is	more	a	
‘weapon	in	party	competition’	than	a	citizens’	instrument	as	such.	Such	votes	have	been	
held	on	a	wide	range	of	issues,	including	regular	issues	of	inter-party	competition,	such	
as	economic	policy	and	ethical	issues	(45	in	total).	Since	international	treaty	ratification	
is	excluded	from	the	use	of	referendums,	only	one	–	advisory	–	vote	on	the	EU	was	held,	
namely	in	1989	on	whether	the	European	Parliament	should	be	mandated	with	drafting	
a	future	EU	constitution.	This	vote	was	triggered	by	a	majority	in	parliament.	In	Italy,	it	
is	quite	common	to	put	several	questions	to	a	popular	vote	at	one	time.	For	example,	
in	the	1995	referendum	no	less	than	twelve	issues	were	put	to	the	ballot	box.	Twenty-
three	Italian	votes	related	to	institutional	issues.	
Figure 4.5: Referendum use in cluster 1, EU17 (1950-2014)
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Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.	
In	 Ireland,	 all	 36	 referendums	were	decision-controlling	mandatory	 referendums.	As	
shown	in	figure 4.5,	a	large	number	of	these	referendums	related	to	institutional	issues	
(10	in	total).	Moreover,	nine	referendums	were	held	on	the	EU.	In	fact,	only	Irish	citizens	
were	able	to	vote	on	all	major	EU	treaties	of	recent	decades	(and	twice	on	the	treaties	
of	Nice	and	Lisbon).51	Non-institutional	and	non-EU	constitutional	amendments	have	
also	 been	put	 to	 popular	 vote	 (17	 in	 total),	 including	 those	on	 ethical	 constitutional	
acts,	mainly	on	abortion	and	divorce,	and	acts	related	to	 law	and	order.	Rather	than	
expressing	an	essential	interest	in	direct	democracy,	referendum	use	in	Ireland	should	
be	understood	as	an	outcome	of	a	strict	constitutional	requirement	that	stipulates	that	
constitutional	amendments	should	be	submitted	to	a	referendum.	As	Gallagher	(1996a,	
51.	 	A	referendum	on	the	TCE	was	pledged,	but	cancelled	after	the	French	and	Dutch	rejection	of	the	
Treaty.
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102)	argues,	the	high	number	of	such	amendments	should,	in	their	turn,	be	understood	
in	terms	of	rapid	changes	in	Irish	society	instigated	by	the	declining	significance	of	the	
Catholic	church	and	Europeanization,	which	have	boosted	the	number	of	referendums	
on	ethical	issues	and	the	EU	(Gallagher	1996a,	102).	Moreover,	rather	than	transforming	
Irish	 representative	 decision-making,	 referendums	 in	 Ireland	 protect	 the	 Irish	 party	
system,	since	the	issues	on	which	referendums	are	held	often	cut	across	existing	party	
cleavages	(Sinnott	1995,	295;	Gallagher	1996a,	103).	
	 In	Denmark,	eighteen	referendums	were	held	between	1950	and	2014.	Twelve	of	
these	 votes	 were	mandatory,	 ten	 of	 which	were	 purely	 decision-controlling.	 In	 two	
votes	on	the	EU,	the	government	had	some	agenda-setting	power	(i.e.	they	could	have	
been	avoided	if	the	government	had	ruled	that	the	EU	treaty	did	not	signify	a	transfer	of	
sovereignty),	making	these	votes	decision-promotive	(see	chapter 5).	Furthermore,	two	
legislative	majority	and	four	legislative	minority	referendums	were	held.	In	Denmark,	
referendums	 have	 been	mainly	 held	 on	 politically	 weighty	 issues	 like	 constitutional	
amendments	and	EU	affairs.	The	mandatory	votes	dealt	with	the	age	of	suffrage	(5),	the	
EU	(4)	and	two	general	institutional	reforms.	The	two	legislative	majority	referendums	
both	related	to	EU	affairs:	the	ratification	of	the	Single	European	Act	(SEA)	and	of	the	
revised	Maastricht	Treaty.	In	the	first	case,	a	referendum	was	not	mandatory	as	there	
was	 insufficient	parliamentary	support;	 the	government	therefore	decided	to	submit	
it	to	an	advisory	referendum.	In	the	case	of	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty,	parliament	
decided	to	hold	a	referendum	in	any	case,	regardless	of	the	vote	in	parliament.	Finally,	
the	fourth	legislative	minority	referendum	dealt	with	land	law	reforms.	All	these	four	
votes	were	held	in	1963	(on	the	same	date);	no	referendum	on	regular	legislation	was	
held	after	these	votes.	
	 In	 France,	 after	a	mandatory	 referendum	on	 the	adoption	of	 the	 constitution	 in	
1958,	nine	decision-promotive	presidential	referendums	were	held:	three	on	political	
system	 reforms,	 three	 on	 EU	 affairs	 and	 three	 on	 overseas	 territorial	 questions.	 No	
referendums	were	held	on	regular	policy	issues.	
	 In	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 second	 cluster,	 where	 referendums	 are	 only	 held	
occasionally,	they	mainly	relate	to	politically	weighty	issues.	While	some	referendums	
on	regular	policy	issues	have	been	held,	in	most	countries	in	this	cluster	referendums	
related	primarily	to	one-off	events	like	institutional	reform,	EU	accession	or	EU	treaty	
reform.	 This	 is	 shown	 in	 figure 4.6.	 Portugal	 is	 an	 interesting	 case	 in	 this	 respect:	
three	referendums	have	been	held,	 two	on	abortion	 (in	1998	and	2007)	and	one	on	
regionalization.	No	referendums	have	thus	been	held	on	the	EU	and,	unlike	the	other	
Southern	European	countries	Greece	and	Spain,	which	also	adopted	their	democratic	
constitutions	 in	 the	1970s,	Portuguese	citizens	have	not	been	able	to	cast	 their	vote	
on	the	new	constitution.	Most	countries	in	this	cluster	however,	only	held	one	or	two	
referendums	on	the	EU	or	institutional	reform,	and	no	other	referendums	since,	despite	
provisions	for	referendums	being	available.	
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The	same	applies	to	the	countries	in	the	third	cluster,	where	no	national	referendum	
provisions	 are	 available	 in	 the	 constitution.	 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 the	 first	 and	 only	
referendum	to	be	held	was	in	2005	on	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty.	By	contrast,	in	post-
war	Belgium,	only	one	referendum	was	held,	namely	in	1950	on	restoring	Leopold	III	to	
the	throne,	and	no	other	referendums	have	been	held	since.	In	Cyprus,	one	referendum	
was	held,	 in	2004,	on	a	reunification	plan	(the	Annan	Plan).	This	referendum	was	set	
up	by	 the	United	Nations	 to	 force	the	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	negotiators	
towards	an	agreement.		
Figure 4.6: Referendum use in cluster 2, EU17 (1950-2014)
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Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
4.4.2 The CEECs
While	referendum	use	in	the	EU17	is	largely	controlled	by	political	representatives,	in	the	
CEECs	citizens’	vetoes	and	initiatives	have	been	organized	on	a	relatively	frequent	basis	
and	therefore	constitute	a	political	routine	of	sorts.52	Yet	again,	the	CEECs	also	differ	
in	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	used,	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	
are	not	used	in	all	countries. This	is	shown	in	table 4.14. As	described	in	section	4.2,	in	
all	CEECs	the	constitution	makes	explicit	reference	to	the	referendum	as	an	instrument	
and	hence	there	are	no	CEECs	in	the	third	cluster	of	countries.
52.	 	Nevertheless,	it	should	be	noted	that,	given	that	in	many	of	the	CEECs	turnout	thresholds	for	a	
referendum	outcome	to	be	valid	are	hardly	met,	these	countries	can	by	no	means	be	characterized	by	
a	vivid	direct	democratic	culture	comparable	to	Switzerland.
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 Table 4.14: Referendum votes in the CEECs, 1989-201453 
Total Majority  Minority Presidential Mandatory Citizens
Cluster 1
Lithuania 21 1 3 - 6 11
Slovenia 20 4 9 - - 7
Slovakia 15 3 - - 1 11
Hungary 12 1 - - 1 10
Latvia 9 1 - - 2 6
Cluster 2
Poland 7 7 0 0 - -
Romania 5 1 - 1 3 -
Estonia 4 3 - - 1 -
Croatia 3 0 - 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 0 - - - 1
Czech	Republic 1 1 - - - -
Total 98 22 12 2 15 47
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	0=	legally	provided	for,	but	not	used;	-	=	not	legally	
provided	for;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
Referendums	have	been	held	on	a	relatively	frequent	basis	in	five	CEECs.	This	is	mainly	
due	to	the	fact	that	 in	these	countries	referendums	can	be	(and	have	been)	 initiated	
by	 citizens.	 In	 Lithuania,	 for	 example	–where	 the	most	 referendums	were	held	 –	 20	
questions	have	been	put	to	a	popular	vote,	of	which	ten	were	citizens’	initiatives	(8	being	
held	at	the	same	time	in	1994).	In	fact,	in	this	group	of	CEECs,	referendums	initiated	by	
political	 representatives	are	 rare.	An	exception	 is	Slovenia,	where	 thirteen	of	 the	20	
referendums	were	initiated	by	representatives.	By	contrast,	in	most	of	the	CEECs	where	
referendums	are	only	held	occasionally	 (cluster	2),	 the	constitution	does	not	contain	
provisions	 for	holding	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 In	 these	 countries,	 referendums	
are	 triggered	 either	 by	 the	 constitution	 or	 by	 parliamentary	 majorities.	 In	 Poland,	
Romania	and	Croatia,	however,	referendums	can	also	be	initiated	by	the	president	but,	
unlike	in	France,	this	rarely	occurs	in	these	countries.	
53.	 	In	some	CEECs,	too,	several	questions	can	be	put	to	the	vote	at	once.	This	is	the	case	in	Lithuania,	
Slovenia,	Slovakia,	Hungary,	Poland,	and	Estonia.	Again,	the	numbers	shown	in	the	table	are	the	
number	of	issues	put	to	popular	vote.
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In	the	five	CEECs	where	referendums	are	frequent,	referendums	have	been	held	on	a	
wider	range	of	issues	than	in	the	EU17.	This	is	shown	in	figure 4.7.	All	CEECs	in	the	first	
cluster	held	a	referendum	on	EU	membership	and	more	than	one	vote	on	institutional	
reform.	 In	 Latvia,	 Lithuania	 and	 Slovenia,	 a	 referendum	was	 held	 on	 the	 post-1989	
change	 of	 regime,	 and	 after	 that	 on	 other	 institutional	 reforms	 stemming	 from	 the	
collapse	of	communism,	for	example,	electoral	law.	In	Hungary,	four	issues	were	put	to	a	
popular	initiative	in	1989,	all	to	decide	on	post-1989	political	changes	negotiated	during	
the	so-called	Round	Table	talks.	In	Slovakia,	the	first	votes	were	held	in	1994,	one	year	
after	the	dissolution	of	Czechoslovakia,	and	subsequent	votes	were	held	on	electoral	
reforms,	all	of	which	were	advisory.	In	all	these	countries,	other	issues	have	also	been	
put	to	a	popular	vote,	including	economic	policy	(mainly	privatizations),	ethical	issues	
and	citizenship	 legislation.	This	 is	mainly	due	 to	 the	 large	number	of	citizen-initiated	
referendums	which	generally	relate	to	soft	policy	issues	rather	than	politically	weighty	
ones	(which	are	often	excluded	from	a	veto	or	initiative).	
Figure 4.7: Referendum use in cluster 1, CEECs (1989-2014)
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Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
The	 situation	 is	 different	 in	 the	 CEECs	 in	 the	 second	 cluster	 of	 countries,	 where	
referendums	were	only	occasionally	held.	Except	for	Bulgaria,	all	these	countries	held	
referendums	on	their	independence	or	the	adoption	of	their	democratic	constitution,	
but	have	only	held	few	referendums	since.	Moreover,	unlike	the	countries	in	the	first	
cluster,	not	all	countries	in	the	second	cluster	held	a	referendum	on	EU	membership.	
Citizens	in	Romania	and	Bulgaria	were	not	able	to	cast	a	direct	vote	on	EU	accession.54 
Moreover,	 as	 shown	 in	figure 4.8,	 the	 relatively	 few	 referendums	held	 in	 this	 group	
of	 countries	 mainly	 related	 to	 institutional	 reform.	 An	 exception	 is	 Poland,	 where	
five	 votes	 triggered	by	 the	 legislative	majority	 addressed	privatizations.	 These	 votes	
54.	 	However,	as	noted,	the	2003	referendum	on	the	Romanian	constitution	did	contain	a	prominent	EU	
component.	
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were	combined	in	one	ballot	round	in	1996.	Another	exception	is	Bulgaria,	where	no	
referendums	have	been	held	on	constitutional	issues	or	the	EU,	as	these	are	basically	
excluded	from	a	Bulgarian	popular	vote.	In	most	of	these	countries	however,	the	limited	
referendums	held	related	to	one-off	events	like	EU	membership	and	major	institutional	
reform.	
Figure 4.8: Referendum use in cluster 2, CEECs (1989-2014)
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Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
 
4.5 CONCLUSION: REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS
In	this	chapter,	I	have	shown	that	referendum	provisions	were	adopted	and	extended	in	
an	increasing	number	of	countries	throughout	the	twentieth	century.	On	an	aggregated	
level	 (including	 all	 28	 EU	 countries),	 referendums	were	 also	 increasingly	 used	 in	 the	
second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	the	largest	proportion	of	these	votes	were	
triggered	directly	by	citizens.	This	 suggests	 that	 representative	democracy	 in	Europe	
has	been	transformed.	However,	this	conclusion	proves	incorrect	when	‘extreme’	cases	
like	Ireland,	Italy	and	some	of	the	CEECs	are	excluded.	In	the	bulk	of	EU	member	states,	
especially	the	‘old’	ones,	referendums	can	only	be	triggered	by	political	representatives,	
mainly	those	in	power,	and	are	held	only	occasionally	to	confirm	their	standpoints	on	
politically	weighty	issues	like	institutional	reform	or	EU	treaty	ratification.	Referendums	
that	 truly	 reflect	popular	 sovereignty	–	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	–	are	only	held	
frequently	 in	 a	 few	 countries	 (most	 notably	 Italy	 and	 the	 CEECs).	 Thus,	 in	most	 EU	
countries,	 referendums	are	primarily	 instruments	of	party	democracy,	 and	 their	 use	
does	not	mark	a	generic	shift	towards	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.
	 Those	 referendums	 and	 associated	 procedures	 that	 are	 institutionalized	 usually	
fit	 the	 existing	 design	 of	 the	 democratic	 polity,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 EU17.	 Majoritarian	
democracies	tend	to	have	constitutional	provisions	that	allow	parliamentary	majorities	
4
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to	 trigger	 referendums,	but	not	parliamentary	or	popular	minorities.	Such	 legislative	
majority	referendums	generally	serve	to	confirm	the	preference	of	the	ruling	majority,	
and	usually	have	no	quorums	that	make	the	outcome	of	the	vote	more	proportionate.	
This	is	consistent	with	the	institutional	fit	hypothesis	that	I	presented	in	chapter 2.	In	
addition,	majoritarian	democracies	usually	have	provisions	for	mandatory	referendums,	
which	are	not	commonly	provided	for	 in	consensus	democracies.	Denmark	 is	a	clear	
exception,	 but	 mandatory	 referendums	 were	 introduced	 there	 to	 protect	 minority	
groups	and	strict	quorums	underscore	the	Danish	consensual	democratic	tradition.
	 By	 contrast,	 while	 legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 also	 used	 in	 consensus	
countries,	more	consensus	democracies	than	majoritarian	democracies	have	provisions	
for	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 and	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 Since	 such	
referendums	 provide	 more	 scope	 for	 integrating	 minority	 preferences,	 this	 finding	
is	 consistent	 with	 the	 institutional	 fit	 thesis.	 In	 addition,	 referendums	 in	 consensus	
democracies,	 especially	 when	 triggered	 by	 minorities,	 are	 usually	 accompanied	 by	
quorums	to	ensure	the	proportionality	of	the	outcomes.	An	exception	is	Ireland,	which	
is	one	of	the	few	majoritarian	democracies	where	a	parliamentary	minority	can	trigger	
a	 referendum	 (on	 non-constitutional	 issues)	 and	where	 such	 referendums	 require	 a	
strict	quorum.	However,	accordingly,	this	quorum	was	essentially	introduced	in	Ireland	
to	 protect	 the	 political	majority,	 by	 ensuring	 that	 ‘the	will	 of	 the	 Dáil	 could	 not	 be	
overridden	by	a	small	but	committed	minority	with	the	majority	indifferent’	(Gallagher	
1996a,	88).	In	addition,	in	Ireland,	this	type	of	referendum	has	not	been	used.
	 These	 obvious	 conclusions	 indicate	 that	 referendums	 are	 crafted	 and	 used	 in	 a	
way	that	fits	the	government-opposition	dynamics	of	representative	decision-making	
present	in	a	country,	rather	than	posing	a	challenge	to	representative	decision-making.	
In	fact,	in	most	countries	the	introduction	of	referendum	provisions	was	primarily	the	
outcome	of	political	trade-offs	between	political	parties	(notably	between	government	
and	opposition	parties).	In	the	few	countries	where	this	has	not	resulted	in	the	adoption	
of	referendum	provisions	in	the	constitution,	the	institutional	context	portrays	a	high	
number	of	 both	 institutional	 (i.e.	when	 there	 is	 a	 rigid	 constitution	 and	 a	 bicameral	
parliament)	and	partisan	veto	players,	which	impeded	referendum	institutionalization	
and	use.	 In	addition,	referendums	in	most	countries	are	restricted	to	one-off	events,	
and	 there	 are	 only	 a	 few	 EU17	 countries	 where	 referendums	 have	 been	 held	 on	 a	
frequent	basis.	Moreover,	in	most	EU17	countries,	referendums	have	been	pledged	by	
ruling	majorities	and	these	votes	have	served	to	conform	certain	decisions.	
	 In	the	CEECs,	the	choices	made	regarding	referendum	initiation	procedures	and	the	
frequency	with	which	they	are	used	fits	the	constitutional	choices	made	after	the	collapse	
of	the	Soviet	Union.	 Instruments	of	checks-and-balances	were	introduced	to	counter	
potential	 authoritarian	 rule	 (Lijphart	 1992).	 In	 most	 CEECs,	 referendum	 provisions	
were	 introduced	 to	 provide	 political	 and/or	 popular	 minorities	 with	 instruments	 to	
influence	decision-making,	and	to	counter	possible	abuse	of	power	by	political	officials.	
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Referendums	mainly	served	to	consolidate	democracy	and	to	compensate	for	general	
weaknesses	 in	the	party	system	(Council	of	Europe	1998).	Most	CEECs	have	imposed	
restrictions	on	the	ability	of	political	executives	to	control	the	referendum	process.	For	
example,	when	referendums	can	be	triggered	by	political	majorities,	they	can	do	so	only 
on	politically	weighty	 issues.	However,	also	 in	 the	CEECs,	 referendums	have	become	
instruments	of	political	parties	in	opposition,	rather	than	of	the	people	as	such.	
	 Cross-country	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 referendums	 are	 used	 and	 the	
nature	of	these	referendums	appear	to	support	the	observation	by	Butler	and	Ranney,	
noted	earlier,	that	referendums	‘fail	 to	fit	any	universal	pattern’	 (1978,	18).	Hence,	 it	
is	important	to	examine	the	specific	context	in	which	referendums	were	pledged,	and	
the	motives	for	which	this	was	done.	 In	order	to	do	this,	the	remainder	of	this	study	
will	be	based	on	case	studies	within	each	of	the	three	clusters	of	countries.	Chapter 5 
analyses	referendum	practice	for	the	cluster	of	countries	where	referendum	provisions	
are	provided	for,	and	where	referendums	are	more	of	a	political	routine.	A	first	country	
representing	this	cluster	 is	France,	where	ten	referendums	have	been	pledged	in	the	
past	five	decades.	As	all	of	these	referendums	were	pledged	by	the	country’s	presidents,	
France	 is	 an	 interesting	 case	 to	 examine	 the	 motives	 behind	 decision-promoting	
referendums.	 The	 French	 referendums	 will	 be	 compared	 with	 referendums	 held	 in	
the	more	 consensus-like	 country	 of	Denmark,	where	 referendums	have	 often	 had	 a	
decision-controlling	 function	 and	 have	 been	 pledged	 by	 opposition	 parties.	Chapter 
6	 examines	 the	 cluster	 of	 countries	where	 referendum	 provisions	 are	 available,	 but	
where	referendums	are	held	only	occasionally.	A	first	country	representing	this	cluster	
is	the	UK.	In	the	UK,	referendum	provisions	have	only	became	institutionalized	recently,	
and	therefore	it	is	interesting	to	examine	the	motives	behind	this	institutionalization.	
The	UK	 is	 then	compared	to	Sweden,	which	 is	a	typical	consensus	democracy	where	
referendums	have	been	held	occasionally.	
	 Finally,	chapter 7	deals	with	a	country	where	the	constitution	does	not	provide	for	
national	referendums.	The	country	representing	this	cluster	is	the	Netherlands,	which	
provides	a	good	exemplary	case	of	how	institutional	rigidity	can	impede	institutional	
reform,	despite	the	fact	that	the	referendum	issue	has	been	put	on	the	political	agenda	
regularly	in	the	past	decades.	Thus,	with	this	case	selection,	I	will	be	able	to	analyse	the	
various	motives	that	political	representatives	might	have	when	pledging	referendums	
and	the	relationship	between	the	character	of	the	polity	and	political	actors’	incentives	
and	 interests.	By	applying	the	method	of	process-tracing,	 I	will	examine	decisions	to	
institutionalize	 referendums	 and	 specific	 referendum	pledges,	 asking	what	 triggered	
these	decisions,	norms	or	interests?	Such	in-depth	case	studies	also	allow	examination	
of	the	interplay	between	political	motives	and	institutional	context,	and	provide	scope	
to	assess	the	influence	of	each	country’s	historical	referendum	track	record.
4
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CHAPTER 5. 
FRANCE AND DENMARK 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Only	a	few	EU	countries	have	held	referendums	on	a	relatively	regular	basis,	namely	
Italy,	 Ireland,	France,	Denmark	and	some	of	the	CEECs.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	examine	
the	 factors	 that	have	driven	 referendum	 institutionalization	and	use	 in	 two	of	 these	
countries,	France	and	Denmark.	Between	1950	and	2014,	France	held	ten	referendums,	
while	Denmark	held	no	 less	 than	eighteen,	and	 its	nineteenth	 in	December	2015.	 In	
these	two	countries,	the	political	authorities	have	played	a	substantive	role	in	triggering	
at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 referendums	 held.	 This	 stands	 in	 contrast	 with	 Ireland,	 where	
all	 referendums	held	were	triggered	by	the	constitution,	and	 Italy,	where	most	were	
citizens’	 vetoes.	The	comparison	of	France	and	Denmark	 follows	 the	 logic	of	a	Most	
Different	Systems	Design	 (MDSD):	because	 they	are	 two	different	 countries	 in	 terms	
of	type	of	democracy	–	France	being	a	semi-presidential	system	based	on	majoritarian	
decision-making	and	Denmark	being	a	consensus	democracy	–	I	have	been	able	to	distil	
the	shared	factors	that	explain	why	referendums	are	held	with	a	higher	frequency	in	
these	two	countries	than	in	most	of	their	Western	EU	counterparts.	
	 A	straightforward	answer	is	that	the	strong	constitutional	basis	in	these	countries	
makes	 referendums	 largely	 unavoidable.	 Indeed,	 in	 many	 of	 the	 countries	 where	
referendums	have	been	held	on	a	frequent	basis,	referendums	are	mandatory	on	major	
political	 issues	 like	constitutional	 reform	and	national	sovereignty	 transfer.	However,	
such	a	 constitutional	 requirement	 is	most	 certainly	not	a	 condition sine qua non, as 
shown	by	Italy,	where	there	is	no	constitutional	requirement	for	holding	referendums,	
but	 where	 they	 are	 nevertheless	 frequently	 held.	 More	 importantly,	 however,	 in	
both	 France	 and	 Denmark	 the	 government	 has	 considerable	 scope	 to	 interpret	 the	
constitution,	making	referendums	often	not	strictly	mandatory	in	practice.	In	France,	
referendums	are	only	mandatory	on	constitutional	revisions	proposed	by	parliament.	
In	Denmark,	the	government	can	avoid	referendums	on	EU	treaty	ratifications	by	ruling	
that	the	treaty	reform	does	not	signify	a	transfer	of	Danish	sovereignty.	Hence,	although	
having	a	constitutional	requirement	does	set	a	clear	precedent,	it	is	by	no	means	the	
single	or	even	most	important	driver	of	referendum	use.	
	 In	chapter 2,	I	outlined	six	factors	which	I	expect	to	be	important	in	understanding	
referendum	institutionalization	and	use.	These	are	the	type	of	democracy,	the	number	
of	veto	players	present	in	decisions	to	implement	and/or	use	referendum	provisions,	a	
country’s	past	referendum	experience,	public	demands	for	referendums,	political	values	
attached	to	referendums,	and	strategic	interests.	In	this	chapter,	I	assess	the	relevance	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
137
France and Denmark
of	these	factors	to	understanding	referendum	practice	in	France	and	Denmark.	I	show	
that	the	relatively	high	number	of	referendums	held	 in	these	countries	 is	mainly	due	
to	 the	 relative	 ease	with	which	 referendums	 are	 triggered,	 due	 to	 a	 low	number	 of	
veto	players.	 In	addition,	both	countries	have	a	pre-WWII	referendum	tradition.	This	
creates	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 referendums	 become	 feasible	 political	 options.	
In	 both	 countries	moreover,	 decisions	 to	 call	 a	 referendum	have	 not	 primarily	 been	
motivated	by	legitimacy	or	participatory	concerns,	but	rather	by	the	strategic	functions	
that	referendums	can	have,	for	example	to	pursue	a	certain	policy	proposal	that	would	
otherwise	have	been	voted	down	or	to	strengthen	one’s	position	electorally	vis-à-vis	
political	competitors.	The	exact	role	that	referendums	have	played	is	different	in	France	
than	 in	 Denmark,	 due	 to	 fundamental	 differences	 in	 polity	 and,	 subsequently,	 the	
nature	of	the	referendum	legislation.	Section 5.2	deals	with	France,	where	referendums	
are	decision-promotive	instruments	usually	directly	invoked	by	the	president.	Section 
5.3	looks	at	Denmark,	where	referendums,	and	most	prominently	those	on	the	EU,	play	
a	vital	role	in	government-opposition	dynamics.	
	 For	each	country,	I	first	provide	an	outline	of	the	available	referendum	provisions	
and	the	process	by	which	they	have	been	institutionalized.	I	then	outline	referendums	
held	between	1950	and	2014.55	To	understand	patterns	of	convergence	and	divergence,	
I	will	describe	how	referendum	practice	in	these	countries	is	grounded	in	the	existing	
institutional	 framework	 and	 past	 referendum	 tradition.	 Furthermore,	 I	 will	 assess	
whether	referendums	are	primarily	the	result	of	demands	on	the	part	of	citizens	or	of	
the	values	that	political	elites	attach	to	them,	or	whether	referendum	pledges	should	
be	mainly	understood	in	terms	of	the	diverging	functions	that	referendums	have	in	the	
political	game.	Additionally,	I	provide	a	cautious	forecast	about	future	referendum	use	
in	both	countries.	
5.2 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN FRANCE
5.2.1 Referendum provisions in the French constitution
The	constitution	of	the	Fifth	Republic	provides	for	three	types	of	national	referendum:	
presidential	 referendums	 (Article 11-1),	 mandatory	 referendums	 (Article 89, on a 
constitutional	 revision	 initiated	by	parliament,	and	Article 88-5, on	EU	enlargement),	
and	–	from	January	2015	onwards	–	legislative	minority	referendums	(known	in	France	
as	shared	initiative	referendums,	as	the	support	of	part	of	the	electorate	is	also	required	
to	trigger	a	referendum)	(Article 11-3)	(International	Constitutional	Law	2014;	Conseil	
Constitutionnel	2015).	Under	Article 11-1,	the	president	can	submit	any	government	bill	
to a binding	referendum	if	it	relates	to	the	organization	of	public	authorities,	reforms	
related	to	economic,	social	or	environmental	policy,	public	services,	or	the	ratification	
55.	 	To	be	more	specific:	from	1	January	1950	until	31	December	2014.
5
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of	 a	 treaty	 that	 affects	 the	 functioning	 of	 French	 institutions.	 Although	 the	 initial	
request	formally	comes	from	the	government	or	parliament,	ultimate	power	to	trigger	a	
referendum	resides	with	the	president.	Only	when	the	president	loses	majority	support	
in	parliament	before	the	end	of	his	mandate	(as	happened	several	times	before	2000,	
when	 the	presidential	 term	was	 two	years	 longer	 than	 the	parliamentary	 term),	 this	
could	have	resulted	in	a	conflict	over	referendum	calls.	However,	such	a	conflict	has	not	
taken	place	in	post-De	Gaulle	French	referendum	history	(Morel	1996,	71).	
 Provisions for mandatory referendums	 on	 constitutional	 revision	 are	 outlined	
in Article 89 of	 the	French	constitution.	A	proposal	 to	 revise	 the	constitution	can	be	
initiated	by	the	president	(at	the	request	of	the	prime	minister)	or	by	MPs.	A	referendum	
is	 only	 mandatory	 when	 the	 proposal	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution	 comes	 from	MPs	
(Reestman	2008,	587).	The	referendum	is	held	after	both	the	National	Assembly	and	
the	Senate	have	adopted	the	proposal.	When	the	proposal	is	initiated	by	the	president	
and	prime	minister,	a	referendum	is	not	obligatory,	as	the	president	can	decide	not	to	
call	a	referendum	and	instead	submit	the	bill	to	Congress	–	the	joint	assembly	of	the	two	
houses	of	parliament	–	which	must	then	approve	the	bill	by	a	three-fifths	majority.	
From	the	mid-1990s,	some	changes	were	made	 in	France’s	referendum	legislation.	A	
first	 change	was	 extension	 of	 the	 provisions	 for	 the	 presidential	 referendum	 under	
Article 11-1 in	1995,	and	then	again	in	2008.	Initially,	a	referendum	under	Article 11-1 
could	only	be	held	on	the	organization	of	public	powers	and	the	ratification	of	treaties	
that	are	not	unconstitutional	but	have	 implications	for	French	 institutions.	By	means	
of	 a	 constitutional	 revision	 under	 Jacques	 Chirac	 in	 1995,	 the	 scope	 of	Article 11-1 
was	extended	to	 include	economic	and	social	 reforms	and	related	public	services.	 In	
2008,	president	Nicolas	Sarkozy	further	extended	the	scope	of	Article 11-1 to include 
environmental	policy.	
	 A	 second	change	was	 the	 introduction	of	 the	 initially	mandatory	 referendum	on	
EU	enlargement	in	2005.	Under Article 88-5, a	referendum	is	obligatory	in	the	case	of	
ratification	of	an	EU	treaty	that	allows	for	the	accession	of	new	states	(with	the	exception	
of	Croatia).56	This	article	was	introduced	in	March	2005	to	assure	that	public	approval	is	
needed	when	new	countries	(mainly	Turkey	and	the	Western	Balkan	states)	joined	the	
EU	(Wanlin	1.2.2005).	In	2008,	however,	president	Sarkozy	introduced	a	clause	stating	
that	a	 referendum	can	be	avoided	 if	parliament	approves	a	motion	by	a	 three-fifths	
majority	that	the	accession	treaty	may	be	approved	by	parliament.	The	accession	bill	is	
then	adopted	if	it	is	passed	in	Congress	by	a	three-fifths	majority	of	the	votes	cast.	This	
implies	that	a	referendum	on	EU	enlargement	can	be	avoided	if	the	accession	is	widely	
supported	in	parliament;	the	referendum	is	thus	not	strictly	mandatory.	A	referendum	
on	an	EU	accession	treaty	will	hence	only	be	held	when	the	accession	is	highly	contested	
56.  Article 88-5	is	not	applicable	to	accessions	that	resulted	from	an	Intergovernmental	Conference	
(IGC)		that	was	decided	by	the	European	Council	before	1	July	2004.	This	limitation	was	introduced	to	
prevent	that	a	referendum	needed	to	be	held	on	Croatia’s	accession	to	the	EU	accession	(Hillion	2011,	
208-209).		
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among	French	political	parties	and	the	French	public.	This	makes	referendums	under	
Article 88-5	arbitrary	and	sensitive	to	strategic	use	by	political	elites.	
	 The	most	 fundamental	 change	 in	 France’s	 referendum	 legislation	came	with	 the	
introduction	 of	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 under	 Article 11-3.	 These	 shared 
initiative referendums (in	French:	le référendum d’initiative partagée)	(Clavel	21.11.2013)	
were	 introduced	 under	 the	 presidency	 of	 Sarkozy	 (2007-2012)	 and	 were	 part	 of	 a	
constitutional	 reform	 bill	 which	 included	 a	 package	 of	 proposals	 that	would	 amend	
nearly	one-third	of	the	1958	constitution	(Wright	2010,	540;	Reestman	2010,	73).	The	
reform	bill	was	the	outcome	of	the	work	of	a	constitutional	committee	installed	in	May	
2007,	which	recommended	in	its	report	(Balladur	2007)	that	proposals	be	formulated	
that	would	modernize	French	political	institutions,	most	notably	by	shifting	the	balance	
of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 president	 and	 parliament	 to	 the	 advantage	 of	 the	
latter.	The	constitutional	 reform	bill	was	adopted	by	Congress	on	21	 July	2008,	with	
one	vote	more	than	the	required	three-fifths	majority	(Reestman	2010,	73).	However,	
the	provision	on	the	new	referendum	procedure	did	not	come	into	effect	until	January	
2015.	Under	Article 11-3,	 a	 referendum	on	a	private	member’s	 initiative	 is	 triggered	
when	 requested	 by	 one-fifth	 of	 MPs	 and	 supported	 by	 signatures	 of	 one-tenth	 of	
the	 electorate	 enrolled	 on	 the	 electoral	 register	 and	 gathered	 within	 nine	 months	
(Legifrance	6.12.2013).	No	such	referendum	can	be	held	on	the	constitution.	
	 With	this	type	of	referendum,	France	is	a	clear	exception.	Most	common	in	Europe	
are	minority	referendums	that	are	decision-controlling,	meaning	that	a	parliamentary	
minority	can	trigger	a	referendum	on	a	proposal	already	approved	by	a	parliamentary	
majority.	In	France,	such	a	referendum	can	now	be	held	on	a	newly	written	legislative	
proposal,	and	hence	it	is	decision-promotive.	This	is	clearly	a	break	with	the	traditional	
provisions	for	triggering	referendums.	However,	it	is	above	all	an	instrument	in	the	hands	
of	MPs	rather	than	a	pure	participatory	tool	in	the	hands	of	citizens	(Clavel	21.11.2013).	
This	is	mainly	because	citizens	cannot	themselves	initiate	a	legislative	proposal	and	a	
subsequent	petition	for	the	collection	of	signatures	(the	right	of	initiative	resides	with	
MPs)	and	secondly,	because	of	 the	substantively	high	number	of	signatures	required	
to	trigger	a	referendum	(one-tenth	of	the	French	electorate	amounts	to	roughly	four	
million	signatures).	
5.2.2 Referendum use in France
Although	 France	 has	 witnessed	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	 national	 referendums	
compared	 to	 most	 EU	 countries,	 referendums	 are	 by	 no	 means	 part	 of	 day-to-
day	politics,	 as	 in	Switzerland	and	–	 to	a	 lesser	extent	–	 in	 Italy	and	 Ireland.	Rather,	
referendums	are	limited	to	weighty	political	issues,	like	constitutional	reform,	territorial	
change	and	the	EU.	Ten	national	referendums	were	held	between	1950	and	2014,	all	of	
5
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which	were	binding	in	effect	(see	table 5.1).57	Four	of	these	were	initiated	by	president	
De	Gaulle	(in	office:	1959-1969):	two	on	Algeria	–	one	of	France’s	longest-held	overseas	
territories	–	in	1961	and	1962,	and	two	on	constitutional	reform	in	1962	and	1969.	The	
last	vote	was	lost	by	De	Gaulle,	after	which	he	resigned	from	office.	The	turnout	in	the	
referendums	held	by	De	Gaulle	was	consistently	high,	between	74	and	80	per	cent.	
Table 5.1: Referendums in France, 1950-2014
Year Type Legal basis Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1958 Mandatory Article	90* Adoption	of	
constitution
Constitution Binding 80% Yes
1961 Presidential Article	11 Self-determination	
Algeria
Charles de 
Gaulle
Binding 74% Yes
1962 Presidential Article	11 The	Evian	Treaties Charles de 
Gaulle
Binding 75% Yes
1962 Presidential Article	11 Direct	election	
president
Charles de 
Gaulle
Binding 77% Yes
1969 Presidential Article	11 Reform	of	the	
Senate
Charles de 
Gaulle
Binding 80% No
1972 Presidential Article	11 EC	enlargement Georges	
Pompidou
Binding 60% Yes
1988 Presidential Article	11 The	Matignon	
Agreements
François	
Mitterrand/
Michel	Rocard
Binding 37% Yes
1992 Presidential Article	11 Treaty	of	Maastricht François	
Mitterrand
Binding 70% Yes
2000 Presidential Article	89 Reduction	of	the	
presidential	term
Jacques	Chirac Binding 30% Yes
2005 Presidential Article	11 EU	constitutional	
treaty
Jacques	Chirac Binding 69% No
*Constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic
In	 1972	 De	 Gaulle’s	 successor,	 Georges	 Pompidou	 (in	 office:	 1969-1974),	 held	 a	
referendum	on	the	accession	of	Denmark,	Ireland,	Norway	and	the	UK	to	the	European	
Communities	 (EC).	 The	 turnout	 was	 60	 per	 cent,	 significantly	 lower	 than	 under	 De	
Gaulle.	Francois	Mitterrand	(in	office:	1981-1995)	pledged	two	referendums:	one	on	the	
Matignon	Agreements	on New	Caledonian	 self-determination	 in	1988	and	 the	other	
on	ratification	of	 the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	 in	1992.	Both	resulted	 in	a	 ‘yes’	vote.	The	
turnout	varied	substantially:	while	only	36	per	cent	of	the	electorate	made	the	effort	
to	vote	in	the	1988	referendum,	the	turnout	in	the	Maastricht	referendum	was	70	per	
57.	 	The	referendums	held	in	France’s	overseas	territories	that	only	applied	to	these	countries	are	
excluded	from	the	analysis,	as	I	only	focus	on	referendums	held	in	sovereign	states	that	are	part	of	
the	EU.
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cent.	 Two	 referendums	were	 triggered	 by	Mitterrand’s	 successor,	 Jacques	 Chirac	 (in	
office:	1995-2007):	one	on	the	reduction	of	the	presidential	term	in	2000	and	the	other	
on	 ratification	of	 the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	 (TCE)	 in	2005.	Again	 turnout	numbers	
varied:	the	2000	referendum	was	characterized	by	the	lowest	turnout	ever	measured	
in	French	referendums	(30	per	cent)	while,	in	2005,	nearly	70	per	cent	of	the	electorate	
voted.	Hence,	after	De	Gaulle,	EU	issues	attracted	more	voters	to	the	ballot	box	than	
other	issues.	The	referendum	on	the	TCE	was	the	only	post-De	Gaulle	referendum	that	
was	lost	by	the	president.	No	referendums	were	pledged	by	president	Valéry	Giscard	
d’Estaing	(in	office:	1974-1981),	and	none	were	pledged	by	French	presidents	after	the	
2005	referendum	on	the	TCE.	
5.2.3 Explaining referendum practice in France
To	 a	 significant	 extent,	 France’s	 referendum	 track	 record	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	
exceptional	nature	of	France’s	referendum	legislation	under	which,	for	a	long	time,	the	
power	to	call	a	referendum	primarily	resided	with	the	president. This	changed	with	the	
coming	into	force	of	the	‘new’	referendum	provisions	granting	parliament	a	substantive	
role	 in	 triggering	 referendums,	 either	 indirectly	 on	 EU	enlargement	 (Article	 88-5)	 or	
directly	on	legislative	initiatives	(Article	11-3).	A	long-established	referendum	tradition	
and	a	strong	constitutional	basis	for	holding	referendums	suggest	that	popular	votes	
are	seen	as	an	appropriate	way	of	legitimizing	major	political	events,	like	constitutional	
revisions,	 territorial	 changes	and	EU	 treaty	 reforms.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	only	five	
referendums	 were	 held	 after	 De	 Gaulle	 implies	 that	 presidents	 do	 not	 easily	 use	
this	 instrument.	 The	 circumstances	 under	 which	 French	 presidents	 have	 triggered	
referendums,	as	well	as	their	rather	arbitrary	appeal	to	the	instrument,	suggest	that	they	
only	do	so	when	it	suits	their	immediate	interests.	Below,	I	will	assess	the	importance	of	
the	six	factors	in	explaining	referendum	practice	in	France:	type	of	democracy,	number	
of	veto	players,	past	experience,	public	demands,	values	and	strategic	motives.
TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY
The	way	in	which	referendum	legislation	is	crafted	and	used	is	strongly	embedded	in	the	
French	semi-presidential	majoritarian	system.	The	French	constitution	prescribes	a	dual	
executive,	composed	of	the	president,	whose	legitimacy	is	derived	from	direct	popular	
elections,	 and	a	prime	minister,	who	must	have	 the	 confidence	of	 a	majority	of	 the	
members	of	the	French	lower	house,	the	Assemblée	Nationale.	The	French	executive,	
most	notably	the	president,	has	a	dominant	position	vis-à-vis	the	legislature.	This	is	the	
outcome	of	a	set	of	constitutional	instruments,	the	parliamentarisme rationalisé, that 
limited	the	controlling	and	legislative	powers	of	parliament	and	increased	the	control	
of	 the	government,	 in	order	 to	prevent	 government	 instability	 (Reestman	2010,	73).	
Formally,	the	French	constitution	describes	the	president	as	an	arbitrator	between	the	
parties.	In	practice	however,	the	direct	election	of	the	president,	introduced	in	1962,	
5
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has	strengthened	the	position	considerably	(Reestman	2008,	588).	This	implies	that	the	
president is de facto	the	government	leader,	except	in	periods	of	cohabitation, when	
the	president	comes	from	a	different	political	party	than	the	one	that	holds	a	majority	
in the Assemblée. 
	 The	constitutional	reform	package	of	2008	aimed	to	shift	balance	in	the	relationship	
between	the	executive	and	the	legislature	in	favour	of	the	latter.	The	controlling	and	
legislative	 powers	 of	 parliament	 have	 been	 strengthened	 (for	 example,	 through	 the	
clause	that	legislative	proposals	submitted	by	the	government	need	to	be	accompanied	
by	 judicial,	 economic	 and	 social	 impact	 studies),	 somewhat	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	
executive	 powers	 of	 the	 government	 and	most	 notably	 the	 president	 (for	 example,	
the	president	is	no	longer	allowed	to	serve	more	than	two	consecutive	terms).	Despite	
these	changes,	 the	French	semi-presidential	 system	remains	 largely	characterized	by	
executive	dominance	rather	than	executive-legislative	balance	(Reestman	2010,	77).		
	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 electoral	 and	 party	 system,	 too,	 the	 French	 polity	 is	 essentially	
majoritarian.	French	elections	are	based	on	a	two-round	voting	system,	the	outcome	of	
which	tends	to	be	disproportionate.	When	a	candidate	obtains	more	than	50	per	cent	of	
the	votes	in	the	first	round	of	voting,	he	or	she	wins	the	elections.	If	no	candidate	acquires	
an	absolute	majority	in	the	first	round,	candidates	that	received	at	least	12.5	per	cent	of	
the	votes	(in	the	case	of	legislative	elections),	or	the	two	candidates	with	the	most	votes	
(in	presidential	elections),	enter	the	second	round	of	voting,	in	which	the	candidate	who	
receives	 the	most	 votes	wins.	 Such	 a	 run-off	 system	 is	 highly	 discriminatory	 against	
smaller	political	parties,	as	they	are	eliminated	from	the	ballot	box	in	the	second	round	
(cf.	Bartolini	1984).	Subsequently,	for	a	long	time,	the	electoral	system	has	resulted	in	a	
bipolar	party	system	divided	along	socio-economic	and	religious	lines,	and	in	which	the	
centre-left	(mainly	the Parti Socialiste	(PS)	and	the	Parti Communiste Française (PCF))	
competes	for	office	with	the	centre-right	(mainly	the	neo-Gaullists	–	which	have	had	
several	 different	 names,	 including	 the	Union des Democrates pour la Ve République 
(UDR),	 the	Rassemblement pour la République (RPR),	 the	Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire	(UMP)	and	recently	the	Républicains –	and	the	liberal	conservative	Union pour 
la Démocratie Française (UDF))	(cf.	Cole	2003,	12).	Recently,	the	radical-right	populist	
Front National	(FN)	has	gained	increased	popularity,	posing	a	challenge	to	the	bipolar	
structure.
	 French	 referendum	 practice	 is	 enshrined	 in	 these	 characteristics	 of	 the	 polity.	
Referendums	under	Article 11	 could,	at	 least	until	 January	2015,	only	be	 initiated	by	
the	 president,	 making	 the	 referendum	 initially	 decision-promotive.	 The	 mandatory	
referendums	 on	 constitutional	 revisions	 also	 fit	 the	 semi-presidential	 majoritarian	
system,	since	Article 89	calls	that	a	referendum	is	only	binding	when	a	reform	proposal	
is	drafted	by	parliament.	When	the	proposal	is	drafted	by	the	government,	the	president	
can decide not	to	call	a	referendum.	Another	way	in	which	French	referendums	fit	the	
French	majoritarian	 system	 is	 the	absence	of	 turnout	quorums.	This	means	 that	 the	
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outcome	is	decided	by	simple	majority	vote,	regardless	of	how	many	people	eligible	to	
vote	actually	did	so.
	 There	are	however	two	deviations	from	the	institutional	fit	thesis.	The	first	is	the	
introduction	of	the	clause	under	Article 88-5 that parliament	can	avoid	a	referendum	
on	EU	enlargement	by	adopting	a	motion	by	a	three-fifths	majority.	Triggering	such	a	
referendum	lies	thus	in	the	hands	of	parliament	rather	than	the	president.	Moreover,	
the fact that avoiding	a	referendum	requires	a	qualified	parliamentary	majority	does	
not	entirely	fit	the	majoritarian	principle,	as	this	means	that	a	parliamentary	minority	
(of	 two-fifths	 plus	 one)	 can	 indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 when	 a	 parliamentary	
majority	 attempts	 to	 avoid	 one.	 However,	 the	 clause	 was	 specifically	 introduced	 to	
avoid	a	referendum	and,	in	the	French	parliamentary	system,	a	three-fifths	majority	is	
relatively	easily	reached.	A	second	anomaly	is	the	recent	implementation	of	minority	
referendums.	According	to	Article 11-3,	a	referendum	can	be	triggered	by	one-fifth	of	
MPs,	if	supported	by	one-tenth	of	the	electorate.	Therefore,	on	the	two	dimensions	that	
I	presented	to	classify	referendums,	this	type	of	referendum	ranks	as	representative on 
the representation versus participation	dimension	and	as	integrative on the aggregation 
versus integration	dimension.	According	to	the	institutional	fit	thesis,	it	would	thus	be	
at	odds	with	majoritarian	decision-making.	However,	the	way	in	which	the	legislation	is	
crafted	gives	the	parliamentary	majority	considerable	control.	Namely,	a	referendum	is	
cancelled	if	the	bill	that	is	submitted	to	a	vote	is	examined	by	both	houses	of	parliament	
within	six	months	of	the	bill	being	published	by	the	Conseil Constitutionnel (Legifrance 
6.12.2013).	
NUMBER	OF	VETO	PLAYERS
The	introduction	and	extension	of	French	referendum	provisions	required	a	revision	of	
the	French	constitution.	This	is	a	complex	institutional	affair,	as	the	procedure	to	revise	
the	constitution	 involves	a	considerable	number	of	veto	players.	 It	 requires	majority	
support	 in	 both	 houses	 of	 parliament,	 as	well	 as	 approval	 by	 a	 referendum	or	 by	 a	
three-fifths	majority	in	Congress.	In	both	houses	of	parliament,	a	constitutional	revision	
can	 thus	 be	 vetoed	 by	 partisan	 veto	 players.	When	 put	 to	 Congress,	 this	 entails	 an	
additional	veto	point	with	subsequent	partisan	veto	players;	when	put	to	a	referendum	
rather	than	Congress,	the	people	are	yet	another	veto	player.	Article 89	was	introduced	
with	the	adoption	of	the	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	in	1946,	and	Article 11-1 
was	introduced	with	the	adoption	of	the	constitution	of	the	Fifth	Republic	in	1958.	In	
both	cases,	a	referendum	was	held.	Hence,	veto	power	could	be	exercised	by	the	ruling	
party	in	both	houses	of	parliament	and	by	the	people.	While	the	first	would	have	been	
rather	 contradictory,	 since	 the	 ruling	party	was	proposing	 the	new	constitution,	 the	
people	were	a	viable	veto	player	 (in	 fact,	 in	1946,	a	previous	constitutional	 text	was	
voted	down	by	the	people	in	a	referendum).	The	constitutional	reforms	that	allowed	for	
the	implementation	of	Article 88-5 and Article 11-3	were	submitted	to	Congress	rather	
5
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than	 to	a	 referendum.	This	means	 that	 in	 these	cases,	 the	opposition	–	or	at	 least	a	
certain	proportion	of	it	–	could	also	potentially	have	vetoed	the	reforms	by	preventing	a	
three-fifths	majority	in	support.	This	almost	happened	in	2008,	when	the	constitutional	
reform	package	was	 approved	 by	 just	 one	 vote	more	 than	 the	 required	 three-fifths	
majority.		
	 By	 contrast,	 triggering	 a	 referendum	 requires	 the	 support	 of	 remarkably	 fewer	
actors.	 In	 fact,	 an	 optional	 referendum	 de facto	 only	 requires	 the	 support	 of	 the	
president.	Formally,	the	constitution	states	that	the	president	can	trigger	a	referendum	
at the request of the government or parliament.	However,	given	the	fact	that,	especially	
after	 the	 constitutional	 reform	 of	 2000,	 the	 president	 usually	 has	 the	 support	 of	 a	
parliamentary	majority,	the	number	of	veto	players	is	still	small,	comprising	the	ruling	
majority.	Moreover,	 although	 this	 gives	 the	 government	 or	 parliament	 a	 role	 in	 the	
triggering	process,	ultimate	power	to	decide	whether	or	not	to	organize	a	referendum	
resides	in	practice	in	the	president.
	 This	is	different	in	the	case	of	legislative	minority	referendums	under	Article 11-3.	
Although	the	support	of	relatively	few	MPs	is	required	to	trigger	a	referendum	under	
Article 11-3	(one-fifth),	Article 11-3	introduces	another	veto	player,	namely	the people.	
Triggering	a	referendum	requires	the	additional	signatures	of	one-tenth	of	the	electorate,	
i.e.	approximately	four	million	signatures.	Although	the	period	in	which	these	have	to	
be	collected	has	been	extended	from	three	to	nine	months,	this	still	means	that	roughly	
400,000	signatures	have	to	be	gathered	per	month.58	For	that	reason,	the	initiative	has	
been	criticized	by	French	constitutional	experts	for	being	largely	inapplicable	(Hamon	
2014,	 260;	 see	 also:	 Paris	 2012;	 Clavel	 21.11.2013).59	 In	 addition,	 a	 parliamentary	
majority	can	also	veto	the	triggering	of	a	referendum	by	examining	the	bill	within	six	
months	(Reestman	2010,	77).	
PAST	EXPERIENCE
Although	referendum	provisions	did	not	formally	come	into	effect	until	the	adoption	of	
the	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	(1946-1958),	French	referendum	practice	can	
be	traced	back	to	the	French	Revolution,	when	revolutionary	forces	demanded	greater	
involvement	in	decision-making	(Jaume	2003,	138).	The	first	referendum	ever	held	in	
France	was	on	the	second	revolutionary	constitution	of	1793	(Morel	1996,	67).	Although	
this	constitution	never	came	into	effect,	it	included	provisions	for	citizens’	initiatives	on	
constitutional	and	legislative	issues.	Moreover,	it	was	adopted	by	a	referendum,	setting	
a	 precedence	 to	 submit	 constitutional	 issues	 to	 a	 popular	 vote.	 Three	 subsequent	
58.	 	By	way	of	comparison,	in	Italy,	500,000	signatures	need	to	be	acquired	within	three	months	to	initiate	
a	citizens’	veto.
59.	 	Indeed,	before	the	shared	initiative	came	into	effect,	an	unofficial	initiative	referendum	was	held	
on	the	French	postal	services	in	2009.	Despite	reflecting	a	hotly	debated	issue,	this	initiative	only	
gathered	slightly	more	than	300,000	signatures.	Since	this	was	an	unofficial	vote,	I	do	not	include	it	in	
the	analysis.
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constitutions	were	adopted	by	referendum,	namely	the	constitutions	of	1795,	1799	and	
the acte additionnel	of	1815	(Reestman	2008,	587).
	 Referendums	played	an	 important	role	under	the	authoritarian	rule	of	Napoleon	
I	 (1804-1815)	 and	 Napoleon	 III	 (1852-1870)	 (Brouard	 and	 Tiberj	 2006).	 After	 the	
referendum	in	1800	on	the	constitution	drawn	up	by	Napoleon	I	after	his	coup of 18 
Brumaire in	1799,	six	other	referendums	took	place,	all	of	which	served	to	 legitimize	
Napoleon’s	power	 (Morel	1996,	67).	The	only	 referendum	that	 took	place	 in	a	more	
democratic	context	was	the	one	under	Napoleon	III	on	the	constitution	in	1870	(Morel	
1996,	67-68).	After	 this	 vote,	 referendums	were	not	part	of	 French	politics	 for	quite	
some	time	as	they	had	become	associated	with	authoritarianism	(Morel	1996,	69).60 As 
such,	they	played	no	role	in	the	Second	and	Third	Republics.	
	 It	was	Charles	De	Gaulle	who	 re-introduced	 referendums	 into	French	politics.	 In	
1946,	then	head	of	the	provisional	government,	De	Gaulle	called	a	referendum	on	the	
post-WWII	constitution.	French	citizens	were	asked	whether	they	desired	the	end	of	the	
Third	Republic	and	whether	they	were	in	favour	of	a	new	constitution.	Both	proposals	
were	 supported	 by	 the	 French	 electorate.	 After	 a	 newly	 written	 constitution	 was	
rejected	by	the	public	in	May	1946,	a	revised	text	was	adopted	by	referendum	in	October	
1946.	This	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	introduced	mandatory	referendums	on	
the	constitution.	With	the	adoption	of	the	constitution	of	the	Fifth	Republic	 in	1958,	
presidential	referendums	were	also	introduced	under	Article 11	(Morel	1996,	70-71).	
	 The	 use	 of	 presidential	 referendums	 under	 Article 11	 follows	 the	 logic	 of	 path	
dependency.	 Due	 to	 the	 decision-promotive	 character	 of	 these	 referendums,	 they	
have	 primarily	 served	 to	 legitimize	 a	 certain	 policy	 course,	 or	 even	 the	 executive’s	
own	authority	 (Morel	1996).	This	was	most	obvious	under	De	Gaulle,	but	Pompidou,	
Mitterrand	 and	 Chirac	 also	 invoked	 referendums	 to	 legitimize	 their	 positions	 and	
policies.	 Such	 examples	 and	 the	 strong	 constitutional	 basis	make	 referendums	 thus	
viable	options	for	legitimizing	politically	weighty	issues.	This	being	said,	recent	changes	
in	 referendum	 legislation	have	 given	parliament	 considerably	more	 control	 over	 the	
referendum	process,	which	 is	a	clear	departure	 from	past	 tradition.	However,	 rather	
than	being	seen	as	indicating	a	participatory	shift,	these	changes	should	be	understood	
in	terms	of	a	desire	to	curtail	the	powers	of	the	president,	and	to	shift	the	balance	of	the	
relationship	between	the	president	and	parliament	in	favour	of	the	latter	(cf.	Reestman	
2010).	
PUBLIC	DEMANDS
In	 the	 literature,	 it	 is	 broadly	 assumed	 that	 referendums	 are	 an	 outcome	 of	 public	
pressures	 stemming	 from	either	a	process	of	 cognitive	mobilization,	associated	with	
increased political interest	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 electorate,	 and/or	 increased	 political	
dissatisfaction.	Such	sentiments	are	assumed	to	create	a	social	climate	in	which	political	
60.	 	Besides	an	unofficial	vote	on	women’s	suffrage	in	1914.
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elites	become	susceptible	to	using	referendums.	In	chapter 3,	I	therefore	conceptualized	
three	proxies	 to	enable	 this	 social	 climate	 to	be	assessed:	 two	proxies	 to	assess	 the	
climate	for	referendums	in	general,	namely	the	level	of	political dissatisfaction in society 
(measured	 in	 terms	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 national	 democracy,	 distrust	 of	 political	
parties,	 distrust	 of	 parliament	 and	 distrust	 of	 government)	 and	 the	 level	 of	political 
interest;	 and	a	 third	proxy	 to	 assess	 the	 climate	 for	 referendums	on the EU,	 namely	
the level of Euroscepticism	(measured	in	terms	of	a	lack	of	support	for	a	country’s	EU	
membership,	the	perception	that	a	country	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership,	
dissatisfaction	with	EU	democracy	and	a	general	distrust	of	the	EU).	Although	the	data	
presented	here	provide	no	evidence	for	or	against	the	claim	that	referendums	held	in	
France	are	a	direct	consequence	of	sentiments	in	society,	it	does	provide	information	
about	the	societal	context	in	which	referendums	were	institutionalized	and/or	used	and	
the	likelihood	of	politicians’	susceptibility	to	this	context.
	 The	data	presented	here	show	that	legislative	minority	referendums	were	indeed	
introduced	 in	France	 in	a	time	of	 increased	political	 interest	and	dissatisfaction	with	
national	 and	EU	politics.	Data	 from	 the	European	Values	 Study	 (EVS)	 reveal	 that	 the	
level	of	political	interest	among	the	French	electorate	increased	considerably	between	
1999	and	2008.	 In	1999,	only	36	per	cent	of	French	respondents	said	that	they	were	
interested	 in	 politics,	 while	 in	 2008	 this	 was	 nearly	 50	 per	 cent.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
Eurobarometer	data	show	that	levels	of	dissatisfaction	with	national	politics	and	with	
the	EU	have	increased	over	time,	and	especially	during	the	past	decade.	As	shown	in	
figure 5.1, between	1974	and	2015	dissatisfaction	with	national	democracy	fluctuated	
between	33	and	56	per	cent.	Yet,	after	a	drop	between	1998	and	2000,	 the	 level	of	
dissatisfaction	with	national	democracy	increased	remarkably	during	Chirac’s	last	term	
(2002-2007).	In	2006	–	two	years	before	the	initial	introduction	of	the	shared	initiative	
referendum	–	more	than	50	per	cent	of	the	French	Eurobarometer	respondents	said	
that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	French	democracy,	compared	to	39	per	cent	in	2002.	
This	is	also	revealed	by	data	from	the	EVS:	in	2008,	60	per	cent	of	respondents	said	that	
they	were	dissatisfied	with	democracy,	 compared	 to	51	per	cent	 in	1999	 (EVS	1999;	
EVS	2008).	Compared	to	the	EU	average,	dissatisfaction	with	democracy	in	France	has	
generally	been	higher,	especially	in	this	period,	and	more	volatile.	
	 As	shown	in	figure 5.2,	the	percentage	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	did	not	
trust	parliament,	political	parties	or	the	government	has	also	increased	over	the	past	
ten	years.	The	French	seem	especially	distrustful	towards	political	parties;	according	to	
Cole	(2003,	11),	this	is	consistent	with	the	French	republican	tradition.	In	the	autumn	
of	 2014,	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 French	 respondents	 said	 that	 they	were	 distrustful	 towards	
political	parties,	compared	to	82	per	cent	in	2003.	These	percentages	are	higher	than	
the	 EU	 average,	 where	 distrust	 towards	 political	 parties	 increased	 only	 moderately	
from	77	per	cent	in	2003	to	80	per	cent	in	2014	(not	shown	in	figure).	Distrust	towards	
parliament	and	government	also	 increased	considerably	 in	 the	same	period,	both	by	
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roughly	15	per	cent.	Although	this	does	not	prove	that	legislative	minority	referendums	
were	introduced	because of	these	seemingly	high	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction,	it	is	
valid	to	argue	that	they	were	introduced	in	a	context	of	such	sentiments.	
Figure 5.1: Dissatisfaction with national democracy in France*
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*Percentage	of	French	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	
‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	national	democracy.	
Figure 5.2: Public distrust of national institutions in France*
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*	Percentage	of	French	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	parliament/
political	parties/government.
Growing	levels	of	dissatisfaction	are	also	visible	where	the	EU	is	concerned.	Figure 5.3 
shows	 the	 levels	 of	 Euroscepticism	 among	 French	 citizens	 between	 1983	 and	 2011.	
The	proportion	of	respondents	that	perceived	France’s	EU	membership	as	a	bad	thing	
increased,	 albeit	 not	 continuously,	 from	 the	 late	 1980s	 onwards.	 The	 same	 applies	
to	the	proportion	of	French	citizens	that	feel	that	France	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	
membership:	in	1983,	20	per	cent	held	this	opinion,	but	this	had	nearly	doubled	in	2011.	
In	addition,	dissatisfaction	with	EU	democracy	and	distrust	of	the	EU	in	general	have	
also	 increased	over	 the	past	decade,	and	 specially	 since	2007.	These	figures	 suggest	
that,	 over	 time,	 the	 French	 electorate	 has	 become	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical.	What	
is	more,	although	the	French	electorate	was	 long	known	for	 its	 relatively	supportive	
attitude	to	the	EU,	current	levels	of	Euroscepticism	are	comparable	to	the	EU	average.	
5
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Figure 5.3: Euroscepticism in France*
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*	Percentage	of	French	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	‘France’s	EU	membership	
is	a	bad	thing’/’France	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership’/	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	‘not	
at	all	satisfied’	with	EU	democracy/that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	the	EU.
Such	 sentiments	 of	 political	 engagement	 and	 dissatisfaction	 are	 generally	 perceived	
as	providing	fertile	ground	for	referendum	demands	on	the	part	of	the	electorate.	In	
2000,	a	study	conducted	by	the	Center	for	Political	Research	of	Sciences	Po	(CEVIPOF)	
linked	such	sentiments	to	calls	to	enhance	the	scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation	
(Grunberg,	Mayer	and	Sniderman	2002).	The	study	revealed	strong	support	for	citizen-
initiated	referendums	in	France.	According	to	the	study,	88	per	cent	of	the	respondents	
were	of	the	opinion	that	a	referendum	should	be	held	when	demanded	by	a	considerable	
number	of	people	(Grunberg,	Mayer	and	Sniderman	2002,	112).	
	 There	 are	 no	 comparative	 longitudinal	 data	 on	 support	 for	 referendums	 that	
allow	for	a	comparison	of	 levels	of	support	 for	referendums	between	countries	over	
time.	 In	 2004,	 the	 International	 Social	 Survey	 Programme	 (ISSP)	 incorporated	 the	
question	 in	 its	questionnaire	on	whether	referendums	(without	specifying	what	type	
of	 referendums)	 are	 a	 good	 way	 to	 decide	 important	 political	 matters.	 The	 survey	
indicated	 that	 three-quarters	of	French	 respondents	agreed	with	 the	statement.61	 In	
contrast	to	both	the	cognitive mobilization thesis	(which	asserts	that	individual support 
for	referendums	comes	from	more	highly	educated	and	politically	engaged	citizens)	and	
the dissatisfaction thesis	(which	asserts	that	individual	support	for	referendums	comes	
from	citizens	who	are	largely	dissatisfied	with	politics),	the	ISSP	data	reveal	that,	among	
the	French	public,	there	seems	to	be	no	difference	between	respondents	who	said	that	
they	were	interested	in	politics	and	those	that	said	they	were	not,	or	between	citizens	
who	are	dissatisfied	with	French	democracy	and	those	that	claim	to	be	satisfied.
	 The	European	Election	Studies	(EES)	of	2009	reveal	that	support	for	EU	referendums	
is	also	considerably	high	in	France.	Accordingly,	64	per	cent	of	French	respondents	were	
61.	 	Compared	to	65	per	cent	in	the	Netherlands,	67	per	cent	in	the	UK,	71	per	cent	in	Sweden,	and	80	per	
cent	in	Denmark,	and	an	EU	average	of	70	per	cent;	International	Social	Survey	Programme	(2004)	
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of	the	opinion	that	EU	treaty	changes	should	be	decided	by	referendum.62 According 
to	 the	 EES	 survey	 data,	 support	 for	 EU	 referendums	 is	 considerably	 higher	 among	
respondents	who	 feel	 that	European	unification	has	gone	 too	 far	 (70	per	 cent)	 than	
among	respondents	who	feel	it	should	be	pushed	further	(53	per	cent).	In	addition,	in	
contrast to the cognitive mobilization thesis,	the	EES	data	reveals	that	such	support	is	
slightly	higher	among	respondents	who	said	that	they	have	no	or	little	interest	in	politics	
(67	per	cent)	than	those	who	said	that	they	were	very	or	somewhat	interested	in	politics	
(62	per	cent).	
	 Yet,	 despite	 seemingly	 widespread	 public	 support	 for	 enhancing	 citizens’	 direct	
influence	 over	 political	 decision-making,	 elite	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 as	 an	
instrument	has	 remained	 intact.	A	survey	conducted	 in	2011	by	 the	 Institut Français 
d’Opinion Publique	 (IFOP)	 found	that	72	per	cent	of	 the	French	public	supported	the	
idea	that	citizens	should	be	able	to	trigger	referendums	themselves	(Institut	Français	
d’Opinion	 Publique	 2011).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 recently	 introduced	 shared	 initiative	
referendums	 are	 also	 ultimately	 triggered	 by	 political	 representatives	 and	 not	 by	
citizens.	Although	the	support	of	the	electorate	is	needed	to	launch	a	legislative	minority	
referendum,	the	initiating	power	resides	in	MPs.	Moreover,	the	high	signature	threshold	
makes	the	effective	launch	of	a	referendum	under	Article 11-3	difficult.	In	addition,	the	
fact	that	a	parliamentary	majority	can	avoid	a	referendum	by	examining	the	proposal,	
makes	 the	 initiative	 thus	de facto	 an	 instrument	 to	 put	 issues	 on	 the	parliamentary	
agenda	rather	than	a	referendum	as	such	(Reestman	2010,	77).	While	support	for	the	
citizens’	 initiative	is	shared	by	a	considerable	number	of	political	parties	that	are	not	
represented	 in	 the	 Assemblée,	 support	 among	 mainstream	 political	 parties	 is	 low	
(Article	3	18.11.2014).	Both	the	centre-right	and	centre-left	have	occasionally	expressed	
support	for	the	 initiative,	mainly	 in	election	times,	but	neither	have	 launched	bills	to	
implement	it.	Among	parties	in	parliament,	the	citizens’	initiative	is	only	supported	by	
the	FN	and	France	Arise	(Debout la France, DLF).
	 I	also	found	limited	evidence	for	the	claim	that	the	use	of	referendums	is	triggered	
by	public	demands.	On	some	occasions	a	referendum	was	pledged	while	public	appetite	
for	such	a	referendum	was	strikingly	low.	This	was	the	case,	for	example,	in	1988	and	
2000.	Moreover,	no	referendums	were	pledged	on	the	Single	European	Act	(SEA),	the	
Amsterdam	Treaty,	 the	 euro	or	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 despite	 public	 demands	 to	 do	 so.	
Chirac’s	 reluctance	 to	pledge	 referendums	on	Amsterdam	and	 the	euro	 is	 especially	
remarkable	 as,	 during	 the	 1995	 electoral	 campaign,	 Chirac	 had	 firmly	 stated	 that	 a	
referendum	would	be	held	on	a	new	European	treaty	following	the	Maastricht	Treaty	
(Whitney	5.5.1995).	Moreover,	while	the	Gaullist	tradition	perceived	the	French	franc	
as	an	essential	issue	of	national	sovereignty	(Knapp	2003,	125),	Chirac	decided	not	to	
pledge	a	referendum	on	the	introduction	of	the	euro.	
62.	 	Compared	to	65	per	cent		in	Denmark;	52	per	cent	in	the	Netherlands;	45	per	cent	in	Sweden;	81	per	
cent	in	the	UK;	and	an	EU	average	of	63	per	cent;	European	Election	Studies	(2009).
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	 After	 the	 French	 ‘no’	 to	 the	 TCE,	 there	 was	 considerable	 public	 pressure	 on	
Sarkozy	to	submit	the	Lisbon	Treaty	to	a	popular	vote	(Deutsche	Welle	8.2.2008).	A	poll	
suggested	that	more	than	60	per	cent	of	the	French	electorate	wanted	a	referendum	
on	a	new	EU	treaty	(Vucheva	30.10.2007).	Yet,	fearing	a	second	‘no’,	Sarkozy	became	a	
proponent	of	what	he	called	a	‘mini-traité’	(Reestman	2008,	589),	which	would	replace	
the	TCE	and	which,	according	to	him,	did	not	require	a	referendum	but	could	be	ratified	
by	 parliament	 instead.	 Hence,	 Sarkozy’s	 reluctance	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	 on	 Lisbon	
invalidates	the	expectation	that	referendums	are	held	in	response	to	public	demands.
POLITICAL	VALUES
In	chapter 2,	I	made	a	distinction	between	instrumental	and	intrinsic	values	in	supporting	
referendums.	 I	 argued	 that	 political	 actors	 value	 referendums	 instrumentally	 when	
they	see	them	as	a	means	to	strengthen	the	polity’s	 input-	or	output-legitimacy,	and	
intrinsically	when	they	are	seen	as	a	way	of	boosting	citizens’	political	involvement	and	
empowerment,	which	is	perceived	as	a	goal	in	itself.	
	 The	 first	 set	 of	 instrumental	 arguments	 have	 indeed	been	 commonly	 expressed	
in	 French	 referendum	 debates.	 Most	 notably,	 De	 Gaulle	 established	 a	 convention	
that	 the	 legitimacy	 of	major	 political	 decisions	 affecting	 French	 institutions	 (such	 as	
constitutional	 revisions	or	 territorial	 issues)	 should	be	 strengthened	by	having	 them	
approved	directly	by	the	people	(Morel	1996).	De	Gaulle	extended	this	to	decisions	that	
affected	France’s	role	in	the	European	Communities	(EC).	As	he	famously	put	it,	‘Europe	
will	be	born	on	the	day	on	which	the	different	peoples	fundamentally	decide	to	join.	It	
will	not	suffice	for	members	of	parliament	to	vote	for	ratification.	It	will	require	popular	
referendums,	preferably	held	on	the	same	day	in	all	the	countries	involved’	(De	Gaulle	
cited	in	Peyrefitte	1994,	63-64).63
	 The	tradition	initiated	by	De	Gaulle	induced	his	successors’	referendum	pledges	on	
EC	enlargement,	Maastricht	and	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty.	For	example,	when	
announcing	 the	referendum	on	EC	enlargement	on	French	television,	Pompidou	said	
that	such	an	important	decision	should	be	approved	by	the	French	public:	‘We	must	go	
forward.	But	for	this	to	happen,	it	is	necessary	that	France	is	more	than	ever	united	and	
resolute’	(Pompidou	1972).64	A	confirmative	vote	would,	as	Pompidou’s	words	indicate,	
give	extra	 leverage	to	his	decision	to	support	the	EC	accession	of	Denmark,	Norway,	
Ireland	and	 the	UK.	 In	case	of	 the	Maastricht	Treaty,	 the	Conseil Constitutionnel had 
ruled	that	adoption	of	the	treaty	required	an	amendment	of	the	French	constitution,	
illustrating	the	treaty’s	importance	(Stone	1993,	73).	This	was	underscored	by	president	
Mitterrand,	 who	 said	 that	 ‘rarely	 in	 our	 history	 has	 an	 issue	 affected	 the	 future	
of	 France	 so	directly’	 (Drozdiak	2.7.1992).	 Chirac	 also	 legitimized	 the	 referendum	on	
the	TCE	by	stressing	its	great	political	significance,	which	he	referred	to	as	‘une	grande	
63.	 	Editorial	translation.
64.	 	Free	translation	by	author.	
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affaire’	(Le	Monde	14.7.2004)	on	which	it	was	‘logical’	(Dehousse	2006,	151)	to	hold	a	
referendum.	Moreover,	 referendums	on	 the	TCE	were	pledged	 in	a	number	of	other	
countries,	most	notably	the	UK,	placing	peer	pressure	on	Chirac	to	do	the	same	(Closa	
2007,	1326).	
	 Another	 notable	 example	 of	 a	 referendum	 pledge	 in	which	 instrumental	 values	
played	an	important	role	was	the	1988	referendum	on	the	Matignon	Agreements	on	
New	Caledonia,	 held	 in	 France	 and	New	Caledonia.	 In	 this	 referendum,	 voters	were	
asked	whether	 they	agreed	with	allowing	New	Caledonian	residents	 to	vote	 for	 self-
determination	 in	1998	 (Legifrance	5.10.1988).	The	 referendum	was	 formally	pledged	
by	 the	 Socialist	 President	 Francois	Mitterrand,	 but	 came	 from	 a	 proposal	 by	 prime	
minister	Michel	Rocard,	who	led	the	negotiations	between	the	two	opposing	parties	in	
New	Caledonia.	In	a	television	speech,	Rocard	urged	the	French	public	to	endorse	the	
agreement	which,	according	to	him,	signified	a	‘new	perspective’	for	the	people	of	New	
Caledonia.	He	declared	that	the	aim	of	putting	the	agreement	to	a	popular	vote,	and	
the	anticipation	that	the	French	would	vote	‘yes’,	was	to	‘re-establish	peace’	(Rocard	
1988).	This	referendum	pledge	cannot	be	seen	in	isolation	from	the	two	referendums	
on	Algerian	independence	in	the	early	1960s,	and	fits	in	with	a	convention	of	submitting	
territorial	issues	to	a	referendum	–	something	not	uncommon	across	Europe.	
	 However,	although	normative	motives	played	a	role	in	all	French	referendums,	the	
question	 is	whether	such	motives	were	decisive.	As	 I	will	show	in	the	section	below,	
referendum	 pledges	 have	 not	 been	 devoid	 of	 strategic	 interests.	 In	 fact,	 given	 the	
inconsistency	with	which	referendums	have	been	pledged	in	France,	it	is	hardly	likely	
that	instrumental	values	played	a	decisive	role	on	the	occasions	that	referendums	were	
pledged.	The	constitution	of	1958	has	been	amended	no	less	than	24	times,	but	only	twice	
by	referendum	(in	1962	and	2000).	The	same	inconsistency	applies	to	referendums	on	
EU	affairs.	A	referendum	was	held	on	the	EC	accession	of	Denmark,	Norway,	Ireland	and	
the	UK,	although	this,	arguably,	hardly	affected	the	functioning	of	French	institutions	
(Körkemeyer	1995,	111;	Hug	2002,	28).	Moreover,	no	 referendums	were	pledged	on	
several	EU	 treaties	 that	did	 affect	French	 institutions,	 like	 the	Amsterdam	Treaty	 (cf.	
Millns	1999)	and	the	Lisbon	Treaty	(cf.	Piris	2010).	Hence,	 if	there	is	a	default	French	
convention	to	legitimize	important	political	decisions	by	referendum,	then	referendums	
would	have	been	held	on	these	 issues	as	well.	Yet,	after	the	narrow	‘yes’	vote	 in	the	
Maastricht	referendum	in	1992	and	the	‘no’	vote	on	the	TCE,	the	risks	of	doing	so	were	
likely	perceived	as	 too	high	given	 that,	on	Amsterdam	and	Lisbon,	 there	was	 indeed	
a	 gap	 between	 pragmatic	 pro-EU	 political	 leaders	 and	 an	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical	
citizenry.
	 On	some	occasions,	intrinsic	participatory	arguments	played	a	role	in	the	political	
debate.	This	applied,	for	example,	to	Chirac’s	referendum	pledge	on	the	TCE,	in	which	
he	 referred	 to	 France’s	 Rousseauian	 republican	 tradition.	 As	 he	 put	 it,	 ‘the	 current	
referendum	 would	 be	 a	 step	 towards	 a	 more	 democratic	 popular	 technique,	 more	
5
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Republican’	(Le	Monde	23.3.2005),	that	would	moreover	provide	a	boost	to	the	French	
respect	 for	dialogue	 (Le	Monde	14.7.2004).65	Yet,	although	Chirac	was	keen	to	stress	
that	the	referendum	on	the	TCE	‘n’est	pas	un	plébiscite’	(Le	Monde	23.3.2005),	it	was	
a	referendum	that	he	indeed	triggered	himself,	and	as	such	it	was	largely	controlled	by	
the	presidential	majority.	Hence,	it	was	not	a	genuine	popular	instrument.	
	 Indeed,	 if	 participatory	 values	 were	 intended	 to	 be	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 French	
referendum	 practice,	 a	 more	 participatory	 type	 of	 referendum	 would	 have	 been	
introduced.	 The	 recently	 implemented	 minority	 referendum	 should	 be	 understood	
as	a	shift	towards	stronger	parliamentarism,	as	compared	to	the	prevalence	of	semi-
presidentialism	since	De	Gaulle,	rather	than	a	shift	towards	direct	citizens’	participation;	
this	trend	was	set	in	motion	by	president	Chirac	in	his	inaugural	address	to	parliament	in	
May	1995,	when	he	set	out	his	view	on	the	desirability	of	balancing	the	power	between	
the	president	and	parliament	(Millns	1996,	531).	However,	although	Chirac	announced	in	
1995	that	he	would	give	people	a	greater	say	in	decision-making	through	increased	use	
of	referendums	(Varley	19.5.1995),	no	initiative	was	pursued	to	implement	referendums	
that	 could	 be	 triggered	 by	 citizens.	 Hence,	 these	 qualifications	make	 it	 unlikely	 that	
participatory	values	have	played	a	decisive	role	in	French	referendum	practice.	
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
The	 fact	 that	 referendum	 use	 is	 France	 is	 largely	 elite-driven	 feeds	 the	 assumption	
that	 referendum	 institutionalization	 was	 driven	more	 by	 strategic	 interests	 than	 by	
political	values	or	public	pressures.	Especially	act-contingent	motivations	played	a	role.	
Chirac’s	bid	during	the	1995	presidential	election	campaign	to	extend	the	applicability	
of Article 11	to	economic	and	social	issues,	and	to	have	referendums	on	the	education	
system	and	‘Europe’,	came	in	a	period	in	which	these	very	issues	were	hotly	debated	
(Varley	19.5.1995)	 and	 guaranteeing	 a	public	 voice	 in	 such	 important	policy	matters	
also	clearly	seem	to	have	fulfilled	a	legitimizing	purpose.	In	addition,	the	introduction	
of	a	referendum	on	EU	enlargement	under	Article 88-5	should	be	understood	in	terms	
of	 the	government’s	aim	at	 that	time	 to	 ratify	 the	TCE.	Turkey’s	EU	membership	bid	
had	been	a	politically	sensitive	issue	and	it	dominated	the	public	debate	on	the	TCE.	By	
introducing	the	referendum,	Chirac	aimed	to	separate	the	Turkish	question	from	the	
campaign	(Wolff	and	Mounier	2005).	
	 In	addition,	according	to	Oppermann	(2011,	16-17),	the	potential	of	a	referendum	
on	Turkey’s	EU	membership	also	served	as	a	‘red-lining’	strategy	aimed	to	‘strengthen	
French	control	over	the	negotiation	process,	to	reinforce	France’s	veto	position	and	to	
tie	the	EU	to	a	tough	negotiation	position	towards	Turkey’	(see	also	Insel	2012).	The	fact	
that,	 three	years	 later,	 Sarkozy	 introduced	a	clause	 that	enables	parliament	 to	avoid	
a	 referendum	 indeed	 suggests	 that	 legitimacy	or	 participatory	 concerns	 are	unlikely	
to	have	played	a	decisive	 role.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	 clause	 increased	 the	power	of	
65.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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parliament	to	control	 the	ratification	of	EU	accession	treaties,	a	decision	 in	 line	with	
Sarkozy’s	democratization	package	to	balance	the	power	between	the	president	and	
parliament.	However,	the	reform	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	way	to	prevent	a	French	
‘no’	to	future	EU	enlargement,	as	this	could	undermine	the	position	of	France	in	the	EU	
arena	(EurActiv	3.4.2008).	
	 Act-contingent	 motivations	 also	 probably	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	
legislative	minority	referendums,	which	could	be	read	as	an	attempt	to	win	votes	on	the	
basis	of	a	democratic	reform	agenda	at	a	time	when	Chirac’s	presidency	was	associated	
with	various	corruption	scandals	(Hamon	2014,	253).	This	is	illustrated	by	the	fact	that,	
although	Sarkozy	campaigned	for	the	introduction	of	legislative	minority	referendums	
during	 his	 presidential	 election	 campaign	 in	 2007,	 he	made	 no	 strong	 efforts	 to	 do	
so	 once	 he	was	 president.	 The	 organic	 law	 for	 their	 introduction	was	 not	 approved	
by	parliament	until	2013	(Legifrance	6.12.2013),	under	the	presidency	of	the	socialist	
Francois	Hollande,	and	came	into	effect	two	years	later	in	January	2015.	Notably,	while	
the	PS	advocated	more	relaxed	conditions	for	holding	minority	referendums	between	
2007	and	2012,	 it	was	not	a	strong	advocate	of	them	once	in	office,	as	 it	anticipated	
that,	 in	 the	following	five	years,	a	minority	referendum	would	benefit	 the	right-wing	
opposition	(Hamon	2014,	253;	L’Express	10.1.2012).
	 As	 I	will	argue	below,	 the	same	applies	 to	actually	held	 referendums.	Except	 for	
the	1958	referendum	on	the	adoption	of	the	new	constitution	–	which	was	mandatory	
under	the	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	–	all	French	referendums	were	triggered	
by	 the	 president.	 Based	 on	my	 typology	 of	 referendum	motivations,	 as	 outlined	 in	
chapter 2, table 5.2	provides	an	overview	of	the	strategic	motivations	that	passed	the	
hoop	test,	meaning	that	it	is	at	least	likely	that	these	motivations	were	at	play	in	French	
referendum	pledges	made	between	1950	and	2014.	
5
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Table 5.2: Referendum strategies on the part of triggering actors in France*
Issue	and	year	
in	which	vote	
was	held
Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
legislative	
proposal 
in	national	
decision-
making	arena
Initiator	
faces  
internal 
party/
coalition	
divisions
Anticipated	
public	support	
for	initiator’s	
stance
Initiator	
faces 
upcoming	
elections
Initiator	
faces 
sufficient	
support 
for its 
position	
in	EU	
decision-
making	
arena
Strategic 
motivations
Self-
determination	
Algeria	(1961)
NO YES YES YES n/a Policy-seeking
Empowerment
The	Evian	
Treaties	(1962)
NO YES YES YES n/a Policy-seeking
Empowerment
Direct	election	
president 
(1962)
NO YES YES YES n/a Policy-seeking
Empowerment
Reform	Senate	
(1969)
NO YES YES YES n/a Policy-seeking
Empowerment
EC	enlargement	
(1972)
YES YES YES YES YES Empowerment	
EU	empowerment
Conflict	mediation
The	Matignon	
Agreements	
(1988)
YES NO YES NO n/a Empowerment
Treaty of 
Maastricht	
(1992)
YES YES YES YES YES Empowerment	
EU	empowerment
Conflict	mediation
Reduction	
presidential	
term	(2000)
YES NO YES NO n/a Empowerment
European	
Constitutional	
Treaty	(2005)
YES YES	 YES	(but	
controversial)
YES YES Conflict	mediation
Depoliticization
EU	empowerment
*Only	pledges	that	resulted	in	a	referendum	bill	are	listed.
POLICY-SEEKING.	 Policy-seeking	 motives	 played	 a	 role	 in	 four	 of	 the	 ten	 French	
referendums:	 the	 two	 referendums	 on	 Algeria	 in	 1961	 and	 1962	 and	 the	 two	 on	
constitutional	reform	in	1962	and	1969,	all	pledged	by	De	Gaulle.	These	referendums	
were	used	by	De	Gaulle	 to	obstruct	parliament	and	enforce	a	 certain	outcome	with	
which	 parliament	 did	 not	 agree.	 Throughout	 his	 time	 as	 president,	 De	Gaulle	 had	 a	
difficult	relationship	with	political	parties	and	used	referendums	to	promote	his	policy	
preferences	at	the	expense	of	parliament	(Goguel	1965;	Berstein	1993;	Morel	1996).	As	
shown	in	table 5.2,	on	all	four	issues	on	which	De	Gaulle	triggered	a	referendum,	there	
was	 insufficient	 parliamentary	 support	 for	 his	 proposals,	 nor	 was	 there	 unanimous	
support	within	his	own	party.	De	Gaulle	first	used	the	referendum	to	bypass	parliament	
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in	1961	and	1962,	when	he	pledged	 two	 referendums	on	Algeria’s	 independence.	 In	
1958,	he	was	elected	as	president	specifically	to	find	a	solution	to	the	Algerian	crisis.	As	
parliament	was	heavily	divided	on	both	self-determination	and	eventual	independence,	
he	was	unlikely	 to	obtain	 the	 support	of	 a	parliamentary	majority	 (Morel	 1996,	73).	
By	 pledging	 these	 referendums,	De	Gaulle	 could	 pursue	his	 plans	 and	 adhere	 to	 his	
mandate.	
	 The	other	two	referendums	triggered	by	De	Gaulle	–	in	1962	and	1969	–	were	even	
clearer	examples	of	his	use	of	 referendums	 to	bypass	parliament	 (Walker	2003,	32).	
These	referendums	related	to	legislative	proposals	were	heavily	opposed	by	parliament	
as	 they	would	 substantively	diminish	 its	power.	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	1963	elections,	
De	Gaulle	proposed	a	constitutional	reform	that	would	allow	for	the	direct	election	of	
the	president.	As	this	paved	the	way	for	a	semi-presidential	system,	it	met	with	severe	
resistance	from	French	political	parties	 (Grossman	and	Sauger	2009).	A	popular	vote	
allowed	him	to	pursue	this	reform	regardless.	His	reform	proposals	of	1969	were	also	
aimed	 at	weakening	 his	 political	 opponents.	 He	 proposed	 that	 the	members	 of	 the	
French	regional	councils	should	no	longer	be	elected	but	appointed,	and	that	the	Senate	
should	be	restricted	to	a	consultative	role	(Morel	1996).	The	Assemblée	and,	of	course,	
the	Senate	were	severely	opposed	to	both	reforms,	as	they	signified	a	serious	erosion	
of	the	parliamentary	system.	Again,	a	referendum	allowed	him	to	bypass	parliament	to	
push	these	reforms	forward.	
	 Although	his	strategy	worked	in	1962	(the	proposal	for	the	direct	election	of	the	
president	was	supported	by	62	per	cent	of	the	voters),	it	failed	in	1969.	By	that	time,	De	
Gaulle’s	legitimacy	had	been	weakened	(Walker	2003,	34).	In	1967,	the	Gaullists	almost	
lost	 their	majority	during	 the	parliamentary	elections,	and	the	younger	electorate	 in	
particular	criticized	De	Gaulle’s	authoritarian	leadership	style,	his	indifference	to	social	
problems	and	his	opposition	to	and	nationalistic	stance	towards	the	process	of	European	
integration	(Berstein	1993,	195).	Moreover,	he	was	faced	with	strong	opponents	on	the	
left	–	Francois	Mitterrand	–	and	the	right	–	Jean	Lecanuet	(Walker	2003,	34-35).	While	
De	Gaulle	still	anticipated	that	he	would	win	the	referendum	–	as	he	had	in	1962–	the	
French	public	rejected	the	proposals,	which	were	largely	seen	as	undemocratic	attempt	
to	defeat	his	political	enemies	(Walker	2003,	41).	
	 After	De	Gaulle,	no	other	referendums	were	pledged	with	policy-seeking	reasons.	
In	France,	the	possibility	of	an	absence	of	sufficient	parliamentary	support	for	a	certain	
policy	proposal	 is	 small,	 given	 that	 the	president	usually	holds	a	majority	 support	 in	
parliament.	Yet,	during	periods	of	cohabitation,	during	which	the	president	 is	 from	a	
different	political	party	 than	 the	one	holding	a	majority	 in	parliament,	 the	president	
could, in theory,	 use	 a	 referendum	as	 a	minority	weapon.	However,	 this	 situation	 is	
highly	unlikely	as,	in	practice,	the	president	needs	the	endorsement	of	the	government	
to	 organize	 a	 referendum	 (Morel	 1996,	 81).	 In	 the	 post-WWII	 era,	 France	 has	
experienced	three	periods	of	cohabitation:	1986-1988,	1993-1995	and	1997-2002.	Only	
5
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in	the	last	of	these	periods	was	a	referendum	pledged	but	it	was	not	necessary	from	
a	policy	perspective:	the	constitutional	reform	would	have	easily	gained	the	required	
three-fifths	majority	support	in	Congress.66	Moreover,	with	the	2000	reduction	of	the	
presidential	term	and	the	subsequent	synchronisation	of	the	presidential	and	legislative	
elections,	the	probability	of	cohabitation has	declined.	
DOMESTIC	EMPOWERMENT.	Seeking	domestic	empowerment	played	a	role	in	almost	
all	French	referendums.	To	an	important	extent,	this	 is	enshrined	in	the	confirmative	
nature	of	France’s	referendum	legislation.	The	initiator	of	an	optional	referendum	–	i.e.	
the	president	–	is	also	the	author	of	the	proposal	submitted	for	referendum.	Presidential	
referendums	 under	Article 11	 are	 thus	 decision-promotive	 and	 almost	 by	 definition	
become	a	means	to	strengthen	the	president’s	position	or	policy	stance.	As	I	argued	in	
chapter 3,	such	a	strategy	is	likely	at	play	when	a	referendum	is	pledged	regardless	of	
there	being	sufficient	parliamentary	support,	and	when	the	president	anticipates	that	
the	public	 is	on	his	side.	The	prospect	of	approaching	elections	further	 increases	the	
plausibility	of	such	a	strategy.	
	 The	 most	 notable	 examples	 of	 such	 a	 strategic	 use	 of	 the	 popular	 vote	 are	
the	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 president	 De	 Gaulle.	 Though	 for	 De	 Gaulle	 these	
referendums	could	be	considered	necessary	due	to	insufficient	parliamentary	support,	
his	 anticipation	 of	 a	 ‘yes’	 vote	make	 it	 plausible	 that	 these	 popular	 votes	 served	 to	
strengthen	his	public	 legitimacy	and	his	power	vis-à-vis	parliament	 (Morel	1996,	73;	
Cole	2014,	23).	By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	the	independence	of	Algeria	was	supported	
by	 a	majority	 of	 the	 French	 public,	 which	 had	 grown	 tired	 of	 the	 Algerian	war	 and	
demanded	that	their	political	leader	take	steps.	With	political	parties	largely	divided	on	
the	issue,	the	referendum	pledge	enabled	De	Gaulle	to	increase	its	public	legitimacy	vis-
à-vis	its	opponents	(Walker	2003,	26).	The	two	referendums	on	constitutional	reform	
in	1962	and	1969	could	also	be	seen	as	attempts	to	reinforce	his	authority.	In	1962,	De	
Gaulle	anticipated	a	‘yes’	vote,	and,	arguably,	hoped	to	be	hailed	as	a	true	democrat	
for	 providing	 citizens	with	 such	 a	 tool	 to	 elect	 the	president	 directly.	 In	 a	 television	
broadcast	on	8	June	1962,	De	Gaulle	explained	his	argument	in	favour	of	his	proposal,	
saying	that	‘Between	the	people	and	him	who	is	entrusted	with	its	government	there	
must	be,	in	the	modern	world	of	our	Republic,	a	direct	bond’	(quoted	in	Walker	2003,	
33).	His	consistent	‘promise’	to	resign	from	office	if	a	referendum	outcome	went	against	
him	supports	the	claim	that	De	Gaulle	used	referendums	primarily	as	a	tool	to	legitimize	
his	own	authority.	
	 Unlike	the	referendums	under	De	Gaulle,	the	1972	referendum	on	EC	enlargement,	
pledged	 by	 his	 successor	 Georges	 Pompidou,	 was	 strictly	 speaking	 not	 necessary	
66.	 	The	National	Assembly	adopted	the	proposal	on	20	June	2000	with	466	votes	in	favour,	28	votes	
against,	and	9	abstentions;	the	Senate	adopted	the	proposal	on	29	June	2000	with	228	votes	
in	favour,	34	votes	against	and	8	abstentions	(see	C2D	Database	(c2d.ch),	France,	referendum	
‘Abbreviation	of	presidential	term	of	office	to	5	years’).
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in	political	 terms.	Pompidou’s	party,	 the	UDR,	 	 had	over	60	per	 cent	of	 the	 seats	 in	
the	National	Assembly	and	the	enlargement	treaty	was	thus	likely	to	obtain	sufficient	
support	in	parliament.	Yet	Pompidou	decided	to	organize	a	referendum	nevertheless.	
The	fact	that	he	anticipated	clear	support	for	his	pro-European	stance	and	Britain’s	EU	
membership	in	particular	(as	compared	to	De	Gaulle)	and	that	parliamentary	elections	
were	scheduled	 for	1973,	make	 it	 likely	 that	 the	 referendum	served	 to	 legitimize	his	
position	on	Europe.	The	UDR	was	in	need	of	an	electoral	success,	as	the	government	was	
faced	with	high	unemployment	rates	and	allegations	of	tax	evasion	by	political	officials	
(Leigh	1975,	160-161).	Thereby,	Pompidou	clearly	anticipated	a	 ‘yes’	vote,	as	opinion	
polls	indicated	that	a	majority	of	the	French	voters	were	in	favour	of	EC	enlargement	
(Leigh	1975,	157).	Moreover,	as	a	referendum	would	force	the	left	to	follow	suit,	the	
campaign	would	expose	the	divisions	over	Europe	between	the	PS,	which	was	moderately	
supportive	of	European	integration,	and	the	PCF,	which	was	more	Eurosceptical	(Hillion	
2011,	209).	However,	Pompidou’s	strategy	did	not	work.	Although	he	won	the	vote	(68	
per	cent	voted	in	favour	of	EC	enlargement),	after	the	1973	parliamentary	elections	the	
UDR	barely	held	its	majority	in	parliament	and	lost	considerable	votes	to	the	centre-left.	
The	French	electorate	saw	through	Pompidou’s	strategy;	a	public	opinion	poll	held	prior	
to	the	election	revealed	that	more	than	a	quarter	of	the	French	electorate	believed	that	
he	pledged	the	referendum	because	he	was	seeking	personal	endorsement	(Leigh	1975,	
160).	
	 As	shown	 in	table 5.2,	 the	1988	referendum	was	also	held	on	an	 issue	on	which	
there	was	broad	consensus	among	both	mainstream	French	political	parties	and	the	
French	public.	For	policy-seeking	reasons,	the	referendum	was	thus	largely	redundant.	
As	with	other	referendums	in	French	history,	victory	was	certain.	This	suggests	that	the	
referendum,	triggered	by	prime	minister	Rocard	and	held	on	an	issue	that	he	called	‘his	
major	achievement	so	far’	(The	New	York	Times	6.11.1988),	was	pledged	to	enhance	
Rocard’s	legitimacy.	Yet,	rather	than	primarily	enhancing	the	government’s	legitimacy	
at	 home,	 which	 had	motivated	 president	 De	 Gaulle	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	 to	 pledge	 a	
referendum	on	Algerian	self-determination,	the	vote	on	New	Caledonia	mainly	served	
to	enhance	France’s	legitimacy	abroad.	Indeed,	the	issue	of	self-determination	had	led	
to	severe	tensions	in	New	Caledonia	and,	for	Rocard,	it	was	important	to	solve	these	
tensions	in	order	to	restore	France’s	legitimacy	in	the	Pacific	(Greenhouse	21.8.1988).	
Among	the	electorate	in	France,	however,	the	issue	at	stake	was	largely	uncontroversial,	
which	was	illustrated	by	the	extremely	low	turnout	of	37	per	cent.	
	 The	1992	referendum	on	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	pledged	by	Mitterrand,	most	likely	
also	served	as	a	legitimizing	strategy	(Morel	1996,	75;	see	also	Rideau	1992).	This	time	
however,	 the	Conseil Constitutionnel did rule	that	adoption	of	 the	treaty	required	an	
amendment	of	the	French	constitution	(Stone	1993,	73).	When	his	amendments	were	
approved	by	the	required	three-fifths	majority	(Stone	1993,	75),	Mitterrand	could	have	
decided	to	get	the	treaty	approved	by	parliament.	Yet,	he	opted	for	a	referendum	under	
5
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Article 11.	Again,	one	plausible	motivation	was	 to	expose	divisions	 in	 the	competing	
party.	With	a	 view	 to	 the	upcoming	general	elections	 in	1993,	 the	 referendum	gave	
Mitterrand the	opportunity	to	exploit	the	internal	divisions	within	his	political	rival,	the	
RPR,	which	was	divided	between	the	pragmatic	pro-European	Jacques	Chirac	and	the	
more	Eurosceptical	Philippe	Séguin	(Criddle	1993,	229;	IPS	Inter	Press	Service	7.5.1992).	
Mitterrand	strongly	anticipated	a	‘yes’	vote,	as	public	opinion	polls	showed	consistent	
support	for	EC	membership	among	the	French	public	(Standard	Eurobarometer	Reports	
33-37).	Yet,	this	confidence	almost	backfired	for	him,	as	the	treaty	was	only	supported	
by	a	very	small	majority	of	51	per	cent	(Körkemeyer	1995,	114;	Hug	2002,	28).	
	 The	Maastricht	referendum	could	have	served	as	warning	that	using	referendums	
for	personal	endorsement	can	entail	risks.	However,	the	referendum	pledged	by	Chirac	
–	who	 succeeded	Mitterrand	 in	 1995	–	on	 the	 reduction	of	 the	presidential	 term	 in	
2000	 most	 likely	 also	 served	 empowerment	 interests.	 The	 referendum	 was	 again	
not	 necessary,	 as	 the	 required	 three-fifths	 majority	 support	 in	 parliament	 for	 the	
constitutional	 reform	proposal	would	have	easily	been	obtained	 (Henley	25.9.2000).	
While	it	is	tempting	to	perceive	Chirac’s	referendum	pledge	as	part	of	his	announced	
aim	to	democratize	French	institutions,	the	issue	at	stake	was	uncontroversial	and	had	
widespread	support	among	the	French	public	(Dupoirier	and	Sauger	2010,	22).	In	fact,	
political	commentators	argued	that	the	referendum	pledge	was	hardly	taken	seriously	
in	the	public	debate	(Fitchett	25.9.2000;	Henley	25.9.2000),	something	also	illustrated	
by	 the	 fact	 that	 only	 30	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 French	 electorate	made	 the	 effort	 to	 vote	
(see table 5.1).	 It	 is	plausible	 to	argue	 that	Chirac	anticipated	 that	a	public	 ‘yes’	 in	a	
referendum	that	he	had	initiated	would	strengthen	his	legitimacy,	especially	in	the	face	
of	the	increasing	popularity	of	Jean-Marie	Le	Pen’s	FN.	Moreover,	as	Chirac’s	office	had	
been	accused	of	political	corruption	and	was	losing	support,	he	could	certainly	use	a	
success	(Jeffries	1.10.2000).	However,	although	Chirac	won	the	referendum	(73	per	cent	
voted	 in	favour),	 it	had	the	opposite	effect,	as	the	referendum	was	perceived	by	the	
French	public	as	largely	‘inappropriate’	(Henley	25.9.2000).	
EU	EMPOWERMENT.	The	aim	of	enhancing	France’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	EU	arena	 likely	
played	an	important	role	in	all	three	referendums	held	in	France	on	the	EU.	This	motive	
becomes	plausible	when	leaders	anticipate	a	confirmative	outcome,	since	the	outcome	
increases	a	government’s	 credibility	 in	 the	EU	arena.	This	was	a	 strong	 incentive	 for	
Pompidou	when	he	pledged	the	referendum	on	EC	enlargement.	His	predecessor	De	
Gaulle	had	been	a	firm	Eurosceptic;	in	1965,	he	had	caused	the	so-called	‘empty	chair	
crisis’	when	he	boycotted	 the	meetings	of	 the	Council	 after	disagreements	over	 the	
financing	 of	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (Moravcsik	 1998).	 In	 addition,	 in	 1963,	
De	Gaulle	had	vetoed	Britain’s	first	application	for	EC	membership.	For	Pompidou,	an	
anticipated	French	‘yes’	to	EC	enlargement	provided	a	clear	break	with	the	troublesome	
position	 that	 France	 had	 taken	 under	 De	Gaulle,	 and	 a	 boost	 to	 his	 own	 legitimacy	
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among	his	European	colleagues.	In	the	run	up	to	the	European	summit	in	the	autumn	of	
1972,	Pompidou	explicitly	stressed	the	need	for	a	‘yes’	vote,	in	order	to	win	credibility	at	
the	EU	level,	saying	‘When	at	the	summit	conference	which	meets	in	Paris	this	autumn	
everyone	knows	that	the	French	people	have	given	me	a	solemn	mandate	to	speak	in	its	
name,	who	can	doubt	that	the	authority	of	France	will	be	enhanced?’	(Pompidou	cited	
in	Leigh	1975,	163).
	 Arguably,	 also	 for	 Mitterrand,	 a	 French	 popular	 ‘yes’	 to	 Maastricht	 implied	 a	
strengthening	of	France’s	 legitimacy	 in	Europe	 (IPS	 Inter	Press	Service	7.5.1992).	The	
Maastricht	Treaty	was	a	 joint	Franco-German	 initiative,	and	a	public	endorsement	of	
the	treaty	would	certainly	strengthen	France’s	position	vis-à-vis	Germany,	and	reinforce	
its	 voice	 in	 European	 institutions	 (Criddle	 1993,	 230).	 For	 Chirac,	 finally,	 a	 popular	
French	‘yes’	to	the	European	Constitution	would	have	crowned	the	work	of	the	French	
chairman	of	the	European	Convention,	former	president	Valéry	Giscard	d’Estaing,	and	
thereby	could	have	strengthened	France’s	reputation	in	the	EU.
CONFLICT	 MEDIATION.	 Conflict	 mediation	 likely	 played	 a	 role	 in	 three	 referendum	
pledges,	 all	 on	 EU	 affairs.	 Indeed,	 the	 persistent	 divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 within	 the	
mainstream	 political	 parties	 in	 France	 (Evans	 2003,	 156)	 make	 it	 likely	 that	 French	
referendums	on	 ‘Europe’	were	motivated	by	the	aim	to	mediate	 intra-party	conflict.	
This	motivation	 is	 fostered	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 French	 party	 system,	which	mainly	
reflects	the	country’s	socio-economic	divide	and	has	been	incapable	of	incorporating	
cross-cutting	issues	related	to	the	EU.	Both	party	blocs	have	been	unable	to	formulate	
a	unified	stance	towards	France’s	role	in	the	European	integration	process,	and	as	such	
‘Europe’	 has	 caused	 consistent	 splits	 in	 both	 the	 centre-left	 and	 centre-right	 (Evans	
2003,	155-156).	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	French	presidents	are	more	or	less	inclined	to	
take	a	relatively	pro-European	stance,	in	order	to	be	seen	as	credible	and	constructive	
players	at	EU	level.	A	referendum	on	‘Europe’	therefore,	at	least	when	a	‘yes’	vote	is	
anticipated,	legitimizes	a	president’s	stance	and	downplays	Eurosceptical	voices	within	
his	party.	This	was	the	case	in	all	three	EU	referendums.	
	 When	Pompidou	pledged	the	referendum	on	EC	enlargement	in	1972,	his	own	party	
was	divided	between	those	who	followed	the	Eurosceptical	stance	of	his	predecessor	
De	Gaulle	and	who	were	in	particular	opposed	to	the	UK’s	accession	to	the	EC,	and	those	
who	followed	Pompidou’s	more	pragmatic	pro-European	position.	The	anticipated	‘yes’	
vote	in	the	referendum	would	justify	his	departure	from	De	Gaulle’s	line	and	legitimize	
his	 authority	within	 the	 party.	 For	Mitterrand	 too,	 the	 1992	Maastricht	 referendum	
served	 to	 rein	 in	 Eurosceptical	 party	 rebels.	His	 party	was	 split	 between	 those	who	
supported	his	pragmatic	pro-European	stance,	and	those	that	held	a	more	radical	leftist	
position	and	were	much	more	critical	of	enhanced	economic	and	monetary	integration	
(Wolfreys	2003,	94).	The	referendum	could	not	restore	party	unity,	and	had	the	opposite	
effect	of	repelling	the	anti-EU	fraction	led	by	Jean-Pierre	Chevènement, who	split	from	
5
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the	PS	and	some	years	later	founded	his	own	party	(Krell	2009,	333).	Also	for	Chirac,	
who	was	a	clear	proponent	of	the	European	project,	the	anticipated	‘yes’	vote	on	the	
TCE	would	allow	him	to	deal	with	persistent	Eurosceptical	elements	within	his	own	party	
that	demanded	a	 referendum	on	 ‘Europe’	 (Hainsworth	2006,	98),	while	at	 the	 same	
time	 exposing	 the	 divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 within	 the	 political	 opposition	 (Dehousse	
2006,	152).	This	was,	however,	a	huge	miscalculation	and	the	2005	referendum	marked	
the	second	time	in	the	history	of	the	Fifth	Republic	that	the	French	public	voted	down	a	
president’s	proposal	in	a	referendum.
DEPOLITICIZATION.	The	referendums	on	EC	enlargement	and	Maastricht	were	pledged	
at	 a	time	when	 the	 French	electorate	was	 still	 largely	 pro-European.	More	 recently,	
Euroscepticism	has	increased	among	French	voters,	so	that	pledging	a	referendum	on	
the	EU	is	no	longer	an	offensive	tool	to	gain	legitimacy,	but	rather	a	defensive	one	to	
prevent	‘Europe’	from	becoming	an	issue	that	backfires	in	general	elections.	The	risk	
attached	to	such	a	strategy	is	demonstrated	by	Chirac’s	referendum	pledge	on	the	TCE.	
The	promise	 to	organize	 such	 a	 referendum	dated	back	 to	 1995	when,	 immediately	
after	 the	meagre	French	support	 for	Maastricht,	Chirac	was	pushed	by	Eurosceptical	
competition	 from	 the	 radical-right	 FN	 towards	 promising	 a	 referendum	 on	 future	
EU	 treaty	 change	 (Associated	 Press	 Worldstream	 4.5.1995).	 In	 its	 2002	 election	
programme,	the	UMP	promised	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	outcome	of	the	European	
Convention	(UMP	2002;	Associated	Press	Worldstream	4.5.1995).	Through	a	separate	
vote	on	the	TCE,	Chirac	aimed	to	separate	‘Europe’	from	the	2002	elections	and	ensure	
that	he	would	not	lose	votes	to	Eurosceptic	competitors	(Closa	2007,	1318-1319).	Chirac	
adhered	to	his	electoral	promise	and	formally	announced	the	referendum	in	July	2004.	
In	doing	so,	he	anticipated	a	‘yes’	vote,	saying	‘I	have	confidence	in	the	French	[…]	I	hope	
the	French	people	will	understand	we	are	asking	them	an	essential	question	about	their	
future	and	above	all	that	of	their	children’	(Broughton	15.7.2004).	His	confidence	was	
engendered	by	opinion	polls	that	showed	indeed	that,	at	the	time	of	his	pledge,	support	
for	a	European	Constitution	among	the	French	voters	was	around	62	per	cent	(Standard	
Eurobarometer	61).	
	 Chirac	was	probably	also	aiming	to	depoliticize	 the	European	project,	which	was	
increasingly	controversial	 in	France,	when	he	promised	the	French	public,	during	the	
campaign	for	the	TCE	referendum	in	2005,	to	hold	a	referendum	on	a	possible	Turkish	
EU	accession.	When	he	pledged	 the	 referendum	on	 the	 TCE	 in	 2002,	 public	 opinion	
towards	Europe	was	still	 largely	favourable	(Standard	Eurobarometer	Reports	56-57).	
By	 2005,	 however,	 only	 a	 small	majority	 of	 the	 French	 public	 perceived	 France’s	 EU	
membership	as	a	good	thing,	and	support	for	the	EU	Constitution	had	declined	after	
initially	 being	 relatively	 strong	 (Standard	 Eurobarometer	 Reports	 62-63).	 Moreover,	
the	debate	on	Europe	was	blurred	by	severe	opposition	in	France	to	possible	Turkish	
accession	(Andreani	and	Ferenczi	27.5.2005;	Standard	Eurobarometer	Reports	56	and	
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63).	 Hence,	 by	 promising	 this	 referendum,	 and	 even	 introducing	Article 88-5	 which	
prescribed	a	referendum	in	the	case	of	the	accession	of	new	countries	to	the	EU,	Chirac	
aimed	to	separate	the	Turkish	question	from	the	public	debate	on	the	TCE,	so	as	to	win	
the	referendum	on	the	TCE.	Although	the	strategy	did	not	fully	work,	as	the	TCE	was	
voted	down,	a	post-referendum	survey	showed	that	Turkey	had	indeed	only	played	a	
minor	role	in	the	‘no’	vote	(Flash	Eurobarometer	2005).	
5.2.4 The future of French referendums?
The	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	 France	 as	 a	 legitimizing	 or	 conflict-mediating	 instrument	
was	 encouraged	 by	 the	 long	 stable	 bipolar	 electoral	 arena	 in	 which	 the	 centre-left	
and	 the	 centre-right	 competed	 for	 office.	 However,	 from	 the	 1990s	 onwards,	 the	
French	 party	 system	 became	more	 fragmented	 due	 to	 the	 pluralization	 of	 the	 left,	
and	above	all,	the	increased	success	of	the	populist	radical-right	FN,	which	competes	
for	votes	on	a	nationalist	and	Eurosceptical	agenda	 (Andersen	and	Evans	2003).	This	
increased	 fragmentation	 has	 also	 affected	 French	 conduct	 on	 referendums.	 While	
French	 presidents	 long	 used	 the	 device	 offensively	 to	 pursue	 certain	 political	 goals,	
or defensively	to	mediate	conflict	over	Europe,	these	strategies	have	become	risky	in	
an	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical	 context.	 Chirac’s	 pledge	 on	 the	 TCE	was	motivated	 by	
the	 desire	 to	 remove	 the	 controversial	 issue	 from	 the	 electoral	 campaign;	 the	 risks	
associated	with	such	a	strategy	are	 illustrated	by	the	popular	rejection	of	the	TCE	 in	
2005.	And	indeed,	no	referendums	have	been	held	since	then.	
	 There	 are,	 however,	 some	 signs	 that,	 after	 a	 period	 of	 supposed	 “referendum	
fatigue”,	referendums	might	play	a	more	important	role	in	France	in	the	future.	First,	
with	 the	 introduction	of	 legislative	minority	 referendums,	 smaller	opposition	parties	
now	also	have	the	right	to	initiate	a	referendum.	It	remains	to	be	seen	how	easy	it	is,	
under	the	current	provisions,	to	successfully	pledge	a	vote	in	practice,	as	this	requires	
the	approval	of	at	 least	185	MPs	and	over	 four	million	signatures	by	French	citizens.	
Secondly,	 the	 French	 party	 system	 is	 increasingly	 fragmented,	 and	 there	 are	 calls	
from	more	radical	political	parties,	most	notably	the	FN	and	the	DLF,	to	enhance	the	
scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation.	This	fragmentation	makes	it	more	difficult,	for	
example,	to	avoid	a	referendum	on	future	EU	accessions	under	Article 88-5,	as	well	as	
other	referendum	demands.	
	 The	FN	in	particular	is	important	in	this	respect,	as	the	party	effectively	competes	for	
votes	on	issues	that	cut	across	the	traditional	left-right	divide,	like	immigration	and	the	
EU.	In	its	party	programme,	the	FN	proposes	organizing	a	referendum	on	re-introduction	
of the death penalty, revising Article 89 of	the	French	constitution	so	that	all proposals 
to	amend	the	constitution	can	only	be	approved	by	referendum,	and	introducing	the	
citizens’	initiative	(FN	2012).	In	addition,	more	recently,	FN	leader	Marine	le	Pen	called	
for	a	French	referendum	on	EU	membership,	analogous	to	the	UK	vote	of	June	2016.	‘My	
idea	is	to	tell	the	French	people	that	if	they	elect	me	[…in	2017…],	six	months	later	there	
5
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
162
Chapter 5
will	be	a	referendum,’	she	said	in	an	interview	(EurActiv	25.3.2015).	In	fact,	a	study	on	
European	attitudes	towards	the	British	EU	membership	referendum	conducted	by	the	
University	of	Edinburgh	at	the	beginning	of	2016,	found	that	a	majority	of	the	French	
would	 like	 to	have	a	 referendum	on	France’s	EU	membership	 (Eichhorn,	Hübner	and	
Kenealy	2016,	24-25).
	 For	 future	 French	 presidents,	 such	 referendum	 calls	 might	 be	 more	 difficult	 to	
neglect,	especially	given	the	increasingly	politicized	character	of	the	issues.	Moreover,	
FN’s	mobilizing	potential	 is	 likely	 to	 increase,	as	 the	disproportionality	of	 the	French	
electoral	system	leaves	its	supporters	feeling	largely	unrepresented.	In	2015,	the	two-
round	electoral	 system	prevented	 the	 FN	 from	gaining	 control	 of	 any	 regions	 in	 the	
final	round	of	the	regional	elections	despite	a	historically	high	number	of	votes	in	the	
first	round.	In	this	context,	referendums	portray	an	effective	tool	to	mobilize	electoral	
support.	 Research	 has	 shown	 that,	 for	 citizens	 who	 are	 dissatisfied	 with	 and	 feel	
alienated	from	politics,	referendum	promises	have	proven	important	motives	to	vote	
for	populist	parties	(Pauwels	2014,	159	and	176).	Hence,	given	the	increased	success	of	
the	FN,	referendums	may	well	play	a	more	important	role	in	French	politics	in	the	near	
future.
The	next	section	examines	referendum	use	in	Denmark,	which	has	a	different	political	
system	than	France,	but	where	referendums	have	also	been	more	frequently	used	than	
in	 the	 bulk	 of	Western	 European	 countries.	Moreover,	 as	 in	 France,	 referendums	 in	
Denmark	can	only	be	triggered	by	political	representatives	and	not	by	citizens.	What	
motivates	them	to	do	so?	And	what	function	do	referendums	have	in	a	political	system	
based	on	consensus-seeking	rather	than	majoritarian	rule?
5.3 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN DENMARK
5.3.1 Referendum provisions in the Danish constitution
The	 Danish	 constitution	 of	 1953	 provides	 for	 two	 types	 of	 referendum:	mandatory	
and	legislative	minority	referendums.	As	shown	in	chapter 4,	provisions	for	mandatory	
referendums	on	constitutional revision	were	introduced	as	early	as	1915.	This	legislation	
was	invoked	for	the	first	time	in	1920,	when	a	referendum	was	held	on	revision	of	the	
constitution	 to	 add	 an	 article	 regulating	 the	 reunification	 of	 North	 Schleswig	 with	
Denmark.	 The	first	Danish	 referendum	had	 actually	 been	held	 in	 1916,	 but	 this	was	
an	ad	hoc	advisory	 referendum	on	 the	 sale	of	 the	Danish	West	 Indies	 to	 the	United	
States.	 In	1953,	 the	 referendum	provisions	were	extended	with	 the	 incorporation	of	
legislation	for	holding	legislative	minority	referendums	and	mandatory	referendums	on	
a	delegation	of	sovereignty	and	a	revision	of	the	voting	age.	
	 The	options	for	mandatory	referendums	are	outlined	in	three	different	articles	of	
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the	Danish	constitution	(International	Constitutional	Law	1992;	Folketinget	2009).	First,	
Article 88	states	that	a	referendum	is	mandatory	when	parliament	adopts	a	bill	to	revise	
the	constitution;	as	argued	above,	this	provision	was	introduced	in	1915.	A	referendum	
on	 constitutional	 revision	 must	 be	 held	 within	 six	 months	 of	 new	 parliamentary	
elections,	and	after	the	bill	 is	passed	unamended	by	the	newly	elected	Folketing, the 
Danish	parliament.	The	constitutional	 revision	 is	approved	when	a	majority	of	 those	
taking	part	in	the	voting	has	voted	in	favour,	and	when	they	amount	to	at	least	40	per	
cent	of	the	electorate.	
	 Second,	Article 20	 states	 that	 a	 referendum	must	 be	 held	 on	 the	 delegation	 of	
powers	 to	 international	authorities.	This	article	was	 introduced	 in	1953	after	France,	
Germany,	Belgium,	the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg	and	 Italy	signed	the	Treaty	of	Paris	
(1951)	establishing	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community.	The	introduction	of	Article 
20	guaranteed	that	any	possible	future	accession	of	Denmark	would	be	submitted	to	
a	popular	vote.	Currently,	Article 20	guarantees	a	referendum	in	the	case	of	transfer	
of	 Danish	 sovereignty	 to	 the	 EU.	 It	 was	 specifically	 introduced	 to	 avoid	 having	 to	
treat	decisions	 that	 involve	a	 transfer	of	 sovereign	powers	as	an	amendment	 to	 the	
constitution	(as	is	the	case	in	Ireland),	which	would	then,	under	Article 88,	require	both	
new	elections	and	a	referendum	with	a	strict	approval	quorum	(Sørensen	1969,	304;	
Svensson	1996,	36;	Hug	2002,	34).	It	is	up	to	the	government	to	decide	whether	a	specific	
treaty	change	entails	a	 transfer	of	Danish	sovereignty,	and	hence	whether	Article 20 
applies.	Moreover,	 if	 the	government	 judges	that	 it	does	apply,	a	referendum	is	only	
held	when	where	 is	no	5/6	majority	support	 for	 ratifying	the	treaty	 in	 the	Folketing.	
This	means	that	a	referendum	on	the	EU	can	be	indirectly	induced	by	opposition	parties	
by	not	supporting	ratification	 in	the	Folketing	 (Körkemeyer	1995,	41).	Thus,	although	
this	 type	of	 referendum	 is	mandatory,	political	parties	 still	have	considerable	power	
to	 control	 the	actual	necessity	of	holding	one.	Unlike	 referendums	on	constitutional	
revision,	a	referendum	on	a	delegation	of	sovereign	powers	has	a	rejection	quorum,	
which	means	that,	for	the	bill	to	be	rejected,	a	majority	of	the	voters,	constituting	no	
less	than	30	per	cent	of	all	persons	entitled	to	vote,	must	have	voted	against	the	bill.	
 Third, Article 29	 calls	 for	 a	 referendum	 in	 case	 of	 an	 amendment	 (de facto: 
lowering)	of	the	voting	age.	The	decision	in	1953	to	have	this	issue	decided	by	popular	
vote	is	noteworthy,	as	it	was	the	result	of	a	political	struggle	between	the	conservative	
government,	which	was	opposed	to	lowering	the	voting	age,	and	a	leftist	political	block	
that,	like	elsewhere	in	Scandinavia,	was	in	favour	of	it	as	it	anticipated	to	gain	from	an	
expanded	young	electorate	 (Svensson	1979,	65).	When	crafting	the	new	constitution	
in	1953,	the	centre-right	government	 introduced	Article 29	 to	make	sure	that	bills	to	
lower	the	voting	age	would	require	approval	by	popular	vote.	As	the	public	was	at	that	
time	opposed	to	a	radical	lowering	of	the	voting	age,	the	requirement	of	a	referendum	
guaranteed	that	it	could	not	easily	be	achieved.	A	similar	rejection	quorum	applies	as	
under Article 20.
5
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	 The	 provisions	 for	 holding	 a	 legislative	 minority	 referendum	 are	 outlined	 in	
Article 42,	which	was	introduced	during	the	full	revision	of	the	Danish	constitution	in	
1953.	It	states	that,	after	parliament	passes	a	bill,	one-third	of	MPs	may	request	that	
it	 be	 submitted	 to	 a	 referendum.	 Again,	 a	 rejection	 quorum	of	 30	 per	 cent	 applies,	
which	provides	a	restriction	to	simple	majority	rule,	as	 it	makes	 it	 rather	difficult	 for	
the	majority	of	 voters	 to	actually	 reject	a	bill.	 This	 type	of	 referendum	first	entered	
the	political	debate	 in	 the	1930s	as	a	 substitute	 for	abolishing	 the	Upper	House.67 A 
motion	 to	 abolish	 the	 Upper	 House	 was	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 reformist	 government	
of	 Social	 Democrats	 (in	 Danish:	 Socialdemokraterne)	 and	 the	 Social	 Liberal	 Party	
(Radikale Venstre),	and	was	opposed	by	the	Conservative	People’s	Party	(Konservative 
Folkeparti)	and	the	Liberal	Party	(Venstre).	During	the	negotiations,	a	compromise	was	
reached	 that	 included	 the	 institutionalization	of	 the	 legislative	minority	 referendum,	
as	compensation	for	the	loss	of	minority	protection	that	would	result	from	abolishing	
the	Upper	House	(Svensson	1996,	35).	After	the	proposal	for	constitutional	revision	was	
rejected	by	popular	referendum	in	May	1939	due	to	a	 failure	to	reach	the	threshold	
–	despite	the	‘yes’	vote	being	over	90	percent	(Miller	1982,	57)	–	new	discussions	on	
the	 introduction	 of	 the	minority	 referendum	were	 revitalized	 during	 the	 post-WWII	
negotiations	on	constitutional	revision.	The	compromised	proposal	that	would	abolish	
the	 Upper	 House	 and	 introduce	 the	 legislative	 minority	 referendum	 was	 initiated	
by	a	broad	block	of	 leftist	 and	 rightist	parties	 (Christoffersen,	Beyeler,	 Eichenberger,	
Nannestad	and	Paldam	2014,	159).	It	was	approved	in	the	1953	mandatory	referendum	
on	constitutional	revision.
5.3.2 Referendum use in Denmark
With	eighteen	issues	submitted	to	a	popular	vote	in	Denmark	between	1950	and	2014	
(see table 5.3),68	Denmark	is	one	of	the	few	European	countries	where	referendums	are	
invoked	on	a	relatively	regular	basis.	Moreover,	during	the	writing	of	this	book,	Denmark	
held	its	nineteenth	referendum,	namely	on	3	December	2015	on	changing	its	opt-out	
from	the	EU	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	into	a	flexible	opt-in.	The	proposal	
was	rejected	by	53.11	per	cent,	with	a	turnout	of	72	per	cent	(cf.	Jacobsen	4.12.2015).
As	 in	 France,	 referendums	are	only	held	on	major	political	 events	 like	 constitutional	
reform	 and	 EU	 treaty	 change.	 Twelve	 of	 the	 eighteen	 referendums	 held	 between	
1950	and	2014	were	mandatory	votes.	Five,	held	between	1953	and	1978,	related	to	a	
67.	 	Which	is	in	accordance	to	the	argument	of	A.V.	Dicey,	who,	however,	only	advocated	constitutional	
referendums.
68.	 	Moreover,	in	this	period,	four	referendums	were	held	in	Greenland	and	one	in	the	Faroe	Islands.	
These	referendums	are	excluded	from	the	analysis	as	they	only	applied	to	these	countries,	and	I	only	
include	referendums	held	in	sovereign	states	that	are	part	of	the	EU.
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lowering	of	the	voting	age.69	Two	mandatory	referendums	were	held	on	constitutional	
revision.	The	first	was	held	in	1953	on	the	full	constitutional	revision,	which	included	the	
two-fold	proposal	to	abolish	the	Upper	House	and	to	introduce	the	legislative	minority	
referendum.	The	second	was	held	in	2009	on	a	bill	that	would	enable	the	ambisexual	
succession	to	the	throne.	Four	mandatory	referendums	were	held	under	Article 20: in 
1972	on	EC	accession,	 in	1992	on	 the	Maastricht	Treaty,	 in	1998	on	 the	Amsterdam	
Treaty	and	in	2014	on	the	EU	Unified	Patent	Court.	The	referendum	on	the	euro	was	
prescribed	in	the	Edinburgh	Protocol,	which	was	signed	after	the	initial	Danish	‘no’	to	
the	Maastricht	Treaty.	Not	all	of	these	EU	referendums	were	strictly	mandatory,	as	there	
is	 considerable	 scope	 for	Danish	governments	 to	 judge	whether	a	 specific	EU	 treaty	
reform	indeed	requires	invoking	Article 20	or	not.	In	addition,	parties	in	opposition	can	
trigger	a	referendum	indirectly	by	voting	against	ratification	in	the	Folketing,	thereby	
preventing	the	required	5/6	majority	support.
	 Six	 votes	were	 held	 that	were	 strictly	 optional.	 Remarkably,	 although	 legislative	
minority	 referendums	 are,	 in	 principle,	 easily	 initiated,	 Article 42	 has	 only	 been	
successfully	 invoked	 once,	 namely	 in	 1963	 on	 land	 reforms.	 The	 other	 two	optional	
referendums	were	the	votes	on	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty	and	the	Single	European	
Act	 (SEA),	 the	first	 of	which	was	 induced	 indirectly	by	 the	opposition	as	part	 of	 the	
Edinburgh	Protocol,	and	the	second	was	triggered	ad	hoc	by	the	government.	
	 The	turnout	in	Danish	referendums	is	significantly	lower	than	in	general	elections,	
which	 is	 consistently	 around	 85	 per	 cent.70 This is especially true in the case of 
referendums	on	the	constitution	and	voting	age.	In	2009,	only	58	per	cent	of	the	Danes	
made	 the	 effort	 to	 vote	 on	 the	 constitutional	 revision.	 As	 in	 France,	 the	 turnout	 in	
referendums	is	higher	when	they	relate	to	EU	affairs	and	is	only	comparable	to	general	
elections	when	the	Danes	are	given	the	opportunity	to	vote	on	EU	affairs:	90%	of	the	
Danes	voted	on	EC	accession,	roughly	85%	in	the	two	Maastricht	referendums,	and	88%	
on	 the	 euro.	 In	 2014,	 however,	 only	 56%	 voted	 in	 the	 EU	patent	 court	 referendum,	
which	was	even	lower	than	the	turnout	in	the	constitutional	referendum	of	2009,	and	
considerably	lower	than	in	the	previous	parliamentary	elections	(88	per	cent).71
69.	 	Despite	the	rejection	quorum	applicable	under	Article	29,	a	bill	on	a	lowering	of	the	voting	age	is,	
in	principle,	easily	rejected	in	a	referendum.	As	such,	the	reason	for	the	high	number	of	votes	on	
this	issue	is	that	political	parties	that	aimed	to	lower	the	voting	age	were	well	aware	of	this	risk	
of	rejection	and	consequently	chose	to	accomplish	the	desired	reduction	by	small	increments	(cf.	
Nielsen	1970).
70.	 	IDEA	election	turnout	data	Denmark.
71.	 	Idem.
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Table 5.3: Referendums in Denmark, 1950-2014
Year Type Legal basis Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1953 Mandatory Article	88
Article	29*
1-Constitution
2-Voting	age
Constitution Binding 59%
57%
Yes
Option	A
1961 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 37% Yes
1963 Legislative	
minority
Article	42 Land	reforms	
4x
Centre-right	opposition Binding 73% No	
(4x)
1969 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 64% No
1971 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 86% Yes
1972 Mandatory Article	20 EC	accession Constitution	/
Government	of	Jens	Otto	
Krag	III
Binding 90% Yes
1978 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 63% Yes
1986 Ad hoc - Single	
European	Act
Government	of	Poul	
Schlüter	I
Advisory 75% Yes
1992 Mandatory Article	20 Treaty of 
Maastricht
Constitution	/	
Government	of	Poul	
Schlüter	IV
Binding 83% No
1993 Legislative	
majority
Ad hoc Revised Treaty 
of	Maastricht
Opposition:	Social	
Democrats,	Social	
People’s	Party
Binding 86% Yes
1998 Mandatory Article	20 Treaty of 
Amsterdam
Constitution	/	
Government	of	Poul	
Nyrop	Rasmussen	III
Binding 76% Yes
2000 Mandatory Edinburgh	
Protocol
Euro Constitution	/	
Government	of	Poul	
Nyrop	Rasmussen	IV
Binding 88% No
2009 Mandatory Article	88 Throne 
succession
Constitution Binding 58% Yes
2014 Mandatory Article	20 EU	Unified	
Patent Court
Constitution	/	
Government	of	Helle	
Thorning-Schmidt	
Binding 56% Yes
*This	referendum	anticipated	the	coming	into	effect	of	Article	29	with	the	adoption	of	the	1953	
constitution
5.3.3 Explaining referendum practice in Denmark
Popular	votes	have	played	a	relatively	prominent	role	in	Danish	politics	throughout	the	
twentieth	 century.	 To	 a	 large	 extent,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	Articles 20, 29 and 
88	make	referendums	largely	unavoidable.	How	can	the	strong	constitutional	basis	for	
referendums	be	explained?	And	what	explains	the	 instances	 in	which	political	actors	
deliberately	 triggered	 a	 referendum?	 Below,	 I	 will	 assess	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 six	
factors	in	explaining	referendum	practice	in	Denmark.
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TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY
The	 way	 in	 which	 Danish	 referendum	 provisions	 are	 crafted,	 so	 that	 referendums	
can	 only	 be	 triggered	 by	 representatives,	 largely	 fits	 the	 Danish	 representative	
polity.	 As	 Svensson	 (1996,	 49)	 concludes,	 ‘the	 principles	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	
people	 and	 direct	 democracy	 have	 been	 favoured	 only	moderately,	 compared	with	
the	 principles	 of	 minority	 protection	 and	 representative	 democracy’.	 Denmark	 is	 a	
consensus	democracy,	marked	by	a	multiparty	system	and	an	electoral	system	based	
on	proportional	representation	(PR).	As	a	constitutional	monarchy,	the	function	of	the	
head	of	 state	 is	 purely	 ceremonial.	Unlike	 France,	Danish	democracy	 is	 furthermore	
characterized	 by	 a	 balanced	 relationship	 between	 the	 legislature	 and	 the	 executive.	
Danish	governments	are	not	dependent	on	a	formal	vote	of	confidence	when	assuming	
office	 (Slomp	 2011,	 416)	 –	 known	 as	 negative	 parliamentarianism	 –	 and	 minority	
governments	are	the	norm.	 In	fact,	since	WWII,	Denmark	has	only	had	four	majority	
governments	 (Strøm	 1990;	 Arter	 2006).72	 This	 means	 that	 Danish	 political	 decision-
making	 is	 strongly	 opposition-oriented,	 and	 that	 political	 decision-making	 is	 based	
on	constant	deliberation	and	bargaining	between	the	government	and	the	opposition	
parties.	Danish	 politics	 is	 dominated	by	 the	 centre-left	bloc,	 consisting	of	 the	 Social	
Democrats,	supported	by	the	Social	Liberal	Party,	and	the	centre-right	bloc,	consisting	
of	the	Conservative	People’s	Party	and	the	Liberal	Party	(Slomp	2011,	414).	Since	1953,	
Denmark	has	had	a	unicameral	parliament,	the	Folketing,	which	has	179	members.	A	
parliamentary	term	lasts	four	years.	
	 On	paper,	Danish	referendums	are	above	all	minority	 instruments.	First,	 through	
the	initiation	of	referendums:	Article 42	gives	minority	parties	a	direct	tool	to	trigger	
a	referendum	on	a	 legislative	proposal	 that	 is	passed	by	a	majority	 in	parliament,	as	
this	only	requires	the	support	of	one-third	of	MPs	(Svensson	1996,	36).	As	I	argued	in	
chapters 2 and 4,	this	type	of	referendum	is	rather	exceptional	and	typically	found	in	
consensus	democracies,	 since	 it	provides	smaller	parties	 in	parliament	with	a	 strong	
tool	at	the	expense	of	the	parliamentary	majority.	In	addition,	under	Article 20, political	
minorities	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 to	 the	
EU	 indirectly	 by	preventing	 a	five-sixths	majority	 support	 in	 the	Folketing, and have 
frequently	done	so.	However,	the	power	of	political	minorities	to	do	this	is	considerable	
weaker	than	under	Article 42, as Article 20	can	be	circumvented	(and	thus	a	referendum	
avoided)	if	the	government	asserts	that	a	specific	EU	treaty	change	does	not	signify	a	
transfer	of	sovereignty,	as	it	did	in	the	cases	of	the	Treaties	of	Nice	and	Lisbon.	
	 The	second	way	 in	which	Danish	referendum	provisions	fit	 the	consensus	model	
is	through	the	setting	of	quorums,	which	gives	minorities	some	power	to	control	the	
outcome	of	referendums	(Sørensen	1969).	A	rejection	quorum	applies	to	referendums	
on	the	voting	age	(Article 29)	and	on	the	delegation	of	sovereign	powers	(Article 20),	
72.	 	These	are	the	governments	of	H.C.	Hansen	II	(1957-1960),	Viggo	Kampmann	I	(1960),Hilmar	
Baunsgaard	(1968-1971)	and	Poul	Nyrup	Rasmussen	I	(1993-1994).	
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and	 legislative	minority	 referendums	 (Article 42).	 This	means	 that,	 for	 the	 bill	 to	 be	
rejected,	 a	majority	 of	 the	electors	 taking	part	 in	 the	 vote	must	 have	 voted	 against	
the	bill	and	must	constitute	30	per	cent	or	more	of	all	persons	entitled	to	vote.	Thus,	
it	pays	off	for	opposition	parties	opposing	the	bill	to	mobilize	voters	to	vote	‘no’.	In	the	
case	of	a	referendum	on	constitutional	revisions	(Article 88),	the	situation	is	different:	
the	 revision	 is	approved	 if	a	majority	of	 the	voters	are	 in	 favour	and	 if	 this	majority	
constitutes	at	least	40	per	cent	of	the	electorate.	This	makes	it	thus	extremely	difficult	
for	a	political	majority	to	change	the	constitution	by	popular	vote	as	it	requires	not	only	
the	approval	of	the	majority	of	electors	taking	part	in	the	vote,	but	also	a	relatively	large	
proportion	of	the	total	electorate	(see	also	Svensson	1996,	34).	If	a	minority	opposes	the	
revision,	it	can	ensure	a	negative	outcome	by	mobilizing	potentially	yes-voting	citizens	
to	abstain	from	voting,	so	that	a	supporting	majority	of	votes	will	not	easily	constitute	
40	per	 cent	of	 the	electorate.	 This	was	 successfully	done	 in	1939,	when	 the	 liberals	
urged	their	followers	not	to	vote	in	the	referendum	on	constitutional	reform,	thereby	
preventing	 the	 threshold,	which	was	 then	 45	 per	 cent,	 being	 achieved	 (Miller	 1982,	
57;	 Jensen	2008,	277).	Notably,	 in	 the	2009	constitutional	 referendum,	 the	approval	
quorum	of	40	per	cent	was	only	just	reached.	The	‘yes’	vote	(which	acquired	85.4	per	
cent	of	the	votes)	constituted	44.8	per	cent,	meaning	that	the	threshold	would	not	have	
been	sufficient	if	the	previous	1915	threshold	of	45	per	cent	still	applied.	
	 The	existence	of	such	strict	quorum	requirements	fits	the	Danish	system	of	minority	
protection,	 since	 quorums	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 a	 voting	 majority	 to	 pursue	 a	
referendum	outcome.	 In	practice	though,	 it	 is	 too	simplistic	to	say	that	referendums	
provide a tool only	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 opposition	 (Svensson	 1996,	 47).	 While	
theoretically	one	would	assume	that,	on	the	basis	of	Article 42,	referendums	on	regular	
policy	issues	are	a	recurrent	feature	of	Danish	opposition	politics,	this	is	not	the	case.	
On	the	contrary,	only	the	four	votes	in	1963	on	land	reforms	were	successful	pledges	
under Article 42.	Most	Danish	referendums	were	in	fact	held	on	the	EU,	under	Article 
20.	And	indeed,	as	under	Article 20	a	referendum	is	required	only	when	there	is	no	five-
sixths	parliamentary	majority	in	favour	of	a	treaty	ratification,	opposition	parties	play	a	
substantive	role	in	triggering	a	referendum	on	the	EU	indirectly	when	they	vote	against	
ratification.	They	did	so,	for	example,	in	the	case	of	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht,	thereby	
preventing	the	governing	from	bringing	about	smooth	ratification.	
	 However,	in	practice,	Danish	governments	usually	commit	to	a	referendum	on	the	
EU,	regardless	of	the	parliamentary	vote.	Moreover,	there	are	also	instances	in	which	
Danish	governments	have	avoided	a	 referendum	by	not	 invoking	Article 20	 at	 all.	 In	
practice,	Danish	referendums	have	served	the	interests	of	the	government	more	than	
those	of	the	opposition.	Only	on	four	occasions	did	Danish	citizens	oppose	the	decision	
of	 the	 government	 and	 endorse	 that	 of	 the	 minority	 opposition,	 namely	 the	 1963	
votes	on	land	reforms,	the	1969	referendum	on	voting	age,	the	1992	referendum	on	
Maastricht	and	the	2000	referendum	on	the	euro.
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NUMBER	OF	VETO	PLAYERS
Denmark	 being	 a	 consensus	 democracy,	 the	 number	 of	 veto	 players	 involved	 in	
enforcing	a	constitutional	reform	(i.e.	the	number	of	actors	whose	support	is	necessary	
to	approve	a	reform	bill)	is	potentially	higher	than	in	majoritarian	polities	like	France.	
Indeed,	the	introduction	of	referendum	legislation	in	the	Danish	constitution	in	1915	
and	1953	did	require	the	support	of	a	relatively	large	number	of	political	parties	in	the	
fragmented	(then	bicameral)	Danish	parliament.	However,	this	high	number	of	potential	
veto	players	was	not	a	hurdle,	since	the	initiatives	gained	support	among	a	majority	of	
Danish	political	parties.	This	support	was	grounded	in	the	fact	that,	as	in	Denmark	no	
party	holds	a	majority	of	the	seats,	referendums	provide	a	potential	guarantee	for	all 
parties.	Hence,	rather	than	being	a	hurdle,	political	fragmentation	was	the	reason	why	
these	referendum	provisions	were	pursued.	
	 Once	institutionalized,	referendums	in	Denmark	are	quite	easily	triggered.	In	fact,	
the	relatively	large	number	of	referendums	in	the	country	is	to	a	significant	extent	due	to	
the	fact	that	triggering	a	referendum	in	general	requires	the	direct	or	indirect	support	of	
only	a	few	players.	Referendums	under	Article 88 and Article 29	are	triggered	only	by	the	
constitution.	This	partly	applies	to	referendums	under	Article 20,	which	are	mandatory	
only	when	 there	 is	no	five-sixths	parliamentary	majority	 in	 favour	of	 the	 transfer	of	
sovereignty.	Hence,	triggering	a	referendum	under	Article 20	does	involve	partisan	veto	
players,	albeit	a	relatively	low	number.	First,	there	are	the	governing	party	or	parties,	
which	can	avoid	a	referendum	on	the	EU	by	not	invoking	Article 20.	Secondly,	there	is	
the	opposition,	which	is	a	veto	player	as	an	EU	treaty	ratification	requires	the	indirect	
support	of	five-sixths	of	MPs	and,	if	this	is	not	reached,	a	referendum	is	automatically	
triggered.	This	means	that	one-sixth+1	(i.e.	31)	MPs	can	enforce	a	referendum,	which	
is	 in	practice	easily	reached	when	the	Eurosceptic	opposition	parties	join	forces.	This	
was	indeed	the	case	with	the	referendums	on	EU	accession,	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	the	
Treaty	of	Amsterdam,	the	euro	and	the	Unified	Patent	Court.	
	 A	different	story	applies	to	referendums	under	Article 42	or	ad	hoc	referendums.	
In	principle,	triggering	a	 legislative	minority	referendum	requires	the	support	of	only	
one-third	of	MPs,	which	should	make	it	easy	to	do	so.	This	number	is	lower	than,	for	
example,	 in	 the	 UK	 or	 Sweden,	 where	 triggering	 a	 referendum	 always	 requires	 the	
support	of	a	parliamentary	majority.	In	practice,	however,	this	has	proven	to	be	a	high	
number,	given	the	fragmentation	of	the	party	system	(Svensson	1996;	Bulmer	2011).	
An	additional	rule	complicates	the	triggering	of	a	referendum	under	Article 42.	Article	
42(7)	stipulates	that	the	parliamentary	majority	can	decide	to	withdraw	a	bill	that	the	
minority	wants	to	submit	to	a	vote	rather	than	holding	a	referendum	on	it.	Hence,	as	
with	ad	hoc	referendums,	the	parliamentary	majority	is	an	important	veto	player,	as	the	
actual	triggering	of	the	referendum	depends	on	whether	the	referendum	is	supported	
by	a	majority	of	MPs	(Bulmer	2011,	112).	
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PAST	EXPERIENCE
As outlined in chapter 4,	Denmark	is	one	of	the	few	countries	where	the	referendum	
was	 introduced	before	 the	 Second	World	War.	Of	 the	other	EU	member	 states,	 this	
only	applies	to	Austria,	Ireland,	Luxembourg	and	Sweden.	Three	pre-WWII	referendums	
were	 held	 in	 the	 country:	 in	 1916	 the	 incumbent	 government	 pledged	 an	 advisory	
referendum	on	the	sale	of	Danish	West	Indies	to	the	United	States,	in	1920	a	mandatory	
referendum	was	held	on	a	revision	of	the	constitution	with	the	addition	of	an	article	to	
regulate	reunification	with	North	Schleswig,	and	another	constitutional	referendum	was	
held	in	1939.	It	can	well	be	argued	that	these	referendums	set	a	precedent	for	future	
Danish	referendums,	most	notably	those	on	major	political	decisions	like	constitutional	
reform	and	foreign	affairs.	
	 Referendum	legislation	was	extended	in	1953.	This	marked	a	‘critical	juncture’,	in	
which	 a	 post-WWII	 constitution	was	 negotiated.	 The	 outcome	of	 these	 negotiations	
reflected	the	power	struggle	between	the	dominant	Social	Democrats	and	the	centre-
right.	The	negotiated	provisions	set	the	stage	for	the	subsequent	referendums,	and	the	
decisions	taken	then	reflected	a	strong	tendency	to	protect	minority	parties	against	the	
ruling	majority.	
PUBLIC	DEMANDS
Opinion	data	suggests	that	the	Danes	are	fairly	satisfied	with	the	frequency	with	which	
referendums	are	held	in	their	country.	Although	comparative	longitudinal	data	on	public	
support	for	referendums	is	lacking,	it	is	safe	to	argue	that	public	support	for	referendums	
is	relatively	high:	the	ISSP	citizenship	survey	of	2004	revealed	that	80	per	cent	of	Danish	
respondents	were	generally	supportive	of	referendums,	which	is	slightly	higher	than	in	
France,	and	among	the	highest	in	the	EU.73	Unlike	in	France,	the	Danish	data	reveal	a	
difference	in	support	for	referendums	between	politically	interested	respondents	and	
respondents	who	said	that	they	have	no	interest	in	politics.	Among	the	second	group,	
support	is	slightly	higher	(84	per	cent)	than	among	respondents	who	said	that	they	are	
very	or	fairly	interested	(78	per	cent)	(ISSP	2004).	In	addition,	the	ISSP	data	reveal	that,	
contrary to the dissatisfaction thesis,	which	argues	that	support	for	referendums	comes	
from	 politically	 dissatisfied	 citizens,	 support	 for	 referendums	 in	 Denmark	 is	 higher	
among	respondents	who	said	that	they	are	satisfied	with	democracy	(81	per	cent)	than	
among	those	who	said	that	they	are	dissatisfied	with	Danish	democracy	(68	per	cent)	
(ISSP	2004).
	 National	survey	data,	however,	revealed	that,	while	support	for	holding	referendums	
with a higher frequency	increased	during	the	1980s,	it	decreased	significantly	during	the	
1990s	(Svensson	1996,	50;	Svensson	1999,	255;	Buch	and	Hansen	2002,	9).	Moreover,	
a	survey	by	Sonar	 in	1998	revealed	that	the	Danes	were	not	particularly	 in	favour	of	
73.	 	Compared	to	65	per	cent	in	the	Netherlands,	67	per	cent	in	the	UK,	71	per	cent	in	Sweden,	and	75	per	
cent	in	France,	and	an	EU	average	of	70	per	cent;	International	Social	Survey	Programme	(2004).	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
171
France and Denmark
having	 referendums	with a higher frequency,	 as	 this	 was	 supported	 by	 only	 45	 per	
cent	of	respondents	(Sonar	1998;	Bock	and	Larsen	29.12.1998;	Buch	and	Hansen	2002,	
11-12).	Moreover,	a	 survey	by	GfK	Denmark	 in	1999	 revealed	 that	 ‘only’	47	per	cent	
of	 the	Danes	were	 in	 favour	of	 introducing	citizens’	vetoes	 in	Denmark,	which	 is	not	
remarkably	high	compared	to,	for	example,	France	where,	more	than	ten	years	later,	
72	per	cent	of	people	supported	the	introduction	of	citizen-initiated	referendums	(GfK	
Denmark	1999).	These	figures	suggest	that	most	Danes	are	satisfied	with	their	country’s	
referendum	tradition	and	with	restricting	their	use	to	special	occasions.	Moreover,	the	
1998	Sonar	survey	showed	that	support	for	holding	more	referendums	was	the	highest	
(81	per	cent)	among	supporters	of	the	radical	right	populist	Danish	People’s	Party	(Sonar	
1998).	
	 It	matters	what	issues	are	at	stake.	A	survey	conducted	in	the	run-up	to	the	euro	
referendum	in	2000	revealed	that	40	per	cent	of	Danes	were	in	favour	of	having	more	
referendums	on	national	issues,	while	45	per	cent	were	in	favour	of	more	referendums	
on	 the	 EU	 (Buch	 and	 Hansen	 2002,	 11).	 Moreover,	 the	 survey	 revealed	 a	 strong	
difference	 between	 Eurosceptics	 and	 Euro-supporters:	 65	 per	 cent	 of	 Eurosceptics	
supported	the	idea	of	having	more	EU	referendums,	compared	to	only	27	per	cent	of	
euro-supporters	(Buch	and	Hansen	2002,	10).	These	findings	are	supported	by	the	2009	
European	Election	Studies	(EES),	which	revealed	that	65	per	cent	of	Danish	respondents	
were	of	 the	opinion	that	EU	treaty	changes	should	be	decided	by	referendum.74 And 
although	 there	 seems	 to	be	no	difference	between	 respondents	who	 said	 that	 they	
were	politically	interested	or	not	interested,	the	EES	data	does	reveal	that	support	for	
EU	referendums	is	higher	among	respondents	that	feel	European	unification	has	gone	
too	far	(73	per	cent)	than	among	those	that	feel	that	it	should	be	pushed	further	(59	
per	cent)	(EES	2009).	Hence,	all	in	all,	it	seems	reasonably	to	argue	that	the	Danes	are	
relatively	satisfied	with	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	held	in	their	country,	
but	that	they	tend	to	support	the	idea	of	having	more	EU	referendums,	a	view	that	is	
especially	shared	among	Eurosceptics.		
	 Opinion	data	presented	here	suggests	an	absence	of	a	 strong	societal	basis	 that	
pressures	political	elites	 to	hold	 referendums,	except	when	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 transfer	
of	 sovereignty	 to	 the	 EU.	 As	 shown	 in	 figure 5.4,	 dissatisfaction	 with	 democracy	 is	
considerably	 lower	 than	 the	 EU	 average,75	 and	 has	 declined	 in	 recent	 decades.	 The	
European	Values	Study	(EVS)	revealed	that	in	1999,	33	per	cent	of	Danish	respondents	
said	 that	 they	were	dissatisfied	with	Danish	democracy,	 compared	 to	24	per	 cent	 in	
74.	 	Compared	to	64	per	cent		in	France;	52	per	cent	in	the	Netherlands;	45	per	cent	in	Sweden;	81	per	
cent	in	the	UK;	and	an	EU	average	of	63	per	cent;	European	Election	Studies	(2009).
75.	 	However,	in	itself	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	Danes	are	satisfied	with	democracy,	
as	it	could	also	mean	that	citizens	of	other	European	countries	are	simply	very	dissatisfied	with	
democracy.
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2008	(EVS	1999;	EVS	2008).76	At	the	same	time,	as	shown	in	figure 5.5,	Danish	distrust	
of	 political	 institutions	 has	 slightly	 increased	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years,	 and	 since	 2008	
especially	 distrust	 of	 political	 parties	 and	 parliament.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 political	
interest.	The	EVS	revealed	that	political	interest	in	Denmark	is	not	only	high	compared	
to	other	EU	countries,	it	has	also	increased:	in	2008,	67	per	cent	of	the	Danes	claimed	
to	be	interested	in	politics,	compared	to	slightly	more	than	60	per	cent	 in	1999	(EVS	
1999-2008).
Figure 5.4: Dissatisfaction with national democracy in Denmark*
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*Percentage	of	Danish	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	
‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	national	democracy.
Figure 5.5: Public distrust of national institutions in Denmark*
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Until	 the	mid-1990s,	 the	Danes	were	 relatively	 Eurosceptical.	 However,	 as	 shown	 in	
figure 5.6,	from	the	late	1990s	onwards,	the	level	of	Euroscepticism	(measured	in	terms	
of	the	proportion	of	Danish	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	that	
Denmark’s	EU	membership	 is	a	bad	thing,	that	feel	 that	Denmark	has	not	benefitted	
76.	 	Although	the	literature	suggests	that	referendums	are	the	outcome	of	political	dissatisfaction,	it	
could	be	that	in	Denmark	the	relative	satisfaction	with	democracy	is	due	to	the	fact	that	there	are	
regular	referendums.
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
173
France and Denmark
from	EU	membership,	that	claim	to	be	dissatisfied	with	EU	democracy,	and	that	tend	
not	to	trust	the	EU),	decreased	significantly,	despite	a	recent	 increase	between	2007	
and	2013.	Yet,	while	the	Danes	have	become	more	supportive	of	economic	integration,	
such	support	 is	 lower	(and	below	the	EU	average)	when	it	relates	to	 issues	on	which	
Denmark	currently	has	opt-outs,	such	as	the	euro,	security	and	defence,	immigration	
policy	 and	 justice	 (Laursen	 2006,	 57;	 2012).	 Hence,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 Danes’	
exceptional	position	 in	the	EU,	Eurosceptical	sentiments	 indeed	provide	solid	ground	
for	referendum	demands.
Figure 5.6: Euroscepticism in Denmark*
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
EU membership a bad thing
Not benefitted from EU
membership
Distrust of the EU
Dissatisfaction with EU
democracy
*Percentage	of	Danish	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	‘Denmark’s	EU	membership	
is	a	bad	thing’/’Denmark	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership’/	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	
‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	EU	democracy/that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	the	EU.
Given	Denmark’s	constitutional	basis	and	past	referendum	experience,	not	pledging	a	
referendum	in	the	case	of	an	EU	treaty	ratification	is	electorally	risky	as	it	forces	political	
leaders	to	be	susceptible	to	public	demands.	A	notable	example	is	the	referendum	on	
the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty.	After	the	initial	rejection	of	Maastricht	in	1992,	Denmark	
negotiated	several	opt-outs	on	parts	of	the	treaty	that	implied	an	inadmissible	transfer	
of	sovereignty.	In	theory,	the	government	could	therefore	have	decided	to	not	submit	
the	 revised	 treaty	 to	 a	 referendum.	 However,	 public	 pressures	 on	 the	 Rasmussen	
government	to	hold	another	referendum	were	too	strong	for	this	to	be	a	viable	option.	
Thus,	even	if	Rasmussen	was	not	legally	obliged	to	pledge	a	referendum,	he	was	at	least	
politically	obliged	to	do	so.	
	 This	being	said,	in	the	cases	of	both	the	Treaty	of	Nice	and	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	
government	refrained	from	holding	a	popular	vote,	despite	demands	to	do	so.	In	the	
case	of	Nice,	political	pressures	on	the	Danish	government	to	hold	a	referendum	were	
high,	as	a	referendum	was	demanded	by	the	Danish	People’s	Party	(Dansk Folkeparti),	
the	 Christian	 People’s	 Party	 (Kristeligt Folkeparti)	 and	 the	 Red–Green	 Alliance	
(Enhedslisten).	 However,	 the	 salience	 of	Nice	 in	 the	 public	 debate	was	 not	 strikingly	
high,	 and	 the	Danes	had	had	a	 referendum	on	 the	euro	only	one	year	earlier.	 Thus,	
5
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with	the	Danish	rejection	of	the	euro	fresh	in	his	memory,	prime	minister	Lars	Lokke	
Rasmussen	had	a	clear	stake	in	avoiding	a	referendum	on	Nice	(Laursen	2006,	57-58).	
Prior	to	the	Nice	Intergovernmental	Conference,	he	therefore	argued	that	it	was	up	to	
the	government’s	lawyers	to	decide	whether	the	Treaty	would	fall	under	Article 20,	but	
that	there	were	no	indications	in	that	direction	(Madsen	and	Thobo-Carlsen	7.12.2000;	
Laursen	2006,	72).	
	 A	 different	 situation	 applied	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 on	 which	
a	 referendum	was	also	avoided.	The	avoidance	of	Article 20	was	highly	contested	 in	
the	Danish	political	and	public	debate	(Jyllands-Posten	20.6.2007).	In	2009,	a	group	of	
citizens	filed	a	lawsuit	against	former	prime	minister	Rasmussen	for	having	adopted	the	
Lisbon	Treaty	without	a	referendum,	thereby	–	according	to	the	 initiators	–	violating	
Article 20	(Pop	11.1.2o11).	Although	the	initiators	eventually	lost	the	lawsuit,	it	shows	
the	difficult	position	in	which	any	Danish	government	is	placed	when	it	interprets	Article 
20	ambiguously.	
POLITICAL	VALUES
Given	the	inconsistencies	in	parties’	support	for	referendums,	the	institutionalization	
and	extension	of	 referendum	 legislation	 in	Denmark	 is	more	 likely	 to	have	been	 the	
outcome	 of	 opposition-government	 dynamics	 rather	 than	 normative	 motives	 as	
such.	 As	 Svensson	 (1996,	 33)	 argues,	 the	 Danish	 polity,	 with	 its	 various	 options	 for	
organizing	 referendums,	was	part	of	a	democratization	process	 ‘where	various	 ideas	
and	group	interests	have	confronted	one	another’.	The	initial	driving	forces	behind	the	
constitutional	 referendum	 in	1915	were	 the	 Social	Democrats	 and	 the	 Social	 Liberal	
Party	(Miller	1982,	57).	Throughout	the	1920s,	both	parties	continued	to	advocate	an	
extension	of	referendum	provisions.	Yet,	when	the	position	of	the	Social	Democrats	was	
consolidated	after	the	Second	World	War,	the	party	became	sceptical	about	increasing	
the	scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation	(Suksi	1993,	183).77 
	 Support	among	the	Social	Liberals	has	also	been	inconsistent.	As	Svensson	(1996,	
49)	argues,	in	1988	and	between	1990	and	1993,	the	party	opted	for	a	constitutional	
amendment	 that	 included	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 referendums,	 but	 these	 were	 both	
periods	in	which	it	was	in	the	opposition.	When	the	party	was	in	government,	it	made	
no	calls	 to	extend	the	referendum	legislation.	While	 the	Conservative	People’s	Party	
and	the	Liberal	Party	were	initially	sceptical	about	introducing	referendum	legislation,	
during	the	1930s	they	became	cautiously	supportive	of	introducing	legislative	minority	
referendums,	which	they	perceived	as	a	compensatory	instrument	for	the	abolition	of	
the	Upper	House,	which	was	 desired	 by	 the	 left	 (Svensson	 1996,	 35;	 Christoffersen,	
Beyeler,	Eichenberger,	Nannestad	and	Paldam	2014,	159).	
77.	 	In	addition,	the	Social	Democrats	also	were	firmly	opposed	to	several	initiatives	to	organize	popular	
votes	on	foreign	policy	issues	(i.e.	NATO	membership	and	West	German	rearmament)	that	were	
proposed	by	the	Communist	Party	(Miller	1982,	57-58).
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	 Notably,	extension	of	the	current	referendum	provisions	was	only	explicitly	pursued	
from	 the	 1990s	 onward	 by	 radical	 parties	 founded	 later,	 including	 the	 radical	 left-
wing	Red-Green	Alliance,	 the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	 the	 radical	 right-wing	Progress	
Party	 and	 later	 the	Danish	People’s	 Party	 (a	 splinter	 group	 from	 the	Progress	Party)	
(cf.	Svensson	1996,	50;	Christoffersen,	Beyeler,	Eichenberger,	Nannestad	and	Paldam	
2014).	 Such	 limited	 support	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum	 for	 the	 referendum	 as	 an	
instrument	 (thus	not	 for	particular	 referendums)	 also	 applies	 to	parties’	 support	 for	
making	more	use	of	referendums	 in	general.	 In	1998,	the	Danish	newspaper	Jyllands	
Posten	conducted	a	poll	among	MPs,	which	revealed	that	hardly	any	Social	Democrat,	
Social	Liberal	or	Liberal	MPs	were	of	the	opinion	that	certain	politically	weighty	issues	
should	be	decided	by	referendum	(Jyllands	Posten	1998).	Only	MPs	from	the	smaller	
political	 parties,	 i.e.	 the	 Danish	 People’s	 Party	 (100%),	 the	 Socialist	 People’s	 Party	
(89%),	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 the	 Conservative	 People’s	 Party	 (42%),	 answered	 this	
question	positively.	Over	time,	these	parties	have	indeed	filed	several	initiatives	to	hold	
referendums	(on	issues	like	immigration	policy	and	foreign	affairs),	but	these	proposals	
were	opposed	by	mainstream	parties	which	generally	perceived	them	as	incompatible	
with	 representative	 democracy.	 This	 was	 suitably	 expressed	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	
Centre	Democrats,	who	stated	 in	a	parliamentary	debate	on	a	 referendum	proposal	
by	the	radical	right	Progress	Party	on	refugees	in	1989	that	referendums	represent	‘an	
escape	from	the	responsibility	of	the	Parliament’	(Folketinget	31.10.1989).	Moreover,	in	
rejecting	a	proposal	by	the	Socialist	People’s	Party	on	NATO	expansion	with	the	accession	
of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries,	the	Social	Liberal	Foreign	Minister	said	that	
this	was	an	inappropriate	theme	for	a	referendum	and	that	it	was	up	to	parliament	to	
decide	on	the	matter	(Folketinget	13.1.1998).	
	 For	the	smaller	parties	in	favour	of	referendums,	popular	votes	are	defended	with	
a	mixture	of	intrinsic	and	instrumental	arguments.	For	the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	they	
serve	to	‘increase	people’s	knowledge,	commitment,	and	influence	on	political	decision-
making’	(Socialistisk Folkeparti	1998,	19).	For	the	radical	left-wing	Red-Green	Alliance,	
support	 for	 referendums	 is	primarily	motivated	by	an	output-legitimacy	perspective,	
namely	 to	halt	 further	EU	 integration.	 For	example,	 in	 its	2007	manifesto,	 the	party	
countered	the	government’s	refusal	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	as	 it	
perceived	the	Treaty	to	be	essentially	the	same	as	the	TCE	(Enhedslisten	2007).	Moreover,	
in	its	2015	programme,	the	party	argues	that	referendums	provide	the	popular	majority	
with	a	means	to	counter	the	economic	elite	and	enforce	a	‘brud	med	kapitalismen’	(i.e.	
a	break	with	capitalism)	(Enhedslisten	2015).	The	Danish	People’s	Party	also	supports	
referendums	with	anti-elitist	arguments,	and	as	a	means	 to	give	politics	back	 to	 the	
ordinary	people.	For	this	party,	support	for	referendums	is	grounded	in	its	radical-right	
nationalist	ideology,	as	shown	by	its	calls	for	a	referendum	on	Danish	immigration	policy	
and the transfer of sovereignty (Dansk Folkeparti	1998).	Moreover,	 in	 its	2001	party	
programme,	the	party	called	for	the	introduction	of	the	citizens’	initiative	(with	which	
5
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50,000	signatories	would	be	able	to	put	an	issue	to	a	national	referendum)	in	order	to	
‘strengthen	and	renew	democracy’	(Dansk Folkeparti	2001,	9).	
	 For	mainstream	political	parties,	referendums	are	primarily	instrumentally	valued	
as	a	means	to	protect	the	Danes’	exceptional	position	in	the	EU.	Article 20 has indeed 
introduced	 a	 constitutional	 provision	 that	 decisions	 to	 transfer	 Danish	 sovereignty	
to	 the	 EU	 must	 be	 legitimized	 by	 a	 popular	 vote.	 Such	 an	 instrumental	 argument	
was,	 for	example,	put	 forward	by	prime	minister	Rasmussen	when	he	motivated	the	
decision	 to	hold	a	 referendum	on	 the	Amsterdam	Treaty.	According	 to	him,	popular	
legitimization	by	referendum	was	necessary	since	the	treaty	‘opens	up	EU	membership	
for	Eastern	European	nations’	(Associated	Press	International	7.10.1997).	This	function	
of	the	referendum	as	means	to	legitimize	the	Danish	position	in	the	EU	was	reiterated	
in	the	2005	election	manifesto	of	the	Conservative	People’s	Party,	in	which	the	party	
championed	 the	 government’s	 referendum	 pledge	 on	 the	 European	 Constitutional	
Treaty	and	reiterated	the	strict	guarantee	that	the	Danish	exemptions	from	the	EU	‘can	
only	be	repealed	or	amended	by	a	subsequent,	separate	referendum’	(DKF	2005,	6).
	 The	 fact	 that	 such	 instrumental	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 EU	 referendums	 are	
explained	ambiguously	makes	it	more	likely	that	strategic	motives	will	be	decisive.	On	
paper, Article 20	indeed	provides	the	Danish	people	with	a	guarantee	that	a	referendum	
will	be	held	in	the	case	of	sovereignty	transfer	to	the	EU.	Yet	the	way	in	which	Article 20 
is	crafted	makes	the	instrument	largely	elite-driven,	and	inconsistencies	can	be	found	
in	actors’	adherence	to	such	a	convention.	Although	the	decision	whether	or	not	an	EU	
treaty	ratification	falls	under	Article 20	is	formally	a	legal	matter,	such	decisions	are	not	
devoid	of	political	considerations.	That	political	interpretation	plays	a	role	is	illustrated	
by	the	statement	by	prime	minister	Helle	Thorning-Schmidt,	who	had	initially	rejected	
a	referendum	on	the	EU	patent	court,	since	the	treaty	was	perceived	as	‘too	technical	
and	an	issue	not	suitable	for	a	referendum’	(Jacobsen	27.5.2014).	Such	a	statement	is	
striking,	given	that	on	paper	it	is	legal	experts	from	the	Danish	Ministry	of	Justice	who	
decide	whether	an	EU	 treaty	change	 falls	under	Article 20 and	 thus	would	 require	a	
referendum	 if	 there	 is	no	5/6	parliamentary	majority	 in	 support	of	 the	 treaty.	Given	
Thorning-Schmidt’s	initial	objections	to	the	referendum,	and	given	that	a	referendum	
could	be	have	been	avoided,	it	is	likely	that	other	motivations	played	a	role	when	she	
decided	to	call	a	referendum	nevertheless.	
	 The	 fact	 that	Danish	 governments	managed	 to	 avoid	 a	 referendum	on	Nice	 and	
Lisbon	 is	probably	the	main	evidence	against	the	argument	that	there	 is	an	effective	
normative	 convention	 to	 legitimize	 EU	 treaties	 by	 popular	 vote.	 In	 the	 case	of	Nice,	
the	Ministry	of	Justice	ruled	that,	as	the	treaty	did	not	extend	EU	competence	to	new	
policy	areas,	it	did	not	entail	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	(Justitsministeriet	2001).	Yet,	this	
decision	can	be	considered	ambiguous,	given	the	extension	of	qualified	majority	voting	
that	followed	it,	meaning	that	members	states	 lost	their	veto	power	 in	a	substantive	
number	of	policy	areas	(Laursen	2006;	2008).	
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	 Moreover,	 the	 reluctance	 of	 the	 Rasmussen	 government	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	
on	Lisbon	can	especially	be	considered	remarkable,	given	the	fact	that	a	referendum	
was	scheduled	on	 the	TCE	 (but	was	cancelled	after	 the	Dutch	and	French	 ‘no’	vote).	
While	in	2004	the	Ministry	of	Justice	had	argued	that	the	TCE	did	signify	a	transfer	of	
sovereignty	in	terms	of	nine	constitutional	provisions,	it	ruled	that	this	was	no	longer	
the	case	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty	(Udenrigsministeriet	2004).	This	was	the	outcome	of	a	de-
constitutionalization	of	the	TCE	–	which	ensured	that	the	application	of	some	measures	
was	limited	to	what	already	fell	under	existing	law	and	other	provisions	were	moved	to	
the	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice,	on	which	Denmark	has	an	opt-out	(Laursen	
2009,	14-15).	The	fact	that	the	Danish	government	was	one	of	the	clearest	proponents	
of	de-constitutionalization	of	the	TCE	suggests	that	it	feared	having	to	put	the	issue	to	
a	popular	vote.
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
It	is	more	convincing	that	Danish	referendum	practice	is	the	outcome	of	government-
opposition	 dynamics	 rather	 than	 political	 values	 as	 such.	 In	 the	 introduction	 of	
referendum	 legislation,	 outcome-contingent	 motives	 played	 an	 important	 role:	
referendum	legislation	was	adopted	and	extended	because	parties	expected	to	benefit	
from	 it.	 Referendum	 provisions	 have	 indeed	 been	 crafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 they	
provide	 the	 opposition	with	 an	 extra	mechanism	 to	 influence	 decision-making.	 The	
choices	made	are	not	surprising,	as	 in	the	Danish	consensus	democracy,	 it	 is	difficult	
for	a	party	 to	obtain	an	absolute	majority,	and	each	party	has	a	plausible	chance	of	
becoming	a	minority	(Miller	1982,	57).
	 In	triggering	referendums,	too,	competition	between	government	and	opposition,	
mainly	over	the	EU,	played	an	important	role.	Although	referendums,	most	notably	on	
the	EU,	are	to	a	large	extent	unavoidable,	they	nevertheless	provide	Danish	politicians	
with	a	strategic	instrument	in	electoral	competition.	In	the	case	of	most	EU	referendums,	
Danish	governments	played	an	active	role	in	triggering	the	vote.	Only	the	referendums	
on	EU	accession	and	Maastricht	could	arguably	not	have	been	avoided,	since	it	would	
have	been	difficult	for	the	government	to	argue	that	the	treaty	did	not	entail	a	transfer	
of	sovereignty.	Moreover,	given	the	 insufficient	support	 in	parliament	to	ratify	these	
treaties	in	parliament,	a	referendum	was	mandatory.	In	the	case	of	EC	accession,	the	
referendum	issue	was	highly	salient	among	the	Social	Democrats	and	the	party	would	
have	pledged	a	referendum	even	it	expected	to	obtain	sufficient	parliamentary	support	
(see	below).	The	referendums	on	the	Treaty	of	Amsterdam,	the	euro,	and	the	TCE	were	
also	pledged	by	 the	government,	 regardless	of	 the	Folketing	 vote.78	 The	 referendum	
on	Maastricht	was	then	the	only	vote	in	which	strategic	motives	did	not	play	a	decisive	
role. 
78.	 	However,	the	referendums	on	the	euro	and	on	the	opt-in	to	justice	and	home	affairs	were	mandated	
by	the	Edinburgh	Protocol.	
5
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 Table 5.4	provides	an	overview	of	the	motives	that	passed	the	hoop	test	of	process-
tracing,	 meaning	 that	 they	 were	 likely	 at	 play	 in	 Danish	 referendum	 pledges	 made	
between	1950	and	2014,	and	 in	which	political	elites	played	an	 important	 triggering	
role	(referendums	required	by	the	constitutional	are	therefore	excluded).	In	Denmark,	
both	the	government	and	the	opposition	play	a	role	in	the	triggering	of	EU referendums.	
Table 5.4 only	lists	the	motives	to	pledge	EU	referendums	on	the	part	of	the	government,	
given	that	 it	 is	 the	government	that	decides	whether	an	EU	treaty	falls	under	Article	
20	in	the	first	place,	and	 in	the	above-mentioned	cases,	the	government	pledged	the	
referendum	 regardless	of	 the	 vote	 in	parliament.	 For	 the	Danish	opposition,	 control	
over	the	initiation	of	referendums	is	constitutionally	grounded	in	Article 42 and in the 
provisions under Article 20, which	allow	a	popular	vote	to	be	triggered	indirectly.	Five	
votes	were	directly	triggered	by	the	opposition:	the	four	votes	on	land	reforms	in	1963	
and	 the	 referendum	on	 the	 revised	Maastricht	 Treaty.	 In	 three	additional	 cases,	 the	
opposition	played	an	 indirect	 triggering	role	by	preventing	a	five-sixths	majority	 (EC-
accession,	Maastricht,	 UPC).	 In	 these	 cases,	 both	 policy-seeking	 and	 empowerment	
motives	played	an	important	role.	These	are	not	listed	in	table 5.4,	but	will	nevertheless	
be	outlined	below.	
POLICY-SEEKING.	Policy-seeking	motives	are	likely	to	have	played	a	role	in	five	Danish	
referendums:	the	four	votes	held	in	1963	on	land	reforms	triggered	by	the	opposition	
and	 the	 1986	 referendum	on	 the	 SEA	 that	was	 triggered	by	 the	 government.	When	
referendums	are	 initiated	by	the	opposition,	they	have	a	policy-seeking	character	by	
definition.	With	Article 42 and Article 20,	 Danish	 opposition	 parties	 have	 two	 such	
weapons.	Yet,	given	the	many	subject	exclusions	under	Article 42,79	and	the	difficulties	
for	both	small	left	and	right	parties	to	obtain	the	support	of	one-third	of	MPs	to	call	a	
rejective	referendum	(Svensson	1996,	48),	Article 42	has	only	been	successfully	invoked	
once.	In	1963,	a	parliamentary	majority	consisting	of	the	two	government	parties,	the	
Social	Democrats	and	the	Social	Liberal	Party,	and	the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	passed	
four	 land	reform	bills.	The	bills	were	strongly	rejected	by	the	centre-right	opposition	
as	they	would	all	significantly	reduce	private	property	rights.	They	anticipated	that	a	
sufficient	proportion	of	the	electorate	would	oppose	the	four	bills,	and	subsequently	
called	 for	a	 referendum.	And,	 indeed,	all	 the	proposals	were	 rejected	by	 the	Danish	
people.	However,	the	‘no’	vote	was	not	strikingly	high:	57	per	cent	of	the	voters	rejected	
the	bill,	while	43	per	cent	supported	it.	Yet,	the	‘no’	voters	did	constitute	41.5	per	cent	
of	the	total	Danish	electorate,	over	ten	per	cent	more	than	the	necessary	threshold	of	
30	per	cent.	Hence,	these	four	combined	votes	on	land	reforms	were	the	only	occasion	
79.	 	The	subject	exclusions	are	finance	bills,	supplementary	appropriation	bills,	provisional	appropriation	
bills,	government	loan	bills,	civil	servants	(amendment)	bills,	salaries	and	pensions	bills,	naturalization	
bills,	expropriation	bills,	taxation	(direct	and	indirect)	bills,	as	well	as	bills	introduced	for	the	purpose	
of	discharging	existing	treaty	obligations	shall	not	be	submitted	to	decision	by	referendum’	(Article	
42,	Danmarks	Riges	Grundlov).	
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on	which	a	political	minority	was	able	 to	halt	bills	by	 triggering	a	 referendum	under	
Article 42.
Table 5.4: Referendum strategies on the part of triggering actors in Denmark*
Issue	and	year	
in	which	vote	
was	held
Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
legislative	
proposal 
in	national	
decision-
making	arena
Initiator	
faces 
internal 
party/
coalition	
divisions
Anticipated	
public	
support for 
initiator’s	
stance
Initiator	
faces 
upcoming	
elections
Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
its	position	in	
EU	decision-
making	arena
Strategic 
motivations
Land	reforms	
4x	(1963)		
NO NO YES NO n/a Policy-seeking
EC	accession		
(1972)
NO YES YES NO YES Required under 
Article 20
Conflict	mediation
SEA	(1986) NO YES YES YES YES Policy-seeking
Maastricht		
(1992)
NO NO uncertain NO YES Required under 
Article 20
Revised 
Maastricht		
(1993)
NO NO YES	(but	
controversial)
NO NO Conflict	mediation
EU	bargaining
Amsterdam		
(1998)
NO YES YES	(but	
controversial)
YES YES Depoliticization
Euro	(2000) NO NO YES YES YES Required under 
Edinburgh
Empowerment
EU	empowerment
UPC	(2014) NO NO YES NO YES Empowerment
EU	empowerment
Opt-out	justice	
(2015)
NO NO uncertain YES YES Required under 
Edinburgh 
Depoliticization
EU	bargaining
Cancelled:
TCE	2005 NO NO uncertain YES YES Depoliticization
*Only	pledges	that	resulted	in	a	referendum	bill	are	listed.
Article 20	also	gives	opposition	parties	a	weapon	to	block	the	parliamentary	majority.	In	
fact,	with	a	strong	Eurosceptic	opposition,	referendums	on	the	EU	are	difficult	to	avoid	
once	a	government	 invokes	Article 20.	 Such	opposition	comes	 from	both	 the	 radical	
right,	for	which	EU	integration	is	closely	linked	to	issues	of	immigration	and	nationalism,	
and	the	radical	left,	who	aim	to	retain	sovereignty	over	social	and	economic	affairs.	In	
fact,	except	for	the	euro,	for	which	there	was	sufficient	parliamentary	support	(Downs	
2001,	 223),	 the	 Eurosceptic	 opposition	 was	 able	 to	 indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum	
on	all	EU	treaty	changes	 that	 fell	under	Article 20.	Hence,	 strictly	 speaking,	all	 these	
5
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referendums	were	not	devoid	of	policy-seeking	strategies	on	the	part	of	the	opposition.	
The	only	instance	in	which	this	was	successful,	however,	was	on	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht.	
In	1992,	 the	Danish	government	was	unable	 to	mobilize	a	five-sixths	majority	 in	 the	
Folketing	 to	 support	 ratification	 of	 the	 Treaty.	 Despite	 the	 Treaty	 being	 supported	
by	 a	 simple	 majority,	 ratification	 was	 prevented	 by	 a	 clear	 minority	 consisting	 of	
socialists,	ecologists	and	the	nationalist	extreme	right	(Font	3.6.1992),	thereby	forcing	
a	referendum,	the	outcome	of	which	was	disastrous	for	the	Danish	government	(Siune	
and	Svensson	1993).80	In	the	other	pledges	triggered	by	the	opposition	under	Article 20 
(EC	accession,	Amsterdam	and	the	UPC),	the	public	sided	with	the	government	rather	
than	the	Eurosceptic	opposition.	
	 Referendums	could	also	be	expected	to	be	feasible	tools	for	minority	governments	
to	effectuate	a	certain	policy	outcome	when	support	 in	parliament	 is	 insufficient.	 In	
Denmark,	most	post-WWII	governments	have	in	fact	been	minority	governments.	All	
referendums	on	 the	EU	have	 indeed	been	pledged	by	minority	governments	 (except	
the	vote	on	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty,	which	was	the	outcome	of	a	deal	between	
opposition	parties).	 Rather	 than	 an	 offensive	 policy-seeking	 strategy,	 such	 votes	 are	
usually	 the	outcome	of	 an	absence	of	 a	5/6	majority	 in	parliament.	Only	once	did	a	
government	offensively	invoke	a	referendum	to	get	a	policy	bill	approved	that	parliament	
had	rejected,	namely	 in	1986	on	the	Single	European	Act	(SEA).	 Initially,	the	SEA	had	
been	rejected	by	a	simple	majority	in	the	Folketing	(Petersen	1996,	191).	A	referendum	
could	not	be	held	under	Article 20,	as	this	would	require	a	simple	majority	support	in	
parliament.	 EC	 leaders	pushed	 the	Poul	 Schlüter	 government	 to	find	a	 solution,	 and	
subsequently,	it	called	an	ad	hoc	advisory	referendum	so	as	to	effectuate	a	confirmative	
outcome	 (Hug	 2002,	 33).	 The	 motivation	 behind	 this	 referendum	 was	 thus	 clearly	
outcome-contingent,	as	Schlüter	was	convinced	that	‘the	economic	consequences	of	a	
Danish	rejection	of	the	reforms	would	be	disastrous’	(Follett	23.1.1986).
DEPOLITICIZATION.	In	the	cases	in	which	the	government	decided	to	hold	a	referendum	
on	 the	 EU	 regardless	 of	 the	 Folketing	 vote,	 a	 likely	motivation	was	 to	 separate	 the	
issue	at	stake	 from	national	elections.	As	shown	 in	 table 5.4,	evidence	 for	 this	claim	
was	 found	 in	 the	 case	 of	 both	 Amsterdam	 and	 the	 TCE,	 as	well	 as	 the	most	 recent	
pledge	on	 the	Danish	opt-out	 from	 the	area	of	 freedom,	 security	and	 justice.	 In	 the	
run-up	to	the	ratification	of	Amsterdam,	social	democratic	prime	minister	Rasmussen	
had	committed	himself	to	holding	a	referendum.	In	the	end,	the	referendum	became	
unavoidable,	as	a	minority	block	consisting	of	the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	the	Progress	
Party	and	 the	Danish	People’s	Party	and	 the	Red-Green	Alliance,	 rejected	 the	 treaty	
in the Folketing	(Svensson	2002,	745).	Initially,	the	referendum	was	scheduled	to	take	
place	prior	to	the	parliamentary	elections,	but	in	February	1998	Rasmussen	announced	
that	the	Danes	would	go	to	the	polls	six	months	earlier,	in	March	1998,	to	ensure	that	
80.	 	The	Treaty	of	Maastricht	was	rejected	by	the	Danes	by	50.7	per	cent.
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the	referendum	would	take	place	after	the	elections.	Rasmussen	motivated	this	choice	
for	early	elections	by	stating	that	it	was	‘important	to	avoid	a	long	period	of	uncertainty	
and	electoral	speculation	before	the	referendum	on	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	on	May	28’	
(Agence	France	Presse	19.2.1998).	 Yet,	with	 the	guarantee	 that	 the	electorate	 could	
cast	 their	 vote	 directly	 on	 the	 issue	 after	 the	 elections,	 the	 Social	 Democrat-Social	
Liberal	 government	 anticipated	 that	 ‘Europe’	 would	 not	 be	 an	 issue	 in	 the	 election	
campaign,	and	in	this	way	secure	re-election.	With	a	strong	Eurosceptic	opposition,	and	
a	citizenry	that	was,	according	to	public	opinion	surveys,	not	self-evidently	favourable	
towards	Europe	as	such	(Standard	Eurobarometer	48-49),	the	government	undoubtedly	
perceived	dominance	of	the	issue	in	the	election	campaign	as	too	risky,	especially	given	
the	 increased	electoral	 competition	 from	 the	Danish	People’s	 Party	 (Svensson	2002,	
745).	The	strategy	worked:	Rasmussen	gained	a	victory	during	the	1998	elections,	albeit	
a	small	one,	and	later	that	year	he	was	able	to	get	the	Treaty	of	Amsterdam	ratified	by	
the	Danish	public.	
	 In	 the	case	of	 the	TCE,	 it	would	have	been	difficult	 for	 the	government	 to	 claim	
that	the	treaty	did	not	signify	a	transfer	of	sovereignty.	Subsequently,	support	 in	the	
Folketing	did	not	reach	a	five-sixths	majority	due	to	opposition	from	the	populist	right	
Danish	 People’s	 Party	 and	 the	 Red-Green	 Alliance.	 However,	 the	 pledge	 to	 hold	 a	
referendum	came	long	before	the	Folketing	vote:	 liberal	prime	minister	Anders	Fogh	
Rasmussen	had	already	announced	in	the	spring	of	2003	that	Denmark	would	hold	a	
referendum	on	the	European	Constitution	sometime	in	2005	after	the	parliamentary	
elections,	 regardless	of	 the	Folketing	 vote	 (BBC	28.5.2003).	Although	Eurobarometer	
data	suggested	in	the	autumn	of	2002	that	a	very	small	majority	of	around	51	per	cent	
of	Danish	voters	was	supportive	of	an	EU	Constitution	(Standard	Eurobarometer	58),	
their	position	on	‘Europe’	had	proved	ambiguous	and	fluctuating.	In	the	run-up	to	2005,	
several	public	opinion	polls	 suggested	 that	public	 enthusiasm	 for	 an	EU	constitution	
was	waning	(Sørensen	and	Vestergaard	2005).	Thus,	by	openly	committing	to	a	popular	
vote,	it	is	plausible	that	the	government	aimed	to	separate	the	issue	from	the	electoral	
campaign	 for	 the	Folketing	 elections	 in	 February	2005,	 and	make	 sure	 that	 it	would	
not	 lose	 votes	over	 the	 issue	 in	 the	EP	elections	 in	2004.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	discourse	
surrounding	the	Constitutional	Treaty	would	have	made	it	very	difficult	for	Rasmussen	
to	avoid	the	referendum	in	the	first	place	(Laursen	2008,	273).	
	 The	 referendum	 held	 in	 December	 2015	 on	 the	 Danish	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	
of	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	 was	 also	 not	 devoid	 of	 a	 depoliticization	 strategy.	
However,	 this	 being	 said,	 it	 would	 not	 have	 been	 possible	 to	 avoid	 a	 referendum,	
since	it	was	enshrined	in	the	Edinburgh	Protocol	that	future	decisions	on	changing	the	
Danish	opt-outs	into	flexible	opt-ins	had	to	be	submitted	to	a	referendum.	Hence,	for	
the	government	of	Helle	Thorning-Schmidt,	 that	 initially	announced	the	referendum,	
a	 referendum	was	 the	 only	way	 in	which	 it	 could	 have	 pursued	 its	 commitment	 to	
withdraw	 the	opt-out	on	 justice	 in	order	 for	Denmark	 to	be	able	 to	 stay	 in	Europol. 
5
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However,	 it	 is	not	as	much	the	 fact	 that	 the	referendum	was	held,	as	 its	timing that 
makes	 it	 likely	that	strategic	 interests	played	a	role.	The	decision	by	the	government	
parties	 (which	 was	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 Liberal	 Party,	 the	 Conservative	 People’s	
Party,	and	the	Socialist	People’s	Party	in	opposition)	to	hold	the	referendum	after the 
2015	general	elections	 (The	Local	7.10.2014),	 suggests	 that	 it	 aimed	 to	 separate	 this	
controversial	issue	from	the	electoral	campaign.	
CONFLICT	 MEDIATION.	 Especially	 for	 the	 Social	 Democrats,	 referendums	 on	 the	
EU	serve	not	only	as	a	depoliticization	mechanism,	but	also	 to	mediate	conflict	over	
Europe	 within	 their	 own	 party	 and	 with	 their	 Eurosceptic	 leftist	 counterpart,	 the	
Socialist	People’s	Party.	The	1916	referendum	on	the	sale	of	Danish	West	Indies	already	
set	a	precedent	 for	a	conflict-mediating	 referendum.	 It	 served	 to	mediate	a	political	
crisis	between	the	radical	minority	government	and	the	conservative	opposition	and	
should	be	seen	as	part	of	a	broader	compromise	to	prevent	an	even	deeper	crisis	and	
possibly	new	elections	(Miller	1982,	57).	Referendum	as	a	tool	 for	conflict	mediation	
nevertheless	applied	particularly	to	EU	affairs.	As	shown	in	table 5.4, evidence of this 
was	found	in	the	cases	of	both	EC	accession	and	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty.
	 In	1971,	 the	Social	Democrats	were	heavily	divided	over	Denmark’s	accession	to	
the	EC.	While	the	government	of	social	democrat	Jens	Otto	Krag	pursued	Denmark’s	
EC	membership	bid,	a	Eurosceptic	fraction	in	his	party	opposed	Danish	accession.	With	
elections	upcoming,	 	 the	Social	Democrats	had	a	clear	 stake	 in	calling	a	 referendum	
to	 prevent	 a	 party	 split	 over	 the	 issue	 (Martens	 1979,	 28).	 Exposure	 of	 intra-party	
divisions	over	Europe	during	the	election	campaign	would	not	be	beneficial	to	the	Social	
Democrats,	especially	 since	 the	Eurosceptic	Socialist	People’s	Party	could	easily	 take	
advantage	of	the	divisions	and	mobilize	anti-membership	sentiments	(Hug	2002,	33).	
Moreover,	as	shown	 in	table 5.4,	at	 that	time	public	opinion	was	 largely	 in	 favour	of	
EU	membership,	as	polls	estimated	that	a	majority	–	albeit	not	an	overwhelming	one	–	
would	be	in	favour	of	Danish	accession	(Gallup	Institute	1961-1973).	After	the	elections,	
Euroscepticism	was	more	prevalent	in	the	newly	elected	parliament,	with	the	Socialist	
People’s	Party	and	 the	Social	 Liberals	 strongly	opposing	 ratification	of	 the	accession	
treaty.	The	new	Krag	government	held	only	40%	of	the	seats	in	the	Folketing and thus 
relied	on	these	parties	 in	parliament.	By	calling	a	referendum,	Krag	avoided	not	only	
a	split	within	his	own	party,	but	also	with	his	Eurosceptic	 left	counterparts	 (Martens	
1979,	28).	Yet,	a	5/6	majority	in	support	of	ratification	of	Danish	EC	membership	was	not	
obtained	and	a	referendum	became	unavoidable	after	all.	
	 Similarly,	in	1993,	the	agreement	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	revised	Maastricht	
Treaty	 and	 future	 Danish	 opt-ins	 –	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 required	 five-sixths	
majority	was	 reached	 –	was	 a	 clear	 gesture	within	 the	 opposition	 bloc	 towards	 the	
Eurosceptic	Socialist	People’s	Party.	After	the	Danish	‘no’	to	Maastricht,	the	conservative	
government	was	pressured	by	its	European	counterparts	to	come	up	with	a	solution.	
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This	 solution	 was	 found	 in	 a	 ‘national	 compromise’	 (Hug	 2002,	 34),	 referred	 to	 as	
the	Edinburgh	Protocol,	which	 included	Danish	 ‘op-outs’	 from	particular	parts	of	 the	
Treaty.	While	previous	EU	referendums	worked	out	 in	 favour	of	 the	government	 (six	
years	previously,	the	SEA	had	been	approved	by	56.2	per	cent	of	the	Danish	public),	the	
Danish	voters	had	grown	more	Eurosceptical,	and	the	government	was	thus	not	initially	
keen	on	a	referendum	on	the	revised	treaty.	The	opposition	was	then,	however,	faced	
with	internal	divisions.	The	Social	Democrats	–	aiming	to	win	the	elections	in	1993	–	had	
a	clear	interest	in	getting	the	revised	treaty	ratified.	Yet,	relying	upon	support	from	the	
Social	People’s	Party,	they	agreed	with	the	compromise	that,	as	part	of	the	agreement,	
a	referendum	would	be	held	on	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty	as	well	as	future	Danish	
flexible	opt-ins.	The	referendum	was	held,	resulting	in	weak	vote	of	confidence	for	the	
government	(56.8	per	cent	of	the	Danish	public	voted	in	favour).	
EU	 BARGAINING.	 The	 constitutional	 requirement	 to	 hold	 referendums	 on	major	 EU	
treaty	changes	implies	that	Denmark	is	in	a	strong	position	to	get	its	interests	guaranteed	
in	EU	negotiations.	Such	a	‘red-lining’	strategy	(Oppermann	2011)	was	most	obvious	in	
the	Edinburgh	negotiations	where,	pressured	by	the	prospect	of	another	referendum,	
Denmark	was	able	to	clinch	several	opt-outs	from	EU	legislation.	Currently,	Denmark	
has	opt-outs	from	the	euro,	defence	and	justice	(cf.	Adler-Nissen	2008).	According	to	
the	Edinburgh	Protocol	that	was	negotiated	after	the	popular	rejection	of	the	Maastricht	
Treaty	in	1992,	any	future	abolition	of	the	opt-outs	will	require	a	referendum.	This	has	
given	 Denmark	 considerable	 bargaining	 power.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 negotiations	 on	
the	Nice	 Treaty,	 the	Danish	 government	 stated	 that	 ‘The	Danish	 opt-outs	 contained	
in	the	Edinburgh	Decision	and	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	are	not	up	for	negotiation	at	the	
Conference.	 They	have	been	determined	by	 referendum	and	 can	only	be	altered	by	
the	Danish	population	by	a	further	referendum’	(Laursen	2006,	63).	Another	example	
is	 the	 role	 Denmark	 played	 in	 the	 de-constitutionalization	 of	 the	 TCE.	 In	 this	 case,	
the	prospect	of	a	Danish	 referendum	on	 the	 subsequent	 Lisbon	Treaty	provided	 the	
Danish	government	with	a	strong	bargaining	tool	vis-à-vis	the	German	Presidency.	By	
submitting	a	list	of	nine	articles	on	which	the	TCE	required	a	Danish	referendum,	the	
Danes	could	surely	impose	a	red-line	in	the	Lisbon	negotiations	(Laursen	2009,	16).
	 However,	 the	 negotiated	 Danish	 opt-outs	 also	 impose	 constraints	 on	 Danish	
governments,	 since	 they	 become	 isolated	 in	 EU	 negotiations	 (Sion	 2004,	 10).	
Commitment	to	a	referendum	can	thus	also	harm	Denmark’s	position	 in	the	EU.	The	
eventual	avoidance	of	a	referendum	on	Lisbon	is	a	compelling	example	that	the	Danish	
government	feared	that,	regardless	of	the	Danish	opt-outs,	the	public	would	not	support	
its	stance	on	European	integration.	
5
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EMPOWERMENT.	Given	 the	 rejective	character	of	Danish	 referendums	 it	 is,	unlike	 in	
France,	 not	 a	 logical	 step	 for	 governments	 to	pledge	 referendums	 to	 reinforce	 their	
position	either	domestically	or	in	the	EU	arena.	This	would	only	be	an	effective	strategy	
if	the	government	was	confident	that	the	public	was	on	its	side.	Given	the	volatility	of	
the	Danish	public	when	it	comes	to	‘Europe’	and	previous	popular	rejections	of	EU	treaty	
ratifications	(Maastricht,	 the	euro),	EU	referendums	are	highly	risky	for	governments	
that	aim	to	be	credible	players	in	the	EU	arena.	Nevertheless,	in	case	of	the	euro	and	the	
UPC,	it	is	likely	that	the	government	was	aiming	to	strengthen	its	position.	
	 To	an	important	extent,	the	referendum	on	the	euro	could	not	have	been	avoided,	
since	the	Edinburgh	Protocol	obliged	prime	minister	Poul	Nyrup	Rasmussen	to	call	one.	
Not	keeping	 this	promise	would	have	 thus	been	political	 suicide.	However,	 this	does	
not	alter	the	fact	that	the	referendum	had	some	anticipated	advantages.	Rasmussen’s	
victory	in	the	1998	elections	was	only	small,	and	he	was	certainly	in	need	of	a	domestic	
success	 (Downs	 2001).	 Moreover,	 he	 was	 confident	 that	 the	 referendum	 could	 be	
won.	 Two	 years	 earlier,	 under	 his	 leadership,	 the	Danes	 had	 approved	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Amsterdam	 and	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 Danes	 adopted	 a	 more	 favourable	 attitude	
towards	their	country’s	EU	membership	(recall	figure 5.6).	Opinion	polls	held	in	1999	
and	 early	 2000	 also	 indicated	 –	 albeit	 ambiguously	 –a	 very	 slight	 majority	 support	
for	the	euro	among	the	Danish	public	(Miller	2000,	19).	This	optimism	was	illustrated	
by	a	statement	by	a	spokesperson	for	the	Social	Democrats,	who	stressed	that	there	
would	be	no	referendum	‘if	there	is	any	chance	that	the	“no”	vote	may	win	the	day’	
(The	Copenhagen	Post	25.2.2000).	In	addition,	the	euro	was	supported	by	a	majority	
in the Folketing,	as	well	as	by	an	 important	 lobby	of	employer’s	organizations,	 trade	
unions	and	newspapers	(Downs	2001,	223).	A	positive	outcome	would	thus	be	certain	
to	 legitimize	the	prime	minister’s	stance,	both	domestically	and	at	EU	level.	This	was	
clearly	was	a	miscalculation,	as	the	Danish	public	rejected	the	euro	by	a	53.2	per	cent	
majority.		
	 A	different	scenario	applied	in	2014,	when	a	referendum	was	held	on	Denmark’s	
accession	to	the	Unified	Patent	Court	(UPC),	which	established	a	single	and	specialized	
EU	 patent	 jurisdiction.	 The	 vote	 was	 held	 alongside	 the	 elections	 for	 the	 European	
Parliament	 (EP).	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Justice	 judged	 that	 the	 UPC	 implied	 a	 transfer	 of	
sovereignty	to	the	EU,	and	that	Article 20	thus	applied.	A	referendum	could	have	been	
avoided	if	the	government	had	ruled	that	the	UPC	did	not	signify	a	significant	transfer	
of	Danish	sovereignty.	However,	it	anticipated	a	‘yes’	vote,	partly	due	to	strong	support	
from	 Danish	 business	 and	 industry.	 Moreover,	 public	 ratification	 of	 the	 UPC	 would	
certainly	be	a	 success	 for	 the	government	of	Thorning-Schmidt and	 raise	Denmark’s	
legitimacy	 at	 EU	 level.	 The	 decision	 to	 set	 up	 an	 EU	Patent	 Court	 had	 already	 been	
made	in	2012,	and	was	one	of	Denmark’s	victories	during	its	EU	Presidency	in	the	first	
half	 of	 that	 year	 (Politiken	 7.5.2013).	 Thus,	 calling	 a	 referendum	on	Article 20 could 
be	seen	as	clear	attempt	by	Thorning-Schmidt’s	government	to	strengthen	Denmark’s	
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position	at	EU	level. The	Ministry	of	Justice	judgment	that	ratification	of	the	UPC	would	
fall under Article 20	was	tricky.	The	Danish	People’s	Party	and	the	Red-Green	Alliance	
were	known	to	be	unwilling	to	support	the	patent	court.	As	these	two	parties	held	more	
than	one-sixth	of	the	parliamentary	seats,	a	referendum	was	triggered	under	Article 20.	
The	government’s	strategy	nevertheless	worked,	as	62.5	per	cent	of	the	Danish	public	
voted	in	favour	of	ratifying	the	UPC.
	 Danish	referendum	legislation	provides	powerful	weapons	for	opposition	parties	to	
block	policies.	The	contested	nature	of	EU	affairs	makes	Article 20 a	strong	instrument	in	
the	hands	of	Eurosceptic	parties,	which	they	can	easily	invoke	to	empower	themselves	
vis-à-vis	their	pro-EU	counterparts.	And,	although	the	Danes	have	become	more	positive	
about	 their	 country’s	 membership	 over	 time,	 Eurobarometer	 data	 show	 consistent	
ambivalence	among	the	Danish	public	when	it	comes	to	policies	that	affect	Denmark’s	
autonomy.	 In	 the	early	days,	Euroscepticism	came	mainly	 from	the	Socialist	People’s	
Party	and	 the	Communist	Party,	who	 focused	 their	opposition	on	concerns	over	 the	
loss	 of	 Denmark’s	 social	model.81	More	 recently,	 left-wing	 opposition	 has	 expanded	
through	 the	 Red-Green	 Alliance,	 which	 strongly	 opposes	 the	 political	 economy	 of	
the	EU.	 In	addition,	as	elsewhere	 in	Europe,	Euroscepticism	has	also	gained	a	strong	
populist	 right-wing	 character.	Most	 notably	 the	Danish	 People’s	 Party	 has	mobilized	
Euroscepticism	with	 concerns	 over	 immigration	 becoming	 the	main	mobilizing	 force	
(Fitzgibbon	2013).	The	promise	to	hold	referendums	on	the	EU,	and	the	role	they	play	
in	 the	 referendum	 campaigns,	 provides	 Eurosceptic	 parties	with	 a	 tool	 to	 legitimize	
their	position	and	gain	votes	vis-à-vis	the	mainstream	pro-EU	parties	(De	Vreese	and	
Boomgaarden	2005).	Especially	with	an	increasing	number	of	‘floating	voters’,	‘Europe’	
has	become	a	potentially	strong	issue	on	which	votes	can	be	won,	especially	when	it	is	
linked	to	an	anti-immigration	discourse	(Szczerbiak	and	Taggart	2004).	
5.3.4 The future of Danish referendums?
The	strong	constitutional	basis	for	holding	referendums	makes	them	largely	unavoidable.	
Indeed,	even	when	it	is	not	legally	obligatory,	it	might	be	political	suicide	not	to	invoke	
Article 20,	 especially	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 significant	 Danish	 Eurosceptic	 opposition.	
And	 given	 the	 consistent	 gap	 between	 a	 relatively	 pro-European	 political	 elite	 and	
an	 ambivalent	 public,	 referendums	 are	 viable	 instruments	 for	 both	 government	 and	
opposition	parties	in	the	electoral	game.	If	the	ratification	of	new	EU	treaties	coincides	
with	Danish	general	elections,	it	is	tempting	for	governments	to	separate	the	EU	issue	
by	pledging	a	referendum	to	make	sure	that	Europe	will	not	be	a	controversial	issue	in	
the	electoral	campaign.	And,	vice	versa,	referendums	provide	Eurosceptic	opposition	
parties	with	an	effective	instrument	to	reinforce	their	position	vis-à-vis	the	government	
81.	 	Moreover,	there	have	also	been	several	single-issue	anti-EU	movements	like	the	June	Movement	and	
the	People’s	Movement	Against	the	EU	that	have	called	for	more	EU	referendums	(De	Vreese	and	
Tobiasen	2007).
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on	a	Eurosceptic	agenda,	especially	when	such	an	agenda	 is	 linked	 to	other	national	
sovereignty	 issues,	 like	 immigration.	 And	 with	 the	 electoral	 victory	 of	 the	 Danish	
People’s	Party	–	which	pushed	 for	 referendums	on	 the	European	banking	union	and	
on	Denmark’s	 renewed	EU	membership	 (following	 the	example	of	 the	Conservatives	
in	Britain),	 referendums	are	back	on	 the	Danish	political	agenda	 (Levring	16.6.2015). 
And	 indeed,	 at	 the	time	of	writing	 this	 study,	 in	December	2015,	Denmark	has	held	
a	 referendum	on	ending	 its	 exemption	 from	EU	 justice	 rules.	According	 to	 the	1992	
Edinburgh	Protocol,	such	opt-ins	can	only	be	decided	by	referendum	(BBC	Monitoring	
Europe	11.12.2014).	Since	 the	Danes	voted	 in	December	2015	against	changing	 their	
rigid	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	of	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	 into	 a	 flexible	 opt-in,	 it	
remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 earlier	 announced	 referendum	 on	 Denmark’s	 opt-
out	from	the	EU’s	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy	will	be	held	(cf.	Rynning	and	
Clemmensen	20.1.2015).
5.4 FRENCH AND DANISH REFERENDUMS COMPARED 
This	 chapter	 deals	 with	 two	 countries	 that	 have	 held	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	
referendums	in	recent	decades.	Yet,	even	in	these	countries,	it	is	too	simplistic	to	speak	
of	a	direct	participatory	shift	in	terms	of	national	referendum	use.	 In	both	countries,	
referendums	have	only	been	held	on	major	political	 issues	 like	EU	treaty	reform	and	
constitutional	 revisions.	 More	 importantly,	 in	 both	 France	 and	 Denmark,	 political	
representatives	 largely	 control	 the	 referendum	 process.	 Central	 questions	 in	 this	
chapter	were	how	 to	 explain	 political	 decisions	 to	 hold	 national	 referendums	 in	 the	
two	countries,	and	how	to	explain	why	referendums	are	held	with	a	higher	frequency	in	
these	countries	than	in	others,	like	the	UK	and	Sweden.
	 A	 first	 factor	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 referendums	 in	
these	countries	 is	 the	presence	of	a	 strong	constitutional	basis.	 The	constitutions	of	
both	France	and	Denmark	provide	 for	mandatory	 referendums	and	 for	 referendums	
triggered	by	the	government.	A	second	factor	is	that	both	France	and	Denmark	have	
a	 referendum	 tradition.	 A	 final	 factor	 that	 explains	 why	 referendums	 have	 played	
a	 recurrent	 role	 in	French	and	Danish	politics	 is	 the	small	number	of	veto	players	 in	
the	 process	 of	 triggering	 them.	 In	 France,	 until	 recently,	 referendums	 could	 only	 be	
triggered	by	the	president.	In	Denmark,	referendums	are	triggered	by	the	constitution,	
or	 –	 in	 case	 of	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications	 –	 by	 the	 government,	which	 decides	whether	
ratification	 implies	 a	 transfer	 of	 Danish	 sovereignty	 and	 whether	 it	 is	 thus	 suitable	
for	a	 referendum.	Although,	 in	 that	case,	 the	actual	 triggering	of	 the	vote	 lies	 in	 the	
hands	of	the	opposition,	Danish	governments	can	–	given	the	size	of	the	Eurosceptic	
bloc	in	parliament	–	be	certain	that	such	a	decision	will	almost	automatically	lead	to	a	
referendum.	Hence,	in	both	countries,	a	referendum	is	easily	triggered	when	desired	by	
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the	government.
	 This	 chapter	has	 shown	 that	both	governments	have	had	various	motivations	 to	
call	referendums.	There	is	a	strong	tendency	in	the	academic	referendum	literature	to	
explain	referendum	use	in	terms	of	concerns	about	the	sustainability	of	representative	
democracy.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 referendums	 are	 pledged	 either	 instrumentally	 to	
legitimize	major	political	events	or	intrinsically	by	referring	to	a	necessity	to	increase	
the	scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation.	In	the	case	studies	on	France	and	Denmark,	
instrumental	arguments	in	particular	proved	to	play	a	role.	This	is	especially	evident	in	
Denmark,	where	there	is	a	strong	conviction	to	submit	constitutional	and	EU	issues	to	
a	popular	vote.	However,	the	fact	that	political	leaders	in	both	countries	have	pledged	
referendums	with	a	certain	ambiguity	debunks	the	claim	that	such	values	are	decisive.	
On	 several	 occasions,	 political	 leaders	 have	been	 reluctant	 to	 organize	 referendums	
on	comparable	weighty	 issues,	and	despite	public	demands	to	do	so.	The	reluctance	
of	leaders	in	both	countries	to	organize	a	referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	despite	
having	pledged	a	 referendum	on	 the	TCE,	 is	particularly	notable.	Moreover,	 the	 fact	
that,	in	both	countries,	referendums	cannot	be	triggered	by	citizens	themselves	debunks	
the	claim	that	participatory	motives	are	the	primary	drivers	of	referendum	use,	as	 is	
generally	assumed	by	referendum	scholars.
	 By	contrast,	I	found	evidence	to	argue	that	strategic	motivations	were	dominant.	
In	 both	 countries,	 referendums	 have	 served	 primarily	 to	 mediate	 conflict	 about	
controversial	 issues,	most	notably	 the	EU,	and	 to	depoliticize	 these	 issues	 in	general	
election	campaigns.	Indeed,	in	both	France	and	Denmark,	referendum	use	on	‘Europe’	
should	mainly	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	difficulties	of	 integrating	EU	affairs	 into	
normal	 party	 politics.	 In	 France,	 both	 the	 centre-left	 and	 centre-right	 have	 been	
consistently	divided	on	Europe,	and	both	face	opposition	on	the	issue	from	the	growing	
support	for	the	Eurosceptic	and	nationalist	FN.	In	Denmark,	Euroscepticism	had	always	
been	 more	 prevalent,	 and	 ‘Europe’	 has	 caused	 consistent	 disagreement	 especially	
within	the	Social	Democrats.	Referendum	pledges	on	‘Europe’	have	also	served	political	
leaders’	interests	at	EU	level.	First,	they	have	been	used	as	an	instrument	to	increase	
bargaining	power.	This	is	most	obvious	for	Denmark,	where	the	agreement	contained	
in	 the	Edinburgh	Protocol	 to	have	 future	Danish	opt-ins	 submitted	 to	a	 referendum.	
Second,	 when	 the	 authorities	 anticipate	 a	 ‘yes’	 vote,	 referendums	 on	 the	 EU	 can	
strengthen	 the	 country’s	 position	 in	 the	 EU	 arena.	 This	motivated	 French	 president	
Pompidou	to	pledge	a	vote	on	EC	enlargement	 in	1972	to	break	with	his	Eurosceptic	
predecessor	De	Gaulle.	
		 Despite	these	overlaps,	there	are	also	some	clear	differences	between	France	and	
Denmark	in	motives	for	holding	referendums,	which	can	be	traced	back	to	differences	
in	 their	 respective	 political	 systems.	 In	 France,	 referendum	 practice	 is	 strongly	
embedded	 in	 the	 semi-presidential	 majoritarian	 system,	 where	 the	 president	 holds	
a	 rather	dominant	position	vis-à-vis	parliament	and	where	decision-making	 is	 largely	
5
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
188
Chapter 5
based	on	majoritarian	rule.	At	least	until	2015,	referendums	under	Article 11 could only 
be	 triggered	by	 the	president,	making	 the	 referendum	primarily	decision-promotive.	
Moreover,	no	quorums	apply,	which	means	that	referendums	are	mainly	majoritarian	
devices.	Consequently,	in	France,	the	ruling	party	–	i.e.	the	president	–	has	mainly	used	
referendums	to	legitimize	his	own	authority	or	policy	stance.	By	contrast,	in	Denmark,	
referendum	practice	should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	power-sharing	between	the	
government	and	opposition.	The	power	of	the	voting	majority	is	restricted	due	to	the	
existence	of	strict	rejective	quorums.	In	addition,	referendums	in	Denmark	are	primarily	
decision-controlling.	This	means	that	a	strategy	of	political	empowerment	is	usually	not	
compelling	for	Danish	governments,	as	the	rejective	nature	of	the	referendum	implies	
that	the	outcome	can	easily	turn	against	the	government’s	stance,	especially	where	the	
EU	is	concerned.	
	 A	second	obvious	difference	is	that	in	Denmark,	referendums	are	especially	a	tool	
in	the	hands	of	the	opposition,	which	can	use	referendums,	most	notably	on	the	EU,	to	
veto	proposals	pursued	by	the	parliamentary	majority.	This	should	be	understood	 in	
terms	of	the	fragmented	Danish	party	system	and	the	ability	of	a	few	opposition	parties	
to	 indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 (as	 this	 requires	 only	 one-sixth	 plus	 one	 of	MPs).	
However,	the	increased	fragmentation	of	the	French	political	landscape	and	the	recent	
successes	of	the	populist	FN	indicate	that,	for	governments,	referendums	will	more	and	
more	become,	like	they	are	in	Denmark,	defensive	instruments	in	the	political	power	
play	between	government	and	opposition.	Given	growing	Euroscepticism	in	both	France	
and	Denmark,	referendums	on	the	EU	are	increasingly	risky	for	governments	that	aim	to	
promote	the	European	integration	process.	It	can	be	thus	expected	that	governments	
in	both	countries	will	try	to	avoid	referendums	on	future	EU	treaty	reforms	as	much	as	
possible.	However,	precedents	and	the	strong	constitutional	basis	makes	this	difficult	in	
practice.	The	next	chapter	will	investigate	whether	this	is	different	in	countries	where	a	
strong	referendum	tradition	and	a	strong	constitutional	basis	are	lacking,	such	as	in	the	
UK	and	Sweden.	In	such	countries,	even	more	than	in	France	and	Denmark,	referendums	
can	be	expected	to	be	an	outcome	of	party	politics.
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CHAPTER 6. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SWEDEN
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The	 majority	 of	 European	 countries	 have	 held	 only	 a	 few	 referendums,	 despite	
referendum	legislation	being	available.	 In	this	chapter,	 I	examine	two	such	countries,	
namely	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	and	Sweden.	Between	1950	and	2014,	only	two	UK-
wide	referendums	were	held:	in	1975	on	its	membership	of	the	European	Communities	
(EC)	and	in	2011	on	electoral	reform.	In	December	2015,	the	House	of	Lords	adopted	
the	EU	Referendum	Act,	which	set	out	provisions	for	a	second	referendum	on	Britain’s	
EU	membership	 on	 23	 June	 2016.82	 Despite	 this	 low	 level	 of	 UK-wide	 votes,	 several	
referendums	have	been	held	in	Northern	Ireland	(1973	and	1998),	Scotland	(1979,	1997	
and	2014),	Wales	 (1979	 and	1997)	 and	Northeast	 England	 (2004)	 on	devolution	 and	
independence.83	In	Sweden,	five	referendums	were	held:	two	in	the	1950s	on	whether	
to	drive	on	the	left	or	the	right	and	on	pensions,	one	in	1980	on	nuclear	energy,	one	in	
1994	on	Sweden’s	EU	membership	and	one	in	2003	on	the	introduction	of	the	euro.	The	
comparison	between	the	UK	and	Sweden	follows	the	logic	of	a	Most	Different	Systems	
Design	(MDSD):	with	the	UK	being	a	typical	majoritarian	democracy	and	Sweden	being	a	
consensus	democracy,	I	aim	to	distil	the	common	factors	that	explain	why	referendums	
are	held	with	lower	frequency	in	these	countries.	I	do	this	by	assessing	the	relevance	
of	the	six	factors	outlined	in	chapter 2,	namely	type	of	democracy,	the	number	of	veto	
players	 present	 in	 decisions	 to	 implement	 and/or	 use	 referendum	 legislation,	 past	
referendum	experience,	public	referendum	demands,	the	political	values	attached	to	
referendums,	and	strategic	interests.
	 I	show	that	the	low	number	of	referendums	held	in	the	UK	and	Sweden	as	compared	
to	some	other	EU	countries	is	mainly	due	to	the	absence	of	a	constitutional	requirement	
and	 the	 persistent	 ability	 of	 a	 mainstream	 political	 party	 to	 veto	 referendum	
proposals.	 In	 the	 UK,	 both	 Labour	 and	 Conservatives	 were	 long	 able	 to	 withdraw	
earlier	 referendum	 pledges	 on,	 for	 example,	 devolution	 and	 EU	 affairs.	 Due	 to	 the	
increased	electoral	success	of	the	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	and	the	populist-right	
UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	from	the	1990s	onwards,	however,	this	ability	has	now	
been	reduced.	Consequently,	referendums	as	an	instrument	have	become	increasingly	
82.	 	In	this	chapter,	Britain	and	the	UK	are	used	as	shorthand	for	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	
Northern	Ireland.
83.	 	I	exclude	these	referendums	from	the	cross-country	analysis	because	they	were	only	applicable	in	
these	countries	and	are	therefore	not	comparable	to	referendums	in	sovereign states.	However,	since	
referendums	on	devolution	and	independence	became	increasingly	part	of	British	political	practice,	I	
will	pay	some	attention	to	these	votes	in	this	case	study	chapter.
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salient	and	have	been	given	formal	status	 in	the	2000	Political	Parties,	Elections	and	
Referendums	Act	 (hereafter	 the	 PPERA)	 and	 the	 2011	 European	Union	Act	 (EUA).	 In	
Sweden,	the	referendum	was	 introduced	as	early	as	1922,	but	has	nevertheless	only	
been	modestly	used	because	mainstream	parties,	most	notably	the	Social	Democratic	
Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	–	SAP)	and	the	conservative	Moderate	
Party (Moderata samlingspartiet),	 have	 used	 their	 dominant	 positions	 to	 veto	
referendum	 proposals.	 Due	 to	 the	 increased	 electoral	 success	 of	 the	 populist-right	
Sweden	Democrats	 (Sverigedemokraterna	 –	 SD),	who	 call	 for	 referendums	on	 issues	
concerning	‘Europe’	and	immigration,	referendum	pledges	might,	as	in	the	UK,	play	a	
more	prominent	role	in	Swedish	politics	in	the	near	future.	
	 There	are	also	differences	regarding	the	exact	role	that	referendums	play	in	both	
countries.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 vital	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 countries’	 polities,	 which	
provide	different	 incentives	(and	disincentives)	 for	political	representatives	to	pledge	
referendums.	Section 6.2	 of	 this	 chapter	 deals	with	 the	UK,	where	 referendums	 are	
elite-driven	 instruments	 invoked	 by	 political	 parties	 to	 depoliticize	 controversial	
issues	and	 strengthen	 their	position	vis-à-vis	 competing	parties.	Section 6.3 looks at 
Sweden,	where	 referendums	are	also	elite-driven	 instruments,	but	 serve	 to	mediate	
intra-party	or	 intra-coalition	conflict.	For	each	country,	 I	first	provide	an	overview	of	
available	referendum	legislation.	I	then	describe	the	referendums	held	between	1950-
2014,84	and	analyse	to	what	extent	referendum	practice	is	grounded	in	past	referendum	
tradition	and	the	existing	institutional	framework.	Furthermore,	I	will	examine	whether	
referendum	 pledges	 are	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 concerns	 about	 the	 sustainability	
of	 representative	 democracy	 and/or	 citizens’	 demands,	 or	 whether	 they	 should	 be	
understood	purely	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 strategic	 function	of	 referendums	 in	 the	 political	
game.	Additionally,	I	provide	a	cautious	forecast	about	future	referendum	use	in	both	
countries.
6.2 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
6.2.1 Referendum provisions in the UK
The	UK	does	not	have	a	codified	constitution,	but	an	‘unwritten’	one	comprised	of	Acts	of	
Parliament	(International	Constitutional	Law	1992).	This	means	that	there	is	no	codified 
constitutional	 basis	 for	 holding	 referendums.	 Consequently,	 UK-wide	 referendums	
are	 triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 act	 that	 has	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 a	majority	 in	 the	
Westminster	parliament.	For	a	long	time,	there	was	no	legislation	that	regulated	the	use	
of	referendums.	This	changed	in	2000	with	the	signing	of	the	PPERA	(Parliament	of	the	
United	Kingdom	2000).	The	PPERA	does	not	set	out	the cases in which	referendums	shall	
or	can	be	held,	but	only	regulates	how	they	are	held.	Requirements	relating	to	the	issue	
84.	 	To	be	more	specific:	from	1	January	1950	until	31	December	2014.
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at	stake	and	the	effect	of	the	referendum	are	established	by	an	ad	hoc	parliamentary	
act	and	are	thus	decided	on	by	the	ruling	majority.	
	 In	2011,	 referendums	on	 the	EU	acquired	 formal	 status	with	 the	amendment	of	
the	EUA.	Part	of	 the	2010	coalition	agreement	of	 the	Conservative	Party	and	Liberal	
Democrats	 was	 a	 commitment	 to	 amend	 the	 European	 Communities	 Act	 of	 1972,	
to	 make	 sure	 that	 ‘any	 proposed	 future	 treaty	 that	 transferred	 areas	 of	 power,	 or	
competences,	would	be	subject	to	a	referendum	on	that	treaty	–	a	“referendum	lock”’	
(Cameron	and	Clegg	2010,	19).	Under	the	reformed	EUA,	a	broad	range	of	EU	treaty	
changes	 can	only	be	 ratified	by	parliament	when	approved	by	 the	British	electorate	
in	 a	 binding	 referendum.	 The	 EUA	has	 three	 sections	 that	 contain	 such	 referendum	
locks: section 2 prescribes	a	referendum	in	the	case	of	amendments	or	replacements	
of	 the	existing	EU	 treaties	 that	 fall	 under	 the	ordinary	 revision	procedure;	 section 3 
prescribes	 a	 referendum	 in	 the	 case	 of	 amendments	 that	 fall	 under	 the	 simplified	
revision	procedure;	 and	finally,	 section 6	 lists	 a	 number	of	 events,	 like	 changing	 the	
voting	procedures	in	the	Council	or	adoption	of	the	euro,	that	automatically	trigger	a	
referendum	(Parliament	of	the	United	Kingdom	2011).	
	 The	 referendum	 locks	 in	 the	 EUA	 mark	 a	 clear	 break	 from	 the	 parliamentary	
ratification	 of	 EU	 treaty	 changes	 (Gordon	 and	 Dougan	 2012).	 However,	 even	 the	
reformed	EUA	does	not	give	 the	British	people	a	strict	guarantee	 that	a	 referendum	
will	be	held	in	the	event	of	future	EU	treaty	reforms.	First,	referendum	locks	in	the	EUA	
can	be	easily	repealed	by	a	subsequent	ruling	majority.	Secondly,	the	EUA	sets	out	a	
list	with	a	number	of	cases	in	which	a	referendum	is	not	held,	including	the	accession	
of	 new	member	 states.	 Finally,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 referendum	 locks	 are	 crafted	
leaves	considerable	scope	for	political	 interpretation.	 In	 fact,	 the	EUA	of	2011	states	
that	a	 referendum	 is	only	necessary	when	an	EU	treaty	amendment	or	a	 transfer	of	
competences	under	sections 2 and 3 signify a significant	transfer	of	British	sovereignty.	
If	the	government	rules	that	this	is	not	the	case,	a	referendum	is	not	required	(Murkens	
2012,	 398;	 Gordon	 and	 Dougan	 2012).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 such	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 British	
government,	a	majority	 in	 the	British	parliament	can	 ‘second-guess’	 the	government	
and	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 (Murkens	 2012,	 398).	 Yet,	 this	 is	 not	 very	 likely	 given	 the	
UK’s	majoritarian	system,	and	such	a	‘second-guess’	vote	would	only	obtain	sufficient	
support	if	there	was	a	considerable	number	of	Eurosceptic	party	dissidents	in	the	ruling	
party.
6.2.2 Use of UK-wide referendums
With	 only	 two	 UK-wide	 referendums	 held	 between	 1950	 and	 2014	 (see	 table 6.1),	
the	UK	is	one	of	the	many	European	countries	where	referendum	use	 is	exceptional.	
Although	 I	 stated	 in	chapter 3	 that,	 in	 the	cross-country	analysis,	 I	would	only	 focus	
on	UK-wide	referendums,	the	referendums	held	in	the	constituent	countries	of	the	UK	
will	be	briefly	discussed	in	this	chapter,	as	they	are	part	of	the	broader	experience	of	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
193
The United Kingdom and Sweden
referendums	in	the	UK.	The	first	UK-wide	referendum	was	an	advisory	referendum	on	
Britain’s	EC	membership	in	1975.	In	1972,	Conservative	prime	minister	Edward	Heath	
signed	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	thereby	securing	Britain’s	EC	membership.	As	the	decision	
to	join	the	EC	was	made	without	the	unanimous	consent	of	the	Labour	Party,	it	pledged	
–	in	1972,	while	still	in	opposition	–	to	hold	a	referendum	if	it	was	elected	in	1974	and	
after	renegotiations	on	Britain’s	EC	membership	deal.	The	second	UK-wide	referendum	
was	 a	 binding	 one	 on	 electoral	 reform	 in	 2011.85	 This	 referendum	was	 initiated	 by	
the	government	coalition	of	 the	Conservatives	and	Liberal	Democrats	and	related	to	
changing	the	electoral	system	from	the	‘first-past-the-post’	to	an	‘alternative	vote’	(AV)	
system.	
Table 6.1: UK-wide referendums 1950-2014
Year Type Legal 
basis
Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1975 Legislative	
Majority	
- Membership	EC Labour	government Advisory 65% Yes
2011 Legislative	
Majority
- Electoral	reform Conservative-Liberal	
government
Binding 42% No
Despite	the	fact	that	only	two	referendums	have	actually	been	held,	there	have	been	
several	 occasions	 on	 which	 a	 referendum	 was	 called	 either	 by	 the	 government	 or	
opposition,	but	was	not	ultimately	held.	These	include	calls	by	former	prime	minister	
Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	 the	 1990s	 for	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty,	 by	 the	
short-lived	Referendum	Party	in	1994	on	Britain’s	EU	membership,	by	the	Conservatives	
in	1997	–	then	 in	opposition	–	on	the	Treaty	of	Amsterdam,	by	both	Labour	and	the	
Conservatives	from	the	late	1990s	on	the	euro,	by	the	Conservative	opposition	in	2008	
on	the	Lisbon	Treaty	and,	lastly,	by	a	number	of	MPs	in	2011	following	a	public	petition,	
the	‘People’s	Pledge	Campaign’,	signed	by	100,000	British	citizens	and	MPs	demanding	
a	 referendum	 on	 Britain’s	 EU	 membership,	 which	 was	 rejected	 by	 parliament.	 A	
referendum	was	also	scheduled	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	(TCE)	in	2005,	
but	was	cancelled	after	the	French	and	Dutch	‘no’	vote.	These	examples	indeed	mark	
a	 shift	 in	British	politics:	before	 the	1970s,	 referendums	were	not	 seen	as	a	 feasible	
option	for	deciding	on	political	matters.	This	changed	in	the	1970s,	with	the	first	round	
of	referendums	on	devolution	held	in	1973	(Northern	Ireland)	and	1979	(Scotland	and	
Wales)	and	the	referendum	on	EC	accession	in	1975.	After	playing	virtually	no	role	in	
the	1980s,	referendums	again	became	salient	from	the	1990s.	Exemplary	of	this	shift	
is	the	fact	that	in	2009,	a	Constitutional	Committee	of	the	House	of	Lords	launched	an	
extensive	report	on	the	use	of	 referendums	 in	the	UK	as	a	clear	reaction	to	political	
85.	 	Being	post-legislative	–	i.e.	held	after	the	parliamentary	vote	–	the	binding	character	of	the	vote	did	
not	conflict	with	the	notion	of	parliamentary	sovereignty,	since	it	did	not	bind parliament	to	vote	in	a	
particular	way	(Bogdanor	2011,	89).	
6
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parties’	commitment	to	hold	more	referendums	in	the	future,	in	particular	related	to	
the	EU	(House	of	Lords	2009,	11).86
6.2.3 Explaining referendum practice in the UK
Why	has	the	UK	only	held	two	UK-wide	referendums?	And,	notably,	why	did	referendums	
achieve	increased	prominence	in	British	politics,	first	 in	the	1970s	and	later	from	the	
1990s	onward?	To	answer	these	questions,	this	section	assesses	the	importance	of	the	
six	factors	referred	to	above.	I	show	that	the	factors	that	long	prevented	referendums	
from	 playing	 a	 major	 role,	 namely	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 parliamentary	
sovereignty	over	direct	participatory	decision-making	and	the	UK’s	majoritarian	system,	
with	the	long-dominance	of	two	parties,	no	longer	automatically	apply.	In	the	changed	
context	of	 increased	political	 fragmentation	and	Euroscepticism	 from	the	 late	1990s	
onward,	the	mainstream	parties	now	face	greater	difficulties	in	neglecting	referendum	
demands	than	before	this	period.	
TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY
The	way	 in	which	 referendum	 legislation	 is	 crafted	 and	 invoked	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	
British	majoritarian	system.	The	British	Single	Member	Plurality	(SMP)	–	or	‘first-past-
the-post’	 –	 electoral	 system	 for	 a	 long	 time	 enabled	 the	 dominance	 of	 two	 major	
political	 parties	 competing	 for	 office	 –	 the	 centre-right	 Conservative	 Party	 and	 the	
centre-left	Labour	Party	(Lijphart	1999).	Together	with	the	prevalence	of	the	principle	
of positive parliamentarism,87	this	means	that	the	UK	is	usually	ruled	by	majority	one-
party	governments.88	The	fact	that	only	mandatory	referendums	and	legislative	majority	
referendums	are	provided	for	in	the	UK	confirms	the	institutional	fit	thesis.	
	 The	 institutional	 fit	 between	 the	 British	 polity	 and	 the	 available	 referendum	
legislation	lies	 in	the	triggering	process	and,	hence,	the	ruling	majority’s	control	over	
the	referendum	process.	A	UK-wide	referendum	is	held	after	a	bill	to	hold	a	referendum	
passes	the	two	houses	of	the	UK	parliament.	This	means	that	a	referendum	is	triggered	
86.	 	In	its	report,	the	Committee	enumerates	the	various	referendums	held	in	the	UK,	Northern	Ireland,	
Wales	and	Scotland	from	1973	onwards	and	outlines	some	potential	future	referendums.	Together	
with	these	political	realities,	the	Committee	justifies	the	necessity	of	the	report	by	referring	to	‘the	
perception	of	a	decline	in	the	standing	of	the	“traditional”	democratic	system,	in	combination	with	
technological	developments’	[which	accordingly]	‘led	some	to	argue	that	direct	democracy	should	
play	a	greater	role	in	the	UK’s	experience’	(House	of	Lords	2009,	11).	
87.	 	Positive	parliamentarism	implies	that	the	government	is	formed	after	an	investiture	vote	in	which	it	
has	to	have	the	consent	of	a	majority	of	MPs	and	can	also	be	removed	by	a	relative	majority.	Whether	
the	British	polity	is	characterized	by	the	notion	of	positive	parliamentarism	is	open	to	debate.	
Sieberer	(2011)	argues	that	there	is	no	explicit	investiture	vote	in	the	UK,	and	that	the	UK	is	therefore	
characterized	by	negative	parliamentarism.	However,	Louwerse	(2014)	argues	that	the	relative	
majority	vote	on	the	Address	in	Reply	to	the	Speech	from	the	Throne	(which		marks	the	opening	
of	every	new	Parliament)	can	be	seen	as	a	‘vote	of	confidence’	in	the	government,	and	hence,	
represents	an	investiture	vote.
88.	 	Post-WWII	exceptions	are		the	elections	of	1974	(Harold	Wilson)	and	2010	(David	Cameron)	and	after	
by-election	defeats	in	1977	(James	Callaghan)	and	in	1997	(John	Major).
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by	 a	 parliamentary	majority	 –	 i.e.	 the	 governing	 party.	 This	makes	 UK	 referendums	
purely	decision-promotive:	the	ruling	majority	decides	on	both	whether	the	vote	is	held	
and	the	proposal	to	be	voted	on.	
	 The	fact	that	in	UK-wide	referendums,	in	principle,	no	quorum	applies,	signifying	that	
the	outcome	is	decided	by	simple	majority	rule,	is	also	consistent	with	the	institutional	
fit	thesis.89	However,	the	ruling	majority	can	set	a	quorum	ad	hoc	 in	the	referendum	
bill.	This	means	that	the	quorum	issue	is	a	subject	of	controversy	and	has	been	raised	in	
several	referendum	debates,	most	notably	by	the	opposition.	In	the	1975	referendum	
on	EC	membership,	the	Conservative	opposition	tried	to	establish	a	turnout	quorum	of	
60	per	cent,	but	this	proposal	was	withdrawn	by	the	government	(Gay	and	Horton	2011,	
3).	A	quorum	was	also	considered	by	the	Commission on the Conduct of Referendums, 
set	up	in	1996	to	formulate	practical	guidelines	and	modes	of	conduct	for	the	use	of	
referendums,	but	it	explicitly	opposed	the	idea	by	stating	that	‘the	establishment	of	a	
threshold	may	be	confusing	for	voters	and	produce	results	which	do	not	reflect	their	
intentions’	(Nairne	1996,	42).	In	the	debate	on	the	2011	referendum	on	the	electoral	
system,	the	House	of	Lords	filed	an	amendment	that	called	for	a	40	per	cent	turnout	
quorum.	 The	 amendment	was	 rejected	 by	 the	House	 of	 Commons,	 the	 government	
stating	that	a	quorum	‘goes	against	our	view	that	people	should	get	what	they	vote	for’	
[…and…]	 ‘introduces	the	perverse	consequences	associated	with	thresholds’	 (cited	 in	
Gay	and	Horton	2011,	8).	
	 Institutional	fit	is	also	found	in	the	way	in	which	the	referendum	locks	in	the	EUA	
are	drafted.	First,	it	is	up	to	the	ruling	majority	to	judge	whether	a	referendum	on	the	
EU	is	necessary	under	the	EUA.	For	example,	if	the	ruling	majority	argues	that	a	certain	
EU	 treaty	 reform	does	not	 signify	a	 transfer	of	British	 sovereignty	or	 is	 insignificant, 
a	referendum	is	not	required	(Murkens	2012).	In	addition,	the	EUA	was	signed	by	the	
Conservative-Liberal	 Democratic	 government,	 but	 can	 easily	 be	 overturned	 when	 a	
new	majority	comes	in	power.90 
 
NUMBER	OF	VETO	PLAYERS
Compared	 to	 France	 and	 Denmark,	 where	 referendums	 are	 primarily	 triggered	 by	
the	 president	 (France),	 or	 the	 constitution,	 government	 or	 a	 parliamentary	minority	
(Denmark),	more	veto	players	are	involved	in	triggering	UK-wide	referendums,	since	this	
requires	a	majority	of	MPs	(in	three	readings)	in	the	two	houses	of	parliament.	However,	
majority	support	in	Westminster	in	practice	means	the	support	of	the	ruling	majority	
only.	Thus,	at	least	when	there	is	a	single-party	majority	government,	the	opposition	in	
89.	 	This	was	different	in	the	case	of	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	referendums	in	1979,	where	a	turnout	
quorum	of	40	per	cent	was	applicable.		
90.	 	This	is	consistent	with	Dicey’s	notion	of	parliamentary	sovereignty,	which	prevents	an	incumbent	
legislature	from	binding	its	successors	to	certain	political	decisions.
6
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Westminster	has	formally	no	tool	to	trigger	or	impede	a	UK-wide	referendum.91 At least 
when	it	has	a	majority	in	the	House	of	Commons,	the	ruling	party	has	considerable	power	
to	veto	referendum	bills	when	they	are	not	in	its	interest.	It	did	so	in	2011,	when	the	bill	
on	a	EU	referendum	following	the	citizens’	petition	was	voted	down	by	a	parliamentary	
majority	(Bagley	26.10.2011).	This	explains	to	an	important	extent	why	only	two	UK-wide	
referendums	have	been	held.	After	all,	as	Arend	Lijphart	observed,	‘when	governments	
control	the	referendum,	they	will	tend	to	use	it	only	when	they	expect	to	win’	(Lijphart	
1984,	203).	When	referendums	have	a	decision-promotive	character	and	are	invoked	by	
the	ruling	majority,	they	are	largely	redundant	as	an	instrument	for	governing	parties	
to	achieve	certain	policy	outcomes,	and	are	moreover	 risky	as,	 in	practice,	 they	 risk	
a	 vote-of-confidence.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	main	 competitors,	 subsequent	 British	
governments	have	long	had	few	incentives	to	actually	schedule	referendums.	
	 From	the	1990s	onwards,	the	British	political	landscape	became	more	fragmented,	
due	 to	 the	 rising	 popularity	 of	 parties	 like	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats,	 the	 SNP	 and	 the	
populist	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP).	The	2010	elections	were	the	first	time	in	the	
post-WWII	era	that	neither	of	the	two	main	parties	was	able	to	gain	a	majority	in	the	
House	 of	 Commons.	 Consequently,	 the	 Conservatives	 were	 forced	 into	 a	 coalition	
with	the	third	largest	party,	the	Liberal	Democrats.	Although	the	elections	of	2015	re-
installed	a	single-party	majority	government,	it	has	become	commonplace	to	argue	that	
British	politics	has	fundamentally	changed	(Blumenau	and	Hix	31.3.2015;	BBC	9.5.2015). 
	 Changes	 in	 British	 referendum	 practice	 should	 clearly	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	
of	 these	 broader	 changes.	 Notably,	 consistent	 with	 findings	 from	 Rahat	 (2008),	 the	
more	veto	players,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 that	 the	power	of	other	parties	 that	oppose	
a	certain	reform	can	be	broken.	This	certainly	applies	to	the	UK.	First,	with	the	rising	
success	of	other	parties,	it	is	more	difficult	for	the	Labour	and	Conservative	parties	to	
impede	a	referendum.	An	example	is	the	recent	referendum	on	Scottish	independence.	
After	1998,	when	 the	Scottish	parliament	was	established	 (the	outcome	of	 the	1997	
referendum),	 the	 SNP	 energetically	 campaigned	 for	 Scottish	 independence.	 In	 2010,	
a	proposal	by	the	SNP	minority	administration	to	hold	an	 independence	referendum	
failed	to	get	majority	support	in	the	Scottish	parliament	due	to	opposition	from	Labour	
and	the	Conservatives.	After	its	victory	in	the	2011	elections,	however,	the	SNP	was	able	
to	secure	a	majority	in	the	Scottish	parliament	(BBC	7.5.2011a)	and,	as	a	result,	the	party	
was	able	to	pursue	the	referendum.	
	 The	 2011	 referendum	 on	 the	 electoral	 system	 was	 also	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
increased	fragmentation	of	the	party	 landscape.	The	fact	that	the	Liberal	Democrats	
91.	 	The	opposition	in	Westminster	also	has	little	power	to	trigger	or	impede	a	referendum	on	
devolution	in	the	constituent	countries.	Yet,	there	are	more	veto	players	involved	in	triggering	a	
referendum	on	devolution	(or	independence).	Such	a	referendum	(if	binding)	must	be	supported	
by	the	devolved	parliament	(which	includes	in	principle	more	veto	powers,	since		elections	to	the	
devolved	parliaments	in	Scotland,	Northern	Ireland	and	Wales	involve	elements	of	proportional	
representation)	as	well	as	the	UK	parliament.		
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–	who	 favoured	 the	 referendum	since	 they	anticipated	 to	gain	 from	a	change	 in	 the	
voting	system	–	were	necessary	to	form	a	majority	put	them	in	a	beneficial	bargaining	
position.	Secondly,	as	I	will	show	below,	increased	competition	from	other	parties	also	
encourages	British	governments	to	use	referendums	for	act-contingent	reasons	–	 i.e.	
reasons	that	have	little	to	do	with	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	as	such,	but	rather	
with	 the	 act	 of	 pledging	 referendums	 in	 itself.	 For	 opposition	 parties,	 referendums	
called	on	a	controversial	 issue	 like	 the	EU	are	effective	 tools	 in	electoral	 campaigns,	
given	persistent	 levels	of	Euroscepticism	among	the	British	public.	Such	calls	put	the	
political	mainstream	on	the	defensive	and	it	will	most	probably	be	difficult	for	future	
governments	to	neglect	them,	especially	since	both	Labour	and	the	Conservatives	need	
to	 curb	Eurosceptic	 rebels	within	 their	own	parties.	Prime	minister	David	Cameron’s	
recent	 referendum	call	 on	British	 EU	membership	 is	 a	 clear	 example	of	 this	 difficult	
choice	facing	current	British	governments.	
PAST	EXPERIENCE
The	 recent	 formalization	of	 the	 referendum	 in	 the	PPERA	and	 the	EUA	mark	 a	 clear	
departure	from	the	UK’s	long-lasting	reluctance	to	hold	referendums.	For	a	long	time,	
referendums	were	seen	as	 incompatible	with	 the	British	parliamentary	 tradition	and	
the	‘legislative	supremacy’	of	the	British	parliament	(Balsom	1996,	209;	Beedham	2006,	
9;	Qvortrup	2006).	As	famously	elaborated	by	A.V.	Dicey	(1835-1922),	the	British	notion	
of	‘parliamentary	sovereignty’	entails	parliament’s	power	‘to	make	or	unmake	any	law	
whatever’.	This	prevents	an	incumbent	legislature	from	binding	its	successors	to	certain	
political	decisions,	not	even	by	a	written	constitution.	Principally,	the	referendum	does	
not	sit	comfortably	with	this	notion	of	parliamentary	sovereignty.	As	Birch	observed	in	
the	1960s,	‘…there	has	been	no	support	at	all	[in	the	UK]	for	the	idea	that	the	initiative	
and	the	referendum	should	be	adopted	as	a	permanent	institution	of	government,	as	it	
is	in	Switzerland,	so	that	the	representatives	could	be	by-passed’	(Birch	1964,	227-228,	
quoted	in	Qvortrup	2006,	60).	
	 However,	even	Dicey	did	not	rule	out	the	use	of	referendums.	On	the	contrary,	he	
perceived	the	referendum	as	a	viable	 instrument	to	decide	on	changes	 in	the	British	
political	system,	and	as	‘an	emphatic	assertion	of	the	principle	that	nation	stands	above	
party’	 (quoted	 in	 Cosgrove	1981,	 108).	Dicey	was	 referring	 to	 the	persisting	 conflict	
among	political	parties	over	Irish	independence	in	the	1890s,	and	he	saw	a	referendum	
as	a	remedy	for	the	deadlock.	The	referendums	on	devolution	and	sovereignty	affairs	
in	Northern	 Ireland,	Wales	 and	 Scotland,	 as	well	 as	 Britain’s	 EU	membership,	which	
all	cause	conflict	between	and	within	political	parties,	fit	perfectly	with	Dicey’s	legacy	
(Balsom	1996).	
	 This	fit	is	enshrined	in	the	PPERA,	which	was	the	immediate	result	of	the	renewed	
salience	 of	 issues	 concerning	 devolution	 and	 independence	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	
Scotland,	Wales	 and	Northeast	 England.	 Throughout	 Britain’s	 history,	 independence	
6
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and	 devolution	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 disagreement	 between	 citizens’	 groups	
and	 political	 parties,	 and	 referendums	 have	 been	 used	 to	 settle	 the	 issue	 (Balsom	
1996).	Given	the	commitment	of	several	political	parties	 from	the	1990s	onwards	to	
hold	 referendums	 on	 these	 issues,	 both	 political	 representatives	 and	 constitutional	
experts	called	for	referendum	regulations,	so	as	to	guarantee	that	future	referendums	
are	conducted	 fairly	and	efficiently.	 In	1996,	 the	UK	Constitutional	Unit	–	a	 research	
institution	 on	 constitutional	 change	 –	 and	 the	 Electoral	 Reform	 Society	 –	 Britain’s	
largest	 pressure	 group	on	 electoral	 reform	–	 set	 up	 an	 independent	Commission on 
the Conduct of Referendums,	mandated	to	formulate	practical	guidelines	and	modes	of	
conduct	for	the	use	of	referendums.	The	commission	consisted	of	representatives	from	
the	main	political	parties,	as	well	as	referendum	and	constitutional	experts.	It	launched	
its	report	in	November	1996	(Nairne	1996),	which	formed	essential	input	for	the	PPERA. 
	 The	reformed	European	Union	Act	of	2011	also	underscores	Dicey’s	legacy.	The	EUA	
now	states	that	future	EU	treaty	changes	have	to	be	ratified	in	the	UK	by	referendum.	
At	the	same	time,	it	provides	no	solid	guarantee	that	referendums	on	Europe	will	be	
frequently	held.	Indeed,	while	referendum	locks	are	the	most	extensive	when	compared	
to	 constitutional	 EU	 referendum	 requirements	 elsewhere,	 for	 example	 in	 Denmark,	
they	can	be	repealed	by	a	subsequent	ruling	majority	(Gordon	and	Dougan	2012,	12).	
In	 addition,	whether	 the	 ‘significance	 condition’	 is	met	 is	 also	 decided	by	 the	 ruling	
majority,	meaning	that	a	referendum	can	be	legally	avoided	(although	this	is	politically	
risky).	
PUBLIC	DEMANDS
It	could	be	argued	that,	from	the	late	1990s	onwards,	the	social	climate	in	the	UK	became	
more	favourable	to	referendums,	notably	where	the	EU	 is	concerned.	 In	chapter 3,	 I	
conceptualized	three	proxies	to	enable	this	social	climate	to	be	assessed,	two	to	assess	
the	climate	for	referendums	in	general,	namely	the	level	of	political dissatisfaction in 
society and the level of political interest;	 and	a	 third	proxy	 to	assess	 the	climate	 for	
referendums	on the EU,	namely	the	 level	of	Euroscepticism.	Although	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
assess	whether	referendum	pledges	in	the	UK	have	been	a	direct	consequence	of	such	
sentiments	in	society,	these	proxies	do	provide	information	about	the	social	climate	in	
which	referendums	are	or	are	not	pledged,	as	it	is	generally	assumed	that	pressures	on	
political	elites	to	hold	a	referendum	are	greater	when	they	are	faced	with	a	citizenry	
that	is	dissatisfied	with	national	politics	or	with	the	EU,	and	is	interested	in	politics	as	
such. 
 Figures 6.1 and 6.2	 provide	 an	 overview	of	 the	 level	 of	 such	 sentiments	 among	
British	citizens,	based	on	Eurobarometer	survey	data.	The	figures	suggests	that	the	shift	
towards	an	increased	salience	of	the	referendum	in	British	politics	during	the	later	1990s	
indeed	came	at	a	time	of	increasing	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction.	As	shown	in	figure 
6.1,	after	a	drop	in	democratic	dissatisfaction	in	1997	(when	general	elections	resulted	
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in	a	change	in	the	ruling	party	for	the	first	time	in	eighteen	years),	the	proportion	of	
British	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	the	way	democracy	works	
rose	again	 from	the	 late	1990s	onward.	However,	according	 to	Eurobarometer	data,	
the	British	people	are	still	less	dissatisfied	with	democracy	than	they	were	in	the	1970s	
and	1980s,	and	less	dissatisfied	than	the	EU	average.	The	European	Values	Study	(EVS)	
found	higher	levels	of	dissatisfaction,	and	moreover	a	higher	increase	in	the	proportion	
of	dissatisfied	citizens,	from	46	per	cent	in	1999	to	68	per	cent	in	2008.
Figure 6.1: Dissatisfaction with national democracy in the United Kingdom*
 
  
20
30
40
50
60
UK
EU-av
*Percentage	of	UK	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	‘not	
at	all	satisfied’	with	national	democracy.	
As	 shown	 in	figure 6.2,	 the	proportion	of	 respondents	 that	have	 little	or	no	 trust	 in	
national	 institutions	 increased	 between	 2005	 and	 2009,	 i.e.	 during	 the	 last	 term	 of	
prime	minister	Tony	Blair.	This	applies	in	particular	to	levels	of	distrust	of	parliament	and	
government.	By	contrast,	distrust	of	political	parties	remained	stable	but	remarkably	
high	(around	80	per	cent),	and	peaked	in	2009	–	one	year	before	the	elections.	Besides	
levels	of	political	 dissatisfaction,	 the	proportion	of	politically	 interested	 citizens	 also	
increased	slightly	in	the	same	period.	According	to	the	EVS	data,	in	1999	36	per	cent	of	
respondents	said	that	they	were	fairly	or	very	interested	in	politics,	compared	to	43	per	
cent	in	2008.	The	assumption	that	the	increased	salience	of	referendums	from	the	late	
1990s	onwards	is	the	outcome	of	such	increased	political	dissatisfaction	and	interest	
in	politics	 is,	at	 least	on	 the	basis	of	 such	aggregated	data,	very	 tenuous.	Moreover,	
no	referendums	were	held	when	almost	a	majority	of	the	British	people	said	that	they	
were	 dissatisfied	with	 democracy	 (in	 the	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s).	 Nevertheless,	 the	
increased	salience	of	 referendums	did	coincide	with	 increased	distrust	of	parliament	
and	the	government.
6
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Figure 6.2: Public distrust of national institutions of the United Kingdom*
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*	Percentage	of	UK	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	parliament/political	
parties/government.
The	 same	 applies	 to	 levels	 of	 Euroscepticism.	 In	 fact,	 the	 increased	 salience	 of	 EU	
referendums,	especially	from	the	1990s	onward,	occurred	in	a	period	of	growing	British	
Euroscepticism.	Figure 6.3	shows	Euroscepticism	among	British	citizens	between	1983	
and	2011,	based	on	Eurobarometer	survey	data.	The	proportion	of	respondents	that	
see	Britain’s	EU	membership	as	a	bad	thing	increased	especially	after	the	signing	of	the	
Maastricht	Treaty.	In	1991	‘only’	15	per	cent	held	this	opinion,	while	in	2011	this	was	32	
per	cent	(compared	to	an	EU	average	of	19	per	cent).	The	same	applies	to	the	number	
of	 respondents	who	believe	that	 the	UK	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership:	 in	
1991	38	per	cent	held	this	opinion,	while	 in	2011	this	was	54	per	cent	 (compared	to	
an	 EU	 average	 of	 roughly	 38	 per	 cent).	 In	 addition,	 levels	 of	 dissatisfaction	with	 EU	
democracy	and	overall	distrust	of	the	EU	increased	between	the	early	2000s	and	2013.	
Although	such	Eurosceptical	sentiments	seem	to	have	declined	slightly	under	Cameron,	
Euroscepticism	is	considerably	higher	than	the	EU	average.
Figure 6.3: Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom*
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*	Percentage	of	UK	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	‘the	UK’s	EU	membership	is	a	
bad	thing’/’the	UK	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership’/	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	‘not	at	
all	satisfied’	with	EU	democracy/that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	the	EU.
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Such	sentiments	of	political	interest	and	dissatisfaction	with	national	and	EU	politics	are	
generally	linked	to	support	for	referendums.	As	longitudinal	comparative	data	on	public	
opinion	towards	referendums	 is	unavailable,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	assess	the	exact	 level	of	
public	support	for	referendums	among	UK	citizens	over	time.	The	2004	ISSP	Citizenship	
survey	finds	that	in	Great	Britain,92	support	for	the	referendum	is	(only)	slightly	lower	
than	the	EU	average:	67	per	cent	of	the	British	respondents	perceived	the	referendum	
as	 a	 good	way	 to	 decide	 political	 questions,	 compared	 to	 an	 EU	 average	 of	 70	 per	
cent.93	Moreover,	the	ISSP	survey	data	2004	reveals	that	the	proportion	of	respondents	
who	are	supportive	of	referendums	in	general	 is	higher	among	respondents	who	are	
interested	in	politics	(71	per	cent)	and	who	are	satisfied	with	democracy	(72	per	cent)	
than	among	those	who	said	that	they	are	not	very	interested	in	politics	or	not	at	all	(63	
per	cent)	or	are	dissatisfied	with	democracy	(65	per	cent);	this	 is	consistent	with	the	
cognitive mobilization thesis	and	inconsistent	with	the	dissatisfaction thesis.	
	 Although	support	for	referendums	in	general	does	not	appear	to	be	remarkably	high	
compared	to	other	European	countries,	this	is	different	for	referendums	on	the	EU.	The	
2009	European	Election	Studies	(EES)	revealed	that	81	per	cent	of	British	respondents	
held	the	opinion	that	EU	treaty	changes	should	be	decided	by	referendum.94	Moreover,	
of	the	group	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	interested	in	politics,	83	per	cent	
supported	 the	 statement	 that	 EU	 treaty	 reform	 should	 be	 decided	 by	 referendum,	
compared	with	79	per	cent	of	those	who	said	that	they	were	a	little	interested	in	politics	
or	not	at	all	(EES	2009).	Support	for	EU	referendums	is	even	higher	among	Eurosceptics:	
88	per	cent	of	respondents	who	feel	that	European	unification	has	gone	too	far	support	
the	claim	that	future	reform	should	be	decided	by	referendum,	compared	with	72	per	
cent	who	feel	unification	should	be	pushed	further	(EES	2009).	
	 Other	 survey	 data	 seem	 to	 support	 this	 claim.	 When	 Cameron	 announced	 the	
referendum	on	Britain’s	EU	membership	in	2013,	an	opinion	poll	by	TNS BMRB revealed 
that	54	per	cent	of	British	people	were	in	favour	of	the	referendum,	while	only	13	per	
cent	were	opposed	to	it	(TNS	BMRB	27.1.2013).	Moreover,	support	for	the	referendum	
was	especially	high	among	Conservative	voters	(64	per	cent)	and,	most	notably,	UKIP	
voters	(87	per	cent).	By	contrast,	only	38	per	cent	of	Liberal	Democrat	voters	–	a	party	
92.	 	The	2004	ISSP	survey	did	not	include	data	for	the	entire	UK.
93.	 	Compared	to	80	per	cent	in	Denmark,	75	per	cent	in	France,	71	per	cent	in	Sweden	and	65	per	cent	in	
the	Netherlands;	International	Social	Survey	Programme	(2004)	Citizenship.	The	ISSP	2004	citizenship	
survey,	however,	found	differences	between	the	three	constituent	countries	of	Great	Britain:	
referendum	support	was	somewhat	higher	in	England	(69	per	cent)	than	in	Scotland	(62	per	cent)	
and	Wales	(53	per	cent).	This	is	not	remarkable,	since	in	2004,	three	devolution	referendums	were	
scheduled	in	Northern	England	(one	of	which	was	actually	held).
94.	 	Compared	to	65	per	cent	in	Denmark,	64	per	cent	in	France,	52	per	cent	in	the	Netherlands	and	45	
per	cent	in	Sweden,	and	an	EU	average	of	63	per	cent;	European	Election	Studies	(2009).	The	EES	
2009	survey	also	found	differences	between	the	three	constituent	countries	of	Great	Britain:	support	
for	EU	referendums	was	somewhat	higher	in	Wales	(88	per	cent)	than	in	England	(81	per	cent)	and	
Scotland	(82	per	cent).
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that	 in	principle	 supports	 referendums	–	supported	 the	 referendum,	compared	with	
54	per	cent	of	Labour	voters	(TNS	BMRB	27.1.2013).	The	Conservative	Party’s	decision	
in	2015	to	keep	its	electoral	promise	therefore	coincides	with	the	high	level	of	support	
for	an	EU	 referendum	among	 the	UK	electorate,	especially	Conservative	voters	 (and	
those	of	its	Eurosceptic	competitor	UKIP).	This	was	illustrated	by	Conservative	leader	
of	the	House	of	Commons	Chris	Grayling,	who	said	in	the	parliamentary	debate	on	the	
referendum	bill	on	28	May	2015,	‘the	people	of	this	country	want	a	vote	on	Europe,	and	
we	will	deliver	it’	(House	of	Commons	18.5.2015,	column	165).	
	 However,	 it	 is	 somewhat	 dubious	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 increased	 salience	 of	 EU	
referendums	in	the	British	political	debate	is	an	outcome	of	public	demands	for	such	
referendums.	All	major	EU	treaty	changes	in	the	past	three	decades	(SEA,	Maastricht,	
Amsterdam,	Nice	and	Lisbon)	have	been	approved	in	the	UK	by	parliament	rather	than	
by	popular	vote,	despite	widespread	 support	 for	 submitting	 the	 issue	of	 sovereignty	
transfer	to	the	EU	to	a	referendum.	This	is	remarkable	as,	for	all	EU	treaty	ratifications	
except	Amsterdam	and	Lisbon,	there	was	a	government	‘three-line	whip’	to	underline	
the	importance	of	the	issue.	A	three-line	whip	is	an	instruction	by	the	leader	of	a	political	
party	given	to	party	MPs	to	vote	in	accordance	with	the	party	line	on	a	particular	issue.95
	 Moreover,	 the	 refusal	of	Gordon	Brown’s	government	 to	organize	a	 referendum	
on	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	despite	the	referendum	scheduled	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty	
in	 2005	 and	 despite	 public	 demand,	 is	 clear	 evidence	 against	 the	 argument	 that	
referendums	 are	 a	 response	 to	 public	 demands.	 A	 poll	 conducted	 by	 the	 I	Want	 a	
Referendum	(IWAR)	campaign	revealed	that	88	per	cent	of	British	respondents	wanted	
a	referendum	on	Lisbon	(BBC	2.3.2008). Instead,	however,	the	British	government	was	
able	to	secure	several	changes	on	components	of	the	new	treaty	so	that	it	would	differ	
significantly	from	the	TCE,	thereby	avoiding	a	referendum	(Gordon	and	Dougan	2012).96 
Also	in	2011,	public	demands	for	a	referendum	were	denied	by	the	British	government,	
when	prime	minister	David	Cameron	urged	his	party	members	to	reject	a	referendum	
bill	on	Europe,	despite	the	‘People’s	Pledge	Campaign’,	a	public	petition	which	showed	
that	there	was	a	clear	demand	for	an	EU	referendum	among	the	British	people.
POLITICAL	VALUES
As	I	argued	in	chapter 2,	another	argument	derived	from	sociological	institutionalism	
is	 that	 referendums	 are	 increasingly	 held	 because	 political	 actors	 feel	 that	 that	 the	
referendum	is	an	appropriate	decision-making	instrument,	either	intrinsically	(as	a	way	
95.	 	If	a	bill	has	a	three-line	whip,	MPs	must	be	present	at	the	vote	and	pairing	–	an	arrangement	between	
two	MPs	of	opposing	parties	not	to	vote	so	that	their	two	votes	cancel	each	other	out	and	the	
outcome	is	not	affected	–	is	not	allowed.	
96.	 	This	was	criticized	by	the	House	of	Commons’	Foreign	Affairs	Committee,	which	concluded	that	‘there	
is	no	material	difference	between	the	provisions	on	foreign	affairs	in	the	Constitutional	Treaty,	which	
the	government	made	subject	to	approval	in	a	referendum,	and	those	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	on	which	a	
referendum	is	being	denied’	(House	of	Commons	2008,	7).
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of	boosting	citizens’	political	 involvement	and	empowerment)	or	 instrumentally	(as	a	
means	to	strengthen	the	polity’s	input-	or	output-legitimacy).	The	2009	report	by	the	
House	of	Lords,	drafted	by	the	committee	on	the	constitution,	referred	to	the	notion	
that	popular	votes	enhance	citizens’	engagement	and	voter	education	(House	of	Lords	
2009,	 14-15).	 However,	 that	 such	 participatory	 arguments	 were	 indeed	motivations	
behind	British	referendum	practice	is	hardly	likely,	given	the	fact	that	the	conduct	of	
British	referendums	is	primarily	elite-driven.
	 In	 fact,	 no	 serious	 efforts	 were	 made	 to	 introduce	 legislation	 for	 referendums	
initiated	by	citizens	themselves.	In	the	House	of	Lords’	committee	that	examined	the	
referendum	in	the	UK,	referendum	scholar	Graham	Smith	advocated	citizen’s	initiatives,	
saying	that	‘there	is	widespread	criticism	of	the	current	political	culture	in	this	country	
that	there	are	not	the	opportunities	for	citizens	to	participate	in	politics.	The	citizens’	
initiative	is	surely	one	of	the	options	available	for	realising	that	possibility	of	meaningful	
participation’	(House	of	Lords	2009,	31).	However,	referring	to	the	challenges	that	the	
device	constitutes	for	the	system	of	political	representation,	the	referendum	committee	
concluded	that	it	was	‘not	convinced	by	the	arguments	in	favour	of	citizens’	initiatives’	
(House	of	Lords	2009,	50).	Moreover,	while	the	committee	underscored	the	need	‘to	
encourage	greater	citizen	engagement	in	the	democratic	process’	(idem),	it	perceived	
less	far-reaching	citizens	juries	and	assemblies	–	which	give	citizens’	no	direct	decision-
making	power	–	as	more	suitable	instruments	to	achieve	this	aim.	
	 Referendums	in	the	UK	are	mainly	valued	instrumentally	as	a	means	of	protecting	
British	 sovereignty	 and	 legitimizing	proposals	 that	 affect	 the	British	political	 system,	
rather	than	intrinsically	as	participatory	instruments	(Baimbridge,	Whyman	and	Mullen	
2006,	35).	 Such	an	 instrumental	perception	of	 referendums	fits	 in	with	 the	 tradition	
of	Dicey,	who	 stated	 that	 they	 serve	 to	protect	 ‘the	 rights	of	 the	nation	against	 the	
usurpation	of	national	authority	of	any	party	which	happens	to	have	a	parliamentary	
majority’	 (quoted	 in	 Cosgrove	 1981,	 106).	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 1997	 parliamentary	
elections,	 this	 perception	 of	 the	 function	 of	 referendums	 was	 also	 expressed	 by	
opposition	leader	Tony	Blair,	who	promised	a	‘greater	use	of	referendums’	to	give	citizens	
‘a	veto	over	proposals	to	change	their	system	of	government’	(Blair	14.9.1996;	Qvortrup	
2006,	66).	This	view	is	also	reflected	in	the	2009	House	of	Lords	report,	which	called	for	
referendums	to	be	restricted	to	decisions	on	‘fundamental	constitutional	issues’,	such	
as	abolition	of	the	Monarchy,	leaving	the	EU,	or	secession	of	any	of	the	nations	of	the	
UK	 from	the	Union	 (House	of	Lords	2009,	27).	According	 to	 the	report,	 referendums	
serve	to	settle	constitutional	issues	and	to	ensure	that	these	decisions	cannot	be	easily	
repealed	by	a	new	ruling	majority	(House	of	Lords	2009,	14).	And	indeed,	as	Baimbridge,	
Whyman	and	Mullen	(2006,	39)	argue,	‘UK	referendums	(excluding	local	referendums)	
have	 all	 been	 concerned	with	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 irreversibly	 transferring	 the	 powers	
of	Parliament’.	As	 such,	 in	 line	with	Dicey’s	 thinking,	British	politics	has	experienced	
quite	a	number	of	referendums	on	devolution	proposals	in	Northern	Ireland,	Scotland,	
6
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Wales	and	Northeast	England.	The	most	recent	example	is	the	referendum	on	Scottish	
independence	held	in	September	2014.
	 Referendums	 on	 the	 EU	 also	 fit	 in	 with	 Dicey’s	 tradition.	 As	 such,	 instrumental	
values	played	a	key	 role	 in	 the	 referendum	on	EEC	membership,	which	was	 seen	by	
the	Labour	administration	as	‘a	unique	occasion’	that	needed	direct	popular	approval	
(Baimbridge,	Whyman	and	Mullen	2006,	37).	The	referendum	pledged	on	 the	TCE	 in	
2004	also	fits	the	pattern,	as	Tony	Blair	stated	that	it	would	‘resolve	“once	and	for	all”	
whether	Britain	wanted	to	be	at	the	centre	of	Europe	or	not’	(BBC	20.4.2004).	Concerns	
over	 the	 legitimacy	of	 sovereignty	 transfer	 to	 the	EU	were	also	a	motive	behind	 the	
2011	reform	of	the	EUA.	 In	2010,	Europe	minister	David	Lidington	defended	the	EUA	
reform	bill	by	saying	that,	because	the	British	public	feels	‘disconnected’	from	the	EU	
and	how	it	had	developed,	‘we	are	introducing	this	EU	Bill,	to	give	people	more	control	
over	decisions	made	by	the	government	in	the	EU	in	their	name’	(Hawkins	11.11.2010).	
	 When	pledging	the	referendum	on	Britain’s	EU	membership	in	2013,	David	Cameron	
also	said	that	it	would	‘settle	this	European	question	in	British	politics’	(Cameron	2013).	
He	furthermore	argued	that	as	‘people	[…]	feel	that	the	EU	is	now	heading	for	a	level	of	
political	integration	that	is	far	outside	Britain’s	comfort	zone’,	[…]	‘democratic	consent	
for	 the	EU	 in	Britain	 is	now	wafer	 thin’	 (Cameron	2013).	After	 the	 re-election	of	 the	
Conservatives	in	2015,	this	view	was	underscored	by	Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	and	
Commonwealth	Affairs	Philip	Hammond	who	said	during	the	second	reading	of	the	EU	
referendum	bill	 in	the	House	of	Commons	in	2015	that	‘The	fragility	of	the	European	
Union’s	democratic	legitimacy	is	felt	particularly	acutely	by	the	British	people.	Since	our	
referendum	in	1975,	citizens	across	Europe	from	Denmark	and	Ireland	to	France	and	
Spain	have	been	asked	 their	views	on	crucial	aspects	of	 their	country’s	 relationships	
with	the	EU	in	more	than	30	different	national	referendums	–	but	not	in	the	UK’	(House	
of	Commons	9.6.2015,	column	1048).
	 Although	 these	 arguments	 are	 compelling,	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Labour	 and	 the	
Conservatives	have	ambiguously	pledged	referendums	suggests	that	reference	to	such	
normative	 instrumental	 values	 made	 in	 the	 debate	 are	 only	 indicative,	 rather	 than	
representing	decisive	evidence.	Labour	only	embraced	the	referendum	in	its	election	
manifesto	of	1997	–	despite	vigorously	opposing	it	before	the	1970s	–	after	eighteen	
years	of	Conservative	 rule	 (1979-1997),	when	 it	 felt	 increasing	competition	 from	the	
SNP.	And,	although	under	Labour	rule	several	referendums	were	held	on	devolution,	
important	EU	treaty	ratifications,	like	Nice	and	Lisbon,	were	not	submitted	to	a	popular	
vote.	 The	 Conservatives,	 too,	 were	 ambiguous	 in	 their	 referendum	 calls.	 They	 did	
not	 pledge	 a	 referendum	on	 the	 far-reaching	Maastricht	 Treaty	when	 in	 power,	 but	
five	 years	 later,	when	 in	 opposition,	 they	 did	 pledge	 one	 on	 the	Amsterdam	Treaty,	
claiming	that	it	removed	the	UK	veto	in	sixteen	areas	and	extended	the	powers	of	the	
European	Parliament	(EP)	in	23	areas	(Pierce	and	Bowditch	28.6.1997).	Prime	minister	
Blair	rejected	the	pledge,	saying	‘I	have	looked	carefully	at	both	the	Single	European	Act	
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
205
The United Kingdom and Sweden
and	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	and	there	are	vastly	greater	extensions	of	qualified	majority	
voting	 in	both.	Not	a	word	about	a	 referendum	did	we	ever	hear	 from	Conservative	
Members	–	but	then	they	are	consistent	at	least	in	their	inconsistency’	(quoted	in	Miller	
2009,	5).	
	 Blair	was,	however,	also	inconsistent	in	his	referendum	calls.	In	this	respect,	it	is	at	
least	as	remarkable	that	he	was	among	the	first	to	call	for	suspension	of	the	ratification	
process	after	the	negative	referendum	outcomes	in	France	and	the	Netherlands.	In	fact,	
even	before	these	referendums,	foreign	secretary	Jack	Straw	had	said	that	there	would	
be	no	referendum	 in	 the	UK	 if	 the	outcome	 in	France	was	a	 ‘no’	vote	 (which	almost	
backfired	during	the	elections)	(Wintour	18.4.2005). If	the	referendum	pledge	had	truly	
been	motivated	by	a	desire	to	settle	the	issue	among	the	British	public	‘once	and	for	all’,	
then	it	would	not	really	have	mattered	what	the	people	of	France	and	the	Netherlands	
had	voted.	Such	principled	motives	were	also	not	decisive	in	the	decision	to	reform	the	
EUA.	After	all,	if	values	were	decisive,	the	British	government	would	have	introduced	a	
mandatory	referendum	that	is	not	open	for	political	judgement,	after	the	Irish	example.	
Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 David	 Cameron	 opposed	 an	 EU	membership	 referendum	 in	
2011,	when	one	had	been	demanded	by	a	public	petition,	makes	it	unlikely	that	seeking	
legitimization	was	a	genuine	motive.	In	addition,	when	he	did	pledge	a	referendum	on	
EU	membership,	Cameron	made	it	clear	that	it	would	take	place	after	the	2015	elections,	
which	suggests	that	other	considerations	were	at	stake.	Indeed,	in	the	case	of	the	many	
EU	treaties	on	which	no	referendum	was	pledged,	the	considerations	of	not	having	a	
referendum	did	outweigh	the	instrumental	values	related	to	it.	
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
The	ambiguous	position	towards	EU	referendums	on	the	part	of	the	two	main	political	
parties	 in	 the	UK,	 feeds	 the	assumption	 that	 referendums	pledges	are	motivated	by	
strategic	 considerations	 rather	 than	 by	 a	 direct	 democratic	 convention	 or	 public	
pressures.	Especially	in	the	context	of	increased	political	fragmentation	and	controversy	
over	Europe,	referendums	–	or	the	pledge	to	do	so	–	can	fulfil	certain	vital	functions.	
However,	unravelling	political	motivations	is	difficult	and	requires	thorough	examination	
of	the	political	context	in	which	decisions	whether	to	hold	a	referendum	were	made.	
Based	on	my	typology	of	referendum	motivations,	as	outlined	in	chapter 2, table 6.2 
shows	the	motivations	that	were	likely	at	play	in	British	referendum	pledges.	
6
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Table 6.2: Referendum strategies on the part of triggering actors in the UK* 
Issue	and	year	
in	which	vote	
was	held
Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
legislative	
proposal 
in	national	
decision-
making	arena
Initiator	
faces  
internal 
party/
coalition	
divisions
Anticipated	
public	
support for 
initiator’s	
stance
Initiator	
faces 
upcoming	
elections
Initiator	
faces 
sufficient	
support for 
its	position	in	
EU	decision-
making	
arena
Strategic 
motivations
EC	
membership	
(1975)	
YES YES YES NO YES Conflict	mediation
Electoral	
system	(2011)
YES YES uncertain NO n/a Conflict	mediation
Policy-seeking
EU	
membership	
(2016)
YES YES YES	(but	
controversial, 
and	after	
negotiations)
YES NO Conflict	mediation
Depoliticization
EU	bargaining	
Cancelled:
TCE	(2006) YES YES YES	(but	
controversial)
YES YES Conflict	mediation
Depoliticization
*Only	pledges	that	resulted	in	a	referendum	bill	are	listed.
CONFLICT	MEDIATION. As	 shown	 in	 table 6.2,	 all	 British	 referendum	pledges	 related	
to	 issues	 that	 caused	divisions	within	mainstream	parties,	which	makes	 it	 likely	 that	
these	served	to	mediate	such	intra-party	or	intra-coalition	conflict.	In	the	referendums	
on	‘Europe’,	there	were	divisions	within	both	the	Conservatives	and	Labour,	neither	of	
which	have	been	able	to	integrate	‘Europe’	in	their	party	ideology.	Consequently	both	
parties	harbour	pro-EU	and	Eurosceptic	fractions	(Heath,	Jowell	and	Curtice	2001,	68;	
Baimbridge,	Whyman	and	Mullen	2006).	In	the	case	of	the	electoral	reform	referendum,	
the	divisions	were	within	the	coalition	of	the	Conservatives	and	the	Liberal	Democrats	
(Curtice	2013).
	 From	 the	 moment	 that	 the	 Conservative	 government	 of	 Edward	 Heath	 signed	
the	 accession	 agreement	 with	 the	 EC,	 ‘Europe’	 caused	 persistent	 disagreement	
within	 the	 Labour	 Party.	 The	 official	 party	 line	was	 to	 oppose	 accession,	 but	 in	 the	
first	 parliamentary	 reading	 on	 EC	membership	 in	 1971,	 Roy	 Jenkins	 –	 then	 Shadow	
Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	–	and	68	Labour	MPs	deviated	and	voted	in	favour	(Miller	
2008,	 2).	When	 Labour	 entered	 office	 in	 1974,	 these	 divisions	 had	 not	 been	 solved.	
During	the	Labour	government	between	1974	and	1979,	the	party	leadership	adopted	
a	pragmatic	pro-European	position,	and	EC	membership	came	to	be	seen	as	a	viable	
solution	to	counter	economic	instability	(Butler	and	Kitzinger	1976).	Yet,	there	was	still	a	
considerable	Eurosceptic	fraction	–	led	by	Tony	Benn	–	that	wanted	Britain	to	withdraw	
from	the	EC.	Together	with	the	fact	that,	by	1974,	support	for	Britain’s	EC	membership	
was	on	the	rise	(see	Eurobarometer	1973-1974)	and	Labour	therefore	anticipated	a	‘yes’	
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vote,	these	divisions	are	strong	indications	that	conflict	mediation	played	a	role	in	calling	
the	referendum.	This	paid	off,	as	the	referendum	–	which	Labour	had	already	pledged	
prior	to	the	1974	elections	–	indeed	resolved	party	unity.	Prime	minister	Harold	Wilson	
allowed	Eurosceptic	MPs	to	campaign	for	a	‘no’	vote	(Heath,	Jowell	and	Curtice	2001,	
68),	thereby	offering	the	option	to	‘agree	to	differ’	(Curtice	2013,	219).	After	Labour’s	
loss	in	the	1979	elections,	the	party	again	took	a	Eurosceptic	stance,	which	eventually	
led	to	a	split	in	the	party	and,	led	by	Europe-proponent	Roy	Jenkins,	the	formation	of	
the	Social	Democratic	Party	in	1981	(Leach,	Coxall	and	Robins	2011,	281).
	 When	Labour	prime	minister	Tony	Blair	promised	to	hold	a	referendum	on	possible	
British	 adoption	 of	 the	 euro,	 conflict	 mediation	 was	 also	 a	 likely	 motivation.	While	
the	‘yes’	vote	of	1975	had	softened	Euroscepticism	in	the	Labour	party,	the	party	did	
not	adopt	a	more	explicit	pro-EU	stance	until	the	1990s,	and	even	then	many	of	the	
traditional	 left	 remained	 opposed	 to	 the	 UK’s	 EU	membership,	 especially	when	 this	
concerned	 economic	 integration	 (George	 and	 Haythorne	 1996).	 British	 adoption	 of	
the	euro	was	something	Blair	clearly	desired,	but	his	position	was	opposed	by	Labour	
Eurosceptics	(Wintour	23.1.2012).	Finance	minister	Gordon	Brown	was	more	hesitant	
and	 introduced	 five	 economic	 tests	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 to	 determine	whether	 Britain	
should	join	the	euro.	These	tests	served	as	a	way	to	postpone	a	decision	on	the	UK’s	
accession	to	the	eurozone	and	to	depoliticize	the	issue	for	the	time	being	(The	Economist	
5.6.2001).	As	these	five	tests	ruled	out	a	British	eurozone	accession	(Rentoul	5.2.2015),	
no	referendum	bill	was	introduced	to	parliament.97 
	 As	 shown	 in	 table 6.2,	when	Blair	had	 to	 ratify	 the	TCE	 in	2005,	 there	were	 still	
divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 within	 the	 Labour	 party	 and	 he	was	 faced	with	 referendum	
demands	from	the	Conservatives,	the	Liberal	Democrats	and	even	from	within	his	own	
party	 (Seldon,	 Snowdon	 and	 Collings	 2007,	 263-265).	 At	 that	 time,	 Blair’s	 authority	
within	the	party	had	been	damaged	by	his	decision	to	support	British	participation	in	
the	Iraq	war	and	the	increasing	success	of	the	Conservative	Party	in	the	polls	(Qvortrup	
2006,	 67).	 These	 divisions	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 that	 Blair’s	 referendum	 pledge	
was	motivated	by	a	desire	to	smooth	over	party	divisions	and	restore	his	 legitimacy.	
Moreover,	 as	 table 6.2	 shows,	 at	 the	time	when	he	pledged	 the	 vote	 in	April	 2004,	
opinion	polls	revealed	that,	despite	the	controversy	over	the	 issue,	a	majority	of	the	
British	people	would	vote	 in	 favour	of	 the	TCE	 (Eurobarometer	61).	This	argument	 is	
further	supported	by	the	fact	that	Blair	withdrew	his	pledge	after	the	French	and	Dutch	
‘no’	vote	in	2005,	when	British	opinion	polls	also	noted	decreasing	levels	of	support	for	
the	TCE	(Eurobarometer	63).
	 ‘Europe’	had	also	 caused	persistent	divisions	among	 the	Conservatives.	Notably,	
in	 the	first	parliamentary	reading	on	Britain’s	EC	membership	 in	1971,	39	of	 the	330	
97.	 	However,	an	autobiography	of	former	Europe	minister	Peter	Hain	revealed	that,	in	2002,	Blair	and	
Hain	secretly	prepared	the	ground	for	a	euro	referendum	during	a	second	term,	thereby	bypassing	
Gordon	Brown’s	five	tests	(Hain	2012).	
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Conservative	 MPs	 dissented	 from	 the	 government’s	 pragmatic	 pro-EC	 position	 and	
voted	against	membership	 (Miller	2008,	2).	The	Conservative	split	over	 ‘Europe’	was	
clearly	embodied	in	the	position	taken	by	former	prime	minister	Margaret	Thatcher.	She	
had	campaigned	for	a	‘yes’	vote	in	the	1975	EC	membership	referendum	and,	as	prime	
minister,	she	signed	the	Single	European	Act	(SEA)	in	1986.	Nevertheless,	despite	being	
a	proponent	of	economic	integration,	she	fiercely	opposed	an	institutional	reform	plan	
proposed	by	European	Commission	president	Jacques	Delors,	which	would	significantly	
increase	the	powers	of	the	European	Parliament	–	a	move	which	later	caused	her	to	be	
ousted	from	office	by	her	pro-European	colleagues	(Daddow	2013).	In	the	years	running	
up	to	the	signing	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	she	joined	the	‘Maastricht	Rebels’,	a	group	of	
Conservative	MPs	that	campaigned,	without	success,	for	a	national	referendum	on	the	
issue.		
	 Twenty-five	years	later,	the	Conservative	Party	remained	divided	over	‘Europe’.	As	
argued	by	Murkens	(2012,	397),	the	reform	of	the	EUA	in	2011	was	a	direct	outcome	
of	 fundamental	 divisions,	 both	 within	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 and	 between	 the	
Conservative	Party	leadership	and	the	Liberal	Democrats.	David	Cameron	had	already	
expressed	the	aim	to	reform	the	EUA	in	the	run-up	to	the	2010	elections.	He	said	that,	
if	he	was	elected,	he	would	reform	the	Act	to	give	British	voters	a	guarantee	that,	at	
least	under	his	rule,	a	referendum	would	be	held	before	more	powers	were	passed	to	
the	EU	(Summers	4.11.2009).	By	showing	that	he	would	not	pursue	any	further	transfer	
of	 sovereignty	 to	 the	EU	without	first	consulting	 the	people,	he	aimed	to	curtail	 the	
persistent	revolt	from	Eurosceptic	rebels	within	his	party	and	to	stabilize	his	leadership.	
In	addition,	the	fact	that	the	Conservatives	and	the	Liberal	Democrats	held	a	different	
position	towards	Europe	–the	latter	being	much	more	pro-European	than	the	divided	
Conservatives	–	suggests	that	the	EUA	was	reformed	to	guarantee	stability	over	‘Europe’	
in	the	coalition.	
 As argued in chapter 3,	the	anticipation	that	a	referendum	will	be	won	is	a	necessary	
condition	 for	 a	 conflict	mediation	 referendum	 to	 be	 invoked.	 In	 1992,	 Conservative	
prime	minister	John	Major	refused	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht,	
which	was	–	according	to	Eurobarometer	data	–	supported	by	only	26	per	cent	of	the	
British	people	 (Standard	Eurobarometer	38).98	Adverse	public	opinion	was	also	 likely	
Cameron’s	main	objection	to	the	referendum	bill	triggered	by	the	‘People’s	Pledge’	in	
2011	(Clark	24.10.2011).	Eurobarometer	data	from	that	time	revealed	that	only	26	per	
cent	of	the	Brits	were	supportive	of	Britain’s	EU	membership	(Standard	Eurobarometer	
75).	 Once	 again,	 the	 parliamentary	 vote	 on	 the	 People’s	 Pledge	 underscored	 the	
98.	 	Major	already	faced	difficulties	in	getting	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	ratified.	The	government	had	
negotiated	an	opt-out	from	the	Social	Chapter	of	the	treaty,	which	was	opposed	by	Labour.	In	
the	parliamentary	vote,	the	government	lost	the	motion	on	its	policy	on	the	Social	Chapter	and,	
consequently,	Major	was	unable	to	get	the	treaty	ratified.	He	then	initiated	a	vote	of	confidence	in	
the	government	to	get	it	ratified,	forcing	the	rebel	Conservatives	to	vote	in	favour	of	the	motion	
(Leathley	23.7.1993).
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persistent	 divisions	 within	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 since	 over	 80	 Tories	 defied	 the	
government’s	 three-line	whip	 to	 veto	 the	bill	 (BBC	25.10.2011).	Although	Cameron’s	
majority	was	 still	 large	enough	 to	block	 the	bill,	 it	 came	 to	be	 known	as	 the	 largest	
rebellion	against	a	Conservative	prime	minister	over	‘Europe’.	
	 These	divisions	drove	Cameron	to	a	remarkable	U-turn	in	January	2013,	when	he	
announced	his	plans	 to	have	an	 ‘in/out’	 referendum	on	 the	EU,	 to	be	held	after	 the	
2015	elections	(Cameron	2013). Again,	public	opinion	polls	did	not	indicate	that	British	
voters	would	vote	in	favour	of	staying	in	the	EU.	However,	by	that	time,	demands	for	a	
referendum	from	Eurosceptics	within	his	own	party	had	increased,	and	with	elections	
upcoming	(for	the	EP	in	2014	and	for	the	British	parliament	in	2015),	exposure	of	the	
conflict	between	the	party	 leadership	and	the	bulk	of	Tory	MPs	over	 ‘Europe’	would	
likely	have	benefited	Eurosceptic	competitor	UKIP	(Van	Kessel	2015,	160),	especially	in	
the	run-up	to	the	2013	local	elections.	This	displays	evidence	that	passes	the	hoop	test,	
making	it	likely	that	retaining	peace	with	the	Eurosceptic	Conservative	wing	–	and	hence	
securing	his	leadership	–	motivated	Cameron	to	pledge	the	vote.	This	was	underscored	
by	former	prime	minister	John	Major,	who	backed	the	pledge,	saying	‘The	relationship	
with	Europe	has	poisoned	British	politics	for	too	long,	distracted	parliament	from	other	
issues	and	come	close	to	destroying	the	Conservative	Party.	 It	 is	time	to	resolve	the	
matter’	 (Major	 2013).	 The	 fact	 that	Cameron	explicitly	 stressed	 that	 the	 vote	would	
be	held	after	the	renegotiations	with	the	EU,	when	there	would	be	a	higher	chance	of	
winning	the	vote,	underscores	the	likelihood	of	the	argument.
	 The	2011	electoral	reform	referendum	was	also	most	likely	the	result	of	controversy,	
although	 not	 within	 the	 mainstream	 parties	 but	 within	 the	 governing	 coalition.	 As	
such,	it	was	the	direct	outcome	of	the	changes	in	the	British	political	landscape	after	
the	2010	elections	when,	for	the	first	time	in	the	post-WWII	era,	parties	were	forced	
to	 form	a	coalition	government	to	secure	a	majority	 in	 the	House	of	Commons.	This	
referendum	is	an	odd	one,	as	it	risked	an	outcome	that	both	coalition	partners	actually	
did	 not	 want	 –	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats	 preferred	 a	 more	 proportional	 system,	 such	
as	 the	 Single	 Transferable	 Vote	 (STV),	 while	 the	 Conservatives	 preferred	 the	 status	
quo	(BBC	7.9.2010).	When	no	party	gained	a	majority	in	the	2010	elections,	both	the	
Conservatives	and	Labour	 tried	 to	 form	a	coalition	with	Liberal	Democrats.	Electoral	
reform	proved	to	be	an	important	issue	in	the	negotiations	and	served	as	bait	to	woo	
the	 Liberal	 Democrats	 as	 a	 coalition	 party	 (Laycock,	 Renwick,	 Stevens	 and	 Vowles	
2013,	212).	Labour	 leader	Gordon	Brown	–	who	had	already	called	for	a	referendum	
on	 the	 electoral	 system	 in	 a	 speech	 at	 the	 Labour	 conference	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	
2010	 elections	 (Brown	2009)	 –	 offered	 the	 Liberal	Democrats	 to	 put	 the	 alternative	
vote	(AV)	system	into	legislation	and	call	a	subsequent	referendum	to	approve	it	(BBC	
10.5.2010).	In	response,	the	Conservatives	offered	the	Liberal	Democrats	an	immediate	
vote	on	AV,	claiming	that	Labour	was	willing	to	impose	electoral	reform	‘without	first	
consulting	the	public	in	a	referendum’	(BBC	10.5.2010).	The	Liberal	Democrats	accepted	
6
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the	deal	with	the	Conservatives	hoping	that,	when	forming	a	coalition	government,	they	
would	be	able	 to	negotiate	a	subsequent	move	towards	proportional	 representation	
(Curtice	2013,	219).	The	parliamentary	reform	bill,	which	also	included	the	bid	to	hold	
a	referendum	on	the	AV	system,	was	passed	by	a	majority	(BBC	2.11.2010)	as	the	two	
coalition	partners	 ‘whipped’	 their	MPs	to	vote	 in	 favour.	As	such,	 it	offered	the	new	
government	a	possibility	to	deflate	internal	disagreements	as,	 in	Cameron’s	words,	 it	
provided	a	‘resounding	answer	that	settles	the	question’	(BBC	7.5.2011b).	
DEPOLITICIZATION. Labour	 and	 Conservative	 politicians	 not	 only	 face	 highly	
Eurosceptical	colleagues	in	their	own	party,	but	also	a	highly	Eurosceptical	public.	As	
was	shown	in	figure 6.3,	Eurobarometer	surveys	show	that,	ever	since	the	UK	 joined	
the	EC,	public	support	for	EU	membership	had	been	considerably	lower	than	in	other	
member	states.	 In	 fact,	 there	has	 rarely	been	a	majority	of	 the	British	citizenry	 fully	
supportive	of	Britain’s	EU	membership.	In	addition,	compared	to	other	EU	countries,	a	
large	part	of	the	population	(around	30	per	cent)	holds	an	ambivalent	position	towards	
Britain’s	 EU	 membership.	 This	 consistent	 gap	 between	 pro-European	 governments	
and	the	more	Eurosceptical	electorates	puts	pressures	on	any	government	that	aims	
to	 further	 the	European	 integration	process	and	 the	UK’s	 ’s	 role	 in	 it.	 It	 provides	an	
incentive	 for	 government	 parties	 to	 promise	 voters	 a	 referendum	 on	 ‘Europe’	after 
upcoming	elections,	thereby	preventing	the	issue	from	becoming	decisive	in	the	general	
elections.	
	 This	was	likely	the	strategy	behind	Labour’s	pledge	to	hold	a	referendum	on	British	
adoption	of	the	euro.	The	referendum	was	pledged	in	the	run-up	to	the	2001	elections,	
and	the	euro	 issue	was	highly	controversial	among	the	British	public.	Eurobarometer	
surveys	 showed	 that	 a	 large	majority	of	 the	electorate	was	highly	 sceptical	 towards	
British	adoption	of	the	euro	(Standard	Eurobarometer	44	and	46),	and	at	the	time	of	the	
2001	elections,	the	protection	of	the	pound	was	an	issue	successfully	taken	up	by	the	
Conservative	opposition	(The	Economist	5.6.2001).	At	 the	same	time,	prime	minister	
Tony	Blair	had	presented	himself	as	a	strong	proponent	of	the	euro.	Thus,	by	promising	
a	referendum	if	it	came	to	a	bill	on	Britain	joining	the	eurozone,	Labour	was	able	to	keep	
the	euro	issue	separate	for	the	time	being.	According	to	the	diaries	of	his	spin	doctor	
Alastair	Campbell,	Blair	had	clear	hopes	 that,	 in	 the	meantime,	he	could	push	public	
opinion	 towards	a	more	pro-euro	position	 (Campbell	 and	Stott	2008,	553).	A	 similar	
strategy	was	 probably	 adopted	when	Blair	 introduced	 a	 referendum	bill	 on	 the	 TCE	
in	2005.	Elections	were	approaching,	and	the	issue	was	highly	controversial,	as	many	
British	people	perceived	an	EU	constitution	as	a	bridge	too	far	(Ahmed	18.4.2004).	Again,	
a	referendum	promise	would	deflate	the	controversy	during	the	electoral	campaign	and	
enable	Blair	to	gain	a	third	term	in	office	(Closa	2007,	1320).	This	claim	is	underscored	
by	the	fact	that,	unlike	the	Conservatives,	Labour	aimed	not	to	hold	the	referendum	
until	after the	elections	in	2005.	The	aim	to	deflate	controversy	over	Europe	probably	
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also	played	a	role	when	Cameron	pledged	a	referendum	on	EU	membership	in	2013.	At	
that	time,	the	issue	was	still	highly	controversial,	and	polls	show	that	a	‘yes’	vote	was	by	
no	means	assured.	This	controversy,	together	with	the	fact	that	Cameron	announced	
that	the	referendum	would	take	place	after	the	2015	elections,	suggests	that	this	bid	
is	 an	 emergency	measure,	 notably	 in	 the	 face	 of	 UKIP	 competition	 (The	 Economist	
16.5.2013).	
	 So	 why	 was	 there	 no	 government	 referendum	 pledge	 on	 other	 EU	 treaty	
ratifications	that	were	equally	controversial?	The	prospect	of	elections	indeed	seems	
to	have	made	a	difference.	When	Amsterdam	and	Lisbon	needed	to	be	ratified,	there	
were	no	upcoming	elections.	When	Nice	was	signed,	Blair	was	heading	for	elections	in	
June	2001,	but	British	politics	was	much	more	occupied	with	quarrels	over	potential	
British	adoption	of	the	euro	(Norris	2001),	on	which	Blair	had	already	pledged	a	vote.	
Moreover,	he	announced	that	it	would	be	‘bizarre’	to	have	a	referendum	on	Nice,	as	
no	British	 referendum	had	been	held	on	 the	more	 far-reaching	SEA	or	 the	Treaty	of	
Maastricht	(BBC	6.6.2001). 
EU	 BARGAINING. For	 governments	 with	 Eurosceptical	 electorates,	 a	 call	 to	 hold	 a	
referendum	on	a	particular	EU	treaty	reform	could	potentially	be	a	strong	instrument	
in	the	negotiation	process.	This	move	towards	what	Oppermann	(2011)	calls	‘red-lining’	
referendums	was	already	set	in	motion	with	the	signing	of	EUA	in	2011,	through	which	
Cameron	ensured	that	any	future	extension	of	the	power	and	competence	of	the	EU	
with	respect	to	the	UK	needs	to	be	approved	by	the	British	people.	This	gives	the	UK	a	
potentially	strong	bargaining	position	in	any	future	treaty	negotiation	process	(Gordon	
and	Dougan	2012).	Another	notable	 example	of	 such	 red-lining	 is	 Cameron’s	 pledge	
to	hold	a	referendum	on	Britain’s	EU	membership.	In	the	2015	elections,	he	promised	
to	conduct	renegotiations	with	the	EU	to	secure	a	special	status	for	the	UK	within	the	
EU	and,	after	these	negotiations,	to	hold	a	referendum	to	legitimize	this	new	status.	In	
doing	 so,	he	was	pressured	by	 competition	 from	UKIP	and	persisting	Euroscepticism	
within	his	own	party,	which	had	pushed	him	towards	reconsidering	Britain’s	position	in	
the	EU	and	holding	an	‘in/out’	referendum	(Parker	and	Barker	3.11.2014).		
	 Cameron’s	demands	to	Brussels	were	strict	and	addressed	issues	on	which	the	UK’s	
position	 is	 substantively	different	 to	 that	of	 its	 EU	counterparts	 (Miller	2013).	 These	
demands	included	a	British	opt-out	from	the	EU’s	founding	ambition	to	forge	an	‘ever	
closer	 union’,	 strengthening	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 national	 parliaments,	 cuts	 in	 welfare	
benefits	to	EU	migrants,	explicit	recognition	that	the	euro	is	not	the	only	EU	currency,	
guarantees	 that	 steps	 to	 further	 the	 financial	 union	 cannot	 be	 imposed	 on	 non-
eurozone	countries	and	that	the	UK	will	not	have	to	contribute	to	eurozone	bailouts,	
and	a	target	for	the	reduction	of	red	tape,	 i.e.	regulations	that	the	UK	feels	 limit	the	
competitiveness	 of	 EU	member	 states.	 The	 fact	 that	 Cameron	 particularly	 stressed	
that	 the	 referendum	 should	be	held	after	 the	negotiations	 and,	 hence,	 after	he	had	
6
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the	chance	to	‘put	the	relationship	right’	(Dominiczak	27.11.2014),	supports	the	claim	
that	the	referendum	served	a	red-lining	strategy	(see	also	Morris	and	Grice	30.6.2014;	
Dominiczak	27.11.2014).
	 With	the	referendum	pledge,	Cameron	clearly	anticipated	being	able	to	put	pressure	
on	the	negotiations,	assuming	that	EU	leaders	would	not	simply	agree	on	a	deal	that	had	
a	real	chance	of	being	voted	down	by	the	British	public,	and	thereby	lead	to	the	UK	leaving	
the	EU.99	Indeed,	Cameron	had	warned	his	European	colleagues	that	Britain	could	leave	
the	 EU	 unless	 his	 reform	 demands	were	 agreed	 (BBC	 28.5.2015).	 Immediately	 after	
Cameron’s	re-election	 in	May	2015,	both	the	president	of	 the	European	Commission	
Jean-Claude	 Juncker	 and	 German	 Chancellor	 Angela	Merkel	 promised	 to	 work	 with	
David	Cameron	to	negotiate	an	acceptable	agreement	that	would	secure	Britain’s	EU	
membership	(Kirkup	and	Holehouse	9.5.2015).	As	Cameron	stated	in	a	speech	before	
the	negotiations	with	Brussels,	 ‘If	we	can’t	 reach	such	an	agreement,	and	 if	Britain’s	
concerns	were	to	be	met	with	a	deaf	ear,	which	I	do	not	believe	will	happen,	then	we	
will	have	to	think	again	about	whether	this	European	Union	is	right	for	us.	As	I	have	said	
before	–	I	rule	nothing	out’	(Helm	7.11.2015).	
	 Such	red-lining	referendums	are	risky	and	are	thus	only	used	selectively.	Not	only	
is	there	the	risk	that	the	public	will	vote	against	the	wishes	of	the	government,	but	the	
latter	may	also	lose	credibility	in	the	EU.	Indeed,	after	Cameron	initially	announced	the	
EU	referendum	in	2013,	the	leader	of	the	liberal	ALDE	group	in	the	European	Parliament,	
Guy	 Verhofstadt,	 said	 ‘Cameron	 is	 playing	 with	 fire.	 […]	 He	 can	 control	 neither	 the	
timing	nor	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations	and	in	so	doing	is	raising	false	expectations	
that	can	never	be	met’	(EurActiv	23.1.2013).	And	indeed,	despite	the	fact	that	Cameron	
negotiated	some	of	his	demands	–	such	as	the	exemption	from	the	ever	closer	union,	the	
red	card	of	national	parliaments	and	the	demand	to	cut	EU	bureaucracy	–	critics	within	
the	Conservative	Party	marked	 the	deal	 as	 a	 ‘slap	 in	 the	 face	 for	 Britain’,	 especially	
when	it	comes	to	the	cutting	of	welfare	benefits	to	EU	migrants	(Wilkinson	and	Hughes	
2.2.2016).	Moreover,	in	the	run-up	to	the	referendum,	polls	suggest	that	Cameron	has	
a	near	50/50	chance	of	winning	the	vote	(Kirk	and	Wilkinson	13.4.2016).	
	 These	 risks	 indeed	 explain	 why	 British	 leaders	 have	 not	 held	 more	 ‘red-lining’	
referendums,	 for	 example	 on	 the	 SEA,	 Maastricht,	 Amsterdam	 or	 Nice,	 which	 all	
involved	negotiations	 in	which	the	British	position	differed	from	its	EU	counterparts.	
The	UK	had	already	secured	several	opt-outs	 from	EU	treaties	during	the	Maastricht	
negotiations,	which	made	a	red-lining	referendum	largely	unnecessary.100	After	all,	why	
take	the	risk	that	negotiated	opt-outs	will	be	voted	down	in	a	referendum	when	this	
would	certainly	harm	Britain’s	credibility	in	the	EU	arena?	For	example,	in	the	case	of	
99.	 	However,	whether	this	is	an	effective	strategy	remains	to	be	seen,	as	debates	have	already	emerged	
on	the	continent	on	the	importance	of	the	UK	staying	in	the	EU	(Parkes	17.3.2015).	
100.	 	The	UK	has	an	opt-out	from	the	euro	(from	1992	onwards)	and	from	the	Schengen	Agreement	(from	
1997	onwards),	and	a	flexible	opt-out	from	the	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	(from	1997	
onwards)	and	on	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	(from	2007	onwards).
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the	TCE,	Blair	had	obtained	a	satisfactory	outcome	for	all	his	red-lines,	making	an	actual	
referendum	unnecessary	from	a	bargaining	perspective	(Closa	2007,	1317).	In	addition,	
a	British	‘no’	to	the	SEA,	Maastricht,	Amsterdam,	Nice	or	the	TCE	would	have	stalled	the	
integration	process	all	together,	and	meant	a	loss	of	face	in	the	EU	negotiations.	The	
fear	of	this	happening	is	illustrated	by	the	fact	that	Blair	immediately	abandoned	the	
referendum	pledge	on	the	TCE	after	the	‘no’	vote	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	(Rennie	
5.7.2005).	
DOMESTIC	 EMPOWERMENT.	 Equally	 interesting	 as	 the	 few	 calls	 that	 actually	 led	 to	
a	 referendum,	 or	 at	 least	 to	 a	 parliamentary	 vote	 on	 a	 referendum	bill,	 is	 the	 large	
number	of	calls	for	a	referendum	from	opposition	parties	which	did	not	lead	to	a	formal	
referendum	bill.	 Referendum	pledges	by	opposition	parties	on	 issues	on	which	 they	
anticipate	support	from	a	considerable	part	of	the	electorate	are	likely	motivated	by	
an	 empowerment	 strategy.	 In	 fact,	 given	 the	 controversial	 nature	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	
British	public	debate,	it	is	a	viable	strategy	for	British	opposition	parties	to	promise	EU	
referendums	as	a	way	to	exploit	divisions	and	ambiguity	in	the	governing	party	and	win	
votes	on	Europe	(cf.	Szczerbiak	and	Taggart	2008).	The	promise	to	hold	a	referendum	
when	 elected	 gives	 a	 party	 an	 extra	 empowering	 tool,	 and	 an	 advantage	 over	 the	
governing	 party,	 which	 is	more	 bound	 to	maintain	 a	 pragmatic	 pro-EU	 approach	 in	
European	negotiations.	This	 is	most	clearly	shown	by	the	Conservatives,	who	ratified	
EC	accession,	the	SEA	and	the	Maastricht	Treaty	without	a	popular	vote	while	in	office	
(although	 the	 Eurosceptic	 wing	 of	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 the	 ‘Maastricht	 Rebels’	
did	 call	 for	a	popular	vote	on	Maastricht),	and	 then,	during	 the	subsequent	 thirteen	
years	of	Labour	rule,	consistently	called	for	referendums	on	all	EU	treaty	ratifications	
(Amsterdam,	 Nice,	 the	 TCE	 and	 Lisbon),	 including	 those	 that	 were	 less	 far-reaching	
(Miller	2009).	This	is	different	for	Labour,	whose	generally	more	pro-European	stance	
does	not	easily	coincide	with	public	opinion.	
	 As	mentioned	above,	one	important	factor	is	the	emergence	of	strong	Eurosceptic	
parties	 on	 the	 extremes	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 first	 the	 Referendum	 Party	 and	
later	 UKIP	 (Baker,	 Gamble,	 Randall	 and	 Seawright	 2008).	 These	 parties	 pose	 viable	
competition	for	the	Tories	and	have	pushed	them	into	a	defensive	position	on	Europe.	
This	explains	why,	from	the	late	1990s,	referendum	pledges	became	a	viable	strategy	
in	the	hands	of	the	opposition.	For	example,	in	the	run-up	to	the	elections	in	2001,	the	
Tories	campaigned	for	a	referendum	on	Nice,	as	they	argued	that	the	treaty	deepened	
integration	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 than	 the	 preconditions	 for	 enlargement	 (Deans	
9.6.2000).	At	that	time,	support	for	Europe	was	still	strikingly	low:	less	than	30	per	cent	
of	the	British	electorate	supported	Britain’s	EU	membership,	while	almost	half	of	the	
electorate	was	largely	indifferent	towards	the	EU.	In	addition,	UKIP	was	gaining	support	
for	its	Eurosceptical	agenda,	and	potentially	mobilized	these	indifferent	voters	into	the	
Eurosceptic	camp.	By	promising	a	referendum	on	Nice,	the	Tories	clearly	aimed	to	keep	
6
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Eurosceptic	voters	in	their	camp.101	After	the	elections,	when	the	bill	on	Nice	had	to	pass	
through	parliament,	the	Conservatives	introduced	a	clause	stating	that	the	UK	could	not	
ratify	the	treaty	without	a	referendum.	However,	the	fact	that	the	Conservatives	in	the	
House	of	Lords	removed	the	clause	suggests	that,	after	the	elections,	there	was	no	need	
for	the	Conservatives	to	maintain	their	referendum	call	(Miller	2009,	6).	
	 In	the	next	elections,	scheduled	for	May	2005,	 ‘Europe’	was	again	anticipated	to	
play	an	important	role.	2005	was	the	year	in	which	the	highly	controversial	TCE	had	to	
be	ratified.	As	 in	many	other	countries,	political	 leaders	had	committed	to	holding	a	
referendum	on	the	TCE.	As	UKIP	had	just	gained	a	significant	victory	during	the	2004	EP	
elections,	not	committing	to	a	referendum	would	likely	have	electoral	consequences.	
After	 the	 TCE	 was	 rejected	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 Labour	 prime	 minister	
Gordon	Brown	 said	 that	 a	 referendum	on	 Lisbon	was	 not	 strictly	 necessary.	 Shortly	
afterwards,	Conservative	opposition	leader	David	Cameron	gave	a	‘cast-iron	guarantee’	
that	he	would	hold	a	referendum	on	any	treaty	emerging	from	the	Lisbon	process	if	he	
were	to	become	prime	minister	(BBC	21.5.2015).	
6.2.4 The future of British referendums?
Two	recent	events	could	indicate	a	more	important	role	for	referendums	in	Britain	in	
the	future.	The	first	 is	 the	2011	reform	of	the	EUA,	which	has	given	referendums	on	
future	EU	treaty	reform	a	legal	basis.	The	referendum	locks	in	the	EUA	are	formulated	in	
such	a	way,	however,	that	they	provide	room	for	political	manoeuvre	and	governments	
have	the	freedom	to	 interpret	the	necessity	of	a	referendum	according	to	their	own	
interests.	Yet,	 just	 like	 the	 two	EU	membership	 referendums	 (of	1975	and	2016)	 the	
referendum	 locks	 in	 the	EUA	are	 indicative	of	 a	 convention	 that	 any	 future	 changes	
in	Britain’s	relationship	with	the	EU	are	to	be	submitted	to	a	referendum.	The	second	
indication	 of	 a	 more	 important	 role	 for	 referendums	 in	 the	 UK	 is	 the	 increasingly	
fragmented	political	landscape,	which	makes	it	more	difficult	for	both	Labour	and	the	
Conservatives	to	neglect	referendum	demands	by	opposition	parties,	for	example	on	
devolution,	independence	or	the	EU.102 
	 The	Scottish	independence	referendum	in	2014	was	a	direct	result	of	the	increased	
electoral	 success	 of	 the	 SNP.	 Given	 its	 persistent	 success	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
referendum	outcome	was	a	close-call,	a	second	referendum	on	independence	is	more	
difficult	to	avoid	for	any	future	Scottish	and	UK	government,	especially	since	a	majority	
of	Scots	(albeit	small,	only	51	per	cent)	are	in	favour	of	having	such	a	referendum	within	
the	 next	 ten	 years	 (British	 Election	 Study	 Panel	 study	 2015,	 pre-election	 wave).	 In	
addition,	while	previous	opposition	calls	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	EU	never	received	
101.	 	A	strategy	that	did	not	work,	given	UKIP’s		electoral	result	in	2001.		
102.	 	In	fact,	as	I	argued	in	this	chapter,	the	referendum	locks	in	the	EUA	were	in	themselves	an	outcome	of	
the	fragmentation	of	the	political	landscape	after	the	2010	elections,	when	the	Conservatives	were	
forced	to	form	a	coalition.		
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majority	support,	Cameron’s	pledge	 to	hold	a	 referendum	on	EU	membership	was	a	
consequence	of	increased	competition	from	UKIP	and	persisting	Euroscepticism	within	
his	own	party.	 In	 such	a	 context,	 referendums	are	more	difficult	 to	avoid,	especially	
since	public	opinion	data	indicates	that,	for	Eurosceptic	parties,	playing	the	referendum	
card	is	likely	to	pay	off	electorally.	
	 However,	whether	more	referendums	will	be	held	in	the	near	future	depends	largely	
on	British	political	parties	will	be	able	to	win	majority	support	in	the	House	of	Commons,	
and	therefore	on	whether	government	parties	have	veto	power	to	block	referendum	
calls	by	the	opposition.	The	question	then	also	remains	whether	referendum	pledges	
on	‘Europe’	or	devolution	will	spill	over	to	other	issues,	or	whether	–	in	line	with	Dicey’s	
legacy	–	referendums	will	continue	to	be	seen	as	a	viable	option	only	in	cases	of	the	
transfer	of	sovereignty.	While	UKIP	fervently	supports	referendums	on	a	wider	range	of	
issues	–	for	example	immigration	–	(UKIP	2010,	3),	such	calls	are	not	supported	by	the	
mainstream	political	parties.	
 
6.3 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN SWEDEN
6.3.1 Referendum provisions in the Swedish constitution 
The	Swedish	constitution	provides	for	two	types	of	referendum:	1)	advisory	referendums	
triggered	by	a	simple	majority	in	parliament	and	2)	binding	referendums	on	constitutional	
amendments	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority	 (International	Constitutional	Law	
1989).	Advisory	referendums	were	introduced	in	1922	and	are	decision-promotive:	they	
are	triggered	on	the	basis	of	a	normal	act	of	law	by	a	majority	of	MPs	(Chapter 8, Article 
2(5) Swedish	Constitution).	With	the	exception	of	constitutional	amendments,	advisory	
referendums	can	be	initiated	on	any	issue.	Since	the	vote	is	advisory,	no	specific	quorum	
applies,	which	means	that	the	outcome	is	decided	by	a	simple	majority	of	the	votes.	
	 The	referendum	on	constitutional	amendments	under	Chapter 8, Article 16(1)) of 
the	Constitution	is	decision-controlling,	as	it	is	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority	to	
block	a	legislative	proposal	to	amend	the	constitution	approved	by	the	parliamentary	
majority	at	the	first	reading.	It	was	institutionalized	in	binding	form	in	1980	(Suksi	1993,	
216).	The	procedure	comprises	two	steps:	first,	one-tenth	of	MPs	request	a	referendum,	
and	the	referendum	bill	must	then	be	approved	by	one-third	of	MPs.	If	the	bill	is	passed,	
the	referendum	is	held	at	the	same	time	as	national	parliamentary	elections.	For	these	
referendums,	a	strict	rejective	quorum	applies:	the	proposed	constitutional	change	is	
vetoed	by	the	public	if	at	least	a	majority	of	the	participating	voters	and	the	majority	of	
the	participants	in	the	parallel	national	election	vote	‘no’.	If	the	quorum	is	not	reached	
or	 if	 the	outcome	 is	 ‘yes’,	 the	proposal	goes	 to	parliament	 for	final	consideration.	 If,	
however,	more	than	75	per	cent	of	the	participating	voters	support	the	constitutional	
amendment,	it	is	directly	approved	and	goes	into	force.
6
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6.3.2 Referendum use in Sweden
With	five	referendums	held	between	1950	and	2014	(see	table 6.3),	Sweden	belongs	
to	the	group	of	countries	where	use	of	the	referendum	instrument	is	exceptional.	All	
referendums	were	advisory	and	initiated	by	the	government	with	the	support	of	broad	
parliamentary	majorities.	Until	now,	no	minority	referendum	on	the	constitution	under	
Chapter 8, Article 16(1)	has	been	held.	In	terms	of	referendum	issues,	Sweden	deviates	
from	the	bulk	of	European	countries	where	referendums	primarily	relate	to	politically	
weighty	 issues,	such	as	constitutional	reform	or	European	integration.	The	first	post-
WWII	referendum	was	held	in	1955	and	related	to	changing	the	driving	side	from	the	
left	to	the	right.	The	turnout	in	this	referendum	was	relatively	low	(53	per	cent),	and	
considerable	lower	than	in	the	previous	elections	(79	per	cent).103	Although	the	Swedes	
voted	against	the	change	by	an	overwhelming	majority	of	83	per	cent,	the	driving	side	
was	nevertheless	changed	to	the	right	twelve	years	later	in	1967.
	 Two	referendums	were	held	in	which	Swedish	voters	were	presented	with	multiple	
options.	This	was	the	case	in	the	1957	referendum	on	pension	reform,	when	they	could	
choose	between	three	different	reform	options	that	reflected	the	different	positions	
taken	 by	 the	 largest	 parties.104	 The	 option	proposed	 by	 the	 Social	Democratic	 Party	
(SAP)		–	to	introduce	a	mandatory	pension	system	–	received	the	most	support	(46	per	
cent)	with	a	turnout	of	72.4	per	cent.	In	1980,	a	referendum	was	held	proposing	three	
options	for	nuclear	energy,	which	again	reflected	the	positions	of	the	largest	parties.105 
Again,	the	proposal	by	the	SAP	(and	the	Liberals	[Liberalerna])	–	to	keep	power	plants	
but	 to	 simultaneously	 invest	 in	 renewable	energy	–	 received	 the	most	 support	 (39.1	
per	cent)	with	a	turnout	of	75.6	per	cent.	This	was	a	close-call,	as	38.7	per	cent	voted	
in	favour	of	the	proposal	by	the	Centre	Party	(Centerpartiet)	and	the	Communists	to	
dismantle	the	plants.		
	 Two	 referendums	were	held	 relating	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	 1994,	 the	 Swedish	 electorate	
was	 able	 to	 vote	 on	 their	 country’s	 accession	 to	 the	 EU.	 Only	 a	 narrow	majority	 of	
52.3	per	cent	voted	in	favour	of	EU	membership.	Nine	years	later,	a	referendum	was	
held	 on	 adoption	 of	 the	 euro,	which	 resulted	 in	 a	 ‘no’	 vote	 (55.9%).	 The	 turnout	 in	
these	referendums	was	remarkably	high,	and	comparable	to	that	 in	previous	general	
elections.106
103.	 	IDEA	election	turnout	data	Sweden.
104.	 	A	mandatory	system	(SAP),	a	voluntary	pension	system	with	government	involvement	(Centre	Party),	
and	a	voluntary	system	without	government	involvement	(Moderate	Party	and	Liberals).
105.	 	To	keep	the	existing	power	plants	(Moderate	Party),	to	keep	the	power	plants	but	with	the	
qualification	that	more	efforts	would	be	made	to	increase	renewable	energy	capacity	(SAP	and	
Liberals),	and	to	dismantle	the	power	plants	immediately	(Centre	Party	and	Communist	Party).
106.	 	In	the	parliamentary	elections	held	in	September	1994,	turnout	was	nearly	87	per	cent	and	in	
September	2002,	80	per	cent;	IDEA	election	turnout	data	Sweden.
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Table 6.3: Referendums in Sweden, 1950-2014
Year Type Legal basis Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1955 Legislative	
majority
Chapter	8,	
Article	2(5)
Driving	
side
Tage	Erlander	I	
Government	
Advisory 53.2% Status	quo
1957 Legislative	
majority
Chapter	8,	
Article	2(5)
Pensions Tage	Erlander	II	
Government
Advisory 72.4% Option		
SAP
1980 Legislative	
majority
Chapter	8,	
Article	2(5)
Nuclear	
energy
Thorbjörn	Fälldin	II	
Government	
Advisory 75.6% Option	SAP	
+	Lib
1994 Legislative	
majority
Chapter	8,	
Article	2(5)
EU	acces-
sion
Carl	Bildt	Government	 Advisory 83.3% Yes
2003 Legislative	
majority
Chapter	8,	
Article	2(5)
Euro Ingvar	Carlsson	II	
Government	
Advisory 82.6% No
6.3.3 Explaining referendum practice in Sweden
Why	were	only	five	national	referendums	held	in	Sweden	in	a	timeframe	of	50	years?	
Moreover,	while	the	EU	membership	referendum	could	be	expected	to	set	a	precedent	
for	subsequent	referendums	on	‘Europe’,	as	was	the	case	in	Denmark	for	example,	why	
were	all	EU	treaty	ratifications	approved	without	a	popular	vote?	And	what	motivated	
Swedish	governments	to	pledge	a	referendum	on	the	five	occasions	outlined	above?	
To	answer	these	questions,	this	section	again	provides	an	assessment	of	the	six	factors	
outlined in chapter 2.	I	will	show	that	Sweden’s	limited	referendum	track	record	should	
primarily	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	long-dominant	position	of	the	SAP,	which	was	
generally	 opposed	 to	 holding	 referendums.	 The	 referendums	 that	 were	 held	 were	
either	triggered	at	a	time	when	the	SAP	was	not	in	power,	or	when	parties	–	including	
the	SAP	–	were	unable	to	pursue	a	policy	outcome	due	to	parliamentary	fragmentation.	
TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY
Due	 to	 its	 proportional	 representation	 (PR)	 electoral	 system,	 Sweden	 has	 a	 multi-
party	system	and	a	fragmented	parliament:	eight	different	parties	currently	have	seats	
in the Riksdag,	 the	 Swedish	 unicameral	 parliament.	 Swedish	 parliamentary	 politics	
is	 characterized	 by	 negative parliamentarism,	 meaning	 that	 new	 governments	 are	
not	dependent	on	the	majority	approval	of	 the	Riksdag	but	must	only	be	 ‘tolerated’	
(Bergman	 1993;	 Louwerse	 2014).	 In	 Sweden	 this	 implies	 that	minority	 governments	
are	the	rule.107	Moreover,	Swedish	post-WWII	politics	is	characterized	by	the	dominant	
position	of	the	SAP.	From	1945	until	1976,	the	SAP	ruled	without	interruption,	mostly	
forming	a	single-party	minority	government	(only	between	1968	and	1970	did	the	SAP	
form	a	single-party	majority	cabinet)	and	between	1951	and	1957	forming	a	majority	
coalition	with	the	Centre	Party	(Slomp	2011,	434).	After	1976,	too,	the	SAP	held	office	
in	nine	of	the	sixteen	governments,	all	of	which	were	minority	cabinets	(and	only	after	
107.	 	In	fact,	23	of	the	30	post-war	governments	were	minority	governments,	with	only	seven	majority	
governments.
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2014	in	coalition).	These	characteristics	of	the	Swedish	polity	places	referendums	in	a	
quite	different	context	than	in	the	UK.	
	 As	 shown	 in	chapter 4,	 Sweden	belongs	 to	 a	 small	 group	of	 –	mainly	 consensus	
–	 democracies	 where	 political	 minorities	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum,	 albeit	 only	 on	
constitutional	reform	proposals.	This,	together	with	the	strict	turnout	quorum,	confirms	
the	institutional	fit	thesis.	However,	no	minority	referendums	have	ever	been	held	in	
Sweden;	all	five	 referendums	held	between	1950	and	2014	were	 legislative	majority	
referendums	initiated	by	the	government	and	supported	by	a	majority	in	parliament.	
These	 votes	 served	 to	 advise	 government	 and	 parliament	 rather	 than	 to	 control	
decision-making.	Given	 the	consensual	character	of	 the	Swedish	polity,	 this	provides	
no	strong	evidence	for	the	institutional	fit	thesis,	on	the	basis	of	which	referendums	in	
consensus	democracies	would	be	expected	to	have	a	decision-controlling	rather	than	a	
decision-confirming	character.
	 Nevertheless,	the	way	in	which	referendums	are	used	is	clearly	embedded	in	the	
Swedish	system	of	bargaining	and	power-sharing	between	various	parties.	Given	the	
fact	that	the	country	 is	usually	governed	by	a	minority	cabinet,	a	governing	party	or	
coalition	needs	support	from	opposition	parties	to	trigger	a	referendum.	These	decisions	
stem	purely	from	the	necessity	to	solve	disagreements	within	the	coalition	or	between	
the	government	and	opposition	on	controversial	 issues,	such	as	‘Europe’	and	nuclear	
power.	 As	 Bogdanor	 (1994)	 states,	 Swedish	mainstream	parties	 have	 generally	 been	
reluctant	to	use	the	referendum	as	an	instrument,	and	then	only	when	the	process	of	
consensus-building	fails.
NUMBER	OF	VETO	PLAYERS
The	 Swedish	 constitution	 had	 been	 amended	 twice	 to	 introduce	 (1922)	 and	 extend	
(1980)	 referendum	 legislation.	 Before	 1971	 –	 when	 Sweden	 abandoned	 the	 Upper	
House	 –	 such	 a	 constitutional	 revision	 required	 the	 approval	 of	 both	 parliamentary	
houses	with	a	simple	majority	in	two	readings,	with	elections	in	between.	This	created	
a	 considerable	 number	 of	 veto	 points	 and,	 given	 Sweden’s	 fragmented	 polity,	 veto	
players.	In	1922,	when	the	advisory	referendum	was	introduced,	this	high	number	of	
veto	players	did	not	result	in	the	proposal	being	vetoed,	despite	opposition	from	the	
conservatives	(Ruin	1996,	173).	Although	the	referendum	instrument	was	pushed	for	by	
a	movement	calling	for	the	prohibition	of	alcohol	(Sandell	and	Stern	1998,	330),	other	
political	parties	–	including	the	SAP	–	agreed	with	it	as	long	as	it	was	advisory,	because	
they	saw	the	referendum	as	a	viable	means	of	solving	the	alcohol	prohibition	issue,	on	
which	parties	were	heavily	divided	(Wallin	1966;	Suksi	1993;	Ruin	1996).	
	 Unlike	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 advisory	 majority	 referendum,	 the	 road	 to	
institutionalization	 of	 binding	 minority	 legislative	 referendums	 was	 not	 without	 its	
problems.	Proposals	were	put	forward	by	the	centre-right	opposition	parties	with	the	
aim	of	 balancing	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 government,	 opposition	 and	 citizens,	
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which	 included	 installing	 broad	 coalition	 governments,	 abolishing	 the	 first	 chamber	
and,	 as	 compensation,	 introducing	 binding	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 (Suksi	
1993,	 214).	 The	 SAP	 consistently	 used	 its	 dominant	 position	 to	 reject	 proposals	 to	
introduce	this	type	of	referendum	–	as	well	as	to	introduce	citizen-initiated	referendums	
–	as	it	would	strengthen	the	opposition	at	its	expense	(cf.	Suksi	1993;	Bogdanor	1994;	
Kaufmann	2011).	To	deflate	the	controversy	over	the	legislative	minority	referendum,	
a	committee	was	installed	in	the	1950s	to	examine	the	consequences	of	introducing	it	
(Suksi	1993,	215).	The	work	of	the	committee	resulted	in	a	proposal	to	introduce	the	
advisory	minority	referendum	(on	regular	legislation),	but	the	SAP	vetoed	the	proposal	
in	 parliament.	 A	 proposal	 to	 revise	 the	 constitution	 to	 allow	 for	 binding	 minority	
referendums	was	 not	 adopted	 in	 the	Riksdag	 until	 1974,	 in	 the	 first	 reading,	 when	
the	position	of	 the	SAP	was	 seriously	weakened.	Moreover,	at	 that	time,	parliament	
consisted	of	only	one	chamber,	which	 reduced	 the	number	of	veto	points.	After	 the	
SAP	had	been	ousted	from	office	for	the	first	time	in	40	years	in	the	1976	elections,	the	
Riksdag	approved	the	proposal	in	the	second	reading	in	1979.	The	law	on	the	binding 
minority	referendum	on	constitutional	reform	proposals	went	into	effect	in	1980	(Suksi	
1993,	216).	
	 Compared	to	France	and	Denmark,	the	number	of	veto	players	involved	in	triggering	
a	 referendum	 on	 non-constitutional	 issues	 is	 considerably	 higher,	 as	 this	 requires	
a	majority	 of	MPs.	 And	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 Swedish	 electoral	 system,	 in	which	
one	single	party	rarely	holds	a	majority	in	the	Riksdag,	it	is	difficult	for	a	single	party,	
governing	or	otherwise,	to	trigger	a	referendum	on	its	own.	This	implies	that,	unlike	in	
the	UK,	referendum	bills	require	the	support	of	various	ideologically	different	parties.	
This	explains	why	only	five	 referendums	have	been	held.	Notably,	 in	all	 these	cases,	
there	was	such	broad	support	for	the	referendum	bill	because	–	as	I	will	show	below	–	it	
was	in	the	interest	of	various	parties.	When	such	support	is	lacking,	there	are	thus	many	
parties,	most	notably	the	governing	party,	that	can	veto	referendum	proposals.
PAST	EXPERIENCE
Although	Sweden’s	first	experience	with	the	referendum	dates	back	to	before	WWII,	
referendums	played	no	major	role	in	that	period.	The	advisory	referendum	on	alcohol	
prohibition	 in	1922	consolidated	 the	 referendum	 instrument	 in	 the	constitution,	but	
political	interest	in	the	referendum	issue	did	not	resume	until	after	the	Second	World	
War	(Ruin	1996,	174).	Then,	both	the	Social	Democratic	Party	and	the	Moderate	Party	
were	of	 the	opinion	that,	 in	principle,	referendums	should	play	no	prominent	role	 in	
Swedish	politics	(Lewin	1988,	232).	Despite	the	fact	that	the	issue	became	a	recurring	
topic	in	the	political	debate	and	two	referendums	being	held	in	the	1950s,	referendum	
legislation	was	not	extended	to	binding	legislative	minority	referendums	until	the	late	
1970s.	Although	the	referendum	was	introduced	early,	there	is	therefore	no	evidence	
of a strong	referendum	tradition	in	Sweden.	
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	 Given	the	precedent	set	by	the	EU	membership	referendum,	it	is	remarkable	that	all	
subsequent	treaty	reforms	were	ratified	by	parliament.	In	Sweden,	there	is	no	norm	that	
prescribes	the	use	of	a	popular	vote	in	the	case	of	sovereignty	transfer.	Rather,	in	such	
cases,	the	Swedish	constitution	underscores	the	primacy	of	parliament	by	prescribing	
that	 ratification	of	EU	 treaties	 that	 signify	a	 transfer	of	 sovereignty	 require	approval	
of	three-quarters	of	those	voting	and	at	least	half	of	the	total	MPs	(Chapter 10, Article 
6(2) Swedish	 Constitution).	When	 an	 international	 treaty	 is	 considered	 to	 affect	 the	
Swedish	constitution,	ratification	can	also	be	approved	in	a	procedure	for	constitutional	
revision,	which	requires	a	simple	majority	approval	 in	two	parliamentary	readings,	 in	
which	citizens	are	thus	given	an	indirect	vote	in	the	form	of	elections	(Hegeland	2012,	
1).	The	fact	that	all	EU	treaty	ratifications	have	been	approved	by	the	three-quarters	
qualified	majority	procedure	underscores	 the	primacy	of	parliament	 rather	 than	 the	
people.	
PUBLIC	DEMANDS
The	relatively	low	salience	of	referendums	in	Sweden	coincides	with	the	seeming	absence	
of	a	social	climate	favouring	referendums.	As	shown	in	figure 6.4,	Eurobarometer	data	
reveals	 that	 levels	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 Swedish	 democracy	 lie	 far	 below	 the	 EU	
average	and	have	decreased	over	time:	 in	1997,	40	per	cent	of	Swedish	respondents	
who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	democracy	while,	 in	2014,	this	was	only	18	
per	 cent.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 data	 from	 the	 European	 Values	 Study	 (EVS)	 which	
reveals	that	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	
democracy	fell	 from	41	per	cent	 in	1999	to	31	per	cent	 in	2008.	 In	addition,	distrust	
of	political	 institutions	has	decreased	over	time	(figure 6.5).	Although	a	considerable	
proportion	of	 the	Swedes	have	 little	or	no	 trust	 in	political	parties	 (between	60	and	
70	per	cent),	distrust	of	parliament	and	government	is	relatively	low	and	falling.	At	the	
same	time,	EVS	data	reveals	that	levels	of	interest	in	politics	remained	stable	between	
1981	and	2008	(around	45	per	cent)	(EVS	1981-2008).	
Figure 6.4: Dissatisfaction with national democracy in Sweden*
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Figure 6.5: Public distrust of national institutions in Sweden*
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Where	the	EU	is	concerned,	Swedish	citizens	also	seem	to	have	become	less	dissatisfied	
over	 time,	 although	 the	 degree	 of	 Euroscepticism	 fluctuates	 and	 generally	 higher	
than	the	EU	average.	As	shown	in	figure 6.6,	until	2005,	between	40	and	60	per	cent	
of	 Eurobarometer	 respondents	 said	 that	 Sweden	 had	 not	 benefited	 from	 its	 ten	
years	of	membership,	and	this	percentage	fell	 from	2005	onward.	The	proportion	of	
respondents	that	were	of	the	opinion	that	EU	membership	was	a	bad	thing	for	Sweden	
had	especially	decreased	in	that	period:	from	46	per	cent	in	1997	to	32	per	cent	in	2005.	
Between	2005	 and	2011,	 such	negative	 sentiments	 further	 decreased,	 although	 this	
has	still	not	resulted	in	an	overwhelming	majority	of	the	Swedes	holding	positive	views	
towards	the	EU.	In	2011,	only	56	per	cent	of	the	Swedes	perceived	EU	membership	as	a	
good	thing,	while	almost	20	per	cent	explicitly	believed	that	Sweden’s	EU	membership	
is	a	bad	thing.	In	addition,	only	a	small	majority	of	53	per	cent	of	the	Swedes	held	the	
opinion	that	membership	benefitted	Sweden,	compared	to	35	per	cent	that	believed	
Sweden	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership.	Moreover,	while	dissatisfaction	with	
EU	democracy	and	general	 levels	of	distrust	of	 the	EU	decreased	until	2006,	 it	grew	
again	between	2007	and	2012.	
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Figure 6.6: Euroscepticism in Sweden*
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*	Percentage	of	Swedish	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	‘Sweden’s	EU	
membership	is	a	bad	thing’/’Sweden	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership’/	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	
satisfied’	or	‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	EU	democracy/that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	the	EU.
Such	sentiments	of	political	 interest	and	dissatisfaction	with	national	and	EU	politics	
are	 generally	 linked	 to	 support	 for	 referendums.	 As	 public	 opinion	 data	 is	 not	
available	 for	 this	 period,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 analyse	 whether	 the	 introduction	 of	
referendum	legislation	in	Sweden,	in	1922	and	1980,	was	indeed	favoured	by	citizens	
as	well.	 However,	 later	 survey	 data	 does	 not	 show	 overwhelming	 support	 for	more	
referendums.	 In	1994,	 the	Nordic	EU	Referendum	Survey	–	conducted	 in	the	 light	of	
the	EU	membership	referendums	 in	Norway,	Finland	and	Sweden	–	revealed	that	62	
per	cent	of	the	Swedes	supported	a	modest use	of	referendums	on	special	occasions,	
and	only	31	per	cent	preferred	to	use	referendums	with	more	 frequency	 (Nordic	EU	
Referendum	Survey	1994,	from	Donovan	and	Karp	2006,	677).	Ten	years	later,	in	2004,	
the	ISSP	revealed	that	71	per	cent	of	the	Swedes	were	of	the	opinion	that	referendums	
are	a	good	way	to	decide	on	important	political	matters.108	Moreover,	the	data	reveal	
that	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	are	supportive	of	referendums	is	slightly	higher	
among	respondents	that	are	not	very,	or	not	all,	interested	in	politics	(74	per	cent)	than	
among	those	who	said	that	they	were	fairly	or	very	interested	in	politics	(68	per	cent)	
(ISSP	2004).	These	data,	which	are	inconsistent	with	the	cognitive mobilization thesis, 
revealed	no	difference	between	 respondents	who	 said	 that	 they	were	 satisfied	with	
democracy	and	those	who	were	dissatisfied.
	 Although	 the	 data	 are	 not	 comparable,	 in	 2009	 the	 European	 Elections	 Survey	
revealed	 that	 such	 a	 modestly	 supportive	 attitude	 towards	 referendums	 does	 not	
unequivocally	apply	to	EU	referendums:	only	45	per	cent	of	Swedes	were	of	the	opinion	
that	major	EU	treaty	ratifications	should	be	decided	by	referendum	(as	opposed	to	31	
108.	 	Compared	to	80	per	cent	in	Denmark,	75	per	cent	in	France,	67	per	cent	in	the	UK,	65	per	cent	in	
the	Netherlands	and	an	EU	average	of	70	per	cent;	International	Social	Survey	Programme	(2004)	
Citizenship. 
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
223
The United Kingdom and Sweden
per	cent	against),	compared	to	an	EU	average	of	63	per	cent.109 Moreover,	of	the	group	
of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	interested	in	politics,	44	per	cent	supported	
the	statement	that	EU	treaty	reform	should	be	decided	by	referendum,	as	opposed	to	
47	per	cent	of	those	who	said	that	they	were	a	little,	or	not	at	all,	interested	in	politics	
(EES	2009).	This	finding	is	therefore	inconsistent	with	the	cognitive mobilization thesis, 
on	the	basis	of	which	we	would	assume	that	support	specifically	comes	from	politically	
interested	 citizens.	 In	 addition,	 support	 for	 EU	 referendums	 is	 considerable	 higher	
among	Eurosceptics:	58	per	cent	of	respondents	who	feel	that	European	unification	has	
gone	too	far	support	the	claim	that	future	reform	should	be	decided	by	referendum,	
as	opposed	to	36	per	cent	of	respondents	who	feel	that	unification	should	be	pushed	
further	(EES	2009).
	 Nevertheless,	comparatively	speaking,	support	for	EU	referendums	has	not	been	
especially	high	among	the	Swedes.	This	is	different	than	in	the	UK,	where	support	for	
holding	EU	referendums	was	profoundly	higher.	However,	this	situation	might	now	have	
been	reversed	in	Sweden,	too.	At	the	beginning	of	2016,	the	University	of	Edinburgh	
conducted	a	survey	asking	Europeans	about	their	views	on	the	British	EU	membership	
referendum.	The	study	suggests	that	Euroscepticism	in	Sweden	has	 increased.	Thirty	
per	cent	of	Swedes	want	to	leave	the	EU,	which	is	considerably	higher	than	in	the	other	
countries	analysed	in	the	study,	namely	France	(24	per	cent),	Germany	(16	per	cent),	
Spain	(11	per	cent),	Ireland	(11	per	cent)	and	Poland	(9	per	cent)	(Eichhorn,	Hübner	and	
Kenealy	2016,	26).	Moreover,	the	study	revealed	that	49	per	cent	of	Swedes	would	like	
a	referendum	on	Sweden’s	EU	membership,	after	the	British	example	(compared	to	33	
per	cent	against).	This	support	is	especially	high	among	those	who	would	like	Sweden	
to	 leave	 the	EU	 (Eichhorn,	Hübner	 and	Kenealy	 2016,	 24-25).	Of	 the	other	 countries	
analysed	in	the	study,	support	for	an	exit	referendum	is	higher	only	in	France	(53	per	
cent).	
	 The	long	absence	of	a	social	climate	favourable	to	referendums	in	Sweden might	
explain	its	limited	use	of	referendums.	After	all,	in	the	absence	of	a	politically	dissatisfied	
citizenry,	 governments	might	 feel	 little	 pressure	 to	 pledge	 a	 referendum.	 This	 being	
said,	when	there	were	explicit	demands	from	society	to	hold	a	referendum,	they	were	
refused	by	 the	 Swedish	 government.	 This	was	particularly	 the	 case	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	
ratification	of	the	TCE,	when	support	for	the	treaty	was	considerably	 low	among	the	
Swedes.	 The	 Eurobarometer	 survey	 conducted	 in	 the	 spring	of	 2005	 confirmed	 that	
only	 38	 per	 cent	 of	 Swedish	 respondents	 said	 that	 they	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 TCE	
(Standard	Eurobarometer	63,	134).	More	 importantly,	 in	a	 survey	by	SIFO,	nearly	60	
per	cent	of	respondents	said	that	the	decision	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty	should	be	
taken	by	 referendum,	while	 32	per	 cent	 felt	 that	 it	 should	 be	 taken	by	 the	 Swedish	
parliament	(SIFO	18.2.2005,	in	Jungar	and	Karlsson	2005,	106-107).	These	figures	show	
109.	 	Compared	to	81	per	cent	in	the	UK,	65	per	cent	in	Denmark,	64	per	cent	in	France,	and	52	per	cent	in	
the	Netherlands;	European	Election	Studies	(2009).
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a	 gap	 between	 the	 Swedish	 public	 and	 the	 position	 taken	 by	 prime	minister	 Göran	
Persson,	who	gave	primacy	to	parliamentary	ratification.	As	he	put	it,	‘When	the	people	
vote	in	national	elections,	they	also	vote	on	EU	issues,	and	it	is	immensely	important	
that	we	 retain	Riksdagen’s	 responsibility	 and	do	not	 shift	 issues	 from	 there	 to	more	
or	less	permanent	referenda.	It	is	my	belief	that	this	would	be	unfortunate	for	the	EU	
issue,	and	it	would	also	be	unfortunate	for	the	trust	placed	with	Riksdagen’	(Persson	
cited	in	Hemmer	Pihl	22.10.2003).	In	the	run-up	to	the	Swedish	ratification	of	the	TCE,	
a	petition	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	treaty	was	signed	by	120,000	Swedes	(The	Local	
23.3.2005).	The	reluctance	of	the	Swedish	government	to	honour	this	call	provides	little	
evidence	for	sociological	institutionalist	claims	that	referendum	use	is	driven	by	public	
demands.		
POLITICAL	VALUES
Given	 the	 infrequent	 and	 inconsistent	 use	 of	 referendums,	 it	 is	 not	 very	 likely	 that	
Swedish	referendum	practice	is	driven	by	an	intrinsic	desire	to	enhance	citizens’	direct	
participation	 in	politics.	Moreover,	 in	Sweden,	referendums	can	only	be	triggered	by	
political	representatives	and	proposals	to	 initiated	citizen-initiated	referendums	have	
stranded	in	parliament	(Kaufmann	2011).	Indeed,	party	stances	towards	the	referendum	
as	an	 instrument	have	been	ambiguous.	Especially	 the	 introduction	of	 the	 legislative	
minority	referendum	was	not	without	difficulties.	The	SAP	was	consistently	opposed	to	
the	introduction	of	any	type	of	binding	referendum,	claiming	that	it	is	at	odds	with	the	
parliamentary	system	(Bogdanor	1994).	And	yet,	the	SAP	had	been	a	vigorous	supporter	
of	introduction	of	the	advisory	referendum	in	1922	and	either	triggered	or	supported	
all	five	referendums	held	in	the	country.	Thus,	rather	than	principally	motivated,	these	
pledges	are	more	likely	to	have	been	motivated	by	strategic	interests.
	 This	ambiguity	in	stances	on	referendums	also	applies	to	the	centre-right	parties.	
From	the	Second	World	War	on,	these	parties	–	which	were	in	opposition	from	1932	
to	1976	–	called	for	the	introduction	of	legislative	minority	referendums.	In	their	initial	
proposals,	these	referendums	could	be	held	on	all	kinds	of	issues,	not	only	constitutional	
reform.	However,	when	the	SAP	was	ousted	from	government	in	1976,	for	the	first	time	
since	 1932,	 the	 centre-right	 coalition	 rephrased	 its	 earlier	 proposals	 and	 restricted	
minority	referendums	to	constitutional	revisions	(Suksi	1993,	218).	Hence,	this	suggests	
that	centre	political	parties	only	supported	more	far-reaching	referendum	legislation	
when	they	were	in	opposition,	and	not	when	they	were	in	power.	
	 Only	the	radical	left	and	the	radical	right	have	been	consistent	in	their	support	for	
extending	the	legislation	and	use	of	national	referendums	(Ruin	1996,	174;	Kaufmann	
2011).	Such	support	has	been	both	instrumentally	and	intrinsically	motivated.	For	the	
post-materialist	Green	Party	(Miljöpartiet),	participatory	arguments	play	an	important	
role.	In	its	election	manifesto	of	2006,	the	party	calls	for	participatory	democracy	to	be	
strengthened	and	citizens’	opportunities	to	participate	in	decision-making	enhanced	by	
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introducing	citizens’	initiatives	(Miljöpartiet	2006).	For	the	Left	Party	(Vänsterpartiet),	
too,	 support	 for	 the	use	of	 referendums	 is	 grounded	 in	participatory	 arguments.	As	
it	 says	 in	 its	 2006	manifesto,	 ‘Democracy	 is	much	more	 than	 to	 go	 and	 vote	 every	
four	years.	Democracy	is	our	strength	when	we	organize	ourselves	and	act	together’	
(Vänsterpartiet	2006).	However,	especially	where	the	EU	is	concerned,	the	party	also	
emphasizes	instrumental	arguments	in	favour	of	referendums,	and	calls	for	them	to	be	
held	in	particularly	to	legitimize	proposals	that	entail	a	transfer	of	power	to	the	EU.	
	 The	 populist	 right	 Sweden	 Democrats	 are	 also	 consistent	 in	 their	 support	 for	
referendums.	 For	 them,	 such	 support	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 populist	 and	 Eurosceptical	
discourse.	Their	2011	party	programme	states	‘We	adhere	to	the	classical	definition	of	
democracy,	where	the	concept	of	democracy	is	not	synonymous	with	the	individual’s	
own	political	 conceptions	but	primarily	 rests	on	 the	principle	 that	decisions	 shall	 be	
taken	in	accordance	to	the	majority	principle’	[...]	‘Democracy	means	government	by	the	
people	and	the	Sweden	Democrats’	view	is	that	one	cannot	completely	ignore	the	word	
“people”	in	the	concept	of	popular	rule’	(Sverigedemokraterna	2011,	5-6).110	Moreover,	
like	the	radical	left,	the	Sweden	Democrats	are	especially	supportive	of	referendums	on	
the	transfer	of	sovereignty	to	the	EU.	
	 While	 these	 parties	 have	 filed	 several	 proposals	 to	 organize	 referendums,	 the	
mainstream	political	parties	in	Sweden	have	supported	referendums	only	on	occasional	
issues.	 Unlike	 in	 most	 other	 European	 countries,	 referendums	 have	 been	 held	 on	
‘routine’	parliamentary	issues,	such	as	traffic	and	pension	reform	(Ruin	1996).	In	Sweden,	
there	is	no	constitutional	norm	that	prescribes	the	use	of	a	referendum	in	the	case	of	
major	political	regime	changes	or	EU	treaty	change.	Nevertheless,	two	EU	referendums	
were	held	on	issues	that	were	perceived	to	affect	the	functioning	of	the	Swedish	polity	
(Kurpas,	Incerti,	Schönlau,	and	De	Clerck-Sachsse	2005,	24),	which	makes	it	likely	that	
feelings	 that	 it	was	appropriate	 to	 legitimize	 these	 issues	by	direct	popular	approval	
played	a	role	in	the	referendum	pledge.	When	the	Swedish	government	applied	for	EU	
membership	in	1990,	all	parties	soon	agreed	that	this	issue	should	be	submitted	to	a	
referendum,	as	their	counterparts	in	Austria,	Finland	and	Norway	had	done	(Jahn	and	
Storsved	1995).	The	fact	that	all	1994	applicants	held	a	referendum	on	EU	accession	
suggests	that	international	peer	pressure	played	an	important	role.	Prime	minister	Carl	
Bildt	justified	the	pledge	by	saying	that	EU	membership	was	‘Sweden’s	most	important	
international	 agreement	 in	 the	 past	 100	 years’	 (Brock,	 Boyes,	 George	 and	 Kivinen	
3.3.1994).	
	 This	being	said,	all	treaty	reforms	after	Sweden’s	EU	accession	were	approved	by	
parliament	and	referendums	were	not	perceived	as	necessary	(Sitter	2009,	89).	In	the	
case	of	the	Treaty	of	Amsterdam,	the	government	said	that	‘The	Treaty	does	not	change	
the	character	of	the	cooperation	within	the	EU	in	any	major	way.	The	EU	remains	the	
same	 kind	 of	 organization	 at	 it	was	when	 Sweden	 acceded	 on	 1	 January	 1995.	 The	
110.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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Government	has	 therefore	not	 considered	a	 referendum	concerning	 the	Amsterdam	
Treaty	necessary’	(Persson	and	Hjelm-Wallén	1998,	32,	translated	in	Bernitz	2001,	914).	
A	similar	argument	was	expressed	in	the	case	of	the	TCE,	on	which	social	democratic	
State	 Secretary	 Lars	 Danielsson	 justified	 not	 holding	 a	 referendum	 by	 saying	 ‘We	
have	a	tradition	in	Sweden	of	being	restrictive	with	referendums,	reserving	them	for	
questions	of	great	importance.	This	treaty	does	not	entail	any	major	change	in	Sweden’s	
relationship	to	the	EU’	(EU	Business	8.12.2004).	Such	arguments	are	remarkable,	as	the	
EU	membership	referendum,	in	which	52.3	per	cent	of	the	voters	voted	in	favour	and	
46.8	per	cent	against,	by	no	means	provided	an	unequivocal	popular	mandate	for	the	
future	transfer	of	sovereignty.	
	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 euro	 was	 certainly	 perceived	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 substantial	
importance.	 The	 government	 stated	 it	 did	 signify	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 the	
Swedish	people	had	not	 approved	by	 adopting	 the	accession	 treaty	 in	 1994.	 Strictly	
speaking,	Sweden	is	obliged	to	introduce	the	euro	once	it	meets	the	convergence	criteria.	
Unlike	Denmark	and	the	UK,	Sweden	has	no	opt-out	from	the	parts	of	the	Maastricht	
Treaty	that	obliges	states	to	join	the	eurozone	once	they	meet	the	necessary	conditions.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 Swedish	 government	 declared	 that	 Sweden	 reserved	 the	 right	 to	
subject	entry	in	the	third	phase	of	the	EMU	(i.e.	acceptance	of	the	single	currency)	to	a	
separate	decision,	possibly	by	referendum,	‘given	the	Swedish	peoples’	weak	support	
for	 the	 EMU’	 (Finansdepartementet	 1997,	 6).111	 As	 I	will	 argue	 below,	 the	 pledge	 to	
have	a	referendum	on	the	euro	was	not	devoid	of	strategic	considerations,	since	the	
issue	 had	 caused	 divisions	within	 the	 government	 party.	Moreover,	 the	 referendum	
legitimized	 the	Swedish	government’s	deliberate	choice	 to	not	meet	all	 convergence	
requirements,	 thereby	preventing	 the	necessity	 to	 join	 the	euro	 (and	 thus	providing	
Sweden	with	an	informal	opt-out).	The	Social	Democratic	Party’s	call	to	decide	on	the	
euro	by	referendum	was	broadly	supported	by	the	centre-right,	despite	them	generally	
being	reluctant	to	use	referendums.	
      
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
As	I	argued	above,	the	institutionalization	of	the	advisory	referendum	was	motivated	
by	 a	 desire	 to	 solve	 the	 alcohol	 prohibition	 issue	 rather	 than	 a	 desire	 to	 enhance	
citizens’	participation.	And,	as	in	Denmark	and	other	European	countries,	the	struggle	
over	the	institutionalization	of	the	binding	minority	referendum	was	one	for	political	
influence.	This	nuances	the	argument	that	both	decisions	were	motivated	by	normative	
convictions.	Moreover,	 given	 the	 ambiguity	 with	 which	 referendums	 were	 pledged,	
it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	 the	 referendums	 held	 were	 also	 motivated	 more	 by	 strategic	
considerations	than	by	public	demands	or	values.	Indeed,	when	Swedish	governments	
pledged	a	referendum,	they	had	a	clear	interest	in	doing	so.	Based	on	the	typology	of	
referendum	motivations	I	outlined	in	chapter 2, table 6.4	provides	an	overview	of	the	
111.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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motivations	 that	passed	 the	hoop	 test	of	process-tracing,	meaning	 that	 it	 is	 at	 least	
likely	that	they	were	at	play	in	Swedish	referendum	pledges	made	between	1950	and	
2014.	
Table 6.4. Referendum strategies on the part of triggering actors in Sweden*
Issue	and	year	
in	which	vote	
was	held
Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
legislative	
proposal 
in	national	
decision-
making	arena
Initiator	
faces 
internal 
party/
coalition	
divisions
Anticipated	
public	support	
for	initiator’s	
stance
Initiator	
faces 
upcoming	
elections
Initiator	
faces 
sufficient	
support for 
its	position	
in	EU	
decision-
making	
arena
Strategic 
motivations
Driving	side	
(1955)
NO YES uncertain NO n/a Policy-seeking
Conflict	mediation
Pensions	1957 NO YES uncertain NO n/a Policy-seeking
Conflict	mediation
Nuclear	energy	
1980
NO YES uncertain YES	/	NO n/a Policy-seeking
Conflict	mediation
Depoliticization
EU	accession	
1994
YES YES YES	(but	
controversial)
YES NO	(on	
certain 
aspects 
not)
Conflict	mediation
Depoliticization
EU	bargaining
Euro	2003 Uncertain YES uncertain YES NO Depoliticization	
Conflict	mediation
EU	bargaining
*Only	pledges	that	resulted	in	a	referendum	bill	are	listed.
POLICY	SEEKING.	As	shown	in	table 6.4,	three	referendums	were	pledged	on	an	issue	on	
which	agreement	could	not	be	reached:	on	the	driving	side,	pension	reform	and	nuclear	
energy.	At	the	time	of	these	referendums,	the	government	was	formed	by	a	coalition	
of	either	two	or	three	parties	(see	table 6.5),	which	were,	despite	having	a	majority	in	
parliament,	unable	 to	 come	 to	a	unified	proposal	on	 these	 issues	 that	would	obtain	
sufficient	 support	 to	be	pursued	 in	parliament.	Hence,	 these	 referendums	 served	 to	
enforce	a	certain	policy	outcome,	in	the	first	place	because	the	issues	led	to	party	and/
or	coalition	disagreement	(see	below)	but	also	because,	for	that	reason,	the	outcome	
could	not	be	assured.		In	contrast,	the	referendums	on	EU	membership	and	the	euro	
were	pledged	by	minority	governments,	but,	as	shown	in	table 6.4,	not	in	the	first	place	
because	there	was	insufficient	support	in	parliament.
6
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Table 6.5: Referendums and minority governments
Referendum Government % of seats
Driving	on	the	right-1955 Erlander	IV	–	SAP+	Centre	Party 59.1	%
Old-age	insurance-1957 Erlander	V	–	SAP	+	Centre	Party 54.1	%
Nuclear	energy-	1980 Fälldin	II	–	Centre	Party	+	Liberals	+	Moderate	Party 50.1	%
EU	membership-1994 Bildt	-	Centre	Party	+	Liberals	+	Moderate	Party	+	Christian	Democrats 48.7 %
Euro-2003 Persson	III	–	SAP 41.2 %
 
CONFLICT	MEDIATION.	The	fact	that,	 in	the	case	of	all	five	referendums,	the	initiator	
faced	internal	party	or	coalition	disagreement	(see	table	6.4)	increases	the	likelihood	
that	these	votes	were	motivated	by	a	desire	to	solve	these	divisions	to	retain	party	or	
coalition	unity.	This	was	a	highly	risky	strategy	in	all	the	referendums,	since	the	outcome	
of	the	votes	was	uncertain.	A	referendum	had	already	been	held	in	1922	to	settle	the	
issue	of	alcohol	prohibition.	Both	the	conservatives	and	the	liberals	were	divided	over	
the	issue	(Elgán	and	Scobbie,	166;	Anttila	and	Sulkunen	2001),	and	there	was	no	clear	
parliamentary	majority	 in	 favour	 of	 or	 against	 a	 ban.	Moreover,	 across	 the	 political	
spectrum,	the	ban	was	supported	for	different	reasons:	the	left	believed	that	no	profits	
should	be	made	from	the	consumption	of	alcohol;	the	Liberals,	at	least	most	of	them,	
felt	that	individuals	should	be	free	from	all	kinds	of	slavery,	including	alcoholism;	and	the	
Christian	parties	perceived	alcohol	consumption	as	sinful	(Anttila	and	Sulkunen	2001).	
The	debate	was	therefore	in	deadlock	and	the	minority	government	of	the	SAP	hoped,	
albeit	unsuccessfully,	to	settle	the	issue	by	holding	a	referendum	(Ruin	1996,	174).
	 More	than	30	years	later,	a	referendum	was	again	invoked	to	solve	a	conflict	in	the	
governing	coalition.	In	1955,	coalition	partners	SAP	and	the	agrarian	Centre	Party	held	
a	referendum	to	ask	the	Swedish	people	whether	they	wanted	to	change	from	driving	
on	the	left	side	of	the	road	to	the	right.	Although	this	had	been	proposed	previously,	
it	 never	 gained	 sufficient	 parliamentary	 support.	 Opposition	 was	 found	 across	 the	
political	spectrum	and	was	not	bound	to	party	ideologies.	The	opponents	mainly	feared	
an	increase	in	accidents	and	high	costs,	while	the	proponents	pointed	to	the	need	to	
harmonize	Swedish	traffic	rules	with	the	rest	of	the	European	continent	(Ruin	1996).	To	
reach	a	solution,	the	Centre	Party	proposed	submitting	the	issue	to	a	referendum.	The	
public	voted	down	the	proposal	to	change	to	the	right	by	an	overwhelming	majority	of	
83	per	cent.112 
	 While	the	driving	side	issue	cut	across	party	divides,	pension	reform	is	a	traditional	
issue	of	 inter-party	 conflict.	 It	 had	 caused	deep	divisions	within	 the	 coalition	of	 the	
Social	Democratic	Party	and	the	Centre	Party	led	by	Tage	Erlander.	The	SAP	preferred	
a	mandatory	system,	while	the	Centre	Party	preferred	a	voluntary	pension	system.	In	
112.	 	Despite	the	referendum	outcome,	in	1967	the	Swedish	parliament	agreed	to	change	the	driving	side	
to	the	right.
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addition,	 the	opposition	of	 the	 conservatives	and	 liberals	 also	preferred	a	 voluntary	
system	 but,	 unlike	 the	 Centre	 Party,	 without	 government	 involvement.	 As	 none	 of	
the	proposals	enjoyed	the	support	of	a	parliamentary	majority,	 the	coalition	faced	a	
possible	 breakdown.	 The	 deadlock	 suggests	 that	 the	 referendum	was	motivated	 by	
the	intention	to	enforce	an	outcome	and	consequently	prevent	a	split	in	the	coalition,	
especially	since	Erlander	had	initially	opposed	a	referendum	(Ruin	1996,	175-176).	The	
strategy	did	not	work:	the	electorate	rejected	the	Centre	Party’s	proposal	and	the	party	
left	the	coalition.113 
	 The	 nuclear	 energy	 issue	 also	 caused	 disagreements	 within	 the	 centre-right	
coalition.	The	issue	had	already	caused	a	breakdown	of	the	Fälldin	I	coalition	in	1978,	
as	 the	Centre	Party	 took	 a	firm	anti-nuclear	 stance	 against	 the	pro-nuclear	 position	
of	its	liberal	and	conservative	colleagues.	By	1979,	when	Thorbjörn	Fälldin	formed	his	
second	government,	controversy	over	the	issue	had	intensified	after	the	accident	at	the	
Three	Mile	Island	plant	in	the	United	States	(Ruin	1996,	176).	The	SAP	made	initial	calls	
for	a	referendum	in	the	run-up	to	the	1979	elections	as	a	way	to	neutralize	controversy	
over	the	issue	(Nohrstedt	2009,	315),	and	this	call	was	soon	supported	by	the	governing	
parties.	The	fact	that	the	coalition	was	still	divided	on	the	issue	makes	it	likely	that	the	
referendum	was	called	to	prevent	a	second	coalition	split	over	the	issue.	Unlike	in	1957,	
the	strategy	worked,	a	policy	proposal	could	be	elaborated	and	a	coalition	breakdown	
was	avoided.	
	 In	 contrast	 to	 these	 referendums,	 the	 issue	 of	 EU	 membership	 was	 broadly	
supported	 by	 parliament,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Swedish	 government	 had	 long	
rejected	 Swedish	 accession	 (Sitter	 2009,	 86).	 All	 four	 coalition	partners	were	 largely	
in	favour	of	EU	membership	and	the	only	opposition	in	parliament	came	from	the	Left	
(former	Communist)	Party	and	the	Greens	(Jahn	and	Storsved	1995,	27).	The	accession	
treaty	could	therefore	have	been	ratified	without	the	approval	of	 the	people	(Rydén	
2000,	 221-224;	 Sitter	 2009,	 88).	 In	 the	 vote	 in	 parliament	 on	 EU	membership	 on	 15	
December,	278	MPs	voted	 in	 favour	and	36	against,	 so	 the	 three-quarters	 threshold	
was	easily	reached	(Associated	Press	Worldstream	15.12.1994). Although	there	was	a	
strong	normative	conviction	that	EU	accession	required	popular	approval,	it	is	plausible	
that	the	disagreements	within	the	SAP	over	the	membership	issue	played	a	crucial	role	
in	the	initial	pledge.	When	Ingvar	Carlsson’s	social	democratic	government	applied	for	
EU	membership	in	1990,	the	party	was	still	largely	in	favour	of	a	Sweden’s	accession.	
However,	 after	 1991,	 the	 tide	 had	 turned	 and	 Eurosceptic	 fractions	 emerged	within	
the	SAP.	Moreover,	in	the	run-up	to	the	1994	general	elections,	the	Swedish	electorate	
became	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical	 (Jenssen,	 Pesonen	 and	 Gilljam	 1998),	making	 it	 a	
potential	issue	on	which	votes	could	be	lost.	This	makes	it	likely	that	the	SAP	supported	
113.	 	After	the	referendum,	the	social	democratic	minority	government	soon	began	to	work	out	a	pension	
proposal.	Again,	the	proposal	failed	to	get	sufficient	parliamentary	support.	It	took	new	elections	and	
shifts	within	the	Liberal	Party	for	the	proposal	to	gain	the	support	of	a	parliamentary	majority	(Lewin	
1988,	221-222).
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the	 referendum	 as	 a	 means	 to	 flip	 the	 coin	 to	 one	 side	 or	 the	 other,	 anticipating,	
however,	that	in	the	end	the	people	would	vote	‘yes’	(Aylott	2002,	449).	The	strategy	did	
not	work,	as	divisions	over	‘Europe’	remained.	Furthermore,	the	referendum	revealed	
a	deep	split	over	the	issue	among	SAP	voters:	55%	voted	in	favour	and	45%	against	EU	
membership	(Jenssen,	Pesonen	and	Gilljam	1998).
	 Divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 among	 the	 social	 democrats	 are	 again	 likely	 to	 have	
motivated	the	SAP’s	pledge	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	euro.	Due	to	divisions	in	the	
SAP,	even	 in	the	government,	the	Persson	government	decided	to	make	the	entry	to	
the	third	stage	of	the	EMU	dependent	on	a	separate	vote,	either	by	parliament	or	in	a	
referendum	 (Finansdepartementet	1997).	Persson’s	approach	 to	enforce	an	 informal	
opt-out	 from	 the	 eurozone	 received	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Swedish	 parliament	 on	 4	
December	 1997	 (Riksdagen	 4.12.1997).	While	 the	 SAP	 party	 leadership	 was	 largely,	
albeit	not	unanimously,	 in	favour	of	Sweden	adopting	the	euro,	Eurosceptic	fractions	
within	 the	party	gained	the	support	of	 the	Swedish	Trade	Union	Confederation	 (LO),	
the	party’s	main	support	block	(Miller,	Taylor	and	Potton	2003). After,	in	2000,	the	LO	
expressed	its	moderate	support	for	the	euro,	the	issue	was	put	to	a	vote	at	an	SAP	party	
congress.	Although	the	outcome	was	a	formal	pro-euro	stance,	a	substantial	proportion	
of	the	SAP	members	voted	against	this	decision,	so	that	the	party	adopted	a	‘wait	and	
see’	approach	and	aimed	to	delay	entry	(Widfeldt	2004,	506).	
	 Although	the	SAP	was	also	divided	over	the	TCE,	no	referendum	was	pledged.	As	
argued	above,	however,	the	chances	that	a	referendum	on	this	treaty	ratification	would	
have	been	lost	were	considerably	high,	which	explains	why	in	this	case,	the	government,	
which	was	wholeheartedly	 in	 favour	of	 the	TCE,	 downplayed	 the	 importance	of	 this	
treaty	and	opted	for	parliamentary	ratification	(Kurpas,	Incerti,	Schönlau,	and	De	Clerck-
Sachsse	2005,	23-24).	
DEPOLITICIZATION. Upcoming	 elections	 give	 parties	 or	 governments	 an	 additional	
incentive	to	pledge	a	referendum	on	a	controversial	issue	on	which	they	disagree.	As	
shown	in	table 6.4,	three	referendums	were	pledged	in	Sweden	when	elections	were	
upcoming:	on	nuclear	energy,	on	EU	accession	and	on	the	euro.	Although	the	nuclear	
energy	vote	was	officially	pledged	by	the	centre-right	coalition,	the	initial	pledge	was	
made	one	year	earlier	by	the	SAP.	The	party	called	for	a	referendum	to	be	held	after the 
1979	elections,	suggesting	that	its	call	was	motivated	by	the	desire	to	depoliticize	the	
controversial	issue	in	the	election	campaign	(Bogdanor	1994).	
	 The	 same	applies	 to	 the	 referendums	on	EU	membership	 and	 the	euro.	 In	 both	
cases,	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 hold	 the	 referendum	 after	 the	 general	 elections	
(in	1994	and	2002,	 respectively),	which	makes	 it	 likely	 that	 these	 referendums	were	
pledged	to	prevent	these	controversial	 issue	from	becoming	divisive	in	the	elections.	
Initially,	there	was	broad	support	for	EU	accession	among	the	electorate	and,	in	1991,	
when	the	centre-right	Bildt	government	took	office,	survey	data	revealed	that	public	
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support	 for	EU	membership	was	 roughly	65	per	cent	 (Bjørklund	1996,	16).	However,	
in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	1994	elections,	polls	 revealed	a	drop	 in	 support	 to	only	33	per	
cent,	which	was	fostered	by	the	Danish	‘no’	to	Maastricht	in	1992	(LeDuc	2003,	88;	see	
also:	Bjørklund	1996,	15;	 Jenssen,	Pesonen	and	Gilljam	1998).	While,	 in	 the	end,	 the	
Swedes	narrowly	voted	 in	 favour	of	membership,	 this	did	not	apply	 to	 the	euro	and	
opinion	polls	continued	to	show	opposition	to	the	euro	among	the	Swedish	people.	In	
1996,	Eurobarometer	data	revealed	that	roughly	55	per	cent	of	the	Swedes	opposed	
adopting	a	common	currency	(Standard	Eurobarometer	46,	33)	and,	by	the	autumn	of	
1997,	opposition	to	the	euro	had	not	fallen	significantly	(Standard	Eurobarometer	48,	
45).	By	2000,	it	had	reached	a	new	high	(Kirk	9.10.2000),	as	in	2000	over	60	per	cent	of	
the	Swedes	were	against	it	(Standard	Eurobarometer	54,	72).	Hence,	there	was	a	clear	
stake	for	the	Persson	government	not	to	let	the	issue	interfere	in	the	general	elections.
EU	BARGAINING. The	commitment	to	hold	a	referendum	in	a	country	where	a	large	part	
of	the	electorate	is	overwhelmingly	Eurosceptical	could	potentially	form	an	obstacle	to	
the	integration	process.	Hence,	when	a	government	is	in	favour	of	a	certain	EU	treaty	
ratification,	 it	 would	 be	 cautious	 in	 pledging	 a	 referendum,	 as	 such	 commitments	
could	potentially	harm	the	country’s	position	in	the	EU	arena	(Hug	and	Schulz	2007).	
This	is	likely	why	Swedish	governments	did	not	pledge	a	referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	
Amsterdam,	the	Treaty	of	Nice,	the	TCE	or	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	despite	the	fact	that	the	
issues	were	 controversial	 among	 the	public	 and	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 case	of	Amsterdam	
and	Nice,	elections	were	upcoming	(Closa	2007,	1317).	Moreover,	a	‘no’	vote	on	these	
treaties	would	have	hampered	the	 integration	process	altogether	and,	consequently,	
Sweden’s	position	in	the	EU	arena.	This	was	different	in	the	case	of	EU	membership	and	
the	euro,	as	these	issues	were	not	overwhelmingly	supported	by	the	government	(Miles	
2005).
	 In	 these	 two	cases,	 the	difference	 in	position	between	 the	Swedish	government	
and	its	European	counterparts,	makes	it	likely	that	referendums	on	these	issues	were	
pledged	 to	 strengthen	 Sweden’s	 bargaining	 position	 in	 the	 negotiations.114	 In	 the	
negotiations	on	EU	membership,	prime	minister	Carl	Bildt,	who	was	in	an	even	more	
favourable	 position	 as	 the	 referendum	 commitment	 had	 already	 been	made	 by	 his	
social	 democratic	 predecessor,	 was	 able	 to	 negotiate	 certain	 transitional	 rules	 and	
exemptions	in	the	accession	treaty,	most	prominently	with	respect	to	the	much	debated	
Swedish	‘snus’	tobacco	(Associated	Press	Worldstream	5.10.1993).	The	fact	that	there	
was	 a	 strong	 popular	 movement	 in	 Sweden	 that	 called	 for	 these	 exemptions	 as	 a	
condition	for	ratifying	the	membership	treaty	–	making	it	a	politically	and	electorally	
tricky	issue	–	suggests	that	the	commitment	to	a	referendum	also	served	to	influence	
the	negotiations	(McIvor	24.11.1993).
114.	 	However,	for	any	Swedish	government,	such	a	strategy	is	weak	given	the	advisory	character	of	
popular	votes.
6
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	 The	pledge	to	hold	a	euro	referendum	is	an	even	more	notable	example.	Calling	the	
referendum	gave	the	social	democratic	government	a	way	to	avoid	having	to	adopt	the	
single	currency,	despite	not	having	a	formal	opt-out	like	Denmark	and	the	UK.	One	of	
the	requirements	to	join	the	euro	is	two	years’	membership	of	the	European	Exchange	
Rate	Mechanism	 II	 (ERM	 II),	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 the	 convergence	 criterion	 of	 exchange	
rate	stability	and	enter	the	third	EMU	stage	–	 i.e.	adoption	of	the	euro.	Sweden	had	
chosen	not	 to	 join	 this	mechanism	and	thus	did	not	 fulfil	 the	exchange	rate	stability	
requirement,	meaning	 that	 it	was	able	 to	avoid	having	 to	 join	 the	euro	 (Miles	2005,	
4).	Sweden’s	decision	to	refrain	from	joining	the	ERM	II	was	tolerated	by	the	European	
Central	Bank,	because	its	position	was	legitimized	by	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	
(BBC	22.5.2002).	
6.3.4 The future of Swedish referendums?
One	important	reason	why	referendums	on	the	EU	have	not	played	a	prominent	role	in	
Swedish	politics	is	the	long	absence	of	electorally	appealing	Eurosceptic	parties.	What	
became	obvious	from	the	Danish	–	and	more	recently	the	French	and	British	cases	–	is	
that	EU	referendums	are	often	defensively	pledged	by	mainstream	parties	when	they	
are	 challenged	 by	 a	 Eurosceptic	 (populist)	 competitor.	 In	 Denmark,	 the	 Eurosceptic	
Danish	People’s	Party	has	been	successful	in	triggering	EU	referendums,	and	in	the	UK,	
both	the	Conservatives	and,	to	a	lesser	extent	Labour,	are	being	pushed	into	a	defensive	
corner	by	UKIP.	Also	in	France,	the	referendum	has	become	more	salient	due	to	calls	
from	the	Front National	to	hold	referendums	(on	for	example	immigration,	the	death	
penalty	and	the	EU).	For	a	long	time,	right-oriented	Swedish	voters	were	not	provided	
with	an	appealing	Eurosceptical	alternative,	as	Euroscepticism	traditionally	only	came	
from	the	radical	left.	
	 However,	as	in	the	UK,	the	stability	of	the	Swedish	political	landscape	has	recently	
been	challenged	by	a	populist	competitor	–	the	Sweden	Democrats	–	which,	like	UKIP,	
mobilizes	 voters	 on	 a	 strong	 Eurosceptical	 and	 anti-immigration	 agenda.	 For	 a	 long	
time,	no	radical	right	populist	party	was	able	to	successfully	enter	the	electoral	arena,	
despite	the	short-lived	New	Democracy	party	in	the	early	1990s	(cf.	Rydgren	2002).	This	
changed	 in	2006,	when	the	SD	gained	representation	 in	almost	half	of	 the	country’s	
municipalities	(Hellström,	Nilsson	and	Stoltz	2012,	186).	During	the	2010	elections,	the	
threshold	was	reached	and	the	party	obtained	20	seats	in	the	Riksdag;	with	49	seats	in	
the	2014	elections,	the	Sweden	Democrats	are	now	the	third	largest	party	(Jacobsen	
18.12.2014).	 With	 the	 SD’s	 increased	 electoral	 success,	 the	 chances	 that	 there	 will	
be	more	referendums	held	 in	Sweden	 in	the	future	have	 increased,	especially	where	
the	EU	is	concerned.	The	party	has	also	called	for	a	referendum	on	immigration	(The	
Local	29.8.2015).	In	this	context,	it	will	not	be	easy	for	Swedish	governments	to	avoid	
referendums	in	the	future.	Indeed,	for	mainstream	political	parties,	there	is	electorally	
now	much	more	 to	 lose	 over	 ‘Europe’,	which	 provides	 a	 clear	 incentive	 to	 separate	
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European	affairs	from	future	electoral	campaigns.
	 Moreover,	with	 the	 increased	success	of	 the	SD,	 it	will	become	more	difficult	 to	
obtain	a	three-quarters	majority	in	parliament	to	support	future	EU	treaty	ratifications.	
In	 that	 case,	 future	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications	 could	 also	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 constitutional	
revision,	 which	 requires	 a	 simple	 majority	 support	 in	 two	 parliamentary	 readings.	
When	such	a	ratification	is	approved	in	the	first	reading	by	a	simple	majority,	Chapter 
8, Article 16(1)	of	the	constitution	allows	one-third	of	MPs	to	trigger	a	referendum	to	
be	held	simultaneously	with	the	general	elections	(Nergelius	2011,	61).	Until	now,	this	
possibility	to	trigger	a	referendum	has	not	been	used.	But	with	the	increased	success	
of	 the	Swedish	Democrats,	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	Eurosceptic	bloc	of	SD,	 the	Green	
Party	and	the	Left	Party	will	have	sufficient	seats	to	trigger	a	referendum	is	ever	greater,	
especially	if	they	are	joined	by	Eurosceptic	MPs	from	the	mainstream	parties.
6.4 BRITISH AND SWEDISH REFERENDUMS COMPARED
This	chapter	has	dealt	with	two	countries	where	referendums	have	been	held	with	a	lower	
frequency	than	in,	for	example,	France	and	Denmark.	Between	1950	and	2014,	the	UK	
experienced	two	UK-wide	referendums	(in	1975	and	in	2011).	However,	pressures	from	
new	political	competitors	like	the	SNP	and	UKIP	have	led	to	a	revival	of	the	referendum,	
most	notably	on	issues	related	to	devolution,	independence	and	the	EU.	Referendums	
have	been	formalized	by	the	signing	of	the	PPERA	and	in	the	reformed	EUA.	In	Sweden,	
too,	where	only	five	referendums	were	held	between	1950	and	2014,	the	salience	of	the	
referendum	instrument	recently	increased	due	to	enhanced	electoral	competition	from	
the	Sweden	Democrats.	In	both	countries,	however,	the	decision	to	hold	a	referendum	
ultimately	lies	in	the	hands	of	political	representatives	rather	than	the	people.	Hence,	in	
these	countries,	the	revived	attention	to	the	referendum	instrument	certainly	does	not	
represent	a	shift	from	decision-making	by	representation	towards	decision-making	by	
direct	citizens’	participation.	The	central	questions	in	this	chapter	were	how	to	explain	
political	decisions	to	pledge	nationwide	referendums	in	countries	where	the	instrument	
is	not	often	used,	and	 to	explain	why	referendums	are	held	with	 lower	 frequency	 in	
these	countries	than	in	countries	like	France	and	Denmark.
	 As	the	UK	and	Sweden	are	two	different	countries	 in	terms	of	democratic	polity,	
I	was	able	to	distil	 the	shared	factors	that	can	account	for	their	relatively	 infrequent	
referendum	 use.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 absence	 (in	 the	 UK	 until	 2011)	 of	 a	 constitutional	
requirement,	which	makes	it	much	easier	to	avoid	referendums	than,	for	example,	in	
Denmark	or	Ireland,	where	referendums	are	mandatory	in	the	cases	of	constitutional	
reform	and	the	transfer	of	sovereignty.	The	second	factor	 is	 the	absence	of	a	strong	
referendum	 tradition,	 as	 is	 present	 in	 France,	 for	 example.	 Sweden	 had	 an	 early	
referendum	experience	 (here,	 the	referendum	was	 introduced	 in	1922),	but	 this	was	
6
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closely	 linked	 to	one	singular	 issue	 (the	prohibition	of	alcohol)	and	was	not	used	on	
other	issues	until	the	1950s.	In	the	UK,	the	first	UK-wide	referendum	was	held	in	1975.	
In	 both	 countries	 furthermore,	 the	main	 political	 parties	 underscore	 the	 primacy	 of	
parliamentary	 over	 popular	 sovereignty.	 A	 final	 factor	 that	 explains	 the	 limited	 role	
of	 the	 referendum	 in	 these	 countries	 is	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 veto	 players	
as	compared	to,	 for	example,	France	and	Denmark.	 In	the	UK,	referendums	can	only	
be	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	majority.	Given	the	British	political	 system,	majority	
support	 in	 parliament	 only	 requires	 in	 practice	 the	 support	 of	 the	 ruling	 majority,	
which	thus	holds	considerable	power	to	veto	referendum	bills.	Sweden	has	a	different	
system,	but	there	too	a	referendum,	at	least	on	regular	issues,	can	be	triggered	by	a	
parliamentary	majority.	In	fact,	in	Sweden,	the	number	of	veto	players	is	significantly	
increased	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	majority	 consists	of	more	political	parties	 than	 in	 the	
UK.	In	both	countries,	the	mainstream	parties	have	long	been	able	to	veto	referendum	
proposals.	
	 What	 best	 explains	why	 referendums	 have	 been	 held	 on	 such	 few	 occasions	 in	
these	two	countries?	Despite	the	vital	differences	in	terms	of	political	system,	the	case	
studies	on	the	UK	and	Sweden	revealed	interesting	similarities.	In	both	countries,	public	
demands	and	political	values	are	unlikely	to	have	played	a	decisive	role	as	the	authorities	
have	appeared	ambivalent	in	their	judgement	of	whether	a	referendum	was	appropriate,	
despite	 –	 or	 due	 to	 –	 consistent	 gaps	 between	 pragmatic	 pro-EU	 governments	 and	
Eurosceptical	electorates.	This	counters	the	sociological	institutionalist	argument	that	
referendums	are	held	when	political	leaders	find	it	appropriate	to	seek	additional	public	
legitimacy	for	controversial	issues,	or	that	in	doing	so,	these	leaders	are	responsive	to	
public	pressures.	By	contrast,	the	fact	that	consecutive	EU	treaty	reforms	found	little	
support	 among	 the	 British	 and	 Swedish	 electorates	 but	 were	 nevertheless	 ratified	
without	a	referendum,	underscores	the	rational	choice	institutionalist	assumption	that	
referendums	are	only	held	when	political	leaders	perceive	this	to	be	in	their	interest,	
and	that	they	choose	not	to	do	so	when	there	is	a	high	risk	that	the	vote	will	be	lost.	
	 Although	 the	 referendum	 gained	 prominence	 in	 Britain	 and	 Sweden	 in	 differing	
political	contexts,	there	are	some	parallels	to	be	drawn	as	to	political	representatives’	
strategic	interests	in	pledging	referendums.	First,	in	a	context	of	relatively	high	levels	
of	public	Euroscepticism,	political	leaders	in	both	countries	have	used	the	referendum	
as	a	‘buffer’	to	strengthen	their	bargaining	position	in	EU	negotiations.	Secondly,	ruling	
parties	have	used	the	referendum	to	neutralize	divisions	over	a	certain	issue	in	order	
to	preserve	party	or	coalition	unity.	Noteworthy	is	the	fact	that,	in	both	countries,	the	
mainstream	parties	are	divided	over	the	issue	of	European	integration,	which	provides	
an	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	 call	 a	 referendum	 to	 deflate	 intra-party	 or	 intra-coalition	
conflict,	 as	 occurred	 on	 EU	 membership	 and	 the	 euro.	 Finally,	 in	 both	 countries,	
referendums	have	been	used	 to	 separate	 controversial	 issues	 like	 ‘Europe’	 from	 the	
general	elections.	
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	 Despite	 these	 overlaps,	 there	 are	 also	 some	 clear	 differences	 in	 referendum	
motives,	which	can	to	a	 large	extent	be	traced	back	to	differences	 in	the	British	and	
Swedish	polities.	The	first	is	that,	unlike	in	Sweden,	British	governments	have	not	used	
the	referendum	as	an	instrument	to	pursue	policies	on	which	no	parliamentary	majority	
support	could	be	found.	This	is	due	to	the	nature	of	the	British	political	system:	British	
governments	depend	on	the	confidence	of	a	relative	majority	in	parliament,	making	a	
referendum	for	policy-seeking	motives	rather	superfluous.	In	Sweden,	on	the	contrary,	
the	 referendum	 has	 proved	 a	 necessary	 tool	 to	 pursue	 a	 certain	 policy	 when	 the	
process	of	consensus-building	has	failed,	and	when	government	and	parliament	were	
both	so	fragmented	that	no	majority	support	for	a	certain	policy	could	be	reached.	A	
second	difference	concerns	the	role	of	the	opposition.	In	the	UK,	the	long	prevalence	of	
two-party	competition	enabled	situations	in	which	both	Labour	and	the	Conservatives	
consistently	 called	 for	 referendums	 on	 ‘Europe’	 when	 in	 opposition	 as	 a	 way	 to	
strengthen	their	position	vis-à-vis	the	ruling	majority.	However,	both	parties	have	been	
able	to	withdraw	such	calls	once	in	office.	By	contrast,	in	Sweden,	the	referendum	issue	
has	entered	 the	political	 agenda	occasionally,	 but	never	with	 such	 controversy	 as	 in	
the	UK.	This	 is	due	to	Sweden’s	consensus	system	and	its	tendency	to	form	minority	
governments,	which	creates	different	government-opposition	dynamics	than	in	the	UK.	
	 The	recent	fragmentation	of	the	political	landscape	in	both	countries	–	due	to	the	
electoral	success	of	the	SNP	and	the	populist-right	UKIP	in	the	UK	and	of	the	populist-
right	 Sweden	Democrats	 in	 Sweden	–	has	made	 the	withdrawal	 of	 referendum	calls	
on	 controversial	 issues	 much	 more	 difficult.	 Such	 parties	 call	 for	 the	 use	 of	 more	
referendums,	especially	on	controversial	issues	that	cut	across	traditional	party	lines,	
such	as	the	EU	and	immigration.	Hence,	whether	more	British	and	Swedish	referendums	
will	be	held	in	the	future	depends	largely	on	the	electoral	success	of	these	parties.
6
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE NETHERLANDS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Belgium,	Cyprus,	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	are	the	only	EU	countries	where	the	
constitution	does	not	provide	for	the	holding	of	national	referendums.	Yet,	availability	
of	referendum	provisions	certainly	does	not	constitute	a	sine qua non for the use of 
referendums	since,	except	for	Germany,	these	countries	each	held	one	referendum	in	
the	period	between	1950	and	2014.	 In	addition,	during	 the	writing	of	 this	book,	 the	
Netherlands	held	its	second	national	referendum,	in	April	2016,	on	the	EU’s	Association	
Agreement	 with	 Ukraine.	 Nevertheless,	 absence	 of	 legislation	 does	 help	 to	 explain	
why	 referendums	 are	 hardly	 used	 in	 these	 countries	 at	 national	 level.	Whereas	 the	
previous	two	chapters	compared	different	countries	where	national	referendums	are	
institutionalized	and	used	regularly or occasionally,	this	chapter	examines	the	factors	
that	 prevent	 referendums	 from	 becoming	 institutionalized.	 It	 only	 deals	 with	 the	
Netherlands,	which	 I	 justified	 (in	chapter 3)	on	 the	basis	 that	Belgium,	Germany	and	
the	Netherlands	are	rather	comparable	in	terms	of	democracy	type	and	no	additional	
comparison	is	therefore	necessary	to	assess	whether	the	conclusions	apply	in	different	
polities.	 All	 three	 are	 consensus	 countries	 with	 a	 bicameral	 parliament,	 a	 relatively	
rigid	constitution,	and	either	a	federalist	(Belgium	and	Germany)	or	decentralized	(the	
Netherlands)	governing	structure.	By	contrast,	Cyprus	is	characterized	as	a	majoritarian	
democracy	but,	given	its	exceptional	political	context	of	being	a	divided	country,	I	do	
not	consider	it	suitable	for	comparison.	
	 There	are	three	reasons	why	the	Netherlands	is	a	suitable	case	to	examine	some	
of	 the	 theoretical	 considerations	 that	 have	 not	 been	 examined	 thoroughly	 in	 the	
previous	chapters,	most	notably	with	regard	to	 the	role	of	political values and party 
ideology.	First,	recurring	attempts	have	been	made	to	amend	the	constitution	to	allow	
for	the	use	of	binding	national	referendums,	but	they	have	all	failed.	Hence,	the	Dutch	
case	allows	the	factors	to	be	examined	that	led	to	this	failure,	and	a	comparison	with	
Denmark	and	Sweden,	where	opposition	parties	were	able	to	push	through	referendum	
legislation.	Secondly,	given	the	periodic	debate	on	the	issue,	the	Dutch	case	provides	
ample	 and	 accessible	 material	 to	 examine	 the	 course	 of	 the	 political	 debate,	 and	
especially	the	position	taken	by	various,	ideologically	different	parties.	Finally,	in	2014,	
despite	several	failed	attempts,	the	Dutch	parliament	passed	a	bill	allowing	for	a	citizen-
initiated	 referendum	on	 legislative	proposals	 that	are	approved	by	parliament	 (i.e.	 a	
citizens’	veto).	Due	to	its	advisory	nature,	this	bill	did	not	require	an	amendment	to	the	
constitution.	In	practice,	however,	its	introduction	implies	a	noteworthy	shift	in	Dutch	
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politics.	As	of	 2015,	 the	Netherlands	belongs	 to	 a	 small	 group	of	 countries,	most	of	
which	are	 in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	where	citizens	have	an	 instrument	–	albeit	
non-binding	–	to	correct	decisions	by	political	representatives.	
	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 first	 outline	 the	 exact	 provisions	 under	 the	 recently	 approved	
referendum	law	(section	7.2).	In	section	7.3,	I	examine	the	only	referendum	that	took	
place	 in	 the	Netherlands	between	1950	and	2014,	namely	the	vote	on	the	European	
Constitutional	 Treaty	 (TCE)	 in	 2005.	 In	 section	 7.4,	 I	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 six	
explanatory	factors	 identified	in	chapter 2	on	Dutch	referendum	practice	–	or	rather	
the	long	near-absence	of	such	practice.	I	show	that	especially	the	high	number	of	veto	
players	in	the	process	of	revising	the	Dutch	constitution	–	which	requires	approval	in	
the	two	houses	of	the	Dutch	parliament	in	two	parliamentary	readings,	with	elections	
in	between	–	explains	why	even	today	the	constitution	does	not	provide	for	the	use	
of	 referendums.	Moreover,	 given	 the	 proportionality	 of	 the	Dutch	 electoral	 system,	
the	support	of	a	relatively	large	number	of	parties	with	different	ideological	stances	is	
necessary	to	push	through	a	referendum	bill.	And	indeed,	both	in	1999	and	in	2004,	bills	
to	institutionalize	the	citizens’	veto	were	rejected	in	the	second	parliamentary	reading,	
after	being	vetoed	by	the	Christian	Democratic	Party	(in	Dutch:	Christen-Democratisch 
Appèl,	 CDA),	 the	 smaller	 confessional	 parties	 and	 the	 conservative	 Liberal	 Party	
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie,	VVD).	I	furthermore	investigate	what	enabled	
the	adoption	of	the	referendum	bill	that	provided	for	the	referendum	on	the	TCE,	and	
what	 led	to	 the	 institutionalization	of	 the	advisory	citizens’	veto	 in	2015.	 In	 the	final	
section,	I	briefly	outline	the	first	referendum	held	under	this	new	referendum	law,	on	
the	EU’s	association	agreement	with	Ukraine,	and	forecast	what	role	referendums	may	
play	in	future	Dutch	political	decision-making.	
7.2 DUTCH REFERENDUM LEGISLATION
As	stated	above,	the	Netherlands	is	one	of	the	few	countries	where	the	constitution	does	
not	entail	provisions	for	holding	national	referendums	(International	Constitutional	Law	
1989;	Rijksoverheid	 2008).	Nevertheless,	 since	 2015,	 the	Netherlands	 has	 a	 law	 that	
allows	citizens	to	trigger	a	referendum	–	based	on	the	collection	of	signatures	–	to	reject	
a	proposal	that	has	been	approved	by	parliament.	Citizens’	vetoes	can,	however,	not	be	
held	on	the	constitution,	the	monarchy,	the	state	budget,	bills	on	the	implementation	of	
treaties	or	international	law,	or	acts	that	apply	to	the	whole	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands	
(and	which	thus	also	apply	to	the	overseas	territories)	(Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden	2015).	Strictly	speaking,	it	is	not	a	veto,	since	the	outcome	is	only	advisory, 
so	the	government	is	not	obliged	to	adhere	to	it.	Rather,	it	is	corrective, as it takes place 
after	the	decision	has	been	made	in	parliament.	If	a	proposal	is	voted	down	by	a	majority	
of	votes	 in	a	referendum,	the	government	needs	to	reconsider	 it,	but	not	necessarily	
7
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revoke	it.	If	it	is	rejected	in	the	referendum	for	valid	reasons,	the	government	should	
present	another	proposal	to	either	retain	or	revoke	the	proposal	to	parliament,	which	
then	has	 to	 vote	 again.	Hence,	 although	 citizens	 can	only	advise	 the	 government	 to	
repeal	legislation,	the	referendum	is	nevertheless	a	rather	strong	means	of	correcting	
decision-making,	since	advisory	referendums	are	usually	politically	binding	in	practice	
in	that	ignoring	a	popular	verdict	comes	with	political	and	electoral	risks.
	 Given	 that,	 for	 two	 centuries,	 referendums	 played	 virtually	 no	 role	 in	 Dutch	
politics,	the	introduction	of	this	type	of	referendum	can	be	considered	as	representing	
an	exceptional	shift	towards	a	potentially	enhanced	role	for	Dutch	citizens	in	political	
decision-making.	 Indeed,	 given	 the	 long	 absence	 of	 referendum	 legislation	 in	 the	
Netherlands,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 parliament	 approved	 legislation	 that	 is	 a	 rather	
strong	expression	of	popular rather than representative sovereignty.	This	shift	was	set	in	
motion	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	with	a	series	of	proposals	to	introduce	referendum	
legislation,	 which	 were	 however	 repeatedly	 rejected.	 Other	 landmarks	 were	 the	
introduction	of	the	Temporary	Referendum	Act	(TRA)	in	2000,	which	enabled	advisory	
referendums	to	be	held	between	2002	and	2004,	the	first	Dutch	national	referendum	
on	the	EU	Constitution	in	2005,	and	the	introduction	of	the	agenda	initiative	in	2006,	
which	allows	Dutch	citizens	to	file	a	petition	to	put	issues	on	the	parliamentary	agenda.	
Lastly,	 in	 2014,	 parliament	 also	 approved	 a	 bill	 to	 allow	 the	 organization	 of	binding 
citizens’	vetoes.	However,	as	 this	bill	–	which	would	 replace	 the	 law	on	 the	advisory	
referendum	 –	 requires	 an	 amendment	 of	 the	 constitution,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 approved	
in	a	 second	parliamentary	 reading.	 This	 is	due	 to	 take	place	after	 the	parliamentary	
elections	of	2017.
	 The	current	Dutch	referendum	law	is	also	exceptional	in	comparison	with	other	EU	
member	states.	This	 is	firstly	because	citizen-initiated	referendums	are	only	possible	
in	a	few	EU	countries.	As	pointed	out	in	chapter 4,	citizens’	vetoes	are	only	provided	
for	 in	five	other	EU	member	states	 (Italy,	Latvia,	Luxembourg,115	Malta	and	Slovenia)	
and	citizens’	initiatives	in	six	(Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Lithuania	and	Slovakia).	
Outside	the	EU,	citizen-initiated	referendums	are	mostly	associated	with	Switzerland	
and	several	states	in	the	United	States,	most	notably	California.	
	 The	 exceptional	 character	 of	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 in	 the	 Netherlands	
stems	mainly	from	their	exact	provisions.	First,	under	Dutch	referendum	law,	citizens	
can only trigger an advisory	 referendum,	while	 in	other	EU	countries	citizen-initiated	
referendums	are	binding	in	effect.	In	addition,	a	turnout	quorum	is	applicable;	for	an	
outcome	to	be	valid,	at	 least	30	per	cent	of	the	total	electorate	needs	to	participate	
in	the	vote.	Applying	a	quorum	when	the	outcome	of	the	vote	 is	non-binding	seems	
redundant	 and,	 for	 that	 reason,	 there	 are	 no	 other	 EU	 countries	 where	 a	 quorum	
applies	to	advisory	referendums.	In	simple	terms,	such	a	quorum	means	that	the	advice	
of	citizens	is	valid	only	when	a	specific	proportion	of	the	electorate	has	participated	in	
115.	 	But	only	in	the	case	of	constitutional	amendments.
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the	vote.	
Finally,	 compared	 to	 other	 countries	 where	 citizens	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum,	 the	
signature	 threshold	 is	 considerably	 high.	 The	 collection	 of	 signatures	 to	 trigger	 an	
advisory	referendum	proceeds	 in	two	phases:	 in	the	first	phase	(of	4	weeks),	10,000	
signatures	 need	 to	 be	 collected	 to	 initiate	 a	 preliminary	 request	 and,	 in	 the	 second	
phase	(of	6	weeks),	300,000	additional	signatures	are	required	to	trigger	a	referendum.	
This	threshold	is	high	not	so	much	because	of	the	number	of	signatures	–	300,000	is	
roughly	2.5	per	cent	of	the	Dutch	electorate	(by	way	of	comparison,	in	Latvia	a	threshold	
of	10	per	cent	applies)	–	but	because	a	period	of	six	weeks	to	collect	the	signatures	is	
fairly	short	(in	Italy,	500,000	signatures	need	to	be	collected	within	three	months	and,	
in	Slovenia,	40,000	signatures	need	to	be	collected	in	35	days.
	 This	exceptional	character	of	Dutch	referendum	law	is	the	outcome	of	the	long	and	
complex	process	in	which	it	came	into	being.	Throughout	the	past	century,	several	state	
commissions	were	 installed	 to	 examine	 the	 desirability	 of	 introducing	 referendums,	
but	 they	never	 led	 to	 actual	 reform.	 The	 commissions	were	 installed	 in	 response	 to	
persistent	 demands	 from	 society	 and	 progressive	 political	 parties	 to	 reform	 Dutch	
political	 decision-making	 by	 providing	more	 opportunities	 for	 citizens	 to	 participate	
(Koning	 1995).	 The	 Biesheuvel	 commission	 in	 1984	was	 the	 first	 to	 recommend	 the	
introduction	of	the	citizens’	veto.	This	recommendation	was	later	also	adopted	by	the	
De	Koning	commission	in	1992.	The	Biesheuvel	commission	was	especially	important,	
as	 it	 was	 the	 first	 to	 unanimously	 support	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 referendum	
(Biesheuvel	 1984).	 As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 table 7.1,	 the	 current	 law	 is	 largely	 based	 on	
this	 commission’s	 recommendations.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 current	 law,	 the	 commission	
proposed a binding	 referendum.	 It	 also	 recommended	 a	 rejection quorum	 (which	 is	
stricter	than	the	currently	applicable	turnout	quorum)	and	proposed	that,	for	legislation	
to	be	voted	down,	the	opposing	majority	needed	to	constitute	at	least	30	per	cent	of	
the	 total	electorate.	This	 implies	either	a	very	high	 turnout	or	a	very	 large	opposing	
majority.	Biesheuvel’s	referendum	proposals	did	not	have	an	immediate	impact	as	they	
were	 rejected	 by	 the	 government	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 1984).	 After	
that,	it	took	another	ten	years	for	a	breakthrough	in	the	referendum	debate	to	occur	
(see section 7.2.	for	the	full	timeline).	
	 In	 October	 1995,	 the	 Wim	 Kok	 government–	 consisting	 of	 the	 Labour	 Party	
(Partij van de Arbeid,	PvdA),	the	conservative	liberal	VVD	and	the	progressive	liberals	
(Democraten ’66,	 D66)	 –	 submitted	 a	 proposal	 to	 parliament	 to	 institutionalize	 the	
citizens’	 veto	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 1995).	 Table 7.1	 (second	 column)	
outlines	 the	proposed	provisions	 (Kok	and	Dijkstal	1996).	 In	 terms	of	 thresholds,	 the	
proposal	was	much	 stricter	 than	 the	Biesheuvel	 proposal.	 For	 a	 preliminary	 request	
to	be	approved,	40,000	signatures	needed	 to	be	collected	 (rather	 than	10,000)	and,	
for	a	final	request,	600,000	additional	signatures	(rather	than	300,000)	were	required.	
The	bill	was,	however,	rejected	in	the	second	reading	in	the	Upper	House	in	1999.	As	a	
7
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gesture	towards	D66	–	which	advocated	direct	participatory	reform	–	the	Temporary	
Referendum	 Act	 (TRA)	 was	 introduced	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 2000).	
The	TRA	allowed	for	the	organization	of	consultative	citizens’	referendums	at	national,	
provincial	and	local	level	in	the	period	between	2002	and	2004.	In	terms	of	provisions,	the	
law	was	largely	based	on	the	proposal	by	the	first	Kok	government	(Kok-I)	(see	table 7.1, 
third	column).	Compared	to	the	TRA,	the	signature	threshold	for	initiating	a	referendum	
under	the	current	referendum	law	has	thus	been	considerably	loosened.	The	TRA	and	
the	current	law	are	similar	in	that	both	came	into	being	without	constitutional	revision,	
and	are	therefore	only	consultative	in	nature.	No	national	referendums	have	been	held	
on	the	basis	of	the	TRA.	
Table 7.1: Proposed provisions for the citizens’ veto
Biesheuvel 
commission
Kok 
governments
TRA Current Dutch 
citizens’ veto
Signatures 
Initiation
10,000 40,000 40,000 10,000
Signatures 
Final request
300,000 600,000 600,000 300,000
Quorum Rejection	quorum:	
Outcome	is	valid	if	
‘no’	vote	constitutes	
more	than	50	per	
cent	of	voters,	which	
constitutes	at	least	
30	per	cent	of	total	
electorate
Rejection	quorum:	
Outcome	is	valid	if	
‘no’	vote	constitutes	
more	than	50	per	
cent	of	voters,	which	
constitutes	at	least	
30	per	cent	of	total	
electorate
Rejection	quorum:	
Outcome	is	valid	if	
‘no’	vote	constitutes	
more	than	50	per	
cent	of	voters,	which	
constitutes	at	least	
30	per	cent	of	total	
electorate
Turnout 
quorum:	
Outcome	is	
valid	if	30	
per cent of 
electorate 
voted
Outcome Binding Binding Advisory Advisory
The	 TRA	 expired	 on	 1	 January	 2005,	 as	 the	 government	 of	 Jan	 Peter	 Balkenende,	
consisting	 of	 the	 CDA,	 the	 VVD	 and	 the	 populist	 right	 newcomer	 Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF),	had	decided	 in	2002	to	revoke	 it.	On	14	October	2004,	a	proposal	filed	by	the	
PvdA	and	the	Green	Party	(GroenLinks,	GL)	to	make	the	TRA	permanent	was	rejected	
in	parliament	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	14.10.2004).	This	happened	shortly	
after	the	rejection	of	a	second	bill	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto	(proposed	by	the	second	
Kok	government)	 in	June	2004.These	rejections	of	referendum	bills	 in	parliament	did	
not	mean	that	the	debate	on	direct	democratic	reform	had	stalled.	On	the	contrary;	
in	 2005,	 two	 separate	 referendum	bills	were	 initiated	 by	 parties	 in	 opposition.	One	
would	allow	 for	a	binding	citizens’	veto	and	was	 initiated	by	 the	GroenLinks and the 
PvdA,	 joined	 later	 that	 year	 by	 D66	 (Duyvendak	 and	 Dubbelboer	 2005;	 Duyvendak,	
Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2005).	The	other	bill	introduced	an	advisory	citizens’	veto	
and	was	initiated	by	the	PvdA,	D66	and	GroenLinks	(Dubbelboer,	Duyvendak	and	Van	
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der	Ham	2005).	Both	proposals	were	approved	by	the	Upper	House	in	2014	(Plasterk	
2014).	That	it	took	almost	ten	years	for	parliament	to	vote	upon	the	proposal	was	due	
to	several	changes	of	government	and	a	recurring	debate	about	its	desirability	and	its	
actual	provisions.	Consequently,	the	consultative	version	came	in	effect	in	July	2015.	As	
the	second	bill	requires	a	constitutional	revision	due	to	its	binding	character,	it	awaits	
parliamentary	approval	in	the	second	reading	after	the	2017	parliamentary	elections.
7.3 THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY REFERENDUM
The	Dutch	referendum	on	the	TCE	in	2005	was	organized	in	the	absence	of	referendum	
legislation	and	hence	ad hoc.	Although	referendums	have	been	held	at	local	level,	this	
was	the	first	national	referendum	in	the	contemporary	history	of	the	Netherlands	(Van	
der	Krieken	2015).116	At	the	time	of	the	Batavian	Republic,	several	referendums	were	
held	on	adoption	of	the	constitution,	namely	in	1797,	1798,	1801	and	1805,	but	after	
that	none	were	used	in	national	political	decision-making.	The	decision	to	organize	a	
referendum	on	the	TCE	can	be	considered	remarkable.	Of	all	countries	that	committed	
themselves	 to	 holding	 a	 referendum	on	 the	 TCE,	 the	Netherlands	was	 the	 only	 one	
that	had	not	organized	a	national	referendum	in	 its	modern	history.	This	means	that	
all	previous	EU	treaty	 reforms	had	been	approved	by	parliament.	The	referendum	 is	
also	remarkable	because	it	was	initiated	by	the	opposition	and	initially	went	against	the	
wishes	of	 the	government,	especially	of	 the	main	governing	party,	 the	CDA.117	Prime	
minister	 Jan	 Peter	 Balkenende	 fervently	 opposed	 the	 referendum	 and	 questioned	
whether	 the	 issue	at	 stake	was	 ‘suitable	 for	a	simple	yes	or	no’	 (Koelé	11.6.2003).118 
Also,	he	argued	that,	as	the	Netherlands	would	hold	the	EU	presidency	in	the	second	
half	of	2004,	a	‘no’	vote	in	the	referendum	(which	was	initially	planned	to	be	held	at	
the	same	time	as	the	EP	elections	in	June	2004)	would	seriously	undermine	the	Dutch	
position	in	the	EU	arena	(NRC	Handelsblad	17.6.2003).	
	 The	 referendum	was	 originally	 initiated	 in	 October	 2002,	 when	 PvdA	MP	 Frans	
Timmermans	filed	a	motion	to	parliament	to	organize	a	referendum	on	the	outcome	
of	the	European	Convention,	which	had	been	mandated	with	the	task	of	drafting	an	EU	
constitution.	Despite	opposition	from	the	confessional	parties	and	the	VVD,	the	motion	
obtained	 a	 majority	 in	 parliament	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 5.11.2002).	
Nevertheless,	the	government	–	consisting	of	the	CDA,	the	VVD	and	the	newly	founded	
populist	 LPF	–	decided	 to	disregard	 it.	This,	 together	with	a	 rejected	motion	 to	hold	
116.	 	Referendums	have	been	held	in	the	overseas	territories	but	they	only	applied	to	these	countries.	
They	are	therefore	excluded	here	as	I	only	focus	on	sovereign	states	that	are	members	of	the	EU	(in	
the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands	this	only	applies	to	the	Netherlands).	
117.	 	Hence,	strictly	speaking	the	referendum	was	decision-controlling,	as	the	actor	that	triggered	the	vote	
was	not	the	actor	that	drafted	the	proposal.
118.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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a	referendum	on	the	EU	accession	of	the	ten	Central	Eastern	European	countries	(De	
Graaf	et	al.	2002),	led	to	a	heated	debate	on	the	desirability	of	having	a	referendum	on	
the	EU	(Nijeboer	2005:	395).	Consequently,	after	the	2003	elections,	three	MPs	from	
the	PvdA,	the	D66	and	GroenLinks	 introduced	a	bill	proposing	the	organization	of	an	
advisory	referendum	on	the	outcome	of	the	Convention	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	and	Van	
der	Ham	2003).	In	a	debate	in	parliament	on	10	June	2003,	it	was	clear	that	a	majority	
would	be	in	favour	of	the	referendum	(NRC	Handelsblad	11.6.2003).	After	the	Council	of	
State,	a	constitutionally	established	body	that	advises	the	Dutch	government,	ruled	that	
it	had	no	legal	objections	to	the	referendum,	the	road	to	a	referendum	was	clear.	
	 Although	the	VVD	had	opposed	the	Timmermans	motion	in	2002,	it	was	responsive	
to	 the	 Council	 of	 State’s	 judgement	 and	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 bill	 (De	 Volkskrant	
11.9.2003).	This	 change	 in	position	was	mainly	due	 to	 the	 role	played	by	 the	party’s	
newly	 appointed	 leader,	 Jozias	 van	 Aartsen,	 who	 was	 a	 proponent	 of	 referendums	
in	 general	 and	most	 notably	 of	 a	 referendum	on	 the	 EU	 constitution.	His	 view	was,	
however,	certainly	not	widely	 supported	within	 the	party.	Although,	 in	 the	end,	Van	
Aartsen	 was	 able	 to	 convince	 his	 party	 members	 in	 parliament,	 VVD	 Minister	 of	
Finance	Gerrit	Zalm	called	a	referendum	on	Europe	‘too	complicated’	(De	Gelderlander	
11.9.2003),	while	party	member	and	State	Secretary	for	European	Affairs	Atzo	Nicolai	
argued	 that	 a	 referendum	was	 ‘risky’	 as	 it	would	put	 unwanted	pressure	on	 the	 EU	
negotiations	 and	 could	 easily	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence	 in	 the	 incumbent	
government	 rather	 than	 actually	 dealing	 with	 Europe	 (NRC	 Handelsblad	 1.10.2003).	
In	addition,	VVD	member	of	 the	European	Parliament	 (EP)	Hans	van	Baalen	 referred	
to	 the	 referendum	 as	 a	 ‘desperate	 remedy’119	 and	 argued	 that	 Dutch	 citizens	 had	
mandated	their	representatives	to	make	a	judgement	on	the	constitution	for	them	(NRC	
Handelsblad	17.6.2003).	
	 Due	to	the	VVD’s	shift	in	position,	there	was	a	parliamentary	majority	in	favour	of	
the	bill,	with	only	the	confessional	parties	voting	against	 (Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-
Generaal	25.11.2003).	The	initiators	of	the	bill	explicitly	rejected	the	option	of	organizing	
a	 referendum	 under	 the	 TRA,	 as	 that	 would	 only	 be	 possible	 after	 parliamentary	
approval	of	the	TCE.	Since	the	initiators	wanted	to	have	the	referendum	at	the	same	
time	as	the	EP	elections	in	2004	to	boost	turnout,	this	was	considered	too	late	(Karimi,	
Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	6).	As	there	was	no	constitutional	basis	for	holding	
referendums,	 the	 referendum	 regulations	 were	 to	 be	 decided	 by	 parliament,	 and	
were	consequently	the	subject	of	controversy	(Lucardie	2005,	107).	The	CDA	argued	in	
favour	of	a	high	quorum,	calling	for	the	treaty	to	be	rejected	only	if	60	per	cent	or	more	
voted	against	it,	with	a	turnout	of	30	per	cent	of	the	total	electorate.	Other	parties	like	
the	PvdA	also	argued	in	favour	of	the	30	per	cent	turnout	threshold,	but	were	of	the	
opinion	that	a	simple	majority	should	be	sufficient	to	reject	the	treaty	(Lucardie	2005,	
109).	 In	 the	end,	only	 the	 turnout	quorum	was	 applied.	As	 the	European	 summit	of	
119.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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December	2003	failed,	the	referendum	was	postponed	to	1	June	2005.	After	the	French	
had	already	voted	against	the	TCE	in	a	referendum	held	a	few	days	earlier	on	29	May,	
the	Dutch	followed	suit	with	a	solid	majority	of	61.5	per	cent,	with	a	turnout	of	63.3	
per	 cent.	Although	 this	 referendum	was	advisory,	 the	Dutch	government	had	 stated	
beforehand	that	it	would	adhere	to	the	outcome	(ANP	12.6.2003).		
7.4 EXPLAINING DUTCH REFERENDUM PRACTICE
The	referendum	on	the	TCE	and	the	introduction	of	the	citizens’	veto	marked	a	change	
in	Dutch	politics.	Until	2005,	a	referendum	on	the	EU	was	not	a	viable	option	and	all	
previous	EU	treaty	ratifications	had	been	approved	by	parliament.	So	why	did	parliament	
opt	for	a	referendum	to	ratify	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	in	2005?	Moreover,	
while	the	use	of	referendums	was	not	regulated	by	 law	until	2015,	the	citizens’	veto	
is	–	although	advisory	–	one	of	the	most	elite-challenging	types	of	referendum.	What	
explains	 the	 long	absence	of	 referendum	 legislation,	and	 the	 recent	breakthrough?	 I	
will	answer	these	questions	by	assessing	the	importance	of	the	six	factors	identified	in	
chapter	2	that	are	expected	to	impact	upon	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	national	
referendums.
TYPE	OF	DEMOCRACY
On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 institutional	 fit	 thesis,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	
the	 citizens’	 veto	 in	 the	Netherlands	was	 not	 especially	 remarkable.	 Although,	 after	
citizens’	 initiatives,	 citizens’	 vetoes	 are	 the	most	 challenging	 type	of	 referendum	 for	
the	authorities	(as	compared	to	referendums	triggered	by	representatives),	they	allow	
for	the	integration	of	minority	views	in	decision-making	(as	compared	to	referendums	
triggered	by	a	political	majority)	because	they	give	minority	groups	the	possibility	of	
vetoing	 legislative	 proposals	 approved	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority.	 In	 this	 respect,	
citizens’	vetoes	therefore	fit	in	with	the	Dutch	consensus	democracy	based	on	power-
sharing	and	proportional	 representation.	Although	a	 legislative	minority	 referendum	
–	after	the	Danish	example	–	would	have	‘fitted’	better,	as	this	type	of	referendum	gives	
primacy	 to	 representative	 rather	 than	 popular	 sovereignty,	 the	Dutch	 case	 provides	
some	support	for	the	institutional	fit	thesis.	Indeed,	as	I	showed	in	chapter 4,	legislation	
for	holding	citizen-initiated	 referendums	 is	more	commonly	 found	among	consensus	
democracies	than	majoritarian	ones.	
	 The	application	of	a	 turnout	quorum	also	 supports	 the	 thesis,	 since	a	quorum	–	
depending	on	its	 level	–	 limits	the	decision-making	power	of	the	voting majority in a 
referendum	by	making	sure	that	a	certain	proportion	of	the	electorate	participates	in	
the	vote.	Quorums	therefore	make	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	more	proportional.	
However,	a	turnout	quorum	of	30	per	cent	is	not	remarkably	high,	meaning	that	the	limit	
7
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on	the	power	of	the	voting	majority	to	effectuate	a	valid	outcome	is	only	small.	By	way	
of	comparison,	minority	legislative	referendums	in	Denmark	have	a	rejection	quorum	of	
30	per	cent,	meaning	that	the	majority	against	the	proposal	needs	to	encompass	30	per	
cent	of	the	electorate.	Such	a	rejection	quorum	is	thus	more	strict	than	a	simple	turnout	
quorum	of	30	per	 cent.	Under	Dutch	 referendum	 law,	 a	 fervent	minority can rather 
easily turn into a voting majority	in	the	referendum	and	thus	veto	a	legislative	proposal	
that	is	approved	by	the	parliamentary	majority,	especially	if	a	considerable	proportion	
of	 the	 electorate	 abstains.	 For	 example:	 under	 the	 current	 legislation,	 a	minority	 of	
16	per	 cent	of	 the	electorate	 is,	with	a	 turnout	of	31	per	 cent,	 sufficient	 to	win	 the	
referendum.	
	 Quorums	 have	 a	 strong	 effect	 on	 the	 proportionality	 of	 referendum	 outcomes,	
and	as	such	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	the	 issue	of	 the	turnout	quorum	was	debated	 in	
the	 Dutch	 parliament.	 However,	 given	 the	 advisory	 character	 of	 the	 Dutch	 citizens’	
referendum,	the	turnout	quorum	is	striking.	No	other	EU	countries	apply	a	quorum	to	
advisory	referendums.	As	already	discussed	in	the	Danish	case	study,	quorums	tend	to	
encourage	strategic	voting	behaviour	(cf.	Pauly	2013).	In	the	Dutch	case,	proponents	of	
the	legislative	proposal	could	be	encouraged	to	abstain	from	voting	on	it	to	prevent	a	
valid	‘no’	vote.	In	this	way,	applying	a	quorum	to	an	advisory	referendum	thus	provides	
a	double	incentive	for	citizens	that	support	the	proposal	to	abstain:	first	because	the	
outcome	is	only	advisory	to	the	authorities	(which	have	already	approved	the	proposal	
by	majority)	and	second	because,	by	abstaining,	 they	can	potentially	prevent	a	valid	
outcome.	Hence,	this	imposes	limits	on	the	participatory	character	of	the	Dutch	citizens’	
veto.			
NUMBER	OF	VETO	PLAYERS	
The	absence	of	a	constitutional	basis	for	holding	referendums	in	the	Netherlands	is	a	
direct	consequence	of	 the	nature	of	 the	Dutch	polity,	which	provides	 for	a	relatively	
high	 number	 of	 partisan	 and	 non-partisan	 veto	 players.	 This	 is	 enshrined	 in	 both	
the	 procedure	 to	 revise	 the	 constitution	 and	 the	 strict	 proportionality	 of	 the	Dutch	
electoral	system.	Amending	the	constitution	requires	approval	of	the	two	houses	of	the	
Dutch	parliament	in	two	parliamentary	readings,	with	elections	in	between.	In	the	first	
reading,	the	bill	needs	to	be	approved	by	a	simple	majority	and,	in	the	second	reading,	
by	a	two-thirds	majority.	Hence,	there	are	four	moments	at	which	MPs	can	vote	down	
a	reform	bill.	This	makes	revising	the	Dutch	constitution	a	daunting	task.	And	indeed,	
the	attempts	of	both	 the	Kok-I	 (1994-1998)	 and	 the	Kok-II	 (1998-2002)	 governments	
to	 introduce	 the	 citizens’	 veto	 ran	 aground	 in	 the	 complex	 process	 of	 revising	 the	
constitution.	The	first	proposal	(introduced	by	Kok-I	 in	1995)	was	rejected	 in	1999	in	
the	second	 reading	 in	 the	Upper	House,	after	a	16-hour	debate	 that	became	known	
as	the	‘Night	of	Wiegel’.	The	required	two-thirds	majority	fell	short	by	only	one	vote,	
when	VVD	 senator	Hans	Wiegel	 rejected	 the	bill	 (Eerste	Kamer	der	 Staten-Generaal	
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18.5.1999).	 By	doing	 so,	Wiegel	 departed	 from	 the	official	 party	 line,	 since	 the	VVD	
was	a	member	of	the	Kok-II	coalition	and	thus	the	co-initiator	of	the	referendum	bill.120 
The	second	proposal	(introduced	by	Kok-II	in	2000)	was	voted	down	during	the	second	
parliamentary	reading	in	the	Lower	House	in	2004,	when	both	the	CDA	and	the	VVD	
(which	was	now	no	longer	bound	by	a	coalition	agreement)	voted	against.	Hence,	on	
both	occasions	the	bill	ran	aground	in	the	complex	process	of	revising	the	constitution,	
and	the	relatively	large	number	of	veto	points	(four	–	two	houses	in	two	readings).
	 The	reason	why	the	citizens’	veto	has	now	been	approved	is	a	direct	result	of	the	
fact that it did not	require	a	constitutional	revision	and	only	a	simple	majority	in	one	
parliamentary	 reading	 (in	 both	 houses).	 The	 VVD,	 CDA	 and	 the	 smaller	 confessional	
parties	voted	against	in	both	houses,	but	their	share	of	seats	was	insufficient	to	block	a	
simple	majority.	The	future	of	the	binding	variant	is	uncertain	as	it	has	to	be	approved	
by	a	two-thirds	majority	 in	both	chambers	after	the	parliamentary	elections	of	2017,	
which	entails	considerably	more	veto	points	and	players.	
	 Constitutional	rigidity	and	bicameralism	cannot,	however,	explain	the	full	picture.	
Of	 particular	 importance	 is	 the	 role	 of	partisan	 veto	 players	 (i.e.	 political	 parties	 or	
MPs).	 Jacobs	 (2011,	 201)	 argued	 that,	 in	 countries	 with	 a	 high	 number	 of	 partisan	
veto	players,	reform	can	occur	when	parties	work	together	to	block	the	power	of	the	
existing	cartel	when	it	threatens	to	veto	a	reform.121	In	the	Netherlands,	the	CDA	and	
the	smaller	confessional	parties	have	consistently	formed	a	bloc	large	enough	to	veto	
the	referendum	bill	 in	parliament	(Lucardie	2010).	Moreover,	 in	1999,	the	support	of	
only	one	VVD	senator	was	required	to	veto	the	bill	while,	in	2004,	the	VVD	also	joined	
the	 vetoing	 cartel.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 CDA	 is	 especially	 important	 as	 the	 party	 –	 or	 its	
predecessors	–	have	been	part	of	almost	all	post-WWII	governments.	Consistent	with	
Jacobs’	findings,	breakthroughs	in	the	referendum	debate	only	occurred	at	times	when	
the	CDA	was	in	opposition	and	lost	seats	while	the	seat	share	of	D66	(in	1994-1998)	or	
the	leftwing	parties	(2012-present)	increased.	This	loss	of	power	on	the	part	of	the	CDA	
in	the	elections	of	2010	and	2012	ensured	that	the	pro-referendum	parties	were	able	to	
get	the	referendum	bill	approved	in	parliament	in	2013	(Lower	House)	and	2014	(Upper	
House).
	 Despite	the	absence	of	referendum	legislation,	referendums	could	potentially	have	
been	triggered	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	which	would	require	the	support	of	a	parliamentary	
majority.	In	a	proportional	system	like	the	Netherlands,	acquiring	such	a	majority	is	not	
straightforward,	as	it	requires	the	support	of	many	ideologically	diverse	parties.	In	the	
case	of	the	TCE	referendum,	a	majority	was	achieved	due	to	a	shift	in	position	by	the	
VVD.	In	the	end,	only	the	confessional	parties	voted	against	the	bill.	In	2007,	however,	
120.	 	Dutch	senators	are	not	bound	to	coalition	agreements.	
121.	 	In	Sweden,	for	example,	when	a	non-social	democratic	coalition	gained	a	majority	of	the	seats	
during	two	subsequent	elections	(in	1976	and	1979),	it	was	able	to	block	the	veto	power	of	the	
social	democrats	and	push	through	the	institutionalization	of	the	binding	constitutional	minority	
referendum.
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majority	support	for	a	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty	was	not	reached	when	the	PvdA	
voted	against	it.	Consequently,	when	it	comes	to	the	initiation	of	ad	hoc	referendums	
in	the	Netherlands,	the	large	number	of	partisan	veto	players	makes	the	adoption	of	
referendum	bills	more	uncertain	than	in	majoritarian	systems	like	France	and	the	UK.	
PAST	EXPERIENCE
One	could	argue	that	the	fact	that	only	one	referendum	has	been	held	in	the	Netherlands	
is	due	to	the	fact	that,	apart	from	the	consecutive	referendums	held	during	the	Batavian	
Republic,	 the	 country	 has	 had	 no	 referendum	 tradition.	 However,	 this	 argument	
neglects	the	fact	that	the	referendum	did	play	a	significant	role	in	the	political	debate	
from	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.	Throughout	that	century,	the	referendum	
question	was	on	and	off	the	political	agenda,	and	the	recent	adoption	of	the	citizens’	
veto	dates	back	to	discussions	in	various	state	commissions	and	parliamentary	votes.	
Table 7.2	provides	a	timeline	of	key	events	in	the	Dutch	referendum	debate.	After	the	
issue	had	been	debated	 in	 the	Dutch	parliament	 in	 the	1890s,	first	demands	 for	 the	
institutionalization	of	the	citizens’	veto	were	expressed	in	1903	by	the	Social	Democratic	
Labour	 Party	 (SDAP),	 which	 merged	 into	 the	 PvdA	 in	 1946.	 As	 in	 Switzerland,	 this	
proposal	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto	was	linked	to	the	abolition	of	the	Upper	House.	
The	proposal	was,	however,	rejected	in	parliament	(Rosema	2009;	Lucardie	2010).	
	 In	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 referendum	 issue	 was	 discussed	 in	 five	 state	
commissions.	Installing	such	commissions	to	discuss	constitutional	reform	is	a	typical	
Dutch	way	 to	 discuss	 issues	 that	 fundamentally	 divide	 Dutch	 politics	 (Van	 Leeuwen	
2013a).	In	the	late	nineteenth	century,	introduction	of	the	referendum	on	constitutional	
reform	 (as	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	 second	 parliamentary	 reading)	was	 discussed	 by	 the	
Heemskerk	 commission,	which	 rejected	 the	 issue	 by	majority	 (Van	 Leeuwen	 2013b,	
41).	The	Ruijs	de	Beerenbrouck	commission,	installed	in	1918,	was	the	first	commission	
that	dealt	with	the	institutionalization	of	citizen-initiated	referendums.	The	commission	
rejected	 such	 referendums	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 were	 seen	 as	 incompatible	
with	parliamentary	decision-making	 and	would	undermine	 the	 legitimacy	of	 general	
elections	 (Ruijs	 de	 Beerenbrouck	 1920,	 5).	 However,	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 commission	
expressed	support	for	introducing	a	mandatory	referendum	on	constitutional	revisions	
(to	replace	the	second	parliamentary	reading)	and	on	a	change	of	regime	type	(Ruijs	de	
Beerenbrouck	1920,	5-6;	see	also	Van	Leeuwen	2013b,	93-99).	
	 In	its	subsequent	proposal	to	revise	the	constitution	in	1921,	the	government	only	
incorporated	the	proposal	to	introduce	the	mandatory	referendum	on	the	constitution	
(Van	 der	 Krieken	 2015,	 8).	 This	 proposal	 was,	 however,	 rejected	 in	 parliament,	
simultaneously	with	the	rejection	of	a	motion	that	was	filed	by	the	Liberal	Democratic	
League	(VDB)	–	which	also	merged	into	the	PvdA	in	1946	–	to	 introduce	the	citizens’	
veto	(Koning	1995,	233).
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After	the	Second	World	War,	the	referendum	issue	was	again	discussed	during	debates	
on	 constitutional	 reform.	However,	 this	 did	not	 lead	 to	 concrete	proposals	 (Van	der	
Krieken	 2015,	 9).	 Two	 consecutive	 state	 commissions	 (Van	 Schaik	 (1950)	 and	 Cals/
Donner	 (1967))	 argued	 against	 the	 introduction	 of	 referendums	 in	 Dutch	 politics	
(Van	Leeuwen	2013b).	The	Biesheuvel	commission,	installed	in	1982	by	the	Van	Agt	II	
government	(CDA,	PvdA	and	D66),	was	the	first	state	commission	that	wholeheartedly	
and	unanimously	supported	the	citizens’	veto	and	the	citizens’	initiative.	Moreover,	as	
argued	in	section	7.2,	the	Biesheuvel	commission	formulated	a	detailed	proposal	of	how	
such	referendums	were	to	be	organized.	Until	then,	the	state	commissions	had	discussed	
the	implementation	of	citizen-initiated	referendums,	rather	than	those	initiated	by	law
Table 7.2: Timeline of events in the Dutch referendum debate
Period Events
1903 Proposal	SDAP:	implementation	citizens’	veto	<>	abolition	Upper	House	> rejected
1918-1920 Ruijs	de	Beerenbrouck	commission:	rejection	citizens’	initiative	and	citizens’	veto;	in	favour	of	a	
mandatory	referendum	on	constitutional	revision	(linked	to	abolition	of	second	parliamentary	
reading)	and	of	the	mandatory	referendum	on	a	change	of	regime	time
1921 Bill	Ruijs	de	Beerenbrouck-I:	introduction	mandatory	referendum	on	constitution	>	rejected
Proposal	VDB:	implementation	citizens’	veto	> rejected
1950-1954 Van	Schaik	commission:	Rejection	of	referendums
1967-1971 Cals/Donner	commission:	small	majority	against	citizens’	veto;	majority	against	citizens’	initiative
1982-1984 Biesheuvel	commission:	In	favour	of	rejective	citizens’	veto	and	citizens’	initiative	
1992 De	Koning	commission:	In	favour	of	rejective	citizens’	veto	> proposal PvdA > rejected
October	1995 Bill	Kok-I	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto
June	1997 Approval	referendum	bill	Kok-I	in	first	reading	Lower	House
March	1998 Approval	referendum	bill	Kok-I	in	first	reading	Upper	House
February	1999 Approval	referendum	bill	Kok-I	in	second	reading	Lower	House
May	1999 Rejection	referendum	bill	Kok-I	in	second	reading	Upper	House
March	2000 Bill	Kok-II	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto
February	2001 Approval	referendum	bill	Kok-II	in	first	reading	Lower	House
July	2001 Approval	referendum	bill	Kok-II	in	first	reading	Upper	House
November	2003 Bill	on	referendum	European	Constitutional	Treaty	approved	in	Lower	House
June	2004 Rejection	referendum	bill	Kok-II	in	second	reading	in	Lower	House
October	2004 Rejection	extension	Temporary	Referendum	Bill	in	Lower	House
January	2005 Bill	on	referendum	European	Constitutional	Treaty	approved	in	Upper	House
June	2005 Initiative	proposal	to	introduce	the	binding	citizens’	veto	(GroenLinks	&	PvdA)
November	2005 Initiative	proposal	to	introduce	the	consultative	citizens’	veto	(PvdA,	GroenLinks	and	D66)
February	2013 Approval	bill	consultative	veto	PvdA/D66/GroenLinks	Lower	House
April	2013 Approval	bill	binding	veto	PvdA/D66/GroenLinks	in	first	reading	in	Lower	House
April	2014 Approval	two	referendum	bills	PvdA/D66/GroenLinks	in	first	reading	in	Upper	House
7
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or	political	representatives.	The	Biesheuvel	commission	also	discussed	the	introduction	
an	advisory	referendum	initiated	by	political	representatives.	However,	a	majority	of	the	
members	rejected	this	type	of	referendum	on	the	grounds	that	the	advisory	character	
of	the	outcome	would	lead	to	frustration	and	disappointment	(Biesheuvel	1984,	50,	83-
84,	and	90).	No	formal	legislative	proposal	followed	from	the	Biesheuvel	commission.
	 Despite	 the	 limited	 impact	 of	 the	 Biesheuvel	 commission,	 concerns	 about	 the	
functioning	of	Dutch	democracy	remained.	Seven	years	later,	in	1992,	when	the	PvdA	
had	joined	the	CDA	in	the	third	government	led	by	Ruud	Lubbers,	another	commission	
was	installed	to	investigate	the	desirability	of	referendum	legislation.	In	line	with	the	
Biesheuvel	commission,	this	De	Koning	commission	advised	in	favour	of	the	citizens’	veto	
(Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal 1993a).	 Again,	 however,	 the	 recommendations	
had	no	immediate	effect,	as	a	subsequent	motion	to	introduce	the	referendum	in	Dutch	
politics	by	PvdA	MP	Erik	Jurgens	was	rejected	in	parliament	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-
Generaal	1993b).122	This	was	the	first	time	since	1921	that	the	Dutch	parliament	voted	
on	a	proposal	to	institutionalize	the	referendum.	The	De	Koning	commission	was	the	
last	to	address	the	referendum	issue	before	the	first	Kok	government	–	consisting	of	the	
PvdA,	the	VVD	and	D66	–	filed	a	proposal	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto.	When	both	
this	proposal	and	a	subsequent	one	were	voted	down	in	parliament,	and	after	the	Dutch	
people	had	rejected	the	EU	Constitution	in	an	ad	hoc	referendum	in	2005,	a	National	
Convention	consisting	of	a	wide	range	of	experts	was	installed	in	2006	to	address	a	wide	
range	of	democratic	reforms,	including	the	referendum.	The	Convention	also	called	for	
the	institutionalization	of	the	binding	citizens’	veto	(Nationale Conventie	2006,	19).
	 Path	dependency	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 institutionalization	of	 the	 citizens’	
veto.	The	proposal	by	the	first	Kok	government	to	introduce	the	referendum	into	the	
Dutch	constitution	was	based	on	the	proposal	formulated	by	the	Biesheuvel	commission.	
The	 only	 change	 it	 made	 was	 to	 significantly	 increase	 the	 signature	 thresholds	 for	
holding	a	 referendum.123	Similarly,	 the	TRA	was	based	on	the	Kok	proposal,	with	 the	
only	difference	that	referendums	on	the	TRA	would	have	been	advisory.	Interestingly,	
the	initiators	of	the	current	referendum	law	copied	this	technical	revision	when	they	
chose	to	initiate	two	separate	referendum	bills,	both	a	binding	and	a	consultative	one.	
PUBLIC	DEMANDS
The	discussion	on	the	referendum	in	several	state	commissions	was	a	clear	outcome	
of	 demands	 from	progressive	 forces	 in	 society	 and	 parliament	 to	 reform	 the	 closed	
character	of	the	Dutch	political	system	(Elzinga	1985;	Koning	1995).	 In	 its	report,	the	
Cals/Donner	commission,	which	was	installed	in	response	to	the	heated	protests	in	the	
1960s,	 explicitly	 referred	 to	 such	demands,	by	 stating	 ‘it	 is	 of	high	 importance	 that,	
122.	 	See	Kok and Dijkstal (1997)	for	an	overview.
123.	 	This	was	a	gesture	to	the	VVD,	which	was	initially	against	the	referendum	and	feared	that,	with	a	
lower	threshold,	too	many	referendums	would	take	place.
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also	 due	 to	 new	modes	 of	mass	 communication,	many	 citizens	 are	 increasingly	 and	
suddenly	aware	of	these	changes	and	due	to	their	concerns	about	the	consequences,	
they	 increasingly	search	 for	ways	 to	express	 their	voice’	 (Cals	and	Donner	1971,	18).	
The	Biesheuvel	commission	was	also	installed	in	1982	in	response	to	reform	demands	
by	 both	 political	 parties	 and	 citizens.	 Notably,	 in	 1981,	 a	 petition	 was	 filed	 by	 the	
action	movement	Actiecomité Referendum: Ja,	to	introduce	a	referendum	on	politically	
weighty	 issues	 (Lucardie	 1997),	which	was	 subsequently	 discussed	 in	 the	Biesheuvel	
commission.	 In	addition,	the	National	Convention	was	 installed	 in	2006	as	a	reaction	
to	an	alleged	‘gap’	between	citizens	and	political	decision-making	(Nationale Conventie 
2006).		
	 As	in	the	UK,	the	social	climate	in	the	Netherlands	became	increasingly	susceptible	
to	the	use	of	referendums,	notably	where	the	EU	is	concerned. Figures 7.1-7.3 provide an 
overview	of	the	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction,	distrust	of	representative	institutions	
and	Euroscepticism	over	time	on	 the	basis	 of	 Eurobarometer	data.	Figure 7.1	 shows	
levels	of	dissatisfaction	with	Dutch	democracy.	Dissatisfaction	with	democracy	in	the	
Netherlands	 is	relatively	 low	and	considerably	 lower	than	the	EU	average.	Moreover,	
such	 sentiments	 have	 decreased	 in	 recent	 decades.	 This	 is,	 however,	 not	 consistent	
with	the	findings	of	the	European	Values	Study	(EVS)	which	states	that	the	proportion	of	
Dutch	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	democracy	increased	from	
26	per	cent	in	1999	to	45	per	cent	in	2008.	Indeed,	as	shown	in	figure 7.2, when	it	comes	
to	perceptions	of	representative	institutions,	the	Eurobarometer	shows	increased	levels	
of	distrust:	while	distrust	of	representative	institutions	decreased	until	2008,	it	seems	
to	have	been	on	the	rise	since	2008.	In	fact,	in	2013,	a	majority	of	Dutch	people	said	
that	they	have	no	trust	in	political	parties,	parliament	or	government.	Hence,	when	the	
Dutch	parliament	again	debated	the	referendum	bills	in	2009	and	2010,	this	took	place	
in	a	context	of	increasing	distrust	of	representative	institutions,	despite	Dutch	people	
being	fairly	satisfied	with	democracy	in	general.	From	2013	onwards	however,	levels	of	
distrust	are	again	decreasing.	
Figure 7.1: Dissatisfaction with national democracy in the Netherlands*
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*Percentage	of	Dutch	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	claim	to	be	‘not	very	satisfied’	or	
‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	national	democracy.	
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Figure 7.2: Public distrust of national institutions the Netherlands*
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*Percentage	of	Dutch	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	parliament/
political	parties/government.
Such	more	dissatisfied	 attitudes	 also	 apply	 to	 the	 EU.	As	 shown	 in	figure 7.3,	 based	
on	Eurobarometer	data,	Eurosceptical	sentiments	among	Dutch	people	increased	over	
time,	despite	them	still	being	fairly	supportive	of	their	country’s	EU	membership.	In	the	
parliamentary	debate	on	the	TCE	referendum	in	2003	–	when	the	level	of	Euroscepticism	
peaked	–	such	sentiments	of	increased	dissatisfaction,	or	even	apathy,	towards	‘Europe’	
were	seized	by	the	initiators	as	a	key	argument	in	favour	of	holding	a	referendum.	As	
the	 initiators	stressed	 in	 their	memorandum,	 ‘More	 involvement	of	Dutch	citizens	 in	
the	EU	reform	process	is	urgently	required,	and	a	referendum	is	a	suitable	instrument	
to	realize	this’	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	3).124 
Figure 7.3: Euroscepticism in the Netherlands*
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*Percentage	of	Dutch	respondents	to	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	that	believe	that	‘the	Netherlands’	EU	
membership	is	a	bad	thing’/’the	Netherlands	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership’/	that	claim	to	be	
‘not	very	satisfied’	or	‘not	at	all	satisfied’	with	EU	democracy/that	‘tend	not	to	trust’	the	EU.
The	 EVS	 indicates	 that	 between	 1981	 and	 2008,	 general	 levels	 of	 political	 interest	
in	 the	Netherlands	also	 increased	 (albeit	not	 consistently):	 from	42	per	 cent	 in	1981	
124.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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to	61	per	 cent	 in	2008	 (with	a	 ‘peak’	of	67	per	 cent	 in	1999)	 (EVS	1981-2008).	 Such	
sentiments	 of	 increased	 interest	 in	 politics	 and	 dissatisfaction	with	 national	 and	 EU	
politics	 are	 generally	 linked	 to	 support	 for	 referendums.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	
despite	the	recurrent	salience	of	the	issue	of	the	citizens’	veto,	little	research	had	been	
done	on	whether	Dutch	citizens	indeed	want	the	possibility	of	triggering	referendums	
themselves.	The	annual	Dutch	Election	Survey	(in	Dutch:	Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 
NKO)	only	included	the	referendum	question	in	five	years	(see	table 7.3),	and	this	was	
only	a	general	question	on	whether	citizens	should	make	important	decisions	for	the	
country	by	referendum,	without	distinguishing	who	triggered	it.	Nevertheless,	as	shown	
in table 7.3,	the	NKO	surveys	reveal	that	a	large	majority	of	Dutch	citizens	(roughly	70	
per	cent)	support	the	idea	of	holding	referendums.	These	figures	are	slightly	higher	than	
data	from	the	2004	ISSP	citizenship	survey,	which	revealed	that	Dutch	support	for	the	
referendum	was	65.4	per	cent,	compared	to	an	EU	average	of	70	per	cent.125	Moreover,	
the	ISSP	data	reveals	that	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	support	referendums	is	
only	slightly	higher	among	respondents	that	are	interested	in	politics	(67	per	cent)	than	
among	those	that	said	that	they	were	not	very,	or	not	at	all,	interested	in	politics	(63	
per	cent).	This	is	consistent	with	the	cognitive mobilization thesis.	In	addition,	the	data	
reveal	that	there	is	no	difference	in	support	levels	between	Dutch	respondents	who	are	
satisfied	or	dissatisfied	with	democracy.
  
Table 7.3: Referendum support according to Dutch Election Survey 2012
Year 1972 2002 2006 2010 2012
Support	for	referendums* 72% 76% 75% 69% 66%
Support	for	referendums	on	EU	treaties** - - 65% 60% 56%
Support	for	referendums	on	EU	enlargement*** - - 66% 64% 58%
*The	electorate	should	make	important	decisions	for	the	country	by	referendum
**Future	EU	treaties	should	be	addressed	in	a	popular	referendum
***Future	EU	enlargements	should	be	addressed	in	a	popular	referendum
Rather	 than	 an	 increase	 in	 support	 –	 which	 we	 would	 assume	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
increasing	 levels	 of	 political	 dissatisfaction	 –	 NKO	 data	 reveal	 that	 support	 for	
referendums	dropped	by	ten	per	cent	between	2002	and	2012.	This	could,	however,	
well	be	due	to	the	high	levels	of	support	in	2002	and	2006.	In	2002,	there	was	a	heated	
political	debate	on	whether	 to	have	a	referendum	on	the	EU,	which	 intensified	after	
the	assassination	of	Dutch	politician	and	Eurosceptic	Pim	Fortuyn.	In	2006,	it	was	just	
one	year	after	the	French	and	Dutch	rejection	of	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	and,	at	
that	time,	there	was	a	political	debate	about	whether	the	succeeding	treaty	should	be	
125.	 	Compared	to	67	per	cent	in	Britain,	80	per	cent	in	Denmark,	75	per	cent	in	France,	and	71	per	cent	in	
Sweden;	International	Social	Survey	Programme	(2004)	Citizenship. 
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submitted	to	a	referendum.	By	2010	and	2012,	the	salience	of	the	referendum	issue	in	
the	public	debate	seemed	to	have	declined.
	 This	fall	in	support	also	applies	to	support	for	EU	referendums	(see	table 7.3).	The	
NKO	data	for	2012	reveal	that	only	a	small	majority	of	56	per	cent	agreed	that	future	
EU	treaties	should	be	addressed	in	a	referendum,	and	58	per	cent	of	the	respondents	
were	of	the	opinion	that	future	EU	enlargement	should	be	addressed	in	a	referendum.	
Moreover,	these	percentages	were	10	per	cent	higher	in	2006,	when	the	Dutch	people	
had	just	voted	on	the	European	Constitution,	and	6	per	cent	higher	in	2010.	The	data	of	
the	2009	European	Elections	Studies	(EES)	furthermore	reveal	that	Dutch	support	for	
EU	referendums	is	below	the	EU	average:	52	per	cent	of	Dutch	respondents	supported	
the	 idea	 that	 EU	 treaty	 changes	 should	 be	decided	by	 referendum,	 compared	 to	 an	
EU	average	of	63	per	cent.126	Moreover,	unlike	in	the	case	of	general	referendums,	of	
the	group	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	 interested	 in	politics,	48	per	cent	
supported	the	statement	that	EU	treaty	reform	should	be	decided	by	referendum,	which	
is	lower	than	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	a	little,	or	not	at	
all,	interested	in	politics,	of	which	57	per	cent	supported	the	idea	of	having	referendums	
on	 EU	 treaty	 reform	 (EES	 2009).	 Support	 for	 EU	 referendums	 is	 considerably	 higher	
among	Eurosceptics:	 71	per	 cent	of	 respondents	who	 feel	 that	 European	unification	
has	gone	 too	 far	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 future	 treaty	 reforms	 should	be	decided	by	
referendum,	as	opposed	to	40	per	cent	of	respondents	who	feel	European	unification	
can	be	pushed	further	(EES	2009).	This	suggests	that	such	support	for	EU	referendums	
is	 highly	 instrumentally	 motivated:	 especially	 those	 who	 want	 to	 stop	 European	
integration	support	EU	referendums.
	 The	 NKO	 survey	 data	 for	 2012	 allows	 the	 relationship	 between	 support	 for	
referendums	and	party	affiliation	 to	be	assessed.	Table 7.4	 provides	 some	 indicative	
conclusions.	As	the	table	shows,	support	for	referendums	in	general	seems	the	highest	
among	supporters	of	radical	parties,	especially	the	populist	right	Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(PVV)	and	the	radical	left	Socialist	Party	(SP).	Interestingly,	support	for	referendums	on	
EU	treaty	reform	is	not	remarkably	high	among	the	supporters	of	parties	that	initiated	
the	referendum	bill	on	the	TCE	in	2003.	Of	the	respondents	who	voted	for	GroenLinks,	
only	 26	per	 cent	 claim	 to	 support	 EU	 treaty	 referendums,	 compared	 to	 44	per	 cent	
of	D66	voters	and	53	of	PvdA	voters.	Moreover,	support	for	referendums	was	higher	
among	 the	 supporters	of	 parties	 that	have	 consistently	opposed	 referendums	 (CDA,	
VVD	and	the	SGP)	than	among	supporters	of	parties	that	have	pushed	for	referendums	
in	parliament	(GroenLinks,	PvdA	and	D66).
126.	 	Compared	to	81	per	cent	in	the	UK,	65	per	cent	in	Denmark,		64	per	cent	in	France	and	45	per	cent	in	
Sweden	(European	Election	Studies	2009).
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Table 7.4: Support for referendums by party affiliation NKO 2012
Important decisions made 
by referendum
Support for referendums 
on EU treaties
Support for referendums on 
EU enlargement
Average 66% 56% 58%
Party voted for:
SP
PvdA
GroenLinks
D66
VVD
CDA
ChristenUnie	
SGP
PVV
                    
79%
63%
50%
63%
73%
60%
49%
66%
85%
74%
53%
26%
44%
52%
61%
50%
67%
76%
69%
52%
20%
52%
59%
56%
61%
63%
82%
The	 long-standing	 high	 levels	 of	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 among	 the	 Dutch	 public,	 in	
combination	 with	 a	 low	 salience	 of	 ‘Europe’	 in	 the	 public	 debate	 as	 such,	 largely	
explains	why	Dutch	governments	were	able	to	prevent	a	referendum	on	previous	EU	
treaty	 ratifications.	 Demands	 by	 the	 opposition–	 such	 as	 on	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty,	
on	 the	Amsterdam	Treaty,	and	on	 the	euro	–	were	 rejected	by	parliament	 (Nijeboer	
2005,	394).	However,	 this	was	no	 longer	 tenable	 in	2003,	when	 the	political	 context	
had	 changed	with	 the	 rise	 and	 assassination	 of	 populist	 politician	 Pim	 Fortuyn.	 Not	
only	did	Fortuyn	reject	Dutch	elitist	politics,	he	also	broke	with	the	Dutch	consensus	
on	‘Europe’.	In	his	book	‘Soulless Europe: Against a Europe of technocrats, bureaucracy, 
subsidies and inevitable fraud’,127	he	openly	attacked	the	EU’s	technocratic	and	elitist	
character	 (Fortuyn	 1997),	 and	 advocated	 giving	 people	 a	 direct	 say	 in	 EU	 decision-
making	(Voerman	2005,	59).	
	 Although	the	EU	as	such	played	no	significant	role	in	the	2002	elections,	Fortuyn	did	
expose	sentiments	of	dissatisfaction	with	Europe	among	the	Dutch	electorate,	which	
stirred	up	demands	for	a	referendum	and	politicians’	susceptibility	to	it	(Kleinijenhuis,	
Takens	 and	 Van	 Atteveldt	 2005,	 127-128).	 The	 initiators	 of	 the	 referendum	 bill	 on	
the	TCE	pointed	 to	 this	changed	climate,	 referring	 to	a	public	opinion	survey	held	 in	
February	1997,	which	revealed	that	64	per	cent	of	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	
citizens	should	have	a	vote	on	the	transfer	of	sovereignty	to	the	EU	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	
and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	6).	Although	the	initiators	referred	to	survey	data	from	1997,	
127.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
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by	 2003	 polls	 revealed	 even	 higher	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum.	 For	 example,	 a	
poll	conducted	by	the	Dutch	government	in	2003	revealed	that	80	per	cent	of	Dutch	
citizens	were	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 referendum	 (De	Volkskrant	 6.9.2003).	 In	 addition,	 the	
Dutch	debate	on	the	referendum	on	the	TCE	took	place	in	a	highly	charged	discourse	
where	the	overriding	feeling	was	that	European	integration	could	not	continue	without	
the	consent	of	the	people,	marked	by	referendum	pledges	by	various	other	EU	member	
states,	including	France	and	the	UK	(Lanting	16.7.2004).	The	Dutch	government	did	not,	
however,	embrace	this	discourse	wholeheartedly,	and	certainly	 let	go	of	 it	two	years	
later,	when	two	parties	that	had	been	in	favour	of	the	2005	referendum,	the	PvdA	and	
the	VVD,	voted	against	a	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	
POLITICAL	VALUES	
As	the	referendum	issue	was	periodically	on	and	off	the	Dutch	political	agenda,	there	is	
ample	material	–	in	the	form	of	party	manifestos	and	parliamentary	debates	–	to	examine	
the	arguments	that	representatives	used	to	argue	in	favour	of	or	against	it.	It	also	allows	
examination	of	whether	such	perspectives	are	related	to	party	ideology,	which	has	not	
been	 examined	 thoroughly	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 manifestos	
of	some	of	the	current	main	Dutch	political	parties	from	1967	to	2012	(see	table 7.5 
for	an	overview)	reveals	a	link	between	party	ideology	and	support	for	referendums.	
Opposition	to	the	referendum	is	most	consistent	among	the	Christian	democratic	and	
other	Christian	parties,	as	well	as	the	VVD.	Although	the	CDA	(as	well	as	its	pre-1977	
Christian	 democratic	 forerunners)	 and	 VVD	 have	 been	 coalition	 partners	 in	 a	 large	
number	of	post-WWII	governments,	 table 7.5	 shows	that	 they	were	also	opposed	to	
the	referendum	when	in	opposition.	Their	opposition	is	grounded	in	a	protective	liberal	
tradition	that	gives	primacy	to	political	representation	rather	than	popular	sovereignty	
(cf.	Lucardie	1997).	This	was	distinctively	underscored	by	CDA	senator	Pia	Lokin-Sassen,	
who	said	in	2014	that	‘Enabling	a	referendum	after	all	stages	of	the	legislative	process	
will	be,	according	to	our	fraction,	only	counterproductive	and	disillusioning	with	respect	
to	representative	democracy	and	it	will	hamper	and	choke	overall	government	policy’	
(Eerste	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	8.4.2014,	2652).
	 In	 the	 various	 votes	 in	 parliament,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 VVD	 has	 been	 of	 vital	
importance.	In	general,	the	party	has	opposed	the	referendum	and	the	issue	has	hardly	
been	mentioned	in	its	manifestos.	The	party	reluctantly	accepted	the	referendum	bid	
in	 the	 coalition	 agreement	 during	 the	 two	 Kok	 governments	 (Kok	 1994;	 Kok	 1998).	
Remarkably,	 as	 shown	 in	 table 7.5,	 the	 VVD	 supported	 the	 referendum	 in	 its	 1998	
manifesto,	when	 it	was	aiming	 for	a	position	 in	a	 second	Kok	government.	 It	did	 so,	
despite	 raising	 principally	 objections,	 which	 were	 distinctively	 underscored	 by	 VVD	
senator	Hans	Wiegel,	who	stressed	 that	 the	 referendum	 is	 ‘at	odds’	with	 the	notion	
of	 parliamentary	 sovereignty	 and	 should	 therefore	 not	 be	 perceived	 as	 panacea	 to	
cure	the	ills	of	democratic	decision-making.	As	he	put	it,	‘our	claim	is	that	one	cannot	
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strengthen	our	democracy	by	changing	the	structures,	but	by	playing	the	political	game	
in	such	a	way	that	voters,	the	citizens	in	our	country,	feel	that	we,	as	representatives,	
are	there	for	them	and	that	we	will	represent	them	as	good	as	we	can’	(Eerste	Kamer	
der	Staten-Generaal	18.5.1999,	1395).	But	the	VVD	was	not	unified	in	its	position,	and	
Wiegel	faced	opposition	from	his	colleague	Jozias	van	Aartsen,	who	supported	Dicey’s	
notion	that	a	referendum	on	issues	that	affect	the	Dutch	constitution,	such	as	EU	treaty	
reform,	can	replace	the	necessity	of	having	new	parliamentary	elections	and	a	second	
parliamentary	reading	(see	interview	with	Van	Aartsen	by	Kristof	Jacobs	2011).
	 The	 smaller	 confessional	 parties	 have	 generally	 been	 opposed	 to	 referendums.	
The	objections	of	the	protestant	Reformed	Political	Party	(Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij,	SGP)	are	grounded	 in	a	confessional	view	of	 the	relationship	between	citizens	
and	their	representatives.	As	SGP	senator	Gerrit	Holdijk	put	it	during	the	1999	Upper	
House	debate,	‘Of	heavier	weight	is	our	vision	of	the	responsibility	of	the	government	
as	 such.	 That	 is	 an	 official	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 as	 servant	 of	 God.	 It	 is	
this	 responsibility	 that	may	not	be	challenged	by	a	 judgement	of	 the	people’	 (Eerste	
Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	18.5.1999:	1347).	By	contrast,	as	 shown	 in	 table 7.5, the 
ChristenUnie	(CU)	was	cautiously	supportive	of	the	referendum	in	its	2010	manifesto.	
In	parliament,	however,	the	party	voted	against	the	various	referendum	bills	that	were	
proposed,128	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 signature	 and	 turnout	 quorums	were	not	 high	
enough.	As	it	stated	in	its	2010	election	programme,	‘such	a	referendum	[the	citizens’	
veto]	is	only	useful	if	the	number	of	signatures	to	trigger	a	referendum	is	set	at	a	credible	
level,	and	if	the	turnout	quorum	is	at	least	5o	per	cent’	(ChristenUnie	2010,	64).
	 As	 shown	 in	 table 7.5,	 the	post-materialist	GroenLinks129	 and	D66,	as	well	 as	 the	
radical	left	SP	and	the	social	democratic	PvdA,	consistently	supported	referendums.	Of	
these	parties,	only	the	PvdA	and	D66	have	held	positions	in	government	but	then,	too,	
they	expressed	support	for	the	referendum	in	their	manifestos.	In	addition,	consistent	
with	 the	 literature	 (Mudde	2004,	543;	 Jacobs	2011,	34),	Dutch	populist	 right	parties	
–	the	Party	 for	Freedom	(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV)	 from	2006	onwards	and,	prior	
to	that,	the	Centre	Democrats	(Centrum Democraten,	CD)	and	the	LPF	(which	are	not	
included in table 7.5)	–	were	consistent	supporters	of	the	referendum.
	 For	the	parties	that	supported	the	referendum	instrument,	such	support	was	both	
intrinsically	and	instrumentally	motivated.	It	is	remarkable	that,	at	the	time	that	the	issue	
was	introduced	in	the	debate	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	participatory	arguments	in	
particular	played	an	important	role	for	these	parties.	From	the	beginning	of	the	century	
onwards,	political	actors	agreed	that,	 if the	referendum	was	 to	be	 introduced	 in	 the	
Netherlands,	legislation	should	allow	citizens	to	trigger	a	referendum	themselves	rather	
than	politicians	(Elzinga	2005).	This	suggests	that	intrinsic	values	played	an	important	
role	in	calls	to	institutionalize	the	referendum.	In	this	respect,	the	Dutch	case	stands	in	
128.	 	And	its	predecessors.	
129.	 	As	well	as	its	radical	left	and	communist	predecessors.	
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sharp	contrast	with	most	other	EU	countries,	where	representatives	primarily	control	
the	 referendum	process	and	where	 the	 introduction	of	citizen-initiated	 referendums	
hardly	played	a	role	among	mainstream	political	parties.	
	 One	reason	for	this	is	consistently	expressed	concerns	about	the	closed	character	
of	the	Dutch	political	system,	and	citizens’	limited	influence	on	the	composition	of	the	
government	 (Kennedy	2004).	 Such	 concerns	especially	flourished	during	 the	 ‘roaring	
60s’	 (Elsinga	1985),	but	participatory	arguments	also	played	a	prominent	 role	 in	 the	
referendum	debate	later.	They	were	expressed	most	consistently	by	GroenLinks,	the	SP	
and	D66.	Strong	emphasis	was	placed	on	the	intrinsic	value	of	active	citizenship,	with	
was	seen	as	a	key	condition	for	democracy	to	flourish.	For	example,	in	the	parliamentary	
debate	of	1996,	the	spokesperson	for	GroenLinks, Oedayraj	Singh	Varma, referred to 
the	referendum	as	an	empowering	instrument,	saying	‘At	this	time,	people	do	not	want	
to	go	to	the	polls	only	once	every	four	years,	they	want	to	be	involved	in	what	happens,	
in	decision-making.	Citizens	are	mature,	 they	are	knowledgeable	and	they	are	aware	
of	what	happens	here	 in	 this	House	and	at	other	 levels’	 (Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-
Generaal	14.2.1996,	4032).130	A	similar	view	was	expressed	thirteen	years	later	by	D66	
leader	Alexander	 Pechtold,	who	 said	 the	 referendum	 ‘would	 do	more	 justice	 to	 the	
position	of	 the	 emancipated	 citizens	 in	 our	 society	 and	would	 furthermore	 advance	
the	emancipation	of	better	educated	and	better	 informed	citizens.	 […]	 It	would	be	a	
beneficial	 incentive	 to	 promote	 public	 involvement	 and	 active	 citizenship’	 (Tweede	
Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	17.2.2009,	4455).131	Both	parties	were	also	supportive	of	
introducing	the	citizens’	initiative,	although	no	formal	proposal	was	drafted.	
	 In	 addition	 to	 participatory	 arguments,	 instrumental	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	
referendums	were	expressed	and,	especially	from	the	1980s	onwards,	the	referendum	
was	 seen	as	able	 to	 solve	a	perceived	gap	between	citizens	and	politicians.132 In	 the	
1997	Upper	House	debate,	D66	senator	Ruud	Hessing	explicitly	emphasized	 that	 the	
Dutch	electoral	system	had	not	functioned	properly	since	the	Second	World	War.	He	
furthermore	argued	that,	due	to	processes	of	secularization,	increased	social	mobility,	
urbanization,	the	rise	of	the	media	and	rising	education	levels,	contemporary	political	
parties	 no	 longer	 reflect	 all	 perspectives	 and	 opinions	 in	 society	 (Eerste	 Kamer	 der	
Staten-Generaal	17.2.1998,	912).	Referendums	provide	a	tool	to	correct	these	flaws	and,	
as	stated	by	the	RPF	(ChristenUnie)	representative	André	Rouvoet	in	the	parliamentary	
debate	in	1996,	to	close	the	gap	between	citizens	and	politicians	(Tweede	Kamer	der	
Staten-Generaal	13.2.1996,	4006).	
	 This	 discourse	 on	 the	 gap	 between	 citizens	 and	 politics	 intensified	 in	 the	 early	
2000s,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 rise	 and	 assassination	 of	 Pim	 Fortuyn	 and	
the	 instigated	 debate	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 direction	 of	 the	 EU.	 The	 SP	 in	 particular	
130.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
131.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
132.	 	Interview	with	Niesco	Dubbelboer	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	2	February	2010,		1,	Jacobs	(2011).
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argued	that	referendums,	most	notably	on	the	EU,	are	valuable	tools	to	regain	public	
control	over	processes	of	globalization	and	European	integration	(SP	2002,	57).	As	SP	
parliamentarian	Ronald	van	Raak	argued	during	the	second	chamber	debate	in	March	
2013,	‘the	organization	of	European	democracy	and	the	transfer	of	sovereignty	can	only	
take	place	with	the	approval	of	the	citizens.	In	any	case,	they	need	to	be	able	to	take	the	
initiative’	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	27.3.2013,	1279).133
	 Such	an	instrumental	discourse	on	referendums	was	also	found	among	the	populist	
right	parties,	although	these	parties	valued	referendums	not	as	much	as	instruments	
to	 strengthen	 representative	 decision-making	 as	 to	 thwart	 representative	 decision-
making.	 For	 them,	 referendums	are	anti-elitist	 instruments	 that	 truly	 reflect	 the	will	
of	the	ordinary	people	(cf.	PVV,	2006).	As	famously	stated	by	LPF	founder	Pim	Fortuyn,	
referendums	would	‘give	the	country	back	to	the	people’.134	Later,	this	was	underscored	
by	PVV	senator	Ronald	Sørensen,	who	stressed	that	referendums	serve	to	‘break	the	
power	of	the	political	elite	and	to	put	that	power	back	where	it	belongs,	with	citizens’	
(Eerste	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	8.4.2014,	11).	Moreover,	these	parties	particularly	
refer	to	referendums	as	instruments	in	the	hands	of	the	public	majority,	which	they	see	
as	being	largely	neglected	by	the	elites.	As	CD	MP	Hans	Janmaat	said	in	1996,	‘in	our	
society,	the	government	does	not	even	take	account	of	the	vast	majority.	[…]	Vulnerable	
minorities	do	not	exist	in	the	Netherlands.	Virtually	all	major	parties	represent	the	views	
of	minorities,	while	the	interests	of	the	majority	are	highly	neglected’	(Tweede	Kamer	
der	Staten-Generaal	14.2.1996,	4030).	
	 Values	also	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	debate	leading	up	to	the	2005	referendum	
on	the	TCE.	The	proposal	was	filed	in	a	context	of	increased	public	dissatisfaction	with	
national	and	EU	decision-making,	as	exposed	by	the	rise	of	Pim	Fortuyn	and	the	aftermath	
of	his	assassination	in	2002.	According	to	the	initiators,	a	referendum	on	the	TCE	would	
enhance	the	democratic	nature	of	the	treaty	as	politicians	would	be	forced	to	explain	
to	citizens	what	the	treaty	is	about	(Trouw	23.5.2003).	The	argued	that	such	increased	
legitimacy	was	required,	given	the	constitutional	character	of	the	Affairs	Ben	Bot,	who	
stated	in	a	speech	in	June	2004	that	citizens	no	longer	approved	of	the	current	speed	of	
European	integration,	and	that	it	was	of	vital	importance	that	the	relationship	between	
citizens	and	the	EU	was	restored	(Remarque	3.6.2004).	As	Bot	put	it,	‘citizens	will	need	
to	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 accommodate	 to	 the	 integration	 of	 Europe’	 (Beunderman	
3.6.2004).	 Rather	 than	 holding	 separate	 referendums	 in	 individual	 member	 states,	
Bot	argued	in	favour	of	pan-European	referendums,	to	be	held	on	the	same	day	in	all	
EU	member	states.	His	proposal	was,	however,	not	supported	by	his	colleagues	in	the	
Dutch	government	and	parliament	(Het	Financieel	Dagblad	10.6.2004).
	 Participatory	arguments	also	played	a	role.	Referring	to	the	Laeken	Declaration	of	
133.	 	Free	translation	by	author.
134.	 	Interview	with	Mat	Herben	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	26	February	2010,	1,	Jacobs	(2011).
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The Netherlands
2001	 (European	Council	 2001),	 the	 initiators	 argued	 that	 a	 referendum	would	boost	
citizens’	involvement	in	EU	affairs	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003;	Trouw	
23.5.2003).	The	Dutch	decision	to	hold	a	referendum	on	the	TCE	thereby	closely	fitted	
the	general	mood	of	that	time	to	increase	the	transparency	of	EU	decision-making	and	
citizens’	involvement	in	it,	as	envisaged	in	the	Laeken	Declaration	and	the	subsequent	
European	 Convention	 TCE	 (Karimi,	 Dubbelboer	 and	 Van	 der	 Ham	 2003).	 This	 notion	
was	 shared	 by	 VVD	MP	 Van	 Aartsen,	 who	 underscored	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 ruling	
that	the	ratification	of	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	was	comparable	to	amending	the	
Dutch	 constitution,	 making	 an	 advisory	 referendum	 a	 valid	 alternative	 to	 a	 second	
parliamentary	reading	(Raad	van	State	2003).139	In	addition,	the	initiators	stressed	that	
many	other	EU	member	states	were	likely	to	organize	a	referendum	on	the	TCE	and	that	
the	Netherlands,	as	a	founding	member,	could	not	lag	behind	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	and	
Van	der	Ham	2003).	Indeed,	the	eventual	approval	of	the	bill	cannot	be	seen	separately	
from	the	fact	that	even	the	German	Bondsdag	considered	holding	a	referendum	on	the	
TCE	(Moerland	23.5.2003).	
	 Such	pledges	occurred	in	the	context	of	a	highly	charged	feeling	across	the	EU	that	
important	decisions	 in	 the	European	 integration	process	could	not	be	made	without	
popular	 approval	 (Lanting	16.7.2004).	 Remarkably,	 such	 a	 feeling	was	 also	 voiced	by	
Dutch	Minister	of	Foreign	(2002/2003).	Thus,	when	parliament	voted	in	favour	of	the	
referendum	on	the	TCE	in	November	2003,	the	initiators	referred	to	this	decision	as	a	
‘victory	for	democracy’	(ANP	20.11.2003).	
	 The	argument	 that	values	played	a	crucial	 role	 in	both	 the	 institutionalization	of	
the	citizens’	 veto	and	 the	debate	on	 the	TCE	 referendum	therefore	passes	 the	hoop 
test	of	process-tracing,	making	it	at	least	likely	that	these	decisions	were	motivated	by	
normative	considerations.	
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
Although	values	thus	played	an	important	role	in	the	debate	on	the	institutionalization	
of	the	citizens’	veto,	parties	often	let	go	of	the	normative	arguments	either	in	favour	or	
against	it,	as	expressed	for	example	in	their	manifestos	or	in	debates,	once	they	held	a	
position	in	government	and	were	bound	by	coalition	agreements.	Among	parties	that	
have	held	a	position	in	government,	support	for	referendums	–	and	the	bill	to	implement	
the	citizens’	veto	in	particular	–	have	therefore	been	highly	inconsistent	(e.g.	abandoning	
support	after	having	included	it	in	their	manifestos).	The	populist	right	LPF,	for	example,	
expressed	support	for	the	citizens’	veto	and	voted	in	favour	for	the	referendum	bill	in	
2004	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal 29.6.2004).	However,	when	it	held	a	position	
in	government	with	the	CDA	and	VVD	in	2002	and	when	the	citizens’	veto	bill	was	sent	to	
parliament	for	the	second	reading,	it	supported	the	government	position	to	not	support	
the	bill.	This	was	justified	by	party	prominent	Mat	Herben,	who	said	in	an	interview	that	
139.	 	Interview	with	Jozias	van	Aartsen	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	21	October	2010,	2,	Jacobs	(2011).
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a	citizens’	veto	takes	place	when	‘the	mischief	has	already	been	done’.140 Apparently, 
the	desire	to	hold	a	position	in	government	was	more	important	than	their	normative	
support	for	the	referendum.	Mat	Herben	underscored	this	act-contingent	motivation	
to	not	support	the	referendum	in	the	same	interview,	saying	‘what	pulled	us	across	the	
line	was,	of	course,	the	negotiation	process.’	[…]	‘It	is	a	matter	of	trade-offs’.141 
	 Ambiguity	 can	 also	 be	 found	 among	 D66	 politicians,	 which	was	 founded	 in	 the	
1960s	primarily	on	 the	basis	of	 a	 strong	participatory	 reform	agenda.	Most	notably,	
founder	 of	 the	 party	Hans	 van	Mierlo	was	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 inclusion	 of	
citizen-initiated	 referendums	 in	 the	coalition	agreement	of	 the	first	Kok	government	
(Kok	1994).	However,	when	 it	held	a	position	 in	 the	second	Balkenende	government	
(2003-2006),	 D66	was	willing	 to	 surrender	 its	 demand	 for	 the	 referendum	 in	 return	
for	a	place	 in	government.	As	D66	prominent	Laurens	Jan	Brinkhorst	said,	 ‘there	are	
more	important	things	than	the	referendum’	(Telegraaf	27.4.2003).	Another	prominent	
party	figure,	Thom	de	Graaf,	said	in	an	interview	that	the	referendum	–	and	democratic	
reform	in	general	–	had	been	an	issue	that	was	consistently	debated	in	the	party,	and	
support	for	the	issue	and	the	extent	to	which	it	was	promoted	had	been	dependent	on	
the	party	leadership.142 
	 By	contrast,	for	the	VVD,	act-contingent	(i.e.	office-seeking)	motivations	played	an	
important	 role	 in	 its	 support	 for	 the	citizens’	veto	during	 the	 two	Kok	governments.	
Clearly,	the	desire	to	form	a	coalition	with	the	PvdA	and	D66	outweighed	the	party’s	
objections	on	principle.	This	is	illustrated	by	a	statement	made	by	VVD	parliamentarian	
Jan	te	Veldhuis,	who	explicitly	referred	to	the	referendum	as	‘the	price	of	purple’	(the	
Kok	 governments	were	 known	as	 ‘purple	 governments’)	 (Tweede	Kamer	der	 Staten-
Generaal	14.2.1996,	4013).
	 Inconsistencies	can	also	be	found	in	the	PvdA’s	position	on	the	referendum,	which	
is	 also	 mainly	 due	 to	 internal	 party	 divisions	 on	 the	 issue.143	 More	 classical	 social	
democrats	gave	primacy	to	representative	sovereignty	and	argued	that	the	referendum	
is	at	odds	with	the	system	of	representation,	while	more	progressive	colleagues	argued	
that	 citizens	 should	 be	 able	 to	 correct	 their	 representatives	 when	 necessary.144	 In	
2014,	when	the	Upper	House	voted	on	the	two	referendum	bills,	the	PvdA	demanded	
at	the	last	minute	that	a	turnout	quorum	be	included	in	the	referendum	legislation	–	
something	that	was	not	part	of	the	initial	plan.	
	 This	 suggests	 that,	 also	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 support	 –	 or	 non-support	 –	 for	
the	 referendum	 is	 not	 devoid	 of	 strategic	 considerations.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 the	
140.	 	Interview	with	Mat	Herben	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	26	February	2010,	1,	Jacobs	(2011).	Free	translation	by	
author.
141.	 	Interview	with	Mat	Herben	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	26	February	2010,	2,	Jacobs	(2011).	Free	translation	by	
author.
142.	 	Interview	with	Thom	de	Graaf	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	28	January	2009.		12,	Jacobs	(2011).
143.	 	Interview	with	Niesco	Dubbelboer	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	2	February	2010,	1,	Jacobs	(2011).
144.	 	Interview	with	Ed	van	Thijn	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	7	December	2009,	1,	Jacobs	(2011).
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referendum	on	 the	TCE.	The	 initiators	of	 the	 referendum	 (PvdA	and	D66)	motivated	
their	pledge	by	referring	to	the	constitutional	character	of	the	treaty,	while	all	previous	
EU	 treaties	 –	 including	 those	 ratified	 when	 the	 PvdA	 and	 D66	 were	 in	 government	
(Treaties	 of	 Amsterdam	 and	 Nice)	 –	 were	 ratified	 without	 a	 referendum.	Moreover	
for	the	PvdA	and	the	VVD,	the	normative	arguments	in	favour	of	the	TCE	referendum	
apparently	did	not	apply	to	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	since	neither	supported	a	referendum	
on	that	treaty.	Notably,	 the	PvdA	had	advocated	a	referendum	on	Lisbon	 in	 its	2006	
election	manifesto.	Yet,	when	it	was	in	government	with	the	CDA	and	CU	between	2007	
and	2010,	it	voted	against	a	referendum	on	Lisbon	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	
3.6.2008).	According	to	party	prominent	Niesco	Dubbelboer,145 internal party divisions 
on	 the	 referendum	again	played	an	 important	 role.	Under	pressure	 from	opponents	
of	 a	 second	EU	 referendum	 from	within	 the	party,	 the	party	 leadership	 took	 refuge	
behind	a	Council	of	State	ruling	that,	unlike	the	TCE,	the	Lisbon	Treaty	had	no	explicitly	
constitutional	features	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	27.5.2008,	6262;	Raad	van	
State	2008).	Apparently,	the	party	considered	retaining	its	position	in	the	government	
coalition	more	important	than	a	referendum.	
	 Given	these	inconsistencies,	 it	 is	 likely	that	strategic	considerations	also	played	a	
role	in	support	for	the	TCE	referendum.	To	an	important	extent,	the	Dutch	referendum	
pledge	on	the	TCE	was	the	‘odd-man-out’	in	Europe.	Rather	than	being	initiated	by	the	
government,	 this	 ad	hoc	 referendum	was	 initiated	by	opposition	parties	 against	 the	
initial	wishes	of	the	government.	This	means	that,	other	than	in	most	other	European	
legislative	 majority	 referendums,	 unravelling	 the	 strategic	 motivations	 behind	 the	
referendum	 pledge	 requires	 analysing	 the	 motivations	 of	 the	 initiating	 (opposition)	
parties,	rather	than	of	the	government.	However,	the	support	of	one	government	party,	
the	VVD,	was	decisive	in	the	eventual	triggering	of	the	referendum,	and	it	is	therefore	
particularly	 important	 to	 assess	 its	motivations	 in	 supporting	 the	 bill.	 Based	 on	my	
typology	 of	 referendum	motivations,	 as	 outlined	 in	 chapter 2, table 7.6 provides an 
overview	of	the	motivations	that	pass	the	hoop test	of	process-tracing,	meaning	that	it	
is	at	least	likely	that	they	were	at	play	in	the	context	of	the	TCE	referendum.	Especially	
for	 the	 three	 initiating	 parties,	 normative	 arguments	 seem	 to	 have	 outweighed	
strategic	political	aims.	For	the	PvdA,	strategic	interests	may	also	have	played	a	role,	
as	it	anticipated	that	a	vote	on	the	TCE	would	strengthen	its	position	vis-à-vis	the	two	
main	 governing	 parties,	 VVD	 and	CDA.	 The	VVD	also	 had	 a	 potential	 interest	 in	 the	
referendum,	as	it	was	internally	divided	on	‘Europe’.	Finally,	the	Eurosceptic	opposition	
parties	that	supported	the	bill	 (not	shown	in	table 7.6)	used	the	referendum	to	push	
their	own	agenda	and	prevent	the	treaty	from	being	ratified.	
145.	 	Interview	with	Niesco	Dubbelboer	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	2	February	2010,	2,	Jacobs	(2011).
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Table 7.6: Referendum strategies on the part of triggering actors TCE
Actors Initiator	faces	
sufficient	
support for 
legislative	
proposal 
in	national	
decision-making	
arena
Initiator	
faces 
internal 
party/
coalition	
divisions
Anticipated	
public	
support for 
initiator’s	
stance
Initiator	
faces 
upcoming	
elections
Initiator	
faces 
sufficient	
support for 
its	position	
in	EU	
decision-
making	
arena
Strategic 
motivations
Pro-EU	
initiating	
parties	
YES NO YES NO Not relevant Empowerment	
VVD	
(parliament)
YES YES YES NO Not relevant Conflict	mediation
DOMESTIC	 EMPOWERMENT.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 policy-seeking	 motives,	 the	
referendum	was	 superfluous,	 since	only	a	minority	 in	parliament	–	 consisting	of	 the	
CU,	the	SGP,	the	LPF	and	the	SP	–	was	wholeheartedly	opposed	to	the	TCE.	A	smooth	
parliamentary	 ratification	was	 therefore	ensured	 (Lucardie	2005,	106).	 The	 initiators	
of	 the	 referendum	 all	 embraced	 the	 TCE.	 As	 I	 stated	 above,	 for	 them,	 normative	
considerations	played	an	 important	 role,	 as	 they	anticipated	 that	a	 ‘yes’	 vote	would	
boost	the	‘the	legitimacy	of	the	decision-making	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty’	(Karimi,	
Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	1).	However,	it	is	likely	that	the	referendum	pledge	
was	 also	 motivated	 by	 an	 aim	 to	 legitimize	 the	 initiators’	 own	 pro-EU	 stance	 in	 a	
turbulent	period	in	Europe,	with	the	coming	enlargement	with	the	CEECs,	the	drafting	
of	a	European	Constitution	and	a	potential	Turkish	accession.	
	 A	 positive	 referendum	 outcome	 would	 also	 have	 strengthened	 the	 initiators’	
position	vis-à-vis	the	government.	An	important	factor	was	that	they	clearly	anticipated	
that	the	referendum	would	be	won.	The	Dutch	people	had	always	been	relatively	pro-
European	and	at	the	time	of	the	referendum	pledge,	support	for	European	integration	
was	still	 relatively	high.	 In	spring	2003,	the	Eurobarometer	revealed	that	support	 for	
EU	membership	was	73	per	cent	 (compared	to	54	per	cent	 in	the	EU	on	average).	 In	
addition,	another	71	per	cent	supported	the	idea	of	an	EU	constitution,	compared	to	
an	EU	average	of	 63	per	 cent	 (Standard	Eurobarometer	59).	 In	 the	autumn	of	 2003,	
Eurobarometer	data	 revealed	 that	Dutch	 support	 for	 an	EU	 constitution	was	among	
the	highest	in	the	15	‘old’	member	states	(Standard	Eurobarometer	60).	With	opinion	
polls	showing	that	the	public	was	clearly	on	their	side,	it	is	not	unlikely	that	the	parties	
anticipated	that	they	would	be	hailed	for	having	initiated	this	referendum.	
	 The	PvdA	in	particular	was	in	need	of	such	a	legitimacy	boost,	since	it	had	lost	a	
dramatic	22	seats	(from	45	to	23,	of	a	total	of	150)	in	the	2002	parliamentary	elections.	
Though	the	party	had	never	pledged	a	referendum	on	the	EU	before	when	in	government,	
PvdA	MP	Frans	Timmermans	openly	attacked	the	intransparency	of	European	decision-
making	and	the	lack	of	citizens’	involvement	in	EU	affairs	and	called	for	a	referendum	on	
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the	TCE.	It	is	not	unlikely	that,	once	in	opposition,	the	party	seized	the	momentum	and	
used	the	referendum	pledge	also	to	strengthen	its	position	vis-à-vis	the	government.	
This	is	underscored	by	the	fact	that	four	years	later	when	the	PvdA	was	in	government,	
Timmermans	–	by	then	State	Secretary	for	European	Affairs	–	rejected	a	referendum	on	
Lisbon.
	 In	the	other	countries	examined	in	this	study,	Eurosceptic	opposition	parties	have	
consistently	called	for	EU	referendums,	not	only	to	veto	treaty	ratifications	(i.e.	a	policy-
seeking	motive),	but	also	as	a	means	to	strengthen	their	position	electorally.	Especially	
after	Fortuyn	and	with	the	prospect	of	a	potential	Turkish	EU	accession,	this	had	also	
become	a	viable	strategy	for	Dutch	Eurosceptics.	The	SP	had	consistently	called	for	EU	
referendums,	on	the	basis	of	its	anti-neoliberal	ideology,	making	it	strongly	normatively	
driven (see section 7.3.3.).	In	the	debate	on	the	bill	on	the	TCE	referendum,	SP	MP	Harry	
van	Bommel	welcomed	 the	 referendum	as	 a	way	of	 putting	a	halt	 to	 the	neoliberal	
nature	of	the	EU,	the	internal	market	and	the	militarization	of	Europe	(Tweede	Kamer	
der	Staten-Generaal	18.11.2003,	1731-1732).	The	party’s	 consistent	 referendum	calls	
on	 other	 EU	 issues	 (Lisbon,	 the	 euro)	 underscores	 an	 electoral	 strategy	 to	mobilize	
voters	on	this	Eurosceptical	agenda.	
	 A	similar	pattern	applies	to	the	LPF.	From	its	foundation,	this	party	too	had	called	
for	referendums	on	the	EU.	But,	rather	than	rejecting	the	neoliberal	nature	of	the	EU	or	
its	primary	focus	on	the	internal	market,	the	LPF	rejected	the	Union’s	elitist	character,	
and	argued	that	 it	was	‘about	time’	that	the	Dutch	electorate	was	granted	a	vote	on	
Europe	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 18.11.2003,	 1742).	 LPF	 representative	
Gerard	van	As	 refuted	 the	objections	 to	 the	 referendum	expressed	by	 the	CDA	and,	
initially,	the	VVD	by	arguing	that	these	parties	‘should	realize	that	the	ever-growing	gap	
between	Europe	and	its	citizens	is	the	consequence	of	such	an	attitude’	(Tweede	Kamer	
der	Staten-Generaal	18.11.2003,	1742).	Hence,	for	the	LPF,	the	referendum	call	clearly	
fitted	its	populist	rhetoric	and	it	is	likely	that,	in	supporting	the	referendum,	the	party	
aimed	to	strengthen	its	position	on	the	basis	of	such	a	populist	Eurosceptical	agenda.	
CONFLICT	MEDIATION. For	 the	VVD	 the	 stakes	were	different.	 Initially,	 the	VVD	was	
not	 very	 enthusiastic	 about	 an	 EU	 referendum.	 However,	 in	 2003,	 pro-referendum	
Jozias	van	Aartsen	became	leader	of	the	parliamentary	party	and	was	able	to	persuade	
his	colleagues	in	parliament	to	vote	in	favour	of	a	referendum. As	shown	in	table 7.6, 
the	finding	 that	 the	VVD	was	 internally	 divided	 over	 the	 TCE	makes	 it	 likely	 that	 its	
eventual	 support	 for	 holding	 the	 referendum	 was	 motivated	 by	 an	 aim	 to	 deflate	
party	disagreements.	The	party	was	divided	between	those	who	accepted	the	TCE	as	
way	to	further	the	internal	market,	and	those	who	criticized	the	far-reaching	political	
consequences	 of	 the	 treaty	 and	 opted	 for	 a	 de-constitutionalized	 variant	 (Voerman	
2005,	61).	A	referendum	would	solve	the	controversy	and	flip	the	coin	to	one	side	or	
the	other.	Moreover,	Van	Aartsen’s	leadership	style	proved	once	again	important,	as	he	
7
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insisted	that	a	referendum	would	enable	an	‘open	discussion’.	Rather	than	obscuring	the	
divisions,	he	opted	for	a	debate	in	which	they	would	be	exposed	and	settled	(Moerland	
18.6.2003).146
	 These	 divisions	 over	 the	 TCE	 are	 illustrative	 of	 the	more	 fundamental	 divisions	
within	 the	 party	 over	 ‘Europe’	 in	 general.	 Especially	 with	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	
Maastricht	 Treaty	 –	 which	 considerably	 expanded	 the	 competences	 of	 the	 EP	 and	
thus	 the	 supranational	 character	 of	 the	 EU	 –	 divisions	 within	 the	 VVD	 intensified.	
This	opposition	was	mainly	expressed	by	party	 leader	Frits	Bolkestein,	who	explicitly	
argued	that	European	integration	should	be	restricted	to	the	internal	market	and	the	
EMU	(Voerman	2005,	56;	ANP	19.6.2003).	These	sentiments	were	echoed	by	finance	
minister	 Gerrit	 Zalm,	 who	 opposed	 increasing	 the	 Dutch	 contribution	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	
addition,	although	the	party	had	in	2002	approved	the	EU	accession	of	the	Central	and	
Eastern	European	countries,	this	enlargement	was	heavily	criticized	by	some	VVD	party	
members,	 most	 notably	 Bolkestein	 and	 his	 successor	 as	 party	 leader,	 Hans	 Dijkstal	
(Voerman	2005,	59).	
	 Divisions	over	 ‘Europe’	had	not	before	 led	 the	VVD	 to	 support	 referendum	calls	
on	 the	EU.	However,	until	2002,	 these	disagreements	had	not	harmed	 the	party.	All	
major	 political	 parties	 supported	 European	 integration,	 and	 the	 Dutch	 electorate	
was	 characterized	 by	 what	 Lindberg	 and	 Scheingold	 (1970)	 coined	 as	 a	 ‘permissive	
consensus’.	Opposition	traditionally	came	only	from	the	Socialist	Party	and	the	smaller	
confessional	CU	and	SGP	(Voerman	2005,	58).	The	2002	and	2003	elections	however	
signified	what	Harmsen	(2003,	6)	called	a	‘critical	turn’	in	the	Dutch	debate	on	‘Europe’,	
as	the	issue	became	increasingly	contested.	The	permissive	consensus	was	replaced	by	
increased	Euroscepticism	among	the	Dutch	public	(see	Eurobarometer	2003/2004;	see	
also	Harmsen	2004).	From	that	moment,	there	was	thus	a	clear	incentive	for	the	VVD	
to	deflate	 its	divisions	by	calling	a	 referendum.	The	elections	 for	 the	EP,	which	were	
scheduled	for	June	2004,	also	forced	the	VVD	to	fall	into	line.	
 
7.5 THE FUTURE OF DUTCH REFERENDUMS?
With	the	 implementation	of	 the	 law	on	the	citizen-initiated	referendum	in	2015,	 the	
options	for	organizing	referendums	in	the	Netherlands	were	expanded.	The	fact	that	
such	 referendums	 cannot	 be	 vetoed	 by	 political	 representatives	 provides	 a	 strong	
indicator	 that	 referendums	will	 gain	a	more	prominent	place	 in	Dutch	politics	 in	 the	
nearby	 future.	Actors	who	wish	 to	 see	a	 referendum	on	a	particular	 issue	no	 longer	
need	the	support	of	other	political	parties	to	trigger	a	referendum,	but	the	support	of	
Dutch	citizens.	On	6	April	2016,	during	the	writing	of	this	study,	the	Netherlands	held	its	
first	referendum	under	the	new	referendum	law,	on	the	EU	Association	Agreement	with	
146.	 	Interview	with	Jozias	van	Aartsen	by	Kristof	Jacobs,	21	October	2010,	Jacobs	(2011).	
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Ukraine.	This	referendum	was	initiated	by	the	Eurosceptic	action	movement	GeenPeil, 
which	collected	almost	430,000	valid	signatures	to	trigger	a	referendum	on	the	Dutch	
ratification	of	 the	agreement.	 In	 the	 referendum,	61	per	 cent	of	 the	voters	 rejected	
Dutch	ratification,	while	38	per	cent	voted	in	favour.	The	turnout	quorum	was	narrowly	
reached,	with	only	32	per	cent	of	the	Dutch	electorate	making	the	effort	to	vote.	
	 Whether	 the	 referendum	 law	 will	 continue	 in	 its	 current	 form	 depends	 on	 the	
aftermath	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 referendum.	 One	 day	 after	 the	 vote,	 some	 parties	
and	 politicians	 (including	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 Interior	 and	 Kingdom	 Relations)	 urged	
reconsideration	of	the	‘rules	of	the	game’	of	Dutch	referendums	(Mebius	8.4.2016).	The	
turnout	threshold	in	particular	is	again	the	subject	of	debate,	since	many	blamed	the	
low	turnout	on	the	fact	that	many	people	may	have	abstained	from	voting	for	strategic	
reasons	(Kas	8.4.2016).	Another	possibility	is	that	the	signature	threshold	will	be	raised	
to	make	it	more	difficult	to	trigger	referendums	in	the	future.	Nevertheless,	it	is	only	
matter	of	time	before	actors	attempt	to	do	so	(Van	Outeren	13.4.2016).	A	platform	has	
already	been	established	that	has	started	collecting	signatures	to	trigger	a	referendum	
on	 Dutch	 ratification	 of	 the	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Partnership	 (TTIP)	
between	the	EU	and	the	United	States,	once	it	has	been	signed.	In	addition,	since	the	SP	
and	the	PVV	have	consistently	called	for	referendums	on	EU	affairs,	it	is	likely	that	they	
will	use	citizens’	vetoes	to	enforce	more	referendums	on	future	EU	treaties.	
	 Potentially,	 the	use	of	 referendums	under	 the	current	 legislation	could	spill	over	
to	 the	 use	 of	 ad	 hoc	 advisory	 referendums	 on	 issues	 on	 which	 there	 is	 as	 yet	 no	
legislation	 (citizens’	 vetoes	 can	only	 be	 triggered	on	 approved	 legislation),	 on	 issues	
that	are	 formally	excluded	 from	citizens’	vetoes	 (for	example	 the	constitution),	or	 in	
the	event	that	a	petition	for	a	citizens’	veto	fails.	In	the	previous	chapters,	I	argued	that	
populist	parties	are	important	actors	in	triggering	referendums,	as	they	put	mainstream	
parties	in	a	defensive	position.	Furthermore,	they	use	referendum	promises	as	means	
to	gain	votes	on	controversial	 issues,	most	notably	‘Europe’,	but	also	on	other	 issues	
(like	the	death	penalty	or	immigration,	as	called	for	by	the	French	Front	National).	 In	
the	Netherlands	in	2005,	the	PVV	initiated	a	bill	calling	for	a	referendum	on	potential	
Turkish	accession	to	the	EU	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	2005).	This	call	was	
prominent	 in	the	party’s	2006	election	manifesto	(the	first	time	when	it	participated	
in	general	parliamentary	elections),	in	which	the	party	also	called	for	referendums	on	
the	exit	of	the	former	Netherlands	Antilles	from	the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands	and	
on	an	abolition	of	the	euro	(PVV	2006).	Moreover,	in	2011,	the	PVV	filed	a	legislative	
proposal	 to	 organize	 a	 referendum	on	 a	minaret	 ban,	 after	 the	 Swiss	 example.	 This	
has,	however,	not	yet	been	debated	in	parliament	(Van	Klaveren	2011).	Although	it	is	
uncertain	whether	such	calls	will	gain	sufficient	political	support	when	debated,	they	
are	additional	signs	–	together	with	the	enhanced	ability	of	these	politicians	to	mobilize	
electoral	support	on	such	issues	–that	referendums	will	be	playing	a	more	important	
role	in	Dutch	politics	in	the	future.	
7
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7.6 THE DUTCH REFERENDUM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In	most	European	countries,	the	adoption	of	referendum	legislation	was	the	outcome	of	
a	struggle	for	power	between	small	opposition	parties	and	the	ruling	party	or	parties.	
In	this	struggle,	the	small	opposition	parties	usually	fought	for	referendum	legislation	
anticipating	 that	 it	 would	 strengthen	 their	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 ruling	 parties;	 the	
latter	were	usually	resistant	to	such	legislation	fearing	that	adding	more	veto	players	
to	the	decision-making	process	(namely	‘the	people’)	would	harm	their	position.	In	the	
countries	analysed	in	this	study,	a	breakthrough	was	only	possible	when	the	position	
of	 the	dominant	parties	was	weakened,	 due	 to	political	 fragmentation	 (Sweden	and	
Denmark)	or	electoral	competition	from	usually	populist	newcomers	(UK	and	France).	
In	 the	Netherlands,	 opposition	 parties	 also	made	 several	 attempts	 to	 introduce	 the	
referendum	 into	 the	 Dutch	 constitution,	 but	were	 never	 successful.	 This	makes	 the	
Netherlands	rather	exceptional	when	compared	to	most	of	its	European	counterparts.	
However,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 the	 Netherlands	 faced	 a	
remarkable	shift.	First,	in	2005,	with	the	successful	initiation	of	a	referendum	on	the	TCE	
and,	secondly,	in	2014	with	the	adoption	of	the	bill	allowing	for	the	organization	of	an	
advisory	citizens’	veto.	The	Netherlands	thus	provides	an	excellent	case	to	investigate	
the	factors	that	led	to	this	shift.	
	 As	 demonstrated,	 an	 important	 factor	 that	 explains	 the	 long	 absence	 of	
referendum	legislation	in	the	Netherlands	is	the	high	number	of	veto	players	involved	
in	the	process	of	revising	the	constitution,	which	requires	simple	majority	approval	in	
a	 first	 parliamentary	 reading	 and	 qualified	majority	 approval	 in	 the	 second	 reading,	
with	 elections	 in	 between.	 To	 compare,	 in	 Sweden,	 it	 is	 much	 easier	 to	 revise	 the	
constitution,	as	this	only	requires	a	simple	majority	approval	in	the	unicameral	Riksdag 
in	two	readings.	Moreover,	the	high	number	of	partisan	veto	players	 is	an	important	
factor.	Given	the	strict	proportionality	of	the	Dutch	polity,	support	from	a	parliamentary	
majority	 implies	 support	 from	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 ideologically	 different	 actors.	 The	
Christian	democrats	(CDA)	and	the	conservative	liberals	(VVD)	in	particular	have	used	
their	veto	power	to	block	the	introduction	of	the	citizens’	veto.	Such	a	complex	process	
of	 amending	 the	 constitution,	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 dominance	 of	 conservative	
parties	sceptical	to	the	use	of	referendums,	also	applies	to	other	countries	where	the	
constitution	does	not	entail	provisions	for	the	use	of	national	referendums,	i.e.	Belgium,	
Cyprus	and	Germany.	Hence,	the	veto-player	logic	accounts	to	a	large	extent	for	the	lack	
of	national	level	referendum	legislation	in	these	countries.	Moreover,	the	veto-player	
logic	can	also	be	applied	to	the	adoption	of	the	current	Dutch	referendum	law.	As	this	
entailed a consultative	referendum,	no	constitutional	revision	was	required	and	hence,	
the	bill	only	required	a	simple	majority	support	in	one	parliamentary	reading.	
	 This	chapter	also	shows	that,	in	the	absence	of	referendum	legislation,	a	decision	
to	organize	a	referendum	ad hoc	(such	as	in	the	Netherlands	on	the	TCE)	is	explained	
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by	a	mix	of	motivations	and	changed	discourses.	In	Denmark	for	example,	the	strong	
constitutional	basis	for	the	holding	of	referendums	on	the	EU	ensures	a	return	to	similar	
motives	for,	and	discourses	on,	organizing	such	votes.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	absence	
of	such	a	requirement	for	a	long	time	prevented	referendum	calls	from	becoming	salient	
in	 the	political	debate.	This	 changed	 in	 the	early	2000s	when	 the	notion	of	 the	EU’s	
‘democratic	deficit’	gained	prominence,	and	when	there	were	strong	normative	pleas	
across	 the	EU	to	organize	popular	votes	on	 the	outcome	document	of	 the	European	
Convention,	 notably	 also	 in	 some	 of	 the	 co-EU	 founding	 countries	 like	 France	 and	
Luxembourg.	Domestically,	pressures	to	organize	an	EU	referendum	increased	with	the	
rise	and	assassination	of	the	Eurosceptic	Pim	Fortuyn,	as	well	as	the	controversy	of	the	
EU’s	enlargement	policy	in	the	Dutch	political	and	public	debate.	In	the	absence	of	such	a	
‘referendum-favourable’	context,	normative	discourses	in	favour	of	referendums	either	
lost	ground	or	become	subordinate	to	the	strategic	interest	of	not	having	a	referendum	
–	as	was	the	case	with	the	ratification	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2008.	The	introduction	of	
referendum	legislation	in	2015,	as	well	as	the	increased	electoral	success	of	the	populist	
right	PVV	and	increased	Dutch	Euroscepticism,	are	signs	that	preventing	referendums	
on	the	EU	(or	other	controversial	issues)	will	become	more	difficult	in	the	future.
7
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CHAPTER 8. 
CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In	this	study,	I	examined	whether	the	increased	institutionalization	and	use	of	national 
referendums	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 and	 early	 twenty-first	
centuries	 mark	 a	 shift	 from	 national	 decision-making	 by	 political	 representation	 to	
decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.	 I	did	so	by	providing	an	overview	of	
referendum	provisions	in	the	current	28	EU	member	states,	as	well	as	of	the	frequency	
with	which,	and	the	form	in	which,	national	referendums	were	used	between	1950	and	
2014.	 I	 also	examined	which	 factors	 contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	and	use	of	
national	referendums	in	Europe,	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	by	providing	in-
depth	analyses	of	referendum	practices	in	five	EU	countries:	France,	Denmark,	the	UK,	
Sweden	and	the	Netherlands.
	 I	 show	 that,	 despite	 aggregated	 increases	 in	 the	 constitutional	 availability	 of	
referendum	provisions	and	use	of	national	referendums	in	the	28	EU	countries,	this	does	
not	signify	a	direct	EU-wide	participatory	shift.	In	most	EU	member	states,	referendums	
are	 primarily	 triggered	 by	 the	 authorities	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	
largely	controlled	by	the Prince rather than the People.	 In	contrast	to	a	broad	field	of	
referendum	 literature	 that	perceives	 referendums	as	 the	outcome	of	political	 elites’	
normative	responses	to	transformative	pressures,	I	show	that	referendums	are	above	
all used strategically	 in	 inter-	 and	 intra-party	 competition,	 especially	 in	 a	 context	of	
rising	 fragmentation	 in	 party	 systems	 and	 electoral	 volatility.	 The	 different	 ways	
in	 which	 referendums	 are	 designed	 and	 used	 affirm	 cross-country	 differences	 in	
party	 competition	 dynamics,	 rather	 than	 being	 illustrative	 of	 a	 generic	 democratic	
transformation.	
8.2 THE FALLACY OF A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SHIFT 
Although,	 in	all	 referendums,	 citizens	participate	 in	decision-making	directly and the 
voting	majority	decides,	not	all	are	a	pure	reflection	of	popular	sovereignty,	nor	of	strict	
majority	rule.	This	depends	on	how	the	vote	is	triggered,	on	who	has	set	the	agenda,	on	
the	effect	of	the	vote,	and	on	the	applicability	of	quorums.	In	the	bulk	of	referendum	
literature,	 variations	 in	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 associated	 provisions	 within	 and	
across	countries	are	often	disregarded,	especially	when	 it	 comes	 to	analyses	of	how	
referendums	are	used.	This	has	led	to	the	fallacy	that	the	growing	use	of	referendums	
in	Europe	signifies	an	unequivocal	shift	towards	direct	democracy.	
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Referendums	triggered	by	citizens,	and	which	are	thus	genuinely	directly	participatory,	
are	only	provided	for	in	ten	countries,	mainly	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	
(CEECs).	This	is	shown	in	table 8.1, which	provides	an	overview	of	four	types	of	(non-
mandatory)	 referendums	and	 the	number	of	EU	countries	where	 these	are	provided	
for	 in	 the	constitution.	These	four	types	of	 referendum	are	classified	on	the	basis	of	
two	 well-known	 theoretical	 dimensions.	 The	 first	 is	 whether	 citizens	 participate	 in	
democratic	decision-making	indirectly,	through	a	process	of	political	representation,	or	
directly.	The	second	dimension	determines	whether	decisions	are	made	by	aggregating	
preferences	 into	 a	 majority	 outcome	 or	 by	 integrating	 individual	 preferences,	 and	
thereby	 giving	 more	 room	 to	 minority	 representation.	 Since	 citizens’	 referendums	
are	triggered	by	popular minorities,	they	allow	for	 integrative	decision-making	rather	
than	being	 purely	majoritarian	 instruments.	 This	 is	 furthermore	underscored	by	 the	
applicability	of	turnout	quorums.	In	four	of	the	ten	countries	where	citizens	can	trigger	
referendums,	 they	 can,	 however,	 only	do	 so	 to	 veto	existing	 legislative	proposals	 or	
legislation,	not	to	promote	their	own	initiatives.	
	 By	way	of	comparison,	in	all	countries	where	the	constitution	contains	provisions	
for	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums,	 this	 can	 be	 done	 by	 political	 representatives,	
but	 in	 some	 cases	 only	 on	 politically	 weighty	 issues.	 In	 20	 EU	 member	 countries,	
the	constitution	allows	 the	political majority	 to	 trigger	a	 referendum;	 this	 is	either	a	
parliamentary	majority	(15	countries),	the	president	(3)	or	both	(2).147	Such	referendums	
are	mostly	advisory	and	therefore	majority	rule	is	not	restricted	by	quorums.	In	eleven	
–	mainly	consensus	–	EU	countries,	the	constitution	allows	a	political minority to trigger 
a	referendum.	Such	referendums	have	an	integrative	effect	on	decision-making,	which	
is	underscored	by	the	fact	that,	in	most	countries,	these	referendums	have	quorums.	
	 Mandatory	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 thirteen	 EU	 countries.	 The	 role	 of	
these	referendums	 in	decision-making	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	
since	they	are	triggered	by	the	constitution	rather	than	by	political	actors.	On	paper,	
mandatory	 referendums	 are	more	 integrative	 than	 legislative	majority	 referendums,	
since	they	provide	a	guarantee	that,	in	the	case	of	major	political	decisions,	the	political	
majority	cannot	easily	impose	its	will.	In	practice,	however,	constitutional	provisions	can	
often	be	loosely	interpreted	and,	in	the	majority	of	mandatory	referendums	held,	the	
authorities	exercised	considerable	influence	over	the	referendum	process,	in	terms	of	
triggering	and	framing	the	vote.	Hence,	despite	the	aggregated	increase	in	the	number	
of	countries	that	adopted	referendum	provisions	and	the	fact	that	there	are	currently	
only	four	EU	countries	where	the	constitution	does	not	provide	for	the	use	of	national 
referendums,	 there	 has	 been	 no	 substantive	 EU-wide	 shift	 in	 decision-making	 from	
representation	to	direct	participation	in	terms	of	available	referendum	legislation.
147.	 	Moreover,	in	countries	where	the	constitution	does	not	allow	the	parliamentary	majority	to	trigger	
referendums,	this	can	be	done	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.
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Table 8.1: A two-dimensional classification of non-mandatory referendum provisions* 
WHO CONTROLS 
THE TRIGGERING OF THE 
VOTE?
Representation
Representative	sovereignty
Participation
Popular sovereignty
A majority
Decision-making	by	
aggregation
Legislative	majority	referendum
17 countries
Presidential	referendum
5 countries
A minority
Decision-making	by	
integration
Legislative	minority	referendum
11 countries
Citizen-initiated	referendum
10 countries
*Constitutionally	provided	for	on	1	January	2015.
There	are	also	cross-country	variations	in	the	use	of	referendums.	They	are	rarely	held	
in	a	large	group	of	countries,	and	the	aggregated	increase	in	referendums	in	the	EU	is	
mainly	due	to	their	frequent	use	in	a	limited	number	of	countries,	most	notably	Ireland	
and	 Italy.	 In	 Ireland,	 all	 referendums	 held	 were	mandatory.	 In	 Italy	 and	 the	 CEECs,	
referendums	are	held	relatively	frequently	because	they	can	be	triggered	by	citizens	or	
opposition	parties.	Yet,	even	in	these	countries,	referendum	practice	does	not	resemble	
that	of	Switzerland,	where	referendums	–	especially	those	triggered	by	citizens	–	are	part	
of	the	political	routine.	Nor	does	it	mark	a	participatory	shift.	In	Ireland,	all	referendums	
were	held	on	constitutional	reform	issues	that	would	otherwise	have	led	to	party	splits	
(such	as	 the	EU	and	moral	 issues).	 They	 therefore	mainly	 serve	 to	protect	 the	party	
system.	In	Italy	and	the	CEECs,	citizens’	referendums	are	primarily	an	instrument	in	the	
hands	of	political	parties,	used	as	a	weapon	in	inter-party	competition.
	 In	most	EU	member	states,	referendums	are	triggered	by	a	political	majority	and,	
rather	 than	 transforming	 representative	 democracy,	 they	 tend	 to	 confirm	 existing	
decision-making	dynamics. This	 is	shown	in	table 8.2,	which	provides	an	overview	of	
non-mandatory	referendums	held	 in	the	EU	by	triggering	actor.	Figures	are	given	for	
the	whole	EU	(the	EU28),	the	group	of	EU	member	states	that	joined	before	2004,	plus	
Malta	and	Cyprus	(the	EU17),	this	same	group	excluding	Ireland	and	Italy	(the	EU15),	
and	the	eleven	CEECs.	Between	1950	and	2014,	190	non-mandatory	referendums	were	
held	in	the	EU28	(compared	to	66	mandatory	referendums),	of	which	31	per	cent	were	
triggered	by	the	political	majority,	nine	per	cent	by	political	minorities	and	nearly	60	
per	 cent	 by	 citizens.	 These	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	were	 all	 held	 in	 Italy	 (66	 in	
total)	and	the	CEECs	(47	in	total).	By	contrast,	in	the	EU15,	no	less	than	34	of	the	38	non-
mandatory	referendums	(89	per	cent)	were	triggered	by	the	political	majority	(either	a	
parliamentary	majority	or	the	president).	The	remaining	four	referendums,	all	held	in	
Denmark,	were	decision-controlling	and	triggered	by	the	opposition.	Moreover,	22	of	
the	38	non-mandatory	referendums	(58	per	cent)	in	the	EU15	were	advisory.	
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By	 contrast,	 referendums	 in	 the	 CEECs	 are	 more	 often	 triggered	 by	 (political	 and	
citizens’)	opposition	 forces	 to	 influence	decision-making.	Only	29	per	 cent	of	 the	83	
non-mandatory	 referendums	 in	 the	 CEECs	 were	 triggered	 by	 the	 political	 majority	
(parliament	or	president),	compared	to	14	per	cent	by	political	minorities	and	57	per	
cent	 by	 citizens.	 Of	 the	 47	 citizens’	 referendums	 held	 in	 seven	 CEECs,	 37	were	 pre-
legislative,	held	on	citizens’	initiatives	(a	type	of	referendum	that	is	not	provided	for	in	
any	of	the	‘old’	EU	member	states).	Nevertheless,	over	55	per	cent	of	the	non-mandatory	
referendums	 held	 in	 the	 CEECs	 were	 also	 advisory,	 usually	 because	 the	 turnout	
threshold	could	not	be	reached.	In	addition,	there	are	also	CEECs	where	referendums	
are	held	only	occasionally,	primarily	on	one-off	events	like	EU	membership	and	major	
institutional	reform.
Table 8.2: Non-mandatory referendum use
Representative
majority
Representative
minority
Citizens’
minority
EU 28 31% 9% 60%
EU 17 33% 5% 62%
EU 15 89% 11% 0%
CEECs 29% 14% 57%
Moreover,	the	use	of	referendums	in	EU	member	countries	 is	restricted	to	politically	
weighty	issues.	It	peaks	around	unique	one-off	events,	like	democratic	and	constitutional	
consolidation	 in	 the	 Mediterranean	 and	 the	 CEECs,	 EU	 accessions	 and	 EU	 treaty	
reforms.	Therefore	 there	 is	certainly	no	gradual	 increase	 in	 the	use	of	 referendums,	
nor	are	referendums	a	political	routine.	Hence,	given	these	nuances,	the	question	of	
what	 explains	 the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 national	 referendums	 in	 European	
democracies,	becomes	primarily	a	question	of	what	explains	why	certain	referendums	
are	provided	for	and	others	not,	why	referendums	are	held	more	frequently	in	some	
countries	than	in	others,	and	why	particularly	on	certain	issues.
8.3 UNDERSTANDING REFERENDUM USE IN EU DEMOCRACIES
To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 examined	 six	 assumptions	 concerning	 the	 potential	
drivers	of	 referendums,	derived	 from	four	schools	of	 institutional	 thought	–	classical	
institutionalism,	 historical	 institutionalism,	 sociological	 institutionalism	 and	 rational	
choice	 institutionalism.	The	comparisons	of	five	countries	with	different	 referendum	
track	 records	 –	 France	 and	Denmark	 (where	 referendums	were	 relatively	 frequently	
held),	 the	 UK	 and	 Sweden	 (where	 referendums	 were	 limitedly	 and	 irregularly	 held)	
8
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and	the	Netherlands	 (which	has	no	constitutional	 referendum	provisions	and	where,	
until	2016,	only	one	referendum	had	been	held)	–	demonstrate	that	controversy	over	
European	integration	and	the	rising	electoral	success	of	populist	parties	in	particular	fuel	
incentives	for	political	authorities	to	use	referendums	for	strategic	purposes.	Although	
values	are	widely	expressed	in	referendum	debates,	interests	prevail	when	it	comes	to	
actual	decisions	on	whether	to	hold	a	referendum.	Whether	referendum	legislation	is	
adopted,	and	how	referendums	are	designed	and	used,	 is	 largely	determined	by	 the	
nature	of	existing	institutions,	the	number	of	veto	players	and	their	preferences,	and	
past	referendum	experience.	In	the	subsequent	sections,	I	will	provide	a	more	detailed	
outline	of	the	motives	for	pledging	referendums,	as	well	as	the	explanations	of	how	they	
vary	among	countries.
8.3.1 Referendum motives: Values versus Interests 
The	analysis	of	decisions	on	whether	to	institutionalize	referendums	in	five	countries	
reveals	that	the	adoption	of	referendum	provisions	is	usually	the	outcome	of	a	struggle	
for	political	power	between	opposition	parties	anticipating	that	referendum	legislation	
will	 increases	 their	 political	 influence,	 and	 ruling	 parties	 that	 generally	 oppose	 such	
legislation	for	fear	of	losing	power.	Most	countries	ultimately	adopt	legislation	that	only	
allows	the	authorities	to	trigger	referendums,	and	the	obvious	conclusion	of	this	study	
is	that	they	do	so	only	when	this	fits	their	immediate	interests.	The	hypothesis	derived	
from	rational	choice	institutionalism,	that	the stronger the act-contingent and outcome-
contingent interests of political actors to support referendums, the more likely it is that 
referendums will be institutionalized and used,	is	thus	corroborated.	
	 The	motives	behind	referendum	pledges	are	often	mixed,	serving	both	outcome-	
and	 act-contingent	 interests.	 It	 is	 of	 course	 difficult	 to	 assess	 whether	 benefits	
associated	with	 referendums	 have	 been	 intentionally	 appealed	 to	 or	whether	 these	
were	 unintended	 consequences	 of	 referendum	 pledges.	 Yet,	 of	 the	 roughly	 40	
referendum	pledges	that	I	examined	in	five	countries,	there	were	few	deliberate pledges 
that	went	against	the	interests	of	the	initiators.	In	most	referendums,	it	is	not	merely	
the	anticipated	outcome	of	the	referendum,	but	the	anticipated	benefits	of the act of 
pledging the referendum	that	incentivizes	political	actors	to	pledge	referendums.		
 Outcome-contingent	motives	played	a	 likely	role	 in	nearly	fifteen	cases,	but	only	
five	 votes	 served	 an	outcome-contingent	 purpose,	 namely	 the	 four	Danish	 votes	 on	
land	reforms	pledged	by	the	opposition	in	1963,	and	the	1986	referendum	in	the	same	
country	 on	 the	 Single	 European	Act	 (SEA),	 pledged	by	 the	minority	 government.	 EU	
negotiations	created	an	additional	incentive	for	governments	to	pledge	referendums,	
since	 such	 votes	 can	 increase	 a	 government’s	 bargaining	 power,	 but	 this	 is	 often	 a	
supplementary	advantage	rather	than	the	primary	motivation	(a	clear	exception	is	the	
Swedish	referendum	to	keep	the	country	out	of	the	eurozone).
 Act-contingent	 motives	 played	 a	 role	 in	 all	 deliberative	 referendum	 pledges	
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analysed	 in	 this	 study,	 except	 for	 the	 Danish	 votes	mentioned	 above.	 Referendums	
are	 sometimes	 used	offensively	 to	 empower	 the	 actors	who	 trigger	 them.	 Although	
such	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 associated	with	 dictatorial	 regimes,	 political	 and	
party	 leaders	 in	democracies	–	especially	majoritarian	ones	 like	France	and	the	UK	–	
have	also	been	 incentivized	to	pledge	a	 referendum	to	strengthen	their	position	vis-
à-vis	 their	 competitors.	Nevertheless,	 contemporary	 referendums	 have	mainly	 been	
pledged defensively,	to	shift	the	focus	from	controversial	issues	in	general	elections	or	
prevent	party	or	 coalition	 splits.	 From	 the	analysis	of	 referendums	 in	five	 countries,	
it	 is	 worthwhile	 discussing	 four	 general	 conclusions	 as	 to	what	 incentivizes	 political	
representatives	to	pledge	referendums.
Conclusion 1: Referendums as defence: deflating controversy over ‘Europe’ 
The	issue	of	European	integration	has	especially	fuelled	the	use	of	referendums	in	EU	
member	 states.	 Between	1950	and	2014,	 38	 referendums	were	held	 that	 related	 to	
the	EU:	29	in	the	EU17	and	nine	in	the	CEECs.	‘Europe’	tends	to	cut	across	traditional	
party	divisions,	especially	 in	 the	 ‘old’	EU	member	states.	As	 such,	many	mainstream	
political	parties	have	difficulties	integrating	EU	issues	into	their	party	ideology,	and	are	
often	internally	divided	by	(sometimes	pragmatic)	pro-European	party	leaderships	and	
Eurosceptic	fractions.	This	applies	both	to	the	centre-left	and	the	centre-right.	When	
there	 is	 a	 high	 probability	 that	 such	 divisions	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 coalition	 or	 party	 split,	
especially	when	 there	are	general	elections	upcoming,	 there	 is	a	 strong	 incentive	 to	
submit	such	issues	to	‘the	people’.	
	 Governments	 are	 often	 faced	 with	 the	 dilemma	 of	 trying	 to	 be	 a	 reliable	 and	
constructive	 negotiation	 partner	while	 being	 pushed	 by	 Eurosceptic	 party	members	
and	 competitors,	 and/or	 volatile	 electorates,	 to	 do	otherwise.	 Referendums	provide	
a	way	 out	 of	 this	 impasse.	When	 a	 government	 faces	 criticism	 from	within	 its	 own	
party	or	parties,	a	referendum	can	the	flip	the	coin	to	one	side	or	the	other	without	the	
leader	losing	authority.	Electoral	dynamics	play	an	important	role	in	EU	referendums,	
since	 public	 opinion	 towards	 ‘Europe’	 is	 highly	 volatile.	 The	 ‘permissive	 consensus’	
which,	according	 to	Lindberg	and	Scheingold	 (1970),	characterized	 the	electorates	 in	
the	 founding	member	 states	 in	 the	 first	 30	 years	 of	 EU	 integration,	 has	 turned	 into	
what	Hooghe	and	Marks	 (2009)	call	a	 ‘constraining	dissensus’.	Especially	when	faced	
with	Eurosceptic	competitors,	‘Europe’	constitutes	an	issue	on	which	votes	can	be	lost	
during	 general	 elections.	 By	 promising	 the	 electorate	 a	 separate	 vote	 on	 EU	 affairs,	
political	parties	can	prevent	such	issues	from	becoming	decisive	in	general	elections.	In	
all	deliberative	post-Maastricht	EU	referendum	pledges	analysed	in	this	study,	deflating 
controversy over Europe	to	prevent	party	splits	or	electoral	losses	played	a	crucial	role.	
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Conclusion 2: Rising salience as the outcome of a populist appeal to referendums
Such	 a	 defensive	 use	 of	 EU	 referendums	 is	 especially	 fuelled	 by	 the	 rising	 electoral	
success	of	populist	Eurosceptic	parties.	Populist	parties	advocate	the	use	of	referendums	
on	issues	relating	to	national	sovereignty	and	immigration.	This	appeal	to	referendums	
is	grounded	in	their	anti-elitist	discourse.	These	parties	stress	that	the	‘ordinary	citizens’	
have	become	increasingly	alienated	from	politics	due	to	the	loss	of	national	sovereignty	
to	 Europe	 and	 the	 alleged	 Islamization	 of	 society	 –	 issues	 on	 which	 mainstream	
political	parties	largely	fail	to	take	an	unequivocal	position.	Referendums,	are	therefore	
alleged	to	restore	the	will	of	the	popular	majority	(i.e.	‘pure	people’)	by	circumventing	
intermediary	institutions	(i.e.	‘the	corrupt	elite’)	and	by	simplifying	complex	issues	into	
simple	questions	and	outcomes.	In	all	five	countries	analysed,	this	populist	discourse	
has	boosted	the	salience	of	referendums	in	the	political	debate.			
	 Survey	 data	 suggest	 that,	 for	 populist	 parties,	 such	 referendum	 calls	 pay	 off	
electorally.	 Support	 for	 referendums	 is	 especially	 high	 among	 populist	 voters,	 and	
research	 suggests	 that,	 for	 citizens	 who	 feel	 alienated	 from	 politics,	 referendum	
promises	are	 important	motives	 to	vote	 for	populist	parties	 (Pauwels	2014,	159	and	
176).	Faced	by	populist	competitors,	mainstream	parties	feel	pressured	to	do	the	same,	
fearing	that	refraining	from	doing	so	would	mean	electoral	 losses.	Populist	pressures	
also	urge	mainstream	parties	 to	 take	positions	on	divisive	 issues,	 creating	 incentives	
to	depoliticize	these	issues	by	pledging	referendums.	This	underscores	the	conclusion	
of	 Susan	Scarrow	 (2001,	652)	 that	 the	 ‘push	 toward	direct	democracy’	 is	 a	 sign	 that	
‘populist	pressures	have	once	again	gained	momentum’.	
Conclusion 3: Values create a referendum-favourable discourse, but hardly drive actual 
referendums
Electoral	referendum	strategies,	by	either	mainstream	or	populist	parties,	are	attractive	
due	to	the	strong	normative	appeal	of	referendums.	It	has	become	common,	or	even	
constitutionally	required,	to	legitimize	grand	political	decisions,	such	as	constitutional	
reform	 and	 EU	 treaty	 ratification,	 by	 referendum.	 In	 publicly	 justifying	 these	 votes,	
governments	generally	refer	to	the	necessity	to	have	such	decisions	directly	approved	
by	 the	 public.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 EU	 affairs,	 referendum	 proponents	 across	 the	
political	spectrum	generally	assert	that	direct	votes	will	help	decrease	the	EU’s	alleged	
‘democratic	 deficit’.	 However,	 although	 such	 normative	 arguments	 indeed	 increase	
the	salience	of	referendums,	they	do	not	necessarily	lead	to	them	actually	being	held.	
Moreover,	 the	 same	 actors	 that	 justify	 a	 referendum	 on	 a	 particular	 occasion	 on	
the	 basis	 of	 participatory	 or	 instrumental	 values	will	 easily	 jettison	 these	 normative	
considerations	in	comparable	occasions	when	faced	with	different	 incentives.	Hence,	
the	hypothesis	derived	from	sociological	institutionalism,	that	the stronger the intrinsic 
and instrumental values that political actors attach to referendums, the more likely it is 
that referendums will be institutionalized and used	is	mainly	falsified.	
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	 A	 notable	 example	 of	 inconsistent	 adherence	 to	 values	 is	 the	 ratification	of	 the	
Lisbon	Treaty	(2007-2009).	At	the	time	of	the	European	Convention	(2002-2003),	there	
was	a	strong	normative	discourse	to	submit	the	Convention’s	outcome	document,	later	
known	as	 the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	 (TCE),	 to	a	 referendum.	No	 fewer	 than	
ten	countries	pledged	a	referendum	on	the	TCE.	Both	politicians	and	academics	argued	
that	European	integration	could	not	go	forward	without	additional	popular	approval,	
something	that	had	been	enshrined	in	the	Laeken	Declaration’s	commitment	to	‘bring	
Europe	closer	to	its	citizens’	(European	Council	2001).	Yet,	after	the	French	and	Dutch	
rejected	the	TCE	 in	a	 referendum	 in	2005,	governments	 that	had	previously	pledged	
referendums	on	the	TCE	decided	not	to	do	so	on	the	subsequent	Lisbon	Treaty.	This	
was	 justified	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 treaty	 was	 de-constitutionalized, and therefore a 
referendum	was	perceived	as	unnecessary.	Concerns	about	the	EU’s	democratic	deficit	
and	 limited	 public	 involvement	 had	 certainly	 not	 declined,	 but	 they	were	 no	 longer	
linked	to	the	necessity	of	holding	a	referendum.	
	 The	mismatch	between	the	appeal	to	referendums	in	the	debate	and	their	actual	
use	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 especially	 when	 assessing	 the	 role	 of	 political	 ideology.	 On	
paper,	support	for	referendums	is	embedded	in	party	ideology	but,	in	practice,	parties	
have	 supported	and	opposed	 referendum	bills	 regardless	of	 their	 ideology.	Principal	
objections	 to	 referendums	 generally	 come	 from	 the	 conservative	 and	 confessional	
right,	which	usually	adhere	to	a	Machiavellian	notion	of	representative	democracy.	By	
contrast,	besides	 the	 radical	 right,	 support	 for	 referendums	 is	also	expressed	by	 the	
progressive-left,	which	tends	to	endorse	Rousseauian	notion	of	political	participation	
and	 empowerment.	 However,	 in	 practice,	 proposals	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	
referendums	have	come	from	both	the	left	and	right,	from	the	centre	and	the	radical	
extremes	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 and	 are	 primarily	 produced	 by	 –	 and	 confirm	 –	
existing	government-opposition	dynamics.	Hence,	 although	values	and	 ideology	play	
an	important	role	in	the	popular	justification	of	proposals	to	both	institutionalize	and	
use	 referendums,	parties	have	primarily	 initiated	 such	proposals	 to	 strengthen	 their	
position	 vis-à-vis	 their	 competitors	 or	 prevent	 electoral	 losses,	 or	 they	 have	 been	
the	outcome	of	 political	 compromises	between	mainstream	and	 smaller	 parties	 (for	
example,	to	compensate	for	the	abolition	of	the	upper	house	or	in	return	for	support	
for	a	specific	policy	proposal).
Conclusion 4: Despite the appeal to ‘the people’, we do not know if people want 
referendums
Research	 on	 referendums	 usually	 starts	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 advanced	
democracies	 increasingly	 use	 referendums	 and	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 value	 changes	 in	
Western	democratic	societies	resulting	in	increasing	public	referendum	demands.	The	
argument	goes	that	such	demands	come	either	from	highly	educated	and	cognitively	
skilled	 citizens	 with	 generally	 high	 levels	 of	 interest	 in	 politics,	 and/or	 from	 people	
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who	are	largely	dissatisfied	with	national	and/or	EU	politics.	Consequently,	 increased	
levels	of	both	political	engagement	and	enragement	lead	to	referendum	demands	to	
which	politicians,	 in	 their	 turn,	 respond.	Attractive	as	 this	argument	may	be,	 I	 found	
no support for the hypothesis that the larger the public demands for referendums, the 
more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.	Indeed,	sentiments	
of	political	dissatisfaction	with	national	or	EU	politics	create	a	referendum-favourable 
discourse	on	the	part	of	politicians	for	whom	referendums	have	a	function	in	the	game	
of	 political	 competition.	 But	 beyond	 political	 discourse,	 I	 found	 little	 evidence	 that	
political	actors	are	primarily	driven	by	such	demands,	as	interests	usually	prevail	over	
normative	concerns.	
	 More	importantly,	however,	for	referendums	to	be	an	outcome	of	public	demands,	
we	must	 at	 least	 be	 certain	 about	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 demands.	 However,	we	 do	
not	know	whether	(and	which)	citizens	want	to	vote	in	referendums.	It	 is	remarkable	
that,	despite	the	appeal	 to	public	demands	on	the	part	of	both	referendum	scholars	
and	 decision-makers,	 there	 are	 no	 comparative	 longitudinal	 data	 on	 support	 for	
referendums	 available	 to	 validate	 these	 claims.	 The	 available	 comparative	 opinion	
surveys	(which	assess	support	for	referendums	in	different	countries)	that	I	used	in	this	
study	(the	ISSP	and	the	EES)	to	analyse	public	support	for	referendums	in	Europe	only	
include	general	questions	about	whether	 respondents	agree	 that	 referendums	are	a	
good	way	 to	decide	 in	 general	 (ISSP)	 or	 on	 the	EU	 (EES).	However,	 support	 for	 such	
general	statements	does	not	tell	us	much	about	actual	referendum	demands.	
	 Furthermore,	these	surveys	do	not	ask	respondents	why	they	agree	or	disagree	with	
the	statement.	It	could	well	be	that	dissatisfied	citizens,	or	populist	voters	in	particular,	
agree	with	the	statements	because	they	are	dissatisfied	with	their	government	or	with	
certain	policy	outputs	but	that	–	in	line	with	an	argument	put	forward	by	Hibbing	and	
Theiss-Morse	(2002)	–	they	prefer	strong	and	responsive	leadership	above	having	to	vote	
in	a	referendum	every	now	and	then.	Moreover,	such	surveys	make	no	differentiation	
between	various	types	of	referendum.	They	do	not	tell	us	therefore	whether	citizens	
prefer	 a	 constitutional	 guarantee	 to	 vote	 in	 EU	 referendums,	 as	 is	 provided	 for	 in	
Denmark,	or	to	be	able	to	trigger	referendums	themselves.	Finally,	the	available	surveys	
do	not	provide	an	answer	on	how	often	referendums	should	be	held	or	on	which	issues	
(other	than	the	EU).	Claims	that	the	use	of	referendums	is	fuelled	by	public	demands	are	
thus	largely	based	on	assumptions,	rather	than	on	empirical	evidence.	
8.3.2 Cross-country variations in referendum provisions and use
Although	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 provides	 a	 sound	 understanding	 of	 why	
political	actors	decide	whether	to	organize	a	referendum,	 it	cannot	fully	explain	why	
referendums	are	held	more	often	in	some	countries	than	in	others.	There	is	no	universal	
answer	to	this	question.	Rather,	understanding	cross-country	variations	in	referendum	
provisions	and	use	requires	above	all	an	understanding	of	each	country’s	institutional	
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and	historic	 context.	 Political	 actors	 in	different	 countries	 could	well	 have	 the	 same	
interest	in	adopting	referendum	legislation	or	holding	a	referendum,	but	the	incentive	
to	 actually	 do	 so	 varies,	 depending	 on	 differences	 in	 institutional	 set-up	 and	 past	
referendum	experience.	The	following	three	conclusions	can	be	drawn	as	to	how	such	
country-specific	factors	shape	referendum	legislation	and	use.
Conclusion 5: Different democratic traditions, different referendum practices
Cross-country	differences	in	referendum	provisions	and	the	way	in	which	referendums	
are	used	(though	not	the	frequency	with	which	they	are	used)	are	strongly	embedded	
in	 differences	 in	 democratic	 tradition.	 Hence,	 the	 hypothesis	 that	was	 derived	 from	
classical	 institutionalism,	that	the better the institutional fit between a country’s type 
of democracy and a particular referendum, the more likely that this type of referendum 
will be institutionalized and used,	is	largely	corroborated.	First,	legislative minority and 
citizen-initiated referendums	are	more	commonly	provided	for	in	consensus	democracies	
than	 in	majoritarian	ones.	 In	most	of	 the	 ‘old’	EU	member	states	with	provisions	 for	
such	minority	referendums,	they	were	introduced	as	the	outcome	of	a	political	trade-
off	between	the	dominant	party	and	smaller	parties,	either	as	compensation	for	 the	
abolition	of	the	Senate	–	such	as	in	Denmark	and	Sweden	–	or	to	effectuate	a	particular	
policy	 outcome	 –	 such	 as	 in	 Italy.	 Although	 such	 referendums	 have	 only	 been	 held	
frequently	 in	 Italy,	 the	 underlying	 principle	 coincides	 with	 the	 integrative	 decision-
making	logic	underlying	the	consensus	model	of	democracy.	In	addition,	referendums	
in	 consensus	 democracies,	 especially	 when	 triggered	 by	 minorities,	 usually	 have	 a	
turnout or approval quorum,	which	presents	a	hurdle	to	simple	majority	voting.	For	that	
reason,	quorums	are	usually	not	applied	in	majoritarian	democracies,	as	is	the	case,	for	
example,	in	the	UK	and	France.		
	 Finally,	of	the	few	European	majoritarian	democracies,	only	Greece	and	Cyprus	lack	
provisions	for	mandatory	referendums.	Mandatory	referendums	are	usually	decision-
controlling,	introduced	to	provide	a	guarantee	that	the	authorities	cannot	easily	impose	
grand	institutional	choices	upon	other	parties.	Arguably,	such	a	guarantee	is	felt	to	be	
more	necessary	in	majoritarian	countries	than	in	consensus	ones,	since	in	the	former	
such	major	political	decisions	would	otherwise	be	made	by	a	simple	majority.	A	clear	
exception	 of	 a	 consensus	 democracy	with	 provisions	 for	mandatory	 referendums	 is	
Denmark,	where	they	were	introduced	specifically	to	provide	a	constitutional	guarantee	
to	political	minorities,	which	is	consistent	with	the	highly	consensual	nature	of	Danish	
democracy.	 Unlike	 in	 other	 (majoritarian)	 countries	 with	 provisions	 for	 mandatory	
referendums,	in	Denmark	strict	quorums	apply,	which	also	underscores	the	notion	of	
minority	protection.	These	conclusions	debunk	the	claim	that	referendums	transform	
representative	decision-making.	Rather,	 they	are	 institutionalized	and	used	 in	such	a	
way	as	to	reinforce	existing	party	competition	dynamics,	leaving	more	room	for	either	
majoritarian	decision-making	or	for	the	integration	of	minority	preferences.		
8
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Conclusion 6: A high number of veto players either constrains or enables the use of 
referendums
The	second	hypothesis	derived	from	classical	institutionalism,	that	the fewer veto players 
there are present in the process of institutionalizing or triggering referendums, the more 
likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used,	is	only	partly	corroborated.	
Obviously,	in	countries	where	referendums	are	held	frequently,	this	is	primarily	due	to	
the	fact	that	triggering	referendums	requires	the	approval	of	only	a	few	players	(i.e.	the	
constitution,	the	president,	a	parliamentary	minority	or	the	public).	For	example,	the	
high	number	of	referendums	in	Italy	is	due	to	the	fact	that	referendums	can	be	rather	
easily	 triggered	by	a	citizens’ minority.	By	contrast,	 the	high	number	of	 referendums	
in	Denmark	and	Ireland	is	mainly	due	to	the	fact	that	referendums	are	mandatory	on	
certain	 issues	 (in	 Denmark	 referendums	 on	 EU	 treaties	 are	 only	mandatory	when	 a	
parliamentary minority	rejects	ratification).	In	France,	referendums	are	relatively	easily	
triggered	by	the	president,	which	explains	why	more	referendums	have	been	held	there	
than	in	most	other	EU	countries.	By	way	of	comparison,	referendums	are	held	less	often	
in	countries	where	referendums	can	only	be	triggered	by	parliamentary	majorities,	like	
the	UK.	However,	 a	 small	 number	of	 veto	players	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 referendums	
are	frequently	held.	For	example,	in	Ireland,	Austria,	Luxembourg,	Spain	and	Sweden,	
legislative	 minorities	 have	 never	 effectively	 made	 use	 of	 their	 right	 to	 trigger	 a	
referendum.	Although	the	number	of	veto	players	shapes	actors’	room	for	manoeuvre,	
decisions	whether	to	hold	referendums	are	primarily	driven	by	actors’ preferences and 
incentives,	which	 vary	 per	 polity	 depending	 on	party competition dynamics and the 
presence of a referendum-favourable discourse.	
	 Indeed,	some	polities	have	more	potential	veto	players	than	others,	due	to	higher	
levels	 of	 political	 fragmentation.	 Whether	 high	 levels	 of	 political	 fragmentation	
frustrate	or	enable	decisions	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums	depends	primarily	
on	the	preferences	of	veto	players.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	rigidity	of	the	constitution	
and	 the	existence	of	a	bicameral	parliament,	 together	with	a	 substantive	number	of	
partisan	veto	players	opposed	to	referendums,	prevented	the approval of referendum 
legislation.	Such	high	levels	of	veto	players	are	also	to	be	found	in	Belgium	and,	to	a	
lesser	extent,	Germany,	where	the	constitution	also	makes	no	reference	to	the	use	of	
national	referendums.	In	addition,	in	consensus	democracies	like	the	Netherlands	and	
Sweden,	a	parliamentary	majority	required	to	trigger a referendum consists of various 
ideologically	different	parties,	which	makes	 this	 essentially	more	difficult	 than	when	
it	only	requires	the	support	of	the	government	party,	such	as	for	example	in	the	UK.	
But	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 referendums	 are	more	 frequently	 held	 in	majoritarian	
democracies	than	in	consensus	democracies.	In	fact,	in	majoritarian	polities,	it	is	also	
easier	for	government	parties	to	avoid	referendums	if	they	see	them	to	be	against	their	
interests.	
	 Political	 fragmentation	 can	 also	 enable	 the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	
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referendums.	 First,	 increased	 fragmentation	 increases	 the	 number	 of	 potential	 veto	
players	 and	makes	 it	more	difficult	 for	mainstream	parties	 to	 avoid	 referendums.	 In	
the	UK	for	example,	 increased	political	 fragmentation	due	to	the	rising	popularity	of	
pro-referendum	parties	(the	SNP	and	UKIP)	has	reduced	the	ability	of	the	mainstream	
parties	 to	 avoid	 referendums	 on,	 for	 example,	 Scottish	 independence	 and	 the	 EU.	
Hence,	the	presence	of	only	a	few	veto	players	does	not	necessarily	facilitate	decisions	
to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums,	nor	does	a	high	number	of	veto	players	always	
constrain	them.
Conclusion 7: Referendums in the past are no guarantee for the future
The	adoption	of	bills	on	either	the	institutionalization	or	use	of	referendums	is	usually	
preceded	by	a	long	political	process,	and	this	process	often	(though	not	always)	follows	
the	 logic	 of	 path	 dependency.	 An	 example	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	
consecutive	referendum	proposals	entailed	legislation	for	the	citizens’	veto	rather	than	
other	 referendum	 types.	 Thus,	 understanding	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 referendum	
debates	 is	 important	 to	understanding	current	ones.	There	 is,	however,	no	universal	
explanation	of	how	past	referendum	experience	shapes	future	practice.	The	hypothesis	
derived	from	historical	institutionalism,	that	when there is past referendum experience 
in a country, it is more likely that referendums will be institutionalized and used, does 
not	entirely	hold.	Having	experience	of	referendums	in	the	past	 is	no guarantee that 
particular	referendums	are	institutionalized	or	used.
	 In	 fact,	 in	most	EU	member	states,	 referendum	legislation	became	 implemented	
during	regime	or	constitutional	change	(so-called	‘critical	junctures’),	and	for	most	of	
these	countries,	this	signified	a	return	to	an	older	–	though	not	necessarily	democratic	
–	tradition.	 In	France,	referendum	provisions	were	introduced	in	the	Fourth	Republic	
by	General	De	Gaulle,	who	later	(as	president)	re-enforced	the	plebiscitary	referendum	
tradition	 initiated	 by	 Napoleon	 I.	 Denmark	 and	 Sweden	 held	 several	 democratic	
referendums	prior	to	WWII,	already	using	them	to	solve	disagreements	on	issues	that	
cut	 across	 party	 lines	 and	 coalitions,	 such	 as	 foreign	 policy	 and	 alcohol	 prohibition.	
However,	early	experience	with	 referendums	 is	no	guarantee	of	 them	being	held	on	
a	 frequent	 basis,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 Austria	 and	 Luxembourg.	 In	 these	 two	 countries,	
pre-WWII	 democratic	 constitutions	 already	 contained	 referendum	 provisions,	 but	
referendums	are	now	held	only	on	unique	occasions.	 In	the	Netherlands,	which	held	
several	democratic	referendums	in	the	late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	centuries,	
the	instrument	was	not	used	again	until	2005.				
	 There	 are	 several	 countries,	 including	 Spain	 and	 Germany,	 where	 experience	
with	 dictatorial	 referendums	 prevents	 referendums	 from	 playing	 an	 important	 role	
in	 contemporary	 decision-making.	 Yet,	 in	 a	 number	 of	 other	 countries,	 referendum	
provisions	 have	 been	 adopted	 and	 used	 frequently	 regardless	 of	 such	 tainted	 past	
experience.	In	some	of	these	countries,	like	Italy	and	the	Baltic	states,	citizen-initiated	
8
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and	 legislative	minority	 referendums	were	 introduced	 to	consolidate	post-dictatorial	
party	 systems,	and	were	 intended	 to	mark	a	break	with	past	plebiscitary	use	of	 the	
referendum.	In	Portugal	and	Romania,	on	the	other	hand,	referendums	are	majoritarian	
tools	 in	the	hands	of	the	president,	despite	past	plebiscitary	dictatorial	use.	 In	these	
countries,	however,	presidents	have	triggered	referendums	less	often	than	in	France,	
which	is	of	course	partly	due	to	their	later	democratization	and	accession	to	the	EU,	but	
also	because	 their	presidents	can	only	call	 referendums	on	politically	weighty	 issues	
(Romania)	or	because	there	are	a	number	of	subject	exclusions	(Portugal).	Hence,	the	
analyses	of	referendum	institutionalization	in	five	countries	suggest	that	decisions	to	
introduce	referendum	legislation	and	use	referendums	are	often	the	outcome	of	context-
specific	political	trade-offs	and	anticipated	gains	rather	than	historical	precedents.
8.4 IMPLICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
These	 findings	 have	 implications	 for	 two	 common	 assumptions	 in	 the	 referendum	
literature.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 European	 citizens	 are	 increasingly	 gaining	 direct	 control	
over	 political	 decision-making	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 political	 parties,	 through	 the	
institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums.	I	have	shown	that	this	is	not	the	case	as,	
in	most	countries	–	both	the	‘old’	EU	member	states	and	the	CEECs	–	referendum	use	
is	restricted	to	one-off	events,	such	as	constitutional	reform	and	EU	accession	and/or	
treaty	reform.	In	addition,	even	in	countries	where	referendums	are	more	frequently	
used,	 they	are	mainly	 tools	 in	 inter-party	competition,	and	hence	strengthen	parties	
rather	 than	weaken	 them.	The	 second	assumption	 is	 that	 the	use	of	 referendums	 is	
driven	by	structural	factors.	Although	values	and	public	opinion	are	important	in	creating	
a	referendum-favourable	discourse,	actual	decisions	are	primarily	the	outcome	of	one-
off	strategic	calculations	by	political	agents.	Since	strategic	referendum	functions	are	
often	obscured	by	the	strong	normative	appeal	typical	of	popular	votes,	putting	political	
agency	first	is	crucial	to	understanding	the	role	of	referendums.	
The People or the Prince?
The	 bias	 in	 the	 literature	 towards	 sociological	 institutionalism	 –	 which	 perceives	
referendums	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 either	 public	 demands	 or	 democratic	 values	 –	 has	
resulted	 in	 a	 tendency	 not	 only	 to	 overestimate	 the	 frequency	with	which	national 
referendums	are	held	in	European	countries,	but	also	to	overestimate	the	role	of	‘the	
people’.	Once	referendums	are	differentiated	on	the	basis	of	how	the	vote	is	triggered,	it	
has	to	be	concluded	that,	in	the	largest	number	of	EU	countries,	referendum	provisions	
are	designed	 in	such	a	way	that	their	use	 is	controlled	by	the	‘Prince’	rather	than	by	
the	‘People’.	Although	in	referendums,	the	people	eventually	decide	on	issues,	political	
parties	 remain	 in	 charge	 of	 determining	when	 and	 on	what	 issues	 the	 people	 vote.	
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Hence,	in	the	European	context	of	increased	electoral	volatility	and	populist	pressures,	
the	use	of	referendums	(or	calls	to	do	so)	have	strengthened	–	rather	than	weakened	–	
the	legislature.
Structure versus Agency?
The	 notion	 that	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 elite-driven	 and	 -controlled	
underscores	 the	 importance	 of	 political agency.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	
that,	 in	 invoking	 referendums,	 political	 actors	 are	 entirely	 free	 from	 their	 structural	
environment.	Their	calculus	is	‘bound’	by	the	institutional	and	historical	context,	as	well	
as	the	public	climate.	For	example,	a	referendum	on	the	EU	can	be	a	viable	option	for	
a	political	party	or	a	government	coalition	that	is	divided	on	‘Europe’,	especially	when	
such	 divisions	 are	 played	 upon	 by	 populist-right	 Eurosceptic	 competitors.	 However,	
whether	a	referendum	is	held	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	democratic	polity	(which	
shapes	 the	 function	 that	 referendums	have	 in	decision-making,	either	as	a	decision-
controlling	or	confirming	mechanism),	the	ease	with	which	a	referendum	is	triggered,	
the	historical	context	and	the	structure	of	public	opinion.	What	this	study	shows	is	that	
attributing	the	use	of	referendums	in	Europe	only	to	actors’	ambitions	to	strengthen	
or	even	transform	democracy	provides	no	understanding	of	the	intentional	functions	
that	referendums	have	in	decision-making,	nor	of	the	impact	that	such	intentional	use	
eventually	has	on	democracy.	
Directions for future research
Growing	 use	 of	 national	 referendums	 in	 some	 countries	 has	 led	 to	 a	 growth	 in	 the	
academic	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 My	
study	 contributes	 to	 this	 literature	 by	 devoting	more	 attention	 to	 the	 various	 types	
of	referendum	and	their	different	functions	in	representative	decision-making;	it	also	
unravels	the	prevailing	discourse,	both	among	academics	and	politicians,	that	perceives	
referendums	only	as	citizens’	instruments	induced	to	and	capable	of	solving	the	alleged	
‘crisis	of	democracy’.	A	first	potential	direction	for	 future	research	 is	broadening the 
focus to the use of referendums in new democracies in Europe and in non-European 
democracies.	 I	have	analysed	 the	 functions	 that	 referendums	have	 in	established	EU	
democracies,	and	showed	that	they	are	largely	triggered	by	political	parties	as	a	weapon	
in	 intra-	 and	 inter-party	 competition.	 I	 thereby	 provided	 no	 insights	 into	 whether	
referendum	functions	differ	in	countries	where	they	are	triggered	more	often	by	citizens.	
I	also	largely	neglected	the	functions	that	referendums	have	in	consolidating	the	new	
democracies	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	where	these	functions	might	indeed	differ	
due	to	differences	in	political	traditions	and	cultures,	political	constellations	and	party	
landscapes.	Moreover,	 since	 I	 focused	only	 on	 EU	 countries,	my	 study	entails	 a	 bias	
towards	the	importance	of	EU	pressures,	and	I	provided	no	understanding	of	the	role	
that	referendums	play	in	different	political	contexts.	
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A	second	direction	for	future	research	is	guided	by	new referendum cases that will likely 
occur in EU countries in the near or more distant future.	I	have	analysed	referendums	
that	were	held	until	the	end	of	2014.	Yet	2015	and	2016	have	already	brought	about	
new	referendums,	in	Greece,	Denmark,	the	Netherlands	and	the	UK.	These	votes	will	
potentially	be	followed	up	by	more,	as	mainstream	political	parties	find	it	increasingly	
difficult	to	take	a	clear	position	on	pressing	issues	like	Europe’s	debt	and	migration	crises.	
This	inability	fuels	the	electoral	success	of	populist	parties,	which	appeal	to	‘the	people’	
by	promising	referendums	on	such	issues	and	put	pressure	on	mainstream	parties	to	do	
the	same.	Future	research	on	referendums	should	therefore	focus	particularly	on	the 
rising success of populist parties and its impact on the use of referendums.  
	 A	final	and	much-needed	direction	for	future	research	is	in-depth analysis of public 
opinion towards referendums.	In	the	public	debate,	it	is	often	stressed	that	‘the	people’	
want	to	be	able	to	vote	in	referendums.	Although	I	aimed	to	assess	whether	this	is	indeed	
the	case,	I	encountered	a	lack	of	comparative	and	longitudinal	data	on	public	support	
for	referendums.	This	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that,	when	comparative	European	opinion	
surveys	first	started	(e.g.	the	Eurobarometer	in	the	1970s	and	the	European	Values	Study	
in	the	1980s),	the	referendum	issue	was	not	sufficiently	salient	to	be	incorporated	in	the	
survey	and	adapting	them	is	seen	as	difficult.	Or	perhaps	the	compilers	and	funders	of	
the	surveys	have	an	interest	in	not	assessing	public	support	for	referendums,	fearing	
that	the	results	will	challenge	the	status	quo.	Whatever	the	reason,	due	to	this	lack	of	
data,	we	simply	do	not	know	whether	electorates	 (and	which	part	of	 them)	support	
referendums	and	why	they	do	so.	We	also	do	not	know	how	citizens	perceive	different	
types	of	referendum,	nor	how	they	perceive	the	way	in	which	referendums	are	used	
in	their	countries.	Given	that,	 in	most	countries,	referendums	are	primarily	triggered	
by	political	actors	towards	whom	public	dissatisfaction	is	directed	(the	government	or	
political	parties	in	general),	referendums	might	even	lead	to	higher,	rather	than	lower,	
levels	of	political	dissatisfaction.	Unravelling	whether	empirical	evidence	endorses	the	
normative	appeal	to	‘the	people’	is	crucial	in	assessing	the	impact	of	referendums	on	
democracy.
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EPILOGUE: THE POLITICS OF FOUR RECENT EUROPEAN REFERENDUMS
Referendum	calls,	by	both	politicians	and	academics,	are	closely	 linked	to	an	alleged	
crisis of democracy.	Referendums	are	 seen	as	 instruments	 to	close	 the	assumed	gap	
between	citizens	and	politics,	and	 in	particular	between	citizens	and	 ‘Europe’,	or,	by	
Eurosceptics,	to	curtail	sovereignty	transfers	to	the	EU.	This	discourse	has,	however	not	
unequivocally	 translated	 into	 the	actual	use	of	 such	 referendums,	 since	 the	benefits	
of	not	holding	a	popular	vote	usually	outweigh	its	normative	appeal.	In	fact,	especially	
after	 the	 French	 and	Dutch	 rejection	of	 the	 European	Constitutional	 Treaty	 in	 2005,	
enthusiasm	for	holding	EU	referendums	declined	among	political	leaders.	However,	a	
decade	later	EU	referendums,	are	back	on	the	agenda.	During	the	course	of	finalizing	
this	study,	four	referendums	took	place	on	EU	matters:	in	July	2015	in	Greece,	on	the	
country’s	Eurozone	bailout	deal;	in	December	2015	in	Denmark,	on	the	Danish	EU	opt-
out	from	the	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice;	in	April	2016	in	the	Netherlands,	on	
ratification	of	the	EU’s	association	agreement	with	Ukraine;	and	in	June	2016	in	the	UK,	
on	whether	it	should	stay	in	the	EU.148 
	 The	salience	of	referendums,	especially	on	the	EU,	 is	to	a	 large	extent	fuelled	by	
the	 rising	 electoral	 success	 of	 Eurosceptic	 populist	 parties,	 both	 on	 the	 radical-left	
and	 radical-right	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 These	 parties	 mobilize	 support	 on	 the	
basis	of	promises	to	hold	referendums,	which	they	portray	as	a	means	to	restore	the	
power	of	‘the	people’	at	the	expense	of	‘the	elites’.	Despite	this	normative	argument,	
such	promises	have	a	 strong	empowering	 function,	as	 they	allow	populist	parties	 to	
strengthen	their	position	vis-à-vis	mainstream	competitors.	Their	referendum	calls	put	
pressure	on	mainstream	parties	to	follow	suit.	Although	political	actors	tend	to	justify	
their	referendum	pledges	by	the	democratic	value	of	letting	‘the	people’	decide,	I	have	
demonstrated	in	this	study	that,	in	practice,	referendums	are	rarely	a	genuine	reflection	
of	popular	sovereignty.	This	conclusion	is	once	again	underlined	by	these	four	recent	
referendums,	which	fall	outside	the	timeframe	of	this	study,	but	which	are	nevertheless	
worthwhile	examining.	First,	the	Greek,	Dutch	and	British	referendums	were	pledged	
by	actors	whose	intentions	did	not	unambiguously	coincide	with	how	they	justified	their	
pledges	 in	 the	public	debate,	while	 the	mandatory	Danish	 referendum	also	served	a	
political	strategy,	due	to	the	timing	of	the	vote.	Second,	despite	deliberate	appeals	to	
‘the	people’	in	Greece,	the	Netherlands	and	the	UK,	the	referendums	in	these	countries	
gave	voters	no	guarantee	that	their	verdict	would	be	respected,	since	the	authorities	
have	considerable	leeway	in	interpreting	the	results	or	to	change	their	course	of	action.	
Greece: ‘David versus Goliath’
On	 5	 July	 2015,	 the	 Greeks	 rejected	 the	 bailout	 deal	 proposed	 by	 the	 Troika	 in	 a	
148.	 	An	overview	of	the	primary	sources	used	in	the	Epilogue	is	provided	in	appendix	3.
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national	referendum,149	which	had	been	pledged	by	the	radical-left	Syriza	government.	
Commentators	 –	 at	 least	 those	 on	 the	 political	 left	 –	 praised	 the	 referendum	 as	 a	
‘triumph	 for	 democracy’	 (Fotaki	 6.7.2015).	 The	Greeks	 had	 chosen	 ‘democracy	 over	
fear’	 (Fulton	 5.7.2015)	 and	 the	 referendum	 showed	 that	 citizens	 could	 counter	 the	
political	elite	in	Brussels.	Indeed,	when	pledging	the	referendum	–the	second	one	to	be	
held	in	Greece	since	the	fall	of	the	Junta	in	1974	–	prime	minister	Alexis	Tsipras	said	that	
he	had	done	so	to	restore	the	sovereignty	of	the	Greek	people.	This	was	underscored	
by	 former	finance	minister	Yanis	Varoufakis,	who	said	 that	 the	 referendum	provided	
a	boost	to	democracy,	and	that	Syriza	had	delivered	it	(BBC	27.6.2015).	Given	that	the	
elections	 held	 six	 months	 earlier	 had	 given	 the	 party	 a	 strong	mandate	 to	 prevent	
further	austerity	measures,	the	vote	was	arguably	superfluous.	Yet,	it	is	illustrative	of	
the	strategic	role	that	national	referendums	play	in	domestic	and	international	politics,	
one	of	the	main	conclusions	of	this	book.	
	 The	 referendum	 pledge	 was	 grounded	 in	 a	 radical-left	 populist	 discourse.	 Both	
Tsipras	and	Varoufakis	referred	to	‘the	Greek	people’	as	opposed	to	the	economic	elites	
in	Brussels	and	 justified	 the	 referendum	as	a	means	 to	 restore	power	 to	 the	first	at	
the	 expense	of	 the	 latter.	Despite	 this	 normative	 appeal,	 the	 vote	was	 certainly	 not	
devoid	of	other	intentions.	In	fact,	Tsipras	himself	made	no	secret	of	the	fact	that	the	
referendum	 served	 to	 strengthen	 Greece’s	 bargaining	 position	 in	 the	 negotiations	
with	 the	Troika,	 since	a	 ‘no’	vote	would	 force	 the	negotiators	 to	draw	an	alternative	
deal	(BBC	27.6.2015;	Johnston	27.6.2015).	However,	the	pledge	certainly	also	provided	
Tsipras	with	a	way	out	of	the	impasse	in	which	he	found	himself.	 It	thereby	served	a	
strong	empowering	function,	as	is	often	the	case	when	referendums	are	pledged	by	the	
authorities.	Not	accepting	the	deal	would	stall	the	negotiations	altogether,	leaving	the	
newly	elected	government	as	an	unreliable	partner	in	Brussels.	Yet	accepting	the	deal	
implied	that	Syriza	would	break	its	electoral	promise.	Thus,	by	pledging	the	referendum,	
Tsipras	showed	his	supporters	that	he	would	not	undisputedly	accept	a	deal	that	went	
against	the	interests	of	the	Greeks.
	 Nevertheless,	soon	after	the	referendum,	the	Greek	people	had	to	accept	another	
eurozone	 deal	with	 comparable	 consequences	 to	 the	 first,	 regardless	 of	 their	 initial	
‘no’.	The	aftermath	of	the	Greek	referendum	was	therefore	comparable	to	that	of	the	
referendums	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	in	2005,	on	which	the	electorates	
of	several	EU	countries	were	given	a	say,	but	not	on	the	subsequent	Lisbon	Treaty.	The	
way	in	which	the	referendum	was	justified	by	the	Tsipras	government	and	its	supporters	
symbolizes	the	tendency	to	perceive	referendums	as	a	genuine	expression	of	popular	
sovereignty,	 regardless	 of	 the	 political	 context	 in	 which	 they	 are	 triggered	 and	 of	
whether	they	actually	allow	citizens	to	determine	the	course	of	action.
149.	 	The	Troika	is	made	up	of	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	the	European	Commission	(EC),	and	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).
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Denmark: ‘Depoliticizing opting-in’
On	3	December	2015,	 the	Danish	public	narrowly	 rejected	a	proposal	 to	 change	 the	
Danish	opt-out	from	the	EU	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	into	a	flexible	opt-in.	
The	referendum	was	formally	announced	by	the	centre-right	government	in	August	2015,	
in	order	to	save	Denmark	from	having	to	leave	the	EU’s	joint	police	law	enforcement	
agency,	 Europol.	 The	 justice	 opt-out,	 like	 the	 Danish	 opt-outs	 from	 defence	 policy	
and	the	euro,	was	the	consequence	of	the	Danish	public’s	rejection	of	the	Maastricht	
Treaty	in	1992.	Unlike	the	Greek	referendum,	this	vote	was	not	deliberately	pledged:	
any	decision	to	change	the	Danish	opt-outs	into	(flexible)	opt-ins	had	to	be	submitted	
to	a	referendum.	Lifting	the	Danish	exemption	from	justice	affairs	could	therefore	not	
have	been	pursued	without	a	 referendum,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	supported	by	
a	majority	of	Danish	political	parties,	on	both	 the	centre-left	and	centre-right	of	 the	
political	 spectrum.	This	 referendum,	 too,	was	not	devoid	of	political	 strategy,	not	as	
much	because	it	was	held,	but	because	of	its	timing.
	 The	 initial	 commitment	 to	hold	a	 referendum	on	 the	Danish	 justice	opt-out	had	
already	been	expressed	in	2011,	when	the	centre-left	government	of	Helle	Thorning-
Schmidt came	 into	 power. Thorning-Schmidt	 was	 also	 willing	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	
on	 lifting	 the	 Danish	 defence	 opt-out,	 but no	 official	 referendums	 were	 scheduled	
during	her	term	of	office.	The	centre-right	opposition	party	Venstre	proposed	holding	
a	referendum	on	both	the	justice	and	defence	opt-out	together	with	the	referendum	
on	the	Unified	Patent	Court	(UPC)	in	May	2014	(which	coincided	with	the	EP	elections),	
but	the	government	rejected	this,	claiming	that	‘the	timing	was	not	right’	(Copenhagen	
Post	13.9.2013).	Arguably,	Thorning-Schmidt	not	only	feared	that	the	Danish	electorate	
would	reject	lifting	the	opt-outs	in	a	time	of	adverse	Danish	public	opinion	following	the	
EU’s	debt	crisis,	but	also	that	the	controversy	over	the	issue	would	negatively	impact	on	
the	outcome	of	the	less	controversial	UPC	vote.	In	October	2014,	five	months	after	the	
Danes	had	voted	in	favour	of	the	UPC,	Thorning-Schmidt	reiterated	her	plan	to	hold	a	
referendum on	the	justice	opt-in,	to	be	held	after	the	general	elections	in	June	2015.	
	 The	proposal	by	Venstre	to	hold	a	referendum	during	Thorning-Schmidt’s	term,	as	
well	as	 the	centre-left	government’s	 rejection	of	 it,	 illustrate	the	 important	role	that	
referendums	play	in	government-opposition	dynamics,	as	I	have	demonstrated	in	this	
book.	The	call	by	Venstre	–	which,	during	its	ten	years	in	government	between	2001	and	
2011,	avoided	a	referendum	on	the	Lisbon	Treaty	and	did	not	pledge	votes	on	the	Danish	
opt-outs	–	to	hold	the	opt-out	referendums	during	the	centre-left	government’s	term	
provided	it	with	a	means	to	avoid	the	political	risks	associated	with	referendums	(which	
are	higher	for	government	than	for	opposition	parties).	These	risks	were	exactly	why	
the	centre-left	government	rejected	the	proposal.	However,	Thorning-Schmidt	clearly	
still	felt	the	necessity	to	lift	the	justice	opt-out,	as	is	shown	by	her	proposal	to	hold	a	
referendum	after the 2015 general elections, which	was	 eventually	 supported	 by	 all	
mainstream	parties.	Postponing	the	vote	allowed	the	mainstream	pro-European	parties	
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to	separate	the	controversial	issue	from	the	electoral	campaign,	thereby	curtailing	the	
electoral	success	of	the	Eurosceptic	Danish	People’s	Party,	which	had	been	pushing	for	
a	referendum	on	Denmark’s	exit	from	the	EU.	
	 Thus,	although	decisions	to	transfer	Danish	sovereignty	to	the	EU	can	most	often	not	
be	made	without	explicit	consent	of	the	Danish	people	–	given	that	referendums	on	the	
EU	are	in	most	cases	mandatory	–	this	recent	referendum	underscores	the	conclusion	of	
this	study	that,	even	in	Denmark,	EU	referendums	are	susceptible	to	political	strategy.
The Netherlands: ‘Mobilizing Euroscepticism’
On	6	April	2016,	Dutch	citizens	voted	in	their	second	national	referendum	in	modern	
history	 on	 whether	 they	 agreed	 with	 Dutch	 ratification	 of	 the	 EU’s	 Association	
Agreement	with	Ukraine.	It	was	also	the	second	time	that	the	Dutch	voted	‘no’	in	an	
EU-related	referendum:	a	majority	of	61	per	cent	rejected	ratification	of	the	agreement.	
The	Ukraine	referendum	was	the	outcome	of	the	recently	approved	referendum	law	
which	grants	Dutch	citizens	the	possibility	to	trigger	a	referendum	on	bills	approved	by	
the	Dutch	parliament.	Consequently,	although	the	Netherlands	was	for	a	long	time	one	
of	the	few	European	countries	without	legislation	on	the	use	of	national	referendums,	
this	new	law	allows	for	a	far-reaching	type	of	referendum	enabling	citizens	to	correct	
their	elected	representatives	when	they	disagree	with	a	decision.	However,	the	Ukraine	
vote	demonstrates	that	this	is	no	guarantee	that	citizens	can	indeed	influence	decision-
making	and	that,	even	when	referendums	are	triggered	by	citizens,	the	vote	can	easily	
be	 ‘hijacked’	by	political	parties	or	groups	with	other	 intentions	 than	claimed	 in	 the	
justification	for	holding	the	referendum.	
	 The	Dutch	referendum	law	allows	for	citizen-initiated	referendums,	which	are,	 in	
principle,	 more	 directly	 participatory	 than	 other	 types	 of	 referendum.	 However,	 as	
with	 other	 country	 examples	 described	 in	 this	 study,	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 the	 direct	
participatory	nature	of	 the	 referendum	 is	curtailed	by	 the	design	of	 the	 referendum	
law.	 The	 Dutch	 referendum	 law	 is	 an	 odd-man-out	 in	 Europe,	 as	 it	 specifies	 that	
referendums	are	not	only	advisory,	but	also	require	a	turnout quorum.	This	means	that	
the	 people’s	 advice	 to	 the	 government	 is	 only	 valid	 if	 30	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 electorate	
participate	in	the	vote.	This	could	create	a	double	incentive	not	to	vote,	first	because	the	
outcome	is	not	legally	binding,	and	second	because	voters	who	do	not	agree	with	the	
anticipated	outcome,	or	who	reject	such	referendums	as	such,	can	frustrate	its	validity	
by	abstaining	from	voting.	Indeed,	a	survey	conducted	on	the	day	of	the	poll	revealed	
that	the	low	turnout	of	32	per	cent	was	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	many	people	in	favour	
strategically	decided	to	abstain	from	voting,	anticipating	that	the	turnout	quorum	of	30	
per	cent	would	not	be	reached	(Poort	8.4.2016).	
	 In	addition,	although	the	Dutch	referendum	law	grants	citizens	the	right	to	trigger	
a	referendum,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	will	stipulate	
the	 government’s	 course	of	 action.	After	 the	 ‘no’	 vote,	 the	Dutch	 government,	with	
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the	approval	of	a	majority	in	Parliament,	decided	to	postpone	a	decision	on	ratification	
so	 that	 it	 can	 negotiate	 with	 Brussels	 and	 Ukraine	 and	 await	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	
Brexit	referendum	in	the	UK.	Moreover,	parts	of	the	agreement	that	deal	with	trade	
regulations	already	came	into	effect	in	January	2016,	and	to	cancel	them	in	retrospect	
requires	approval	of	all	28	member	states,	which	 is	obviously	highly	unlikely.	Hence,	
‘the	people’	have	indeed	spoken,	but	certainly	not	decided.	
	 Nevertheless,	 in	the	debate,	 the	Eurosceptic	citizens’	movement	GeenPeil,	which	
initiated	the	referendum,	emphasized	that	the	referendum	would	‘save	democracy’	by	
granting	‘the	people’	an	instrument	to	express	their	voice	on	the	Ukraine	agreement,	
which	was,	accordingly,	approved	by	parliament	almost	unanimously.	As	such,	the	vote	
would	restore	the	power	of	the	Dutch	citizens	who,	according	to	the	initiators,	have	lost	
control	over	major	developments	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	the	EU.	Given	the	advisory	
nature	of	the	vote,	this	discourse	could	well	have	contributed	to	a	sense	of	false	hope	
on	the	part	of	the	Dutch	‘no’	voters	that	their	verdict	would	indeed	change	the	course	
of	action.	
	 Moreover,	 the	 discourse	 did	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	 initiators’	 actual	 intentions,	
which	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 referendum	 in	 a	 newspaper	 interview.	
The	initiators	stressed	that,	rather	than	giving	Dutch	citizens	a	democratic	say	on	the	
Ukraine	 agreement	 as	 such,	 their	 primary	 concern	was	 to	 distort	 relations	 between	
the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	 EU.	 As	 they	 put	 it,	 ‘we	 do	 not	 really	 care	 about	 Ukraine’	
(Heck	31.3.2016).	 In	fact,	they	had	been	waiting	for	the	first	opportunity	to	trigger	a	
referendum	on	 the	EU,	and	 the	Ukraine	agreement	was	 the	first	plausible	option	 to	
present	itself.	The	referendum	thus	supports	one	of	the	main	conclusions	in	this	study,	
that	the	political	intentions	behind	referendum	calls	are	easily	masked	by	the	appeal	of	
the	discourse	that	portrays	referendums	as	the	cure	for	all	democratic	ills.
  
The United Kingdom: ‘Saving the Conservative Party’
During	the	writing	of	this	study,	David	Cameron’s	Conservative	government	announced	
the	first	British	 EU	 referendum	 since	 its	 EC	membership	 referendum	 in	 1975.	 In	 the	
referendum,	 held	 on	 23	 June	 2016,	 the	 British	 people	 voted	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	with	 a	
narrow	majority	of	roughly	52	per	cent,	making	the	UK	likely	the	first	sovereign	country	
to	 leave	 the	 union.	 Regardless	 of	 this	 outcome,	 it	 is	 however	 arguable	whether	 the	
British	people	indeed	have	the	final	say.	
	 As	in	the	Netherlands,	before	the	vote,	British	voters	were	surrounded	by	insecurity	
about	what	their	vote	would	imply.	For	one,	the	referendum	was	not legally binding, 
which	means	that	the	British	parliament	has	the	final	say	when	it	comes	to	Brexit.	Of	
course,	not	adhering	to	a	referendum	outcome	is	politically	risky	but,	then	again,	the	
stakes	 are	 high.	 After	 the	 vote,	 and	 after	 David	 Cameron’s	 resignation,	 uncertainty	
about	what	will	happen	remained,	and	 it	became	clear	 that	 the	 leave	vote	does	not	
automatically	 induce	 Brexit.	 The	 current	 parliament	 can,	 in	 principle,	 ignore	 the	
8
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
288
Chapter 8
outcome	and	 reject	an	EU	exit,	but	 this	of	 course	comes	with	high	electoral	 risks.	 It	
can	also,	by	a	2/3	majority,	enforce	early	elections.	Pro-EU	parties	can	then	campaign	
to	keep	Britain	in	and	if	they	win,	this	could	be	interpreted	by	the	following	parliament	
as	a	mandate	to	reconsider	the	referendum	outcome.	Given	the	growing	popularity	of	
Eurosceptic	competitor	UKIP,	however,	this	scenario	is	unlikely.	Yet,	experience	tells	us	
that	 it	would	not	be	the	first	time	that	a	referendum	outcome	has	been	disregarded	
when	political	constellations	change.	
	 In	any	case,	it	takes	some	time	for	a	country	to	leave	the	EU.	Until	2007,	there	were	
no	formal	regulations	that	set	out	how	a	country	could	exit	the	Union.	The	Lisbon	Treaty	
(Article	50)	now	stipulates	a	negotiation	period	of	maximum two	years.	The	negotiated	
withdrawal	 treaty	 would	 then	 have	 to	 be	 approved	 by	 a	 qualified	 majority	 in	 the	
Council	and	ratified	by	both	the	European	Parliament	and	the	British	Parliament.	A	lot	
can	happen	in	the	meantime.	Alternatively,	instead	of	triggering	Article	50,	Cameron’s	
successor	could	also	interpret	the	narrow	majority	in	favour	of	Brexit	as	a	mandate	to	
hold	a	second	referendum	on	the	issue,	or	as	a	mandate	to	negotiate	new	membership	
conditions.	In	fact,	the	vote	in	favour	of	Brexit	could	give	a	new	British	prime	minister	
an	even	stronger	bargaining	position	than	Cameron	had	in	2015,	when	he	negotiated	
Britain’s	renewed	membership	conditions,	and	two	years	is	a	lot	of	time	to	negotiate	the	
entire	agenda	formulated	by	Cameron	in	September	2015.	If	Brussels	is	indeed	willing	
to	 keep	Britain	by	meeting	all	 of	Britain’s	 terms,	 this	 could	 reinforce	 the	new	prime	
minister’s	position	domestically	and	even	signify	an	eventual	decision	to	stay	in.	Hence,	
as	in	the	Greek	and	Dutch	cases,	a	referendum	as	such	provides	no	solid	guarantee	that	
the	people	indeed	decide,	despite	popular	votes	being	justified	by	political	actors	on	
the	grounds	that	they	do.
	 Also	a	‘remain’	vote	would	have	given	the	British	people	no	guarantee	that	the	issue	
was	settled.	It	would	have	given	the	incumbent	government	a	mandate	to	wipe	Brexit	
off	the	table,	but	this	does	not	apply	to	a	subsequent	government.	Furthermore,	a	vote	
to	stay	in	would	eventually	have	fuelled	a	new	debate,	given	the	fact	that	the	issue	has	
divided	British	politics	ever	since	the	UK	entered	the	EC	in	1973.	Moreover,	the	rising	
success	of	UKIP,	which	was	again	underscored	 in	the	2016	 local	elections	 in	England,	
puts	pressure	on	mainstream	parties	and	ensures	that	 ‘Europe’	will	continue	to	be	a	
‘hot	potato’	for	the	mainstream	parties,	which	are	divided	over	the	issue.	
	 These	divisions	were	in	fact	an	important	reason	for	Cameron	to	pledge	the	vote	
in	the	first	place,	since	they	were,	in	the	words	of	former	Conservative	prime	minister	
John	 Major,	 ‘destroying	 the	 Conservative	 Party’	 (Major	 2013).	 If	 Cameron’s	 main	
concern	was	 indeed	 to	 give	 the	British	 people	 a	 vote	 on	 EU	membership,	 he	would	
have	voted	in	favour	of	the	‘People’s	Pledge’	in	2011,	which	demanded	a	referendum	
on	 Britain’s	 EU	 membership.	 Being	 a	 pragmatic	 pro-European,	 however,	 Cameron	
rejected	the	subsequent	referendum	bill	and	whipped	the	Conservative	MPs	to	do	the	
same	in	the	Commons	vote.	This	vote	revealed	sharp	divisions	within	the	Conservative	
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Party:	80	Conservative	MPs	supported	the	bill,	signifying	the	largest	rebellion	against	
a	Conservative	prime	minister	over	 ‘Europe’.	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	2014	EP	elections	
and	2015	general	elections,	these	divisions	between	the	party	leadership	and	the	bulk	
of	Conservative	MPs	were	still	not	solved.	Moreover,	polls	suggested	rising	electoral	
success	 for	 the	Eurosceptic	UKIP,	especially	 in	 the	2013	 local	elections.	Hence,	when	
Cameron	 pledged	 in	 2013	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	 on	 EU	membership	after	 the	 2015	
elections,	he	aimed	to	both	satisfy	the	Eurosceptics	in	his	party	and prevent a loss of 
Conservative	votes	to	UKIP.	Cameron’s	pledge	thus	supports	the	conclusion	of	this	study	
that	referendums	are	primarily	pledged	defensively,	to	mediate	conflict	and	depoliticize	
controversial	 issues	 so	 as	 to	 guarantee	 party	 unity	 and	 power.	 Nevertheless,	 given	
that	 the	decision	whether	or	 not	 to	 leave	 the	EU	ultimately	 remains	 a political one, 
controversy	 over	 the	 issue,	 also	within	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 is	 likely	 to	 continue,	
regardless	of	the	outcome	of	the	vote.
Claims	that	referendums	restore	the	power	of	the	people	constitute	a	strong	discourse,	
which	finds	 resonance	among	a	 large	number	of	 voters,	 especially	 those	of	populist	
parties,	 who	 feel	 detached	 from	 political	 decision-making,	 and	 among	 especially	
populist	 parties	 aiming	 to	 ‘win’	 votes	on	promises	 to	 grant	 citizens	 a	direct	 vote	on	
important	matters.	It	also	finds	resonance	among	academics	who	favour	referendums	
and	 other	 forms	 of	 direct	 citizens’	 participation,	 and	 study	 the	 phenomenon	with	 a	
normative	preference.	However,	the	normative	appeal	of	referendums	tends	to	mask	
their	 strategic	 functions	 in	 the	 political	 game.	 This	 applies	 especially	 to	 deliberately	
pledged	referendums,	as	the	examples	above	demonstrate.	But	even	mandatory	votes	
are	 often	 not	 devoid	 of	 political	 strategy.	 The	 recent	 votes	 on	 ‘Europe’	 show	 that	
understanding	the	role	that	referendums	play	in	decision-making	requires,	above	all,	an	
understanding	of	the	reasons	why	they	are	held	and	the	context	in	which	this	is	done.	
Especially	when	triggered	by	the	‘Prince’,	the	politics	of	the	direct	popular	vote	is	more	
important	than	what	it	means	on	paper.
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th
e	
he
ad
	o
f	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	T
he
	C
ze
ch
	R
ep
ub
lic
	h
as
	a
	m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
	t
hr
ee
-fi
ft
hs
	m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	b
ot
h	
ho
us
es
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
DE
N
M
AR
K
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
88
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
t
A
pp
ro
va
l:	
a	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	p
er
so
ns
	
ta
ki
ng
	p
ar
t	
in
	t
he
	v
oti
ng
,	a
nd
	a
t	
le
as
t	
40
	p
er
	c
en
t	
of
	t
he
	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
ha
s	
vo
te
d	
in
	fa
vo
ur
	o
f	t
he
	b
ill
	a
s	
pa
ss
ed
	
by
	t
he
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
			
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
29
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
A
ge
	o
f	S
uff
ra
ge
Re
je
cti
on
:	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
es
	a
nd
	
no
t l
es
s t
ha
n 
th
irt
y 
pe
r c
en
t o
f a
ll 
pe
rs
on
s	
w
ho
	a
re
	e
nti
tl
ed
	t
o	
vo
te
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
20
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
D
el
eg
ati
on
	o
f	s
ov
er
ei
gn
	
po
w
er
s	
to
	in
te
rn
ati
on
al
	
bo
di
es
Re
je
cti
on
:	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
es
	a
nd
	
no
t l
es
s t
ha
n 
th
irt
y 
pe
r c
en
t o
f a
ll 
pe
rs
on
s	
w
ho
	a
re
	e
nti
tl
ed
	t
o	
vo
te
A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	is
	n
ot
	n
ec
es
sa
ry
	
w
he
n	
th
e	
bi
ll	
is
	s
up
po
rt
ed
	b
y	
a	
5/
6-
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t.
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
42
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/3
)	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Re
je
cti
on
:	f
or
	a
n	
en
ac
tm
en
t	
to
	b
e	
re
je
ct
ed
,	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	e
le
ct
or
s	
w
ho
	v
ot
e	
an
d	
no
t	
le
ss
	t
ha
n	
th
ir
ty
	
pe
r	
ce
nt
	o
f	a
ll	
pe
rs
on
s	
w
ho
	a
re
	
en
ti
tl
ed
	t
o	
vo
te
Fi
na
nc
e,
	s
up
pl
em
en
ta
ry
	a
pp
ro
pr
i-
ati
on
,	p
ro
vi
si
on
al
	a
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
,	
go
ve
rn
m
en
t	
lo
an
,	c
iv
il	
se
rv
an
ts
	
bi
lls
,	s
al
ar
ie
s	
an
d	
pe
ns
io
ns
,	n
at
u-
ra
liz
ati
on
,	e
xp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
,	t
ax
ati
on
,	
as
	w
el
l	a
s	
bi
lls
	in
tr
od
uc
ed
	fo
r	
th
e	
pu
rp
os
e	
of
	d
is
ch
ar
gi
ng
	e
xi
sti
ng
	
tr
ea
ty
	o
bl
ig
ati
on
s
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	D
en
m
ar
k	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t,
	w
hi
ch
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
n-
ta
ti
on
.	D
en
m
ar
k	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	m
in
or
it
y	
co
al
iti
on
	c
ab
in
et
s.
	T
he
	h
er
ed
it
ar
y	
m
on
ar
ch
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
.	D
en
m
ar
k	
ha
s	
a	
ri
gi
d	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
	s
im
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
ap
pr
ov
al
	in
	t
w
o	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	r
ea
di
ng
s	
w
it
h	
el
ec
ti
on
s	
in
	b
et
w
ee
n	
an
d	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
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ES
TO
N
IA
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
16
2
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
To
	a
m
en
d	
Ch
ap
te
r	
1	
(‘G
en
er
al
	P
ro
vi
si
on
s’
)	
an
d	
Ch
ap
te
r	
XV
	(‘
A
m
en
dm
en
t	
of
	t
he
	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
’)
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
16
4
Q
ua
lifi
ed
	m
aj
or
it
y	
(3
/5
)	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
10
5
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g1
51
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	E
st
on
ia
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	S
ta
te
	C
ou
nc
il)
	t
ha
t	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	I
t	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.		
Th
e	
pr
es
id
en
t	
is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	E
st
on
ia
	h
as
	a
	r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
	t
hr
ee
-fi
ft
h	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t,
	a
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
,	a
nd
	a
no
th
er
	s
im
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	a
	s
uc
ce
ss
iv
e	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
FI
N
LA
N
D
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
53
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	F
in
la
nd
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	
It
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
,	t
ra
di
ti
on
al
ly
	o
ve
rs
iz
ed
	o
ne
s.
	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	F
in
la
nd
	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
n	
ap
pr
ov
al
	b
y	
tw
o	
su
cc
es
si
ve
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ts
,	i
n	
th
e	
fir
st
	r
ea
di
ng
	t
he
	a
m
en
dm
en
t	
re
qu
ir
es
	a
	s
im
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
an
d	
in
	t
he
	s
ec
on
d	
re
ad
in
g	
a	
tw
o-
th
ir
d	
m
aj
or
it
y.
15
1.
		I
n	
ca
se
	a
	la
w
	is
	s
ub
je
ct
	o
f	t
he
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	a
nd
	t
he
	la
w
	is
	r
ej
ec
te
d	
th
er
e	
w
ill
	b
e	
ne
w
	e
le
cti
on
s	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
	
I
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Appendix I
FR
AN
CE
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
 
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
A
rti
cl
e	
89
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
t	
(p
ri
va
te
	m
em
-
be
r’
s	
bi
ll)
N
o
O
nl
y	
in
	c
as
e	
of
	a
	p
ri
va
te
	m
em
be
r’
s	
bi
ll,
	a
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	is
	m
an
da
to
ry
.	
A
	g
ov
er
nm
en
t	
bi
ll	
to
	a
m
en
d	
th
e	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	is
	n
ot
	b
e	
su
bm
itt
ed
	t
o	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
	w
he
n	
th
e	
pr
es
id
en
t	
de
ci
de
s	
to
	s
ub
m
it
	it
	t
o	
Co
ng
re
ss
;	t
he
	
bi
ll	
	n
ee
ds
	a
pp
ro
va
l	o
f	a
	t
hr
ee
-fi
ft
hs
	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	v
ot
es
	c
as
t.
	
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
88
-5
(1
)
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	
+p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Th
e	
ac
ce
ss
io
n	
of
	a
	s
ta
te
	t
o	
th
e	
EU
N
o
N
o	
re
fe
re
nd
um
	in
	c
as
e	
of
	p
as
si
ng
	a
	
m
oti
on
	a
do
pt
ed
	in
	id
en
ti
ca
l	t
er
m
s	
in
	e
ac
h	
H
ou
se
	b
y	
a	
th
re
e-
fift
hs
	
m
aj
or
it
y.
Bi
nd
in
g
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
A
rti
cl
e	
11
-1
Pr
es
id
en
t
Th
e	
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
	o
f	t
he
	p
ub
lic
	a
ut
ho
ri
ti
es
,	
re
fo
rm
s	
re
la
te
d	
to
	e
co
no
m
ic
,	s
oc
ia
l	o
r	
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l	p
ol
ic
y,
	p
ub
lic
	s
er
vi
ce
s,
	o
r	
th
e	
ra
ti
fic
ati
on
	o
f	a
	t
re
at
y	
th
at
	a
ff
ec
ts
	t
he
	
fu
nc
ti
on
in
g	
of
	t
he
	F
re
nc
h	
in
sti
tu
ti
on
s
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
11
-3
	
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/5
)	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t	
+	
1/
10
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	F
ra
nc
e	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	s
em
i-p
re
si
de
nti
al
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
an
d	
th
e	
Se
na
te
).
	T
he
	
N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
a	
tw
o-
ro
un
d	
sy
st
em
.	F
ra
nc
e	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
ha
s	
be
en
	d
om
in
at
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
ce
nt
re
-le
ft
	S
oc
ia
lis
t	
Pa
rt
y	
an
d	
th
e	
ce
nt
re
-r
ig
ht
	
G
au
lli
st
	P
ar
ty
	(w
hi
ch
	h
as
	h
ad
	s
ev
er
al
	d
iff
er
en
t	
na
m
es
	o
ve
r	
ti
m
e,
	c
ur
re
nt
ly
	T
he
 R
ep
ub
lic
an
s)
.	G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
	a
re
	la
rg
el
y	
fo
rm
ed
	b
y	
a	
co
al
iti
on
	o
f	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se
	p
ar
ti
es
	
an
d	
ad
di
ti
on
al
	s
m
al
le
r	
pa
rt
y(
ie
s)
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	F
ra
nc
e	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
t	
re
qu
ir
es
	m
aj
or
it
y	
su
pp
or
t	
in
	b
ot
h	
ho
us
es
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
án
d	
ap
pr
ov
al
	b
y	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
	o
r	b
y	
a	
th
re
e-
fift
h	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	C
on
gr
es
s.
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GE
RM
AN
Y
N
o	
na
ti
on
al
-le
ve
l	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	p
ro
vi
si
on
s	
m
en
ti
on
ed
	in
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
.
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	G
er
m
an
y	
is
	a
	fe
de
ra
l	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	B
un
de
st
ag
	a
nd
	t
he
	B
un
de
sr
at
).
	T
he
	
Bu
nd
es
ta
g	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
m
ix
ed
	m
em
be
r	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	G
er
m
an
y	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	d
om
in
at
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
Ch
ri
sti
an
	D
em
oc
ra
ti
c	
U
ni
on
,	t
og
et
he
r	
w
it
h	
it
s	
Ba
va
ri
an
	s
is
te
r	
pa
rt
y	
th
e	
Ch
ri
sti
an
	S
oc
ia
l	U
ni
on
,	a
nd
	t
he
	S
oc
ia
l	D
em
oc
ra
ti
c	
Pa
rt
y	
an
d	
is
	la
rg
el
y	
go
ve
rn
ed
	b
y	
co
al
iti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
	c
on
si
sti
ng
	o
f	o
ne
	o
f	t
he
se
	
tw
o	
pa
rti
es
	a
nd
	a
n	
ad
di
ti
on
al
	s
m
al
le
r	
pa
rt
y.
	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
Fe
de
ra
l	C
on
ve
nti
on
.	G
er
m
an
y	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	
am
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	t
he
	c
on
se
nt
	o
f	t
w
o	
th
ir
ds
	o
f	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	t
he
	B
un
de
st
ag
	a
nd
	t
w
o	
th
ir
ds
	o
f	t
he
	v
ot
es
	o
f	t
he
	B
un
de
sr
at
.
GR
EE
CE
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
35
Th
re
e-
fift
hs
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	in
te
re
st
A
t	
le
as
t	
40
%
	o
f	t
he
	
ci
ti
ze
ns
	r
eg
is
te
re
d	
as
	
vo
te
rs
 h
av
e 
vo
te
d
N
o	
m
or
e	
th
an
	2
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
s	
in
	t
he
	s
am
e	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	
te
rm
	a
llo
w
ed
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
35
Th
re
e-
fift
hs
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Im
po
rt
an
t	
so
ci
al
	m
att
er
s
A
t	
le
as
t	
50
%
	o
f	
re
gi
st
er
ed
 v
ot
er
s h
av
e 
vo
te
d
Fi
sc
al
	m
att
er
s;
	N
o	
m
or
e	
th
an
	
2	
re
fe
re
nd
um
s	
in
	t
he
	s
am
e	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	t
er
m
	a
llo
w
ed
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	G
re
ec
e	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
se
m
i-p
ro
po
rti
on
al
	r
ep
re
-
se
nt
ati
on
.	I
t	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
w
as
	(u
nti
l	2
00
9)
	la
rg
el
y	
do
m
in
at
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
lib
er
al
-c
on
se
rv
ati
ve
	N
ew
	D
em
oc
ra
cy
	a
nd
	t
he
	s
oc
ia
l-d
em
oc
ra
ti
c	
Pa
nh
el
le
ni
c	
So
ci
al
is
t	
M
ov
em
en
t.
	G
re
ec
e	
ha
s	
tr
ad
iti
on
al
ly
	b
ee
n	
go
ve
rn
ed
,	a
t	
le
as
t	
un
ti
l	r
ec
en
tl
y,
	b
y	
si
ng
le
	p
ar
ty
	c
ab
in
et
s.
	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	G
re
ec
e	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
pp
ro
va
l	b
y	
tw
o	
su
cc
es
si
ve
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ts
;	fi
rs
t	
by
	t
hr
ee
-fi
ft
hs
	m
aj
or
it
y	
an
d	
in
	s
ec
on
d	
re
ad
in
g	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y.
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Appendix I
HU
N
GA
RY
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	i
ni
ti
ati
ve
A
rti
cl
e	
8
20
0.
00
0	
+	
4	
m
on
th
s
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t h
al
f o
f t
he
 
to
ta
l e
le
ct
or
at
e
Th
e	
Fu
nd
am
en
ta
l	L
aw
;	t
he
	c
en
tr
al
	b
ud
ge
t,
	
ce
nt
ra
l	t
ax
es
,	s
ta
m
p	
du
ti
es
,	c
on
tr
ib
uti
on
s,
	
cu
st
om
s	
du
ti
es
,	l
oc
al
	ta
xe
s,
	t
he
	e
le
cti
on
	o
f	
M
em
be
rs
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t,
	o
f	l
oc
al
	g
ov
er
nm
en
t	
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s	
an
d	
m
ay
or
s,
	a
nd
	M
em
be
rs
	
of
	t
he
	E
ur
op
ea
n	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t;
	o
bl
ig
ati
on
s	
ar
is
in
g	
fr
om
	in
te
rn
ati
on
al
	t
re
ati
es
;	p
er
so
na
l	
m
att
er
s	
an
d	
qu
es
ti
on
s	
co
nc
er
ni
ng
	t
he
	
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t	
of
	o
rg
an
iz
ati
on
s	
th
at
	fa
ll	
w
it
hi
n	
th
e	
co
m
pe
te
nc
e	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t;
	t
he
	
di
ss
ol
uti
on
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
or
	a
	b
od
y	
of
	lo
ca
l	
go
ve
rn
m
en
t	
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s;
	t
he
	d
ec
la
ra
ti
on
	
of
	w
ar
,	a
	s
ta
te
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	c
ri
si
s	
or
	s
ta
te
	
of
	e
m
er
ge
nc
y;
	p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
	in
	m
ili
ta
ry
	
op
er
ati
on
s;
	g
en
er
al
	a
m
ne
st
y.
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
a-
jo
rit
y
A
rti
cl
e	
8
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	m
em
be
rs
	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t h
al
f o
f t
he
 
to
ta
l e
le
ct
or
at
e
Id
em
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	H
un
ga
ry
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
a	
m
ix
ed
	s
ys
te
m
	(S
M
P	
an
d	
na
ti
on
al
	li
st
	P
R)
.	I
t	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
ha
s	
be
en
	d
om
in
at
ed
	b
y	
Fi
de
sz
	s
in
ce
	2
01
0	
an
d	
is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	c
ab
in
et
s.
	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	H
un
ga
ry
	h
as
	a
	fl
ex
ib
le
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
	t
w
o-
th
ir
d	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t.
IR
EL
AN
D
Ty
pe
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
A
rti
cl
e	
46
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
t
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
27
O
ne
-t
hi
rd
	o
f	H
ou
se
	o
f	
Re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s	
+	
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	
Se
na
te
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Vo
te
s	
so
	c
as
t	
ag
ai
ns
t	
it
s	
en
ac
tm
en
t	
in
to
	la
w
	s
ha
ll	
ha
ve
	a
m
ou
nt
ed
	t
o	
no
t	
le
ss
	t
ha
n	
th
ir
ty
-t
hr
ee
	a
nd
	o
ne
-
th
ird
 p
er
 c
en
t
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	I
re
la
nd
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	H
ou
se
	a
nd
	R
ep
re
se
nt
ati
ve
s	
an
d	
th
e	
Se
na
te
).
	T
he
	H
ou
se
	o
f	R
ep
re
se
nt
ati
ve
s	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
a	
sp
ec
ia
l	v
ar
ia
nt
	o
f	p
ro
po
rti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
,	c
al
le
d	
th
e	
Si
ng
le
	T
ra
ns
fe
ra
bl
e	
Vo
te
	(S
TV
).
	It
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	Ir
el
an
d	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	
am
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
pp
ro
va
l	b
y	
bo
th
	h
ou
se
s	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
an
d	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
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IT
AL
Y
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	v
et
o
A
rti
cl
e	
75
50
0.
00
0	
+	
3	
m
on
th
s
La
w
s
50
%
	o
f	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
Ta
xe
s,
	t
he
	b
ud
ge
t,
	a
m
ne
st
y	
or
	p
ar
do
n,
	o
r	
a	
la
w
	
ra
ti
fy
in
g	
an
	in
te
rn
ati
on
al
	t
re
at
y	
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
13
8
50
0.
00
0	
+	
3	
m
on
th
s
Pr
op
os
al
s	
to
	a
m
en
d	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
N
o
A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	s
ha
ll	
no
t	
be
	h
el
d	
if	
th
e	
(c
on
sti
-
tu
ti
on
al
)	l
aw
	h
as
	b
ee
n	
ap
pr
ov
ed
	in
	t
he
	s
ec
on
d	
vo
ti
ng
	b
y	
ea
ch
	o
f	t
he
	H
ou
se
s	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
	o
f	m
em
be
rs
.
Ad
vi
so
ry
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
75
5	
re
gi
on
al
	c
ou
nc
ils
La
w
s
50
%
	o
f	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
Ta
xe
s,
	t
he
	b
ud
ge
t,
	a
m
ne
st
y	
or
	p
ar
do
n,
	o
r	
a	
la
w
	
ra
ti
fy
in
g	
an
	in
te
rn
ati
on
al
	t
re
at
y	
Ad
vi
so
ry
A
rti
cl
e	
13
8
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/5
)	o
f	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	a
	h
ou
se
	
or
	5
	r
eg
io
na
l	c
ou
nc
ils
Pr
op
os
al
s	
to
	a
m
en
d	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	I
ta
ly
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(C
ha
m
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	a
nd
	S
en
at
e)
.	T
he
	C
ha
m
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
se
m
i-p
ro
po
rti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	I
ta
ly
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	It
al
y	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	r
eq
ui
re
	a
pp
ro
va
l	o
f	t
w
o	
ho
us
es
	in
	t
w
o	
re
ad
in
gs
	b
y	
a	
si
m
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y.
	
A
m
en
dm
en
ts
	c
an
	b
e	
su
bm
itt
ed
	t
o	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
	w
he
n	
de
si
re
d	
by
	c
iti
ze
ns
	o
r	
op
po
si
ti
on
.
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LA
TV
IA
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
77
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
t	
N
o
In
	c
as
e	
of
	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	A
rti
cl
es
		1
,	2
,	3
,	4
,	6
	
an
d	
7
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
48
-5
0
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
D
is
so
lu
ti
on
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	v
et
o
A
rti
cl
e	
72
1/
10
	o
f	
el
ec
to
ra
te
	+
	2
	
m
on
th
s
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
pr
op
os
al
s
A
pp
ro
va
l	+
	T
ur
no
ut
	
N
um
be
r	
of
	v
ot
er
s	
m
us
t	
be
	
at
	le
as
t	
ha
lf	
of
	t
he
	n
um
be
r	
of
	la
st
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	
el
ec
ti
on
s	
+	
m
aj
or
it
y	
ap
pr
ov
al
Bu
dg
et
,	l
oa
ns
,	t
ax
es
,	c
us
to
m
s	
du
ti
es
,	r
ai
lr
oa
d	
ta
ri
ff
s,
	m
ili
ta
ry
	c
on
sc
ri
pti
on
,	d
ec
la
ra
ti
on
	
an
d	
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t	
of
	w
ar
,	p
ea
ce
	t
re
ati
es
,	
de
cl
ar
ati
on
	o
f	a
	s
ta
te
	o
f	e
m
er
ge
nc
y	
an
d	
it
s	
te
rm
in
ati
on
,	m
ob
ili
sa
ti
on
	a
nd
	d
em
ob
ili
sa
ti
on
,	
ag
re
em
en
ts
	w
it
h	
ot
he
r	
na
ti
on
s.
N
b.
	A
	n
ati
on
al
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	s
ha
ll	
no
t	
ta
ke
	p
la
ce
,	
ho
w
ev
er
,	i
f	t
he
	S
ae
im
a	
ag
ai
n	
vo
te
s	
on
	t
he
	la
w
	
an
d	
no
t	
le
ss
	t
ha
n	
th
re
e-
qu
ar
te
rs
	o
f	a
ll	
m
em
be
rs
	
of
	t
he
	S
ae
im
a	
vo
te
	fo
r	
th
e	
ad
op
ti
on
	o
f	t
he
	la
w
.
Bi
nd
in
g
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	
in
iti
ati
ve
A
rti
cl
e	
78
1/
10
	o
f	t
he
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
	+
	2
	
m
on
th
s
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
pr
op
os
al
s
A
pp
ro
va
l	+
	T
ur
no
ut
	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
t:
	h
al
f	o
f	
th
e	
el
ec
to
ra
te
;	L
aw
:	
pa
rti
ci
pa
ti
on
	m
in
.	l
as
t	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	e
le
cti
on
	+
	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
es
Th
e	
Bu
dg
et
	a
nd
	la
w
s	
co
nc
er
ni
ng
	lo
an
s,
	t
ax
es
,	
cu
st
om
s	
du
ti
es
,	r
ai
lr
oa
d	
ta
ri
ff
s,
	m
ili
ta
ry
	
co
ns
cr
ip
ti
on
,	d
ec
la
ra
ti
on
	a
nd
	c
om
m
en
ce
m
en
t	
of
	w
ar
,	p
ea
ce
	t
re
ati
es
,	d
ec
la
ra
ti
on
	o
f	a
	s
ta
te
	o
f	
em
er
ge
nc
y	
an
d	
it
s	
te
rm
in
ati
on
,	m
ob
ili
sa
ti
on
	
an
d	
de
m
ob
ili
sa
ti
on
,	a
s	
w
el
l	a
s	
ag
re
em
en
ts
	w
it
h	
ot
he
r	
na
ti
on
s	
m
ay
	n
ot
	b
e	
su
bm
itt
ed
	t
o	
na
ti
on
al
	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
68
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	
th
e	
m
em
be
rs
	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Su
bs
ta
nti
al
	
ch
an
ge
s 
re
ga
rd
in
g	
EU
-
m
em
be
rs
hi
p
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	L
at
vi
a	
is
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	
La
tv
ia
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	L
at
vi
a	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	s
ha
ll	
be
	p
as
se
d	
in
	t
hr
ee
	r
ea
di
ng
s	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	n
ot
	le
ss
	t
ha
n	
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
	o
f	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	p
re
se
nt
	a
nd
 in
 c
er
ta
in
 c
as
es
 a
 
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
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LI
TH
UA
N
IA
Ty
pe
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
14
8
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
To
	a
lt
er
	a
rti
cl
e	
1	
of
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
2/
3	
m
aj
or
it
y	
m
us
t	
re
pr
es
en
t	
th
os
e	
ha
vi
ng
	v
oti
ng
	r
ig
ht
;	2
/3
	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
m
us
t	
ap
pr
ov
e
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
14
8
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
To
	a
lt
er
	t
he
	1
st
	c
ha
pt
er
	o
r	
14
th
	
ch
ap
te
r	
of
	t
he
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
M
or
e	
th
an
	h
al
f	h
av
in
g	
th
e	
ri
gh
t	
to
	v
ot
e	
an
d	
ha
vi
ng
	b
ee
n	
re
gi
st
er
ed
 o
n 
vo
te
r l
ist
s h
av
e 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 it
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
4
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
To
	a
lt
er
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
ct
	fr
om
	
Ju
ne
	8
,	1
99
2
At
 le
as
t t
hr
ee
 fo
ur
th
s h
av
in
g 
th
e 
ri
gh
t	
to
	v
ot
e	
an
d	
ha
vi
ng
	b
ee
n	
re
gi
st
er
ed
 in
 v
ot
er
 li
st
s,
 h
av
e 
ap
pr
ov
ed
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
4
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
D
el
eg
ati
on
	o
f	s
ov
er
ei
gn
	p
ow
er
s	
to
	in
te
rn
ati
on
al
	b
od
ie
s
O
ve
r	
1/
2	
ha
vi
ng
	t
he
	r
ig
ht
	t
o	
vo
te
	a
nd
	h
av
in
g	
be
en
	r
eg
is
te
re
d	
in
 v
ot
er
 li
st
s,
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
pa
rt
 
in
	it
.
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	
in
iti
ati
ve
A
rti
cl
e	
4
30
0.
00
0	
+	
3	
m
on
th
s
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t	
50
%
+	
of
	to
ta
l	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
ta
ki
ng
	p
ar
t;
	 
Ye
s	
vo
te
s	
m
us
t	
be
	a
t	
le
as
t	
1/
3	
of
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
	+
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
es
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
9
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/4
)	o
f	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	in
te
re
st
M
in
.	5
0%
+1
	o
f	t
ot
al
	e
le
ct
or
at
e	
ta
ke
s p
ar
t
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	L
it
hu
an
ia
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
w
hi
ch
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
a	
m
ix
ed
	s
ys
te
m
	(P
R	
an
d	
tw
o-
ro
un
d	
sy
st
em
).
	L
it
hu
an
ia
	is
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	d
ir
ec
tl
y.
	
Li
th
ua
ni
a	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	b
ill
s	
fo
r	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	s
ha
ll	
be
	a
do
pt
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t	
in
	t
w
o	
re
ad
in
gs
	b
y	
a	
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
	o
f	a
ll	
th
e	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t.
		T
he
	p
ro
vi
si
on
s	
of
	C
ha
pt
er
	1
	a
nd
	C
ha
pt
er
	1
4	
m
ay
	b
e	
am
en
de
d	
on
ly
	b
y	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
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Appendix I
LU
XE
M
BO
U
RG
Ty
pe
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	v
et
o
A
rti
cl
e	
11
4
25
00
0	
+	
2	
m
on
th
s
Pr
op
os
al
s	
to
	a
m
en
d	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
11
4
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/4
)	o
f	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
51
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	L
ux
em
bo
ur
g	
is
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
.	L
ux
em
bo
ur
g	
is
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	g
ra
nd
	d
uk
e	
is
	t
he
	h
er
ed
it
ar
y	
he
ad
	o
f	s
ta
te
.	L
ux
em
bo
ur
g	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
;	i
n	
ca
se
	o
f	a
n	
am
en
dm
en
t	
pr
op
os
al
	t
he
	C
ha
m
be
r	
au
to
m
ati
ca
lly
	d
is
so
lv
es
.	A
	n
ew
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
de
ci
de
s,
	b
y	
co
m
m
on
	c
on
se
nt
	
w
it
h	
th
e	
G
ra
nd
	D
uk
e,
	o
n	
th
e	
po
in
ts
	t
o	
be
	a
m
en
de
d.
	In
	s
uc
h	
a	
ca
se
,	t
he
	C
ha
m
be
r	
sh
al
l	n
ot
	p
ro
ce
ed
	t
o	
th
e	
vo
te
	u
nl
es
s	
at
	le
as
t	
th
re
e-
qu
ar
te
rs
	o
f	i
ts
	m
em
be
rs
	
ar
e	
pr
es
en
t,
	a
nd
	n
o	
am
en
dm
en
t	
m
ay
	b
e	
ad
op
te
d	
un
le
ss
	it
	is
	b
ac
ke
d	
by
	a
t	
le
as
t	
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
	o
f	t
he
	v
ot
es
.
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M
AL
TA
Ty
pe
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
A
rti
cl
e	
66
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
t
N
o
A
rti
cl
e	
66
	(3
);
	A
rti
cl
e	
66
	(4
);
	o
r	
A
rti
cl
e	
76
	(2
)	
Bi
nd
in
g
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	
ve
to
Re
fe
re
nd
a	
A
ct
	(3
,	1
3,
	
14
,	1
9,
	2
0)
1/
10
	o
f	e
le
ct
or
at
e
La
w
s
Tu
rn
ou
t 
50
%
+1
	o
f	t
he
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
 
A
rt
.	1
3	
(2
)	T
he
	p
ro
vi
si
on
s	
of
	t
hi
s	
Pa
rt
	o
f	t
hi
s	
A
ct
	s
ha
ll	
no
t	
ap
pl
y	
to
	t
hi
s	
ar
ti
cl
e	
an
d	
to
	t
he
	
fo
llo
w
in
g	
en
ac
tm
en
ts
:	 
(a
)	t
he
	C
on
sti
tu
ti
on
	a
nd
	a
ny
	r
eg
ul
ati
on
	
m
ad
e	
un
de
r	
an
y	
 
pr
ov
is
io
n	
th
er
eo
f;
	 
(b
)	t
he
	E
ur
op
ea
n	
Co
nv
en
ti
on
	A
ct
;	 
(c
)	a
ny
	la
w
	p
ro
vi
di
ng
	fo
r	
th
e	
m
att
er
s	
re
fe
rr
ed
	t
o	
in
	a
rti
cl
e	
56
(8
)(
a)
,	(
b)
	o
r	
(c
)	o
f	
th
e	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
;	 
(d
)	t
he
	In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
	A
ct
;	 
(e
)	t
he
	G
en
er
al
	E
le
cti
on
s	
A
ct
;	 
(f
)	a
ny
	fi
sc
al
	le
gi
sl
ati
on
;	 
(g
)	a
ny
	le
gi
sl
ati
on
	g
iv
in
g	
eff
ec
t	
to
	a
ny
	t
re
at
y	
ob
lig
ati
on
	u
nd
er
ta
ke
n	
by
	M
al
ta
;	a
nd
	 
(h
)	s
av
e	
as
	p
ro
vi
de
d	
in
	a
rti
cl
e	
36
A
	o
f	t
he
	
Lo
ca
l	C
ou
nc
ils
	A
ct
,	a
ny
	b
ye
-la
w
	m
ad
e	
by
	a
ny
	
lo
ca
l	c
ou
nc
il	
un
de
r	
th
e	
sa
id
	A
ct
.
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
Re
fe
re
nd
a	
ac
t,
	A
rti
cl
e	
3(
1)
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	H
ou
se
	
of
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
ve
s
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
pr
op
os
al
s
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	M
al
ta
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
ST
V.
	M
al
ta
	h
as
	a
	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
is
	d
om
in
at
ed
	b
y	
tw
o	
pa
rti
es
:	t
he
	C
hr
is
ti
an
	D
em
oc
ra
ts
	a
nd
	t
he
	S
oc
ia
l	D
em
oc
ra
ts
.	T
he
	c
ou
nt
ry
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	s
in
gl
e-
pa
rt
y	
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t.
	M
al
ta
	h
as
	a
	m
ed
iu
m
-fl
ex
ib
le
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
di
ng
	A
rti
cl
es
	6
6(
3,
	4
)	a
nd
	7
6(
2)
	
re
qu
ir
es
	a
	t
w
o-
th
ir
d	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
an
d	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.	A
m
en
di
ng
	o
th
er
	a
rti
cl
es
	r
eq
ui
re
s	
a	
si
m
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y.
N
ET
HE
RL
AN
DS
N
o	
na
ti
on
al
-le
ve
l	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	p
ro
vi
si
on
s	
m
en
ti
on
ed
	in
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
.
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	T
he
	N
et
he
rl
an
ds
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(F
ir
st
	C
ha
m
be
r	
an
d	
Se
co
nd
	
Ch
am
be
r)
.	T
he
	S
ec
on
d	
Ch
am
be
r	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	T
he
	N
et
he
rl
an
ds
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	
Th
e	
he
re
di
ta
ry
	m
on
ar
ch
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
.	T
he
	N
et
he
rl
an
ds
	h
as
	a
	r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
di
ng
	t
he
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
	r
eq
ui
re
s	
ap
pr
ov
al
	in
	t
w
o	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	
re
ad
in
gs
	w
it
h	
	e
le
cti
on
s	
in
	b
et
w
ee
n.
	In
	t
he
	fi
rs
t	
re
ad
in
g	
th
e	
bi
ll	
ne
ed
s	
to
	b
e	
ap
pr
ov
ed
	b
y	
a	
si
m
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y;
	in
	t
he
	s
ec
on
d	
re
ad
in
g	
by
	a
	t
w
o-
th
ir
ds
	m
aj
or
it
y.
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Appendix I
PO
LA
N
D
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
12
5
A
bs
ol
ut
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
	(a
nd
	a
t	
le
as
t	
ha
lf	
of
	
th
e	
st
at
ut
or
y	
m
em
be
rs
	s
ho
ul
d	
be
	p
re
se
nt
)
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	
in
te
re
st
M
or
e	
th
an
	
ha
lf 
of
 
el
ec
to
ra
te
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
23
5
A
bs
ol
ut
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
Se
na
te
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
23
5
O
ne
-fi
ft
h	
of
	t
he
	s
ta
tu
to
ry
	n
um
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
A
rti
cl
e	
12
5
Pr
es
id
en
t	
w
it
h	
co
ns
en
t	
of
	A
bs
ol
ut
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
Se
na
te
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	
in
te
re
st
 
M
or
e	
th
an
	
ha
lf 
of
 
el
ec
to
ra
te
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
23
5
Pr
es
id
en
t
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	P
ol
an
d	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	L
ow
er
	C
ha
m
be
r	
an
d	
th
e	
Se
na
te
).
	T
he
	L
ow
er
	
Ch
am
be
r	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	T
he
	S
en
at
e	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
on
e-
ro
un
d	
si
ng
le
	m
em
be
r	
pl
ur
al
it
y	
vo
ti
ng
	.	
Po
la
nd
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	
us
ua
lly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
s.
	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	P
ol
an
d	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
	b
ill
	t
o	
am
en
d	
th
e	
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	
sh
al
l	b
e	
ad
op
te
d	
by
	t
he
	L
ow
er
	C
ha
m
be
r	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	a
t	
le
as
t	
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
	o
f	v
ot
es
	in
	t
he
	p
re
se
nc
e	
of
	a
t	
le
as
t	
ha
lf	
of
	t
he
	s
ta
tu
to
ry
	n
um
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
,	a
nd
	b
y	
th
e	
Se
na
te
	b
y	
an
	a
bs
ol
ut
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
es
	in
	t
he
	p
re
se
nc
e	
of
	a
t	
le
as
t	
ha
lf	
of
	t
he
	s
ta
tu
to
ry
	n
um
be
r	
of
	S
en
at
or
s.
	A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	c
an
	b
e	
he
ld
	w
he
n	
de
si
re
d	
by
	t
he
	
pr
es
id
en
t	
or
	b
y	
th
e	
Se
na
te
.
PO
RT
U
GA
L
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
A
rti
cl
e	
11
5
Pr
es
id
en
t 
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t: 
N
um
be
r	
of
	
vo
te
rs
	m
us
t	
ex
ce
ed
	h
al
f	
of
 re
gi
st
er
ed
 
el
ec
to
ra
te
 to
 
be
	b
in
di
ng
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
;	
bu
dg
et
	a
nd
	t
ax
;	
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f a
 
tr
ea
ty
	a
im
ed
	a
t	
th
e	
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
	a
nd
	
de
ep
en
in
g 
of
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
	U
ni
on
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	P
or
tu
ga
l	i
s	
a	
un
it
ar
y	
st
at
e.
	It
	is
	a
	s
em
i-p
re
si
de
nti
al
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
.	P
or
tu
ga
l	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
is
	d
om
in
at
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
so
ci
al
	d
em
oc
ra
ts
	a
nd
	t
he
	li
be
ra
l	c
on
se
rv
ati
ve
s.
		P
or
tu
ga
l	i
s	
la
rg
el
y	
go
ve
rn
ed
	b
y	
co
al
iti
on
	
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	P
or
tu
ga
l	h
as
	a
	m
ed
iu
m
-fl
ex
ib
le
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	t
o	
th
e	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	a
re
	a
pp
ro
ve
d	
by
	a
	t
w
o-
th
ir
ds
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	t
he
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
en
ti
tl
ed
	t
o	
vo
te
.
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RO
M
AN
IA
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
15
1
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
t
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
A
rti
cl
e	
95
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Im
pe
ac
hm
en
t	
of
	P
re
si
de
nt
	if
	
de
m
an
de
d	
by
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
A
rti
cl
e	
90
Pr
es
id
en
t
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	in
te
re
st
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	R
om
an
ia
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	s
em
i-p
re
si
de
nti
al
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(C
ha
m
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	a
nd
	S
en
at
e)
.	B
ot
h	
ar
e	
el
ec
te
d	
by
	p
ro
po
rti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	R
om
an
ia
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	la
rg
el
y	
go
ve
rn
ed
	b
y	
co
al
iti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	
an
d	
is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	R
om
an
ia
	h
as
	a
	m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	r
ev
is
io
ns
	m
us
t	
be
	a
do
pt
ed
	b
y	
th
e	
Ch
am
be
r	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	a
nd
	t
he
	S
en
at
e	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	a
t	
le
as
t	
tw
o	
th
ir
ds
	o
f	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	e
ac
h	
ch
am
be
r	
an
d	
a	
re
fe
re
nd
um
.
SL
O
VA
KI
A
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
7
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
Tr
an
sf
er
 o
f s
ov
er
ei
gn
ty
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	i
ni
ti
ati
ve
A
rti
cl
e	
95
35
0.
00
0
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t 
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
Fu
nd
am
en
ta
l	r
ig
ht
s;
	fr
ee
do
m
s;
	ta
xe
s:
	
du
ti
es
	a
nd
	s
ta
te
	b
ud
ge
t
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
96
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
he
	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Tu
rn
ou
t 
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
Id
em
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	S
lo
va
ki
a	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	
It
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	c
oa
liti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	S
lo
va
ki
a	
ha
s	
a	
fle
xi
bl
e	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
:	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
	 n
ee
d	
to
	b
e	
ap
pr
ov
ed
	b
y	
at
	le
as
t	
a	
th
re
e-
fift
hs
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	a
ll	
de
pu
ti
es
.
I
Processed on: 26-10-2016
505887-L-bw-Hollander
306
Appendix I
SL
O
VE
N
IA
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	v
et
o
A
rti
cl
e	
90
40
.0
00
	+
	3
5	
da
ys
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
Co
m
bi
ne
d	
La
w
	is
	r
ej
ec
te
d	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	v
ot
er
s	
w
ho
	h
av
e	
ca
st
	v
al
id
	
vo
te
s a
nd
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
fift
h	
of
	a
ll	
qu
al
ifi
ed
	
vo
te
rs
 h
av
e 
vo
te
d 
ag
ai
ns
t	
th
e	
la
w
D
ef
en
ce
	o
f	t
he
	s
ta
te
,	s
ec
ur
it
y,
	
or
	t
he
	e
lim
in
ati
on
	o
f	t
he
	
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
	o
f	n
at
ur
al
	
di
sa
st
er
s;
	ta
xe
s,
	c
us
to
m
s	
du
ti
es
,	
an
d	
ot
he
r	
co
m
pu
ls
or
y	
ch
ar
ge
s,
	
ad
op
te
d	
fo
r	
th
e	
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
	
of
	t
he
	s
ta
te
	b
ud
ge
t;
	r
ati
fic
ati
on
	
of
	t
re
ati
es
;	h
um
an
	r
ig
ht
s	
an
d	
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l	f
re
ed
om
s.
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
90
M
in
or
it
y	
(	1
/3
)	o
f	
th
e	
m
em
be
rs
	o
f	t
he
	
A
ss
em
bl
y	
or
	C
ou
nc
il
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
17
0
M
in
or
it
y	
(3
0)
	d
ep
uti
es
	o
f	
N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
ot
al
	
el
ec
to
ra
te
 ta
ke
s p
ar
t 
in
	b
al
lo
t
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
3a
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
So
ve
re
ig
nt
y	
tr
an
sf
er
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	S
lo
ve
ni
a	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
an
d	
N
ati
on
al
	C
ou
nc
il)
.	T
he
	
N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	S
lo
ve
ni
a	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	is
	la
rg
el
y	
go
ve
rn
ed
	b
y	
co
al
iti
on
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	p
re
si
de
nt
	is
	
th
e	
he
ad
	o
f	s
ta
te
	a
nd
	is
	d
ir
ec
tl
y	
el
ec
te
d.
	S
lo
ve
ni
a	
ha
s	
a	
m
ed
iu
m
-fl
ex
ib
le
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	p
ro
po
sa
ls
	t
o	
am
en
d	
th
e	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
	n
ee
d	
ap
pr
ov
al
	b
y	
th
e	
N
ati
on
al
	A
ss
em
bl
y	
by
	a
	t
w
o-
th
ir
ds
	m
aj
or
it
y	
vo
te
	o
f	d
ep
uti
es
	p
re
se
nt
.	A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	c
an
	b
e	
de
m
an
de
d	
by
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	m
in
or
it
y.
SP
AI
N
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t.
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
	
A
rti
cl
e	
16
8
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
To
ta
l	r
ev
is
io
n	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
16
7
M
in
or
it
y	
(1
/1
0)
	o
f	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	e
it
he
r	
ho
us
e	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
ts
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
A
rti
cl
e	
92
A
bs
ol
ut
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	c
on
gr
es
s
Is
su
es
	o
f	n
ati
on
al
	in
te
re
st
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	S
pa
in
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
	(w
it
h	
re
gi
on
al
	d
ev
ol
uti
on
).
	It
	is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(C
on
gr
es
s	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	
an
d	
Se
na
te
).
	T
he
	C
on
gr
es
s	
of
	D
ep
uti
es
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	r
ep
re
se
nt
ati
on
.	S
pa
in
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	a
nd
	s
in
ce
	t
he
	1
99
0s
	t
w
o	
pa
rti
es
	h
av
e	
la
rg
el
y	
do
m
-
in
at
ed
	S
pa
ni
sh
	p
ol
iti
cs
:	t
he
	S
pa
ni
sh
	S
oc
ia
lis
t	
W
or
ke
rs
’	P
ar
ty
	(P
SO
E)
	a
nd
	t
he
	P
eo
pl
e’
s	
Pa
rt
y	
(P
P)
.	S
pa
in
	h
as
	u
su
al
ly
	b
ee
n	
go
ve
rn
ed
	b
y	
si
ng
le
-p
ar
ty
	g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
.	T
he
	
he
re
di
ta
ry
	m
on
ar
ch
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
.	S
pa
in
	h
as
	a
	m
ed
iu
m
	r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	b
ill
s	
on
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
al
	a
m
en
dm
en
t	
m
us
t	
be
	a
pp
ro
ve
d	
by
	a
	m
aj
or
it
y	
of
	t
hr
ee
-fi
ft
hs
	
of
	t
he
	m
em
be
rs
	o
f	e
ac
h	
Ch
am
be
r.	
A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	is
	r
eq
ui
re
d	
in
	c
as
e	
of
	a
	t
ot
al
	r
ev
is
io
n.
	A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	o
n	
am
en
dm
en
ts
	m
ig
ht
	b
e	
de
m
an
de
d	
by
	a
	le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y.
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SW
ED
EN
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y
Ch
ap
te
r	
8,
	
A
rti
cl
e	
16
(1
)
M
in
or
it
y	
>	
Tw
o	
st
ep
s:
	(1
)	
1/
10
	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
to
	r
eq
ue
st
	
a	
po
pu
la
r	
vo
te
,	(
2)
	1
/3
	o
f	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t	
to
	t
ri
gg
er
	a
	
po
pu
la
r v
ot
e
Co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	
am
en
dm
en
ts
Re
je
cti
ve
:	F
or
	n
o-
de
ci
si
on
:	5
0%
+1
	
of
	p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
ng
	v
ot
er
s	
an
d	
50
%
+1
	
of
	p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
ng
	v
ot
er
s	
in
	p
ar
al
le
l	
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
	e
le
cti
on
s	
sh
ou
ld
	
vo
te
	“
no
”	
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
Ch
ap
te
r	
8,
	
A
rti
cl
e	
2(
5)
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	S
w
ed
en
	is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
.	I
t	
is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
un
ic
am
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
th
at
	is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
pr
op
or
ti
on
al
	
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
.	S
w
ed
en
	h
as
	a
	m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
.	S
w
ed
en
	is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	s
in
gl
e-
pa
rt
y	
or
	c
oa
liti
on
	m
in
or
it
y	
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
.	T
he
	h
er
ed
it
ar
y	
m
on
ar
ch
	is
	t
he
	
he
ad
	o
f	s
ta
te
.	S
w
ed
en
	h
as
	a
	r
at
he
r	
m
ed
iu
m
-r
ig
id
	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
:	c
on
sti
tu
ti
on
al
	r
ev
is
io
n	
re
qu
ir
ed
	a
pp
ro
va
l	o
f	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
w
it
h	
a	
si
m
pl
e	
m
aj
or
it
y	
in
	t
w
o	
re
ad
in
gs
	–
	w
it
h	
el
ec
ti
on
s	
in
	b
et
w
ee
n.
	A
	r
ef
er
en
du
m
	c
an
	b
e	
de
m
an
de
d	
by
	a
	le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
in
or
it
y.
U
N
IT
ED
 
KI
N
GD
O
M
Ty
pe
 
Co
ns
t. 
In
iti
ati
on
Is
su
es
Q
uo
ru
m
Ex
cl
us
io
ns
O
ut
co
m
e
M
an
da
to
ry
EU
A
,	S
ec
-
ti
on
	2
,	3
,	6
EU
A
Tr
an
sf
er
	t
o	
Eu
ro
pe
an
	
U
ni
on
	
N
o
N
o
Bi
nd
in
g
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
Re
fe
re
nd
um
	
Ac
t
M
aj
or
it
y	
of
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	p
ro
po
sa
ls
N
o
N
o
Ad
vi
so
ry
In
sti
tu
ti
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:	T
he
	U
K	
is
	a
	u
ni
ta
ry
	s
ta
te
	(w
it
h	
re
gi
on
al
	d
ev
ol
uti
on
).
	It
	is
	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	d
em
oc
ra
cy
	w
it
h	
a	
bi
ca
m
er
al
	p
ar
lia
m
en
t	
(t
he
	H
ou
se
	o
f	
Co
m
m
on
s	
an
d	
th
e	
H
ou
se
	o
f	L
or
ds
).
	T
he
	H
ou
se
	o
f	C
om
m
on
s	
is
	e
le
ct
ed
	b
y	
si
ng
le
	m
em
be
r	
pl
ur
al
it
y.
	T
he
	U
K	
ha
s	
a	
m
ul
ti
pa
rt
y	
sy
st
em
	t
ha
t	
is
	la
rg
el
y	
do
m
in
at
ed
	b
y	
La
bo
ur
	a
nd
	t
he
	C
on
se
rv
ati
ve
s	
an
d	
is
	u
su
al
ly
	g
ov
er
ne
d	
by
	s
in
gl
e	
pa
rt
y	
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
.	T
he
	h
er
ed
it
ar
y	
m
on
ar
ch
	is
	t
he
	h
ea
d	
of
	s
ta
te
.	S
in
ce
	t
he
	U
K	
ha
s	
no
	c
od
ifi
ed
	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
,	a
m
en
dm
en
t	
on
ly
	r
eq
ui
re
s	
ap
pr
ov
al
	o
f	a
	p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
	m
aj
or
it
y.
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Appendix II
A
PP
EN
D
IX
 2
. D
EM
O
CR
A
TI
C 
U
SE
 O
F 
N
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
R
EF
ER
EN
D
U
M
S 
EU
28
, 1
95
0-
20
14
15
2
Co
un
tr
y
N
o
Da
te
Ty
pe
Le
ga
l b
as
is
Fu
nc
ti
on
N
o.
 o
f i
ss
ue
s
Q
uo
ru
m
Is
su
es
Is
su
e 
ca
te
go
ry
Eff
ec
t
Au
st
ria
3
5-
11
-1
97
8
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
Re
fe
re
nd
um
	o
n	
le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	
pr
op
os
al
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
	p
ow
er
O
th
er
Ad
vi
so
ry
12
-0
6-
19
94
M
an
da
to
ry
Re
fe
re
nd
um
	o
n	
co
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
	r
ev
is
io
n
Co
nt
ro
lli
ng
1
N
o
EU
	M
em
be
r-
sh
ip
EU
Bi
nd
in
g
20
-0
1-
20
13
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
Re
fe
re
nd
um
	o
n	
is
su
e	
of
	
na
ti
on
al
	im
po
rt
an
ce
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
N
o
O
bl
ig
at
or
y	
m
ili
ta
ry
	s
er
vi
ce
O
th
er
Ad
vi
so
ry
Be
lg
iu
m
1
12
-0
3-
19
50
Le
gi
sl
ati
ve
	m
aj
or
it
y
A
d	
ho
c	
re
fe
re
nd
um
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
N
0
Re
tu
rn
	o
f	K
in
g	
Le
op
ol
d	
III
In
sti
tu
ti
on
s
Ad
vi
so
ry
Bu
lg
ar
ia
1
27
-1
-2
01
3
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	i
ni
ti
ati
ve
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
Ye
s
N
uc
le
ar
	e
ne
rg
y
O
th
er
Ad
vi
so
ry
(in
va
lid
)
Cr
oa
ti
a
3
19
-0
5-
19
91
Pr
es
id
en
ti
al
A
d	
ho
c	
re
fe
re
nd
um
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
Ye
s
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
In
sti
tu
ti
on
s
Bi
nd
in
g
22
-0
1-
20
12
M
an
da
to
ry
Re
fe
re
nd
um
	o
n	
as
so
ci
ati
on
	
w
it
h	
ot
he
r	
st
at
es
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
N
o
EU
	
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
EU
Bi
nd
in
g
1-
12
-2
01
3
Ci
ti
ze
ns
’	i
ni
ti
ati
ve
In
iti
ati
ve
Pr
om
oti
ve
1
N
o
M
ar
ri
ag
e	
on
ly
	
be
tw
ee
n	
m
en
	
an
d	
w
om
en
O
th
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Democratic use of national referendums EU28, 1950-2014
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Democratic use of national referendums EU28, 1950-2014
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Democratic use of national referendums EU28, 1950-2014
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Democratic use of national referendums EU28, 1950-2014
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SUMMARY
THE PEOPLE OR THE PRINCE
THE	POLITICS	OF	REFERENDUM	USE	IN	EUROPEAN	DEMOCRACIES
Academic	interest	in	the	use	of	referendums,	in	Europe	and	beyond,	has	grown	in	recent	
decades.	This	has	been	triggered	by	an	increase	in	the	number	of	national	referendums	
held	in	the	member	states	of	the	European	Union	(EU)	especially	since	the	1990s.	Many	
referendums	have	been	held	on	membership	of	the	European	Union	(EU)	and	EU	treaty	
revisions.	 Although	 enthusiasm	 for	 referendums	 declined	 markedly	 among	 political	
leaders	after	the	French	and	Dutch	public	rejected	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	
in	2005,	today	they	are	back	on	the	agenda.	In	2015	and	the	first	half	of	2016,	no	less	
than	four	referendums	relating	to	EU	policies	 took	place	 in	EU	member	countries:	 in	
July	2015,	Greece	held	a	referendum	on	the	country’s	bailout	deal	with	the	European	
Commission,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 and	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund;	 in	
December	that	same	year,	Denmark	held	a	referendum	on	whether	to	change	its	opt-
out	from	the	EU	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	into	a	flexible	opt-in;	in	April	2016,	
a	 referendum	was	 held	 in	 the	Netherlands	 on	 the	 EU’s	 Association	Agreement	with	
Ukraine;	and	in	June	2016,	Britain	held	a	referendum	on	whether	to	remain	in	the	EU.	
Moreover,	several	European	politicians	promised	to	hold	EU-related	referendums,	or	
officially	announced	one,	such	as	in	Hungary	on	the	migrant	quota.
The	growth	in	the	number	of	referendums	has	resulted	in	an	increase	in	the	number	
of	 academic	 books	 and	 journal	 articles	 on	 the	 subject.	 These	 include	 descriptive	 or	
comparative	 studies	 on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 around	 the	world,	 analyses	 of	 their	
effects	on	decision-making	processes,	or	normative	arguments	for	or	against	them.	A	
common	denominator	in	this	literature	is	that	the	increase	in	the	number	of	national	
referendums	 is	 largely	 interpreted	 as	 signifying	 a	 transformation	 of	 democracy:	 a	
shift	 from	 decision-making	 by	 representation	 to	 decision-making	 by	 direct	 citizens’	
participation.	Furthermore,	the	majority	of	these	studies	assume	that	this	shift	is	a	direct	
result	of	public	dissatisfaction	with	parliamentary	democracy.	From	this	perspective,	
referendums	are	held	because	political	representatives	are	no	longer	capable	of	truly	
representing	 the	people	due	 to	 the	 increasing	pace	of	globalization	and	 the	growing	
influence	of	the	EU,	leading	to	major	political	decisions	not	being	sufficiently	legitimized.	
Referendums	are	thus	held	to	compensate	for	the	deficiency	of	national	parliaments.	
RESEARCH	QUESTIONS	AND	AIMS
This	book	aims	to	examine	both	of	these	assumptions:	that	referendum	use	in	Europe	
represents	a	direct	democracy	shift	and	that	referendums	are	held	with	the	intention	
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to	remedy	flaws	in	representative	decision-making.	The	following	questions	guided	the	
research:	1)	Did	Europe	experience	an	 increase	 in	 the	 institutionalization	and	use	of	
national	referendums	between	1950	and	2014?	2)	If	so,	does	this	increase	mark	a	shift	
from	national	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	
participation?	And	 3)	Which	 factors	 contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	 and	use	 of	
national	referendums	in	European	democracies? 
The	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 is	 fourfold.	 To	 answer	 the	 first	 and	 second	 research	
questions,	I	first	aim	to	provide	a	classification	of	referendums	according	to	the	actors	
triggering	the	referendum	(political	elites,	citizens	or	the	constitution).	Based	on	such	
a	classification,	my	second	aim	is	to	provide	a	cross-country	comparison	of	the	types	
of	referendum	that	are	legally	provided	for,	and	of	the	frequency	with	which	national	
referendums	are	actually	held.	I	thus	only	take	into	account	referendums	held	at	national	
level,	 since	 regional	and	 local	 referendums	have	a	 fundamentally	different	character	
than	 national	 ones.	 To	 answer	 the	 third	 research	 question,	 I	 examine	 the	 impact	 of	
structural factors and	political	agency.	The	third	aim	of	this	study	is	therefore	to	assess	
what	motivates	 political	 elites	 to	 hold	 referendums,	 whereby	 I	 distinguish	 between	
normative	and	rational	motives.	Finally,	the	fourth	aim	of	the	study	is	to	explain	cross-
country	differences	in	national	referendum	provisions	and	use.
The	first	part	of	the	research	(chapter	4)	compares	referendum	provisions	and	use	in	all	
28	countries	that	were	or	became	members	of	the	EU	(or	its	predecessors)	between	1950	
and	2014.	The	second	part	(chapters	5-7)	analyses	available	referendum	provisions	and	
the	motives	with	which	referendums	have	been	used	in	five	selected	countries,	namely	
France,	Denmark,	the	United	Kingdom	(UK),	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands.	I	first	compare	
France	and	Denmark	(chapter	5),	both	of	which	are	countries	where	the	constitution	
provides	for	national	referendums	and	where	they	are	held	relatively	frequently.	The	
two	countries	have	a	different	political-institutional	context,	France	being	a	majoritarian	
democracy	and	Denmark	a	consensus	democracy.	This	Most Different Systems Design 
allows	me	to	identify	the	factors	that	both	countries	have	in	common	and	that	explain	
why	they	hold	referendums	relatively	frequently.	I	then	compare	the	UK	and	Sweden	
(chapter	6),	countries	with	provisions	for	national	referendums	but	where	they	are	used	
only	to	a	limited	extent.	These	countries	also	differ	in	terms	of	democracy	type,	which	
allows	me	to	identify	the	factors	that	they	have	in	common	and	that	explain	why	they	
hold	referendums	less	frequently.	Finally,	I	study	the	Netherlands	(chapter	7),	where	the	
constitution	does	not	contain	provisions	for	holding	national	referendums	and	where	
one	 referendum	was	held	between	1950	and	2014	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	 This	 country	
selection	also	allows	me	to	compare	(implicitly	in	chapter	8)	institutionally-comparable	
countries in a Most Similar Systems Design	(Denmark	with	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands;	
France	with	 the	UK)	 to	 identify	 the	 factors	 that	 explain	 cross-country	 differences	 in	
referendum	use.	
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A	CLASSIFICATION	OF	REFERENDUMS
The	 argument	 that	 referendum	 use	 in	 Europe	 represents	 a	 direct	 democracy	 shift		
stems	 from	 the	 tendency	 to	 perceive	 referendums	 as	 pure	 instruments	 of	 direct	
democracy.	As	 such,	 referendums	are	 contrasted	 to	 representative	democracy,	with	
the	 former	 reflecting	 popular	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 latter	 representative	 sovereignty.	
Opponents	of	referendums	usually	take	this	supposed	theoretical	incompatibility	as	a	
starting	point	to	argue	that	referendums	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	representatives.	
However,		scholars	who	claim	that	referendums	are	or	should	be	held	to	remedy	deficits	
in	 representative	 democracy	 also	 assume	 that	 decision-making	 by	 referendums	 is	
fundamentally	different	 from	that	by	political	 representatives.	This	book	emphasizes	
that	such	a	dichotomy	does	not	do	justice	to	the	diversity	of	types	of	referendum	and	
how	they	are	used	in	European	democracies.
Chapter	2	classifies	referendums	on	the	basis	of	two	known	dimensions	in	democratic	
theory.	The	first	demarcates	the	liberal	notion	of	representative	decision-making	from	
the	classical	democratic	notion	of	direct	citizens’	participation	and	therefore	deals	with	
whether	citizens	participate	in	decision-making	indirectly	(by	choosing	representatives)	
or	 directly	 (by	 making	 decisions	 themselves).	 The	 second	 dimension	 distinguishes	
aggregative	 decision-making	 from	 integrative	 decision-making,	 and	 therefore	 deals	
with	whether	decisions	are	made	by	majority	rule	or	by	integrating	minority	views.	All	
referendums	enable	citizens	to	participate	directly	in	decision-making,	since	they	enable	
citizens	to	vote	on	issues	directly	rather	than	voting	for	representatives	to	do	this	for	
them.	 	And	 in	all	 referendums	 the	majority	ultimately	decides.	Not	all	 referendums,	
however,	 are	a	pure	 reflection	of	popular	 sovereignty	or	of	 strict	majority	 rule.	 This	
depends	primarily	on	the	question	of	who	triggers	the	referendum.
Based	on	 this	criterion,	 I	distinguish	five	different	 types	of	 referendum:	1)	 legislative	
majority	 referendums	 (triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority);	 2)	 presidential	
referendums (triggered	by	the	president);	3)	legislative	minority	referendums (triggered 
by	 a	 parliamentary	minority);	 4)	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 (triggered	by	 citizens);	
and	 5)	 mandatory	 referendums	 (triggered	 by	 the	 constitution).	 Citizen-initiated	
referendums	give	citizens	 the	greatest	control	over	 the	referendum	process	because	
they	can	themselves	trigger	the	vote.	Although	the	majority	ultimately	decides,	this	type	
of	referendum	offers	a	safeguard	to	political	minorities,	 in	that	a	minority	of	citizens	
can	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Referendums	 triggered	 by	 representatives	 offer	 them	 a	
means	of	exercising	control	over	decision-making.	Legislative	majority	and	presidential	
referendums	underscore	the	majority	principle,	while	legislative	minority	referendums	
provide	more	scope	for	the	integration	of	minority	views	in	decision-making.	Mandatory	
referendums	 are	 not	 easily	 placed	within	 this	 two-dimensional	 framework,	 because	
they	are	not	directly	 triggered	by	actors,	 but	by	 the	 constitution.	However,	 in	many	
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cases,	the	government	decides	whether	or	not	to	hold	a	constitutional	referendum.
Placing	referendums	in	this	two-dimensional	framework	also	depends	on	who	sets	and	
frames	the	agenda,	the	subjects	on	which	referendums	can	be	held,	whether	they	are	
binding	or	advisory,	and	whether	quorums	apply	 (with	respect	 to	the	turnout	or	 the	
required	majority).	Citizens’	control	over	the	referendum	process,	and	eventually	the	
decision-making	process,	 is	 limited	when	 referendums	are	only	 advisory,	when	 they	
can	only	be	held	in	exceptional	cases,	and	when	a	quorum	applies.	If	there	is	a	turnout	
quorum,	 the	outcome	of	 the	 referendum	 is	 not	 simply	 determined	by	 a	majority	 of	
votes;	a	certain	proportion	of	the	electorate	must	have	participated	in	the	vote.	In	case	
of	 an	 approval	 quorum	 (or	 a	 rejection	quorum),	 the	 voting	majority	must	 represent	
a	certain	proportion	of	 the	electorate	 for	 the	proposal	 te	be	approved	(or	rejected).	
Referendums	with	a	quorum	are	 thus	more	protective	of	minority	 views	 than	 those	
without.	Hence,	not	all	 referendums	are	a	pure	 reflection	of	 the	 two	principles	 that	
underlie	direct	democracy:	popular	sovereignty	and	majority	rule.	Certain	referendums	
indeed	strengthen	direct	participation	by	the	People, while	others	serve	the	political	
majority,	most	notably	the	executive	–	i.e.	the	Machiavellian	Prince. Certain	referendums	
primarily	underscore	majority	rule,	while	other	referendums	provide	more	scope	to	the	
protection	of	minority	views.	
A	SHIFT	FROM	REPRESENTATIVE	TO	DIRECT	DEMOCRACY?
It	is	important	to	bear	this	distinction	in	mind	when	examining	the	availability	and	actual	
use	of	referendum	provisions	in	EU	countries.	This	research	shows	that	politicians	can	
trigger	a	referendum	in	all	24	EU	countries	where	the	constitution	contains	provisions	
for	the	use	of	national	referendums,	while	citizens	can	do	so	only	in	ten,	mainly	Central	
and	Eastern	EU,	countries.	In	20	EU	countries,	the	constitution	stipulates	that	a	political	
majority	(either	parliamentary	and/or	presidential)	can	trigger	a	referendum,	while	in	
eleven	–	mainly	consensus	–	EU	democracies,	the	constitution	allows	a	parliamentary 
minority	 to	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Moreover,	 most	 mandatory	 referendums	 can	 be	
avoided	by	the	government.	Therefore,	I	conclude	that,	although	there	are	only	four	EU	
countries	where	the	constitution	does	not	contain	provisions	for	national	referendums,	
in	terms	of	the	nature	of	available	referendum	provisions	there	is	no	substantial	EU-wide	
shift	from	representative	to	direct	democracy:	in	general,	control	over	the	referendum	
process,	and	therefore	over	decision-making,	lies	in	the	hands	of	the	ruling	majority.
The	distinction	 is	 even	more	 important	when	 it	 comes	 to	actual	 referendum	use.	 In	
a	 large	group	of	 countries,	 referendums	are	held	only	exceptionally.	The	aggregated	
increase	 in	 referendums	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 their	 frequent	 use	 in	 a	 limited	
number	 of	 countries,	 most	 notably	 Ireland	 and	 Italy.	 Yet,	 even	 in	 these	 countries,	
referendum	 practice	 does	 not	 resemble	 that	 of	 Switzerland	 –	 	 often	 referred	 to	 as	
III
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the	 ideal-type	model	 of	 direct	 democracy.	Nor	 does	 it	mark	 a	 participatory	 shift.	 In	
Ireland,	all	 referendums	were	held	on	constitutional	 issues	on	which	political	parties	
were	internally	divided.	They	therefore	mainly	served	to	protect	the	Irish	party	system,	
because	citizens	voted	on	these	controversial	issues	directly.	In	Italy,	as	well	as	in	the	
CEECs,	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	 citizens’	 referendums	were	 held,	 but	 these	 also	
were	primarily	an	instrument	in	the	hands	of	political	parties.	My	research	shows	that	
in	 the	remaining	fifteen	EU	member	states,	34	of	 the	38	optional	 referendums	were	
triggered	by	a	political	majority.	Rather	than	heralding	a	shift	towards	direct	democracy,	
referendum	 use	 in	 the	 EU	 tends	 to	 confirm	 existing	 representative	 decision-making	
dynamics.	Therefore,	the	question	of	what	explains	the	institutionalization	and	use	of	
national	referendums	in	European	democracies,	becomes	primarily	a	question	of	why	
certain	referendums	are	provided	for	and	others	not,	why	referendums	are	held	more	
frequently	in	some	countries	than	in	others,	and	why	particularly	on	certain	issues.
HOW	CAN	REFERENDUM	USE	IN	EUROPEAN	DEMOCRACIES	BE	EXPLAINED?
To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 examine	 six	 assumptions	 concerning	 the	 potential	
factors	 that	 affect	 referendum	 use.	 These	 assumptions	 are	 derived	 from	 four	
schools	of	 institutional	 thought	–	classical	 institutionalism,	historical	 institutionalism,	
sociological	 institutionalism	 and	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism.	 Derived	 from	
classical	 institutionalism,	 I	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	which	 referendum	 legislation	 ‘fits’	
in	 the	 broader	 institutional	 context.	 From	 historical	 institutionalism,	 I	 examine	 the	
role	 of	 path	 dependency	 in	 referendum	 choices.	 From	 sociological	 institutionalism,	
I	 examine	 whether,	 in	 these	 choices,	 politicians	 are	 driven	 by	 public	 opinion	 or	
normative	convictions.	Finally,	derived	from	rational	choice	institutionalism,	I	examine	
the	 intentional	motives	 that	political	 actors	have	 to	hold	 referendums.	On	 the	basis	
of	these	four	theories,	I	 identify	six	factors	that	affect	referendum	practice:	two	that	
relate	to	political	actors’	motives	to	formalize	or	use	referendum	legislation,	namely	1)	
strategic	interests	or	2)	political	values;	and	four	that	relate	to	the	structural	context	
that	affects	the	choices	these	actors	make,	namely	3)	democracy	type,	4)	the	number	of	
veto	players,	5)	past	referendum	experience,	and	6)	public	demands.
My	research	on	the	decisions	whether	to	institutionalize	referendums	in	five	countries	
(France,	Denmark,	the	UK,	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands)	reveals	that	the	adoption	of	
referendum	provisions	is	usually	the	outcome	of	a	struggle	for	political	power	between	
opposition	parties,	anticipating	that	referendum	legislation	will	increases	their	political	
influence,	and	ruling	parties,	which	generally	oppose	such	legislation	for	fear	of	losing	
power.	 Most	 countries	 ultimately	 adopt	 legislation	 that	 only	 allows	 the	 authorities	
to	 trigger	 referendums,	mostly	 by	majority.	 The	 conclusion	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	
authorities	only	decide	to	hold	a	referendum	when	this	fits	their	immediate	interests.	
These interests can relate to the outcome	 of	 a	 referendum	 (for	 example,	when	 the	
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Danish	government	held	a	 referendum	on	 the	Single	European	Act	 in	1986	after	 the	
treaty	had	been	voted	down	by	parliament)	or	with	the	act	of	holding	a	referendum	
(for	example,	when	the	Conservatives	in	the	UK	approved	holding	a	referendum	on	the	
electoral	system	because	they	wanted	to	form	a	coalition	with	the	Liberal	Democrats).	
Controversy	 over	 European	 integration	 and	 the	 rising	 electoral	 success	 of	 populist	
parties	 especially	 fuel	 incentives	 for	 political	 authorities	 to	 use	 referendums	 for	
strategic	purposes.	‘Europe’	tends	to	cut	across	traditional	party	divisions,	especially	in	
the	‘old’	EU	member	states.	As	such,	many	mainstream	political	parties	have	difficulties	
integrating	EU	issues	into	their	party	ideology.	They	are	often	internally	divided,	with	
pro-European	party	leadership	and	Eurosceptic	fractions.	This	applies	to	both	centre-
left	and	centre-right	parties.	In	addition,	‘Europe’	is	increasingly	a	subject	on	which	votes	
can	be	lost	(take,	for	example,	the	Greek	debt	crisis	or	the	European	migration	crisis).	
When	there	is	a	high	probability	that	party	divisions	over	Europe	will	lead	to	a	split	in	a	
coalition	or	a	party,	or	when	parties	fear	electoral	losses	in	upcoming	elections	because	
of	their	position	on	politically	sensitive	issues,	there	is	a	strong	incentive	to	submit	such	
issues	to	‘the	people’.	In	this	way,	the	party	is	not	forced	to	take	a	stand.	Referendums	
are	thus	mainly	used	to	defend	the	position	of	mainstream	political	parties.	
Such	 defensive	 use	 of	 EU	 referendums	 is	 especially	 fuelled	 by	 the	 rising	 electoral	
success	of	populist	Eurosceptic	parties.	These	parties	advocate	the	use	of	referendums	
on	issues	relating	to	national	sovereignty	and	immigration.	They	stress	that	‘ordinary	
citizens’	 have	 become	 increasingly	 alienated	 from	 the	 political	 elite,	 mainly	 due	 to	
a	 loss	of	national	 sovereignty	 to	Europe	and	 rising	 immigration.	These	are	 issues	on	
which	mainstream	political	parties	largely	fail	to	take	an	unequivocal	position	and	on	
which	 parts	 of	 the	 citizenry	 do	 not	 feel	 represented.	 Populist	 parties	 tend	 to	 claim	
that	 referendums	serve	 to	 restore	 the	will	of	 the	popular	majority	by	 circumventing	
the	political	elite.	In	all	five	countries	analysed,	this	populist	discourse	has	boosted	the	
salience	of	referendums	in	the	political	debate.			
In	publicly	justifying	these	votes,	governments	generally	refer	to	the	necessity	to	have	
major	 decisions	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 sovereignty	 transfer	 or	 constitutional	 reform	
directly	legitimized	by	the	public.	For	example,	when	it	comes	to	EU	affairs,	referendum	
proponents	 across	 the	political	 spectrum	generally	 assert	 that	 direct	 votes	will	 help	
decrease	 the	 EU’s	 alleged	 ‘democratic	 deficit’.	 Although	 such	 normative	 arguments	
indeed	 increase	 the	 salience	 of	 referendums	 in	 the	 debate,	 they	 rarely	 drive	 actual	
referendum	use.	In	fact,	my	research	shows	that	actors	who	justify	a	referendum	on	the	
basis	of	normative	values,	easily	jettison	such	values	when	a	referendum	goes	against	
their	immediate	interests.	A	clear	example	of	an	inconsistent	adherence	to	values	is	the	
fact	that	except	for	Ireland,	none	of	the	EU	countries	held	a	referendum	on	the	Treaty	
III
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of	Lisbon	(signed	in	2007),	while	several	European	leaders	pledged	a	referendum	on	its	
predecessor,	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty.
I	 also	 found	 little	 evidence	 for	 the	 claim	 that	political	 actors	 are	primarily	 driven	by	
public	 demands	 for	 referendums.	 While	 disaffection	 with	 national	 or	 EU	 politics	
creates	a	context	that	is	susceptible	to	referendum	promises,	politicians	rarely	pledge	
referendums	 when	 this	 is	 not	 in	 their	 interest,	 regardless	 of	 public	 demand.	 More	
importantly	 however,	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 longitudinal	 and	 comparative	 survey	 data	 on	
referendum	 support,	 we	 simply	 do	 not	 know	whether	 (and	 which)	 citizens	 want	 to	
vote	in	referendums	and	in	what	type	of	referendum.		This	makes	statistical	analyses	
on	whether	there	is	strong	public	support	for	referendums	almost	impossible.	Claims	
that	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 fuelled	 by	 public	 demand	 are	 thus	 largely	 based	 on	
assumptions,	rather	than	on	empirical	evidence.	
HOW	CAN	CROSS-COUNTRY	DIFFERENCES	IN	REFERENDUM	USE	BE	EXPLAINED?
Although	rational	choice	institutionalism	provides	a	sound	understanding	of	why	political	
actors	decide	whether	to	organize	a	referendum,	it	cannot	fully	explain	why	referendums	
are	 held	more	 often	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	Understanding	 cross-country	
variations	in	referendum	provisions	and	use	requires	above	all	an	understanding	of	each	
country’s	institutional	and	historic	context.	First,	the	nature	of	referendum	provisions	
is	strongly	embedded	in	democratic	tradition.	Legislative minority and citizen-initiated 
referendums	 are	 more	 commonly	 provided	 for	 in	 consensus	 than	 in	 majoritarian	
democracies.	Such	referendums	allow	more	space	for	the	integration	of	minority	views	
in	decision-making,	which	is	also	a	basic	principle	of	consensus	democracy.	Moreover,	
referendums	 in	 consensus	 democracies,	 especially	when	 triggered	 by	 the	 legislative	
minority	or	citizens,	usually	have	a	turnout,	approval	or	rejection	quorum.	Such	quorums	
make	 it	more	difficult	 for	 the	voting	majority	 to	 control	 a	 referendum	outcome.	For	
that	 reason,	quorums	do	not	usually	apply	 in	majoritarian	democracies,	 for	example	
in	the	UK	and	France.	Finally,	of	the	few	typical	majoritarian	democracies,	only	Greece	
and	Cyprus	 lack	provisions	 for	mandatory	referendums.	Mandatory	referendums	are	
usually	 decision-controlling,	 introduced	 to	 provide	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 authorities	
cannot	easily	impose	grand	institutional	choices.	Arguably,	such	a	referendum	is	felt	to	
be	more	necessary	in	majoritarian	countries	than	in	consensus	ones,	since	in	the	former	
such	major	political	decisions	would	otherwise	be	made	by	a	simple	majority.
Referendum	use	 (and	 institutionalization)	 is	also	 influenced	by	 the	number	of	actors	
whose	support	is	necessary	to	trigger	a	referendum	(or	to	institutionalize	referendum	
provisions)	 and	 by	 whom	 referendums	 can	 thus	 potentially	 be	 blocked.	 These	 are	
called	veto	players.	However,	the	impact	of	the	number	of	veto	players	on	decisions	to	
institutionalize	or	use	referendums	depends	on	their	preferences	and	those	of	other	
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players.	 In	countries	where	 referendums	are	held	 frequently,	 this	 is	primarily	due	 to	
the	fact	that	triggering	referendums	requires	the	approval	of	only	a	few	players,	such	
as	 part	 of	 the	 electorate	 (Italy),	 the	 president	 (France),	 or	 the	 constitution	 (Ireland	
and	Denmark).	Referendums	are	held	 less	often	 in	countries	where	they	can	only	be	
triggered	by	parliamentary	majorities,	 like	the	UK.	However,	although	the	number	of	
veto	players	shapes	actors’	room	for	manoeuvre	in	implementing	referendum	provisions	
or	in	triggering	referendums,	decisions	whether	to	implement	or	hold	referendums	are	
primarily	driven	by	actors’ preferences and incentives.	For	example,	due	to	the	rigidity	of	
the	Dutch	constitution	and	the	high	degree	of	fragmentation	of	the	Dutch	party	system,	
influential	 referendum	 opponents	 in	 Dutch	 politics	 have	 repeatedly	 succeeded	 in	
blocking	proposals	to	introduce	referendum	provisions	in	the	constitution.	A	relatively	
high	number	of	veto	players	also	explains	why	referendums	have	rarely	been	held	in	the	
Netherlands.	The	referendum	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty,	held	in	2005,	was	
triggered	because	potential	veto	players	had	in	interest	in	doing	so.	
Understanding	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 referendum	 debates	 is	 important	 to	
understanding	current	ones.	There	is,	however,	no	universally	applicable	relationship	
between	 past	 referendum	 experience	 and	 future	 referendum	 practice.	 Having	
experience	of	referendums	in	the	past	is	no guarantee	that	particular	referendums	are	
institutionalized	or	used,	as	 is	shown	by	the	example	of	the	Netherlands,	which	held	
several	national	democratic	referendums	in	the	 late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	
centuries,	but	which	did	not	use	the	instrument	again	until	2005.	There	are	a	number	
of	countries,	including	Spain	and	Germany,	where	negative	experiences	with	dictatorial	
referendums	are	precisely	the	reason	why	national	referendums	hardly	play	a	role	in	
contemporary	 politics.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 there	 are	 some	 countries,	 like	 Italy,	 Latvia	
and	Lithuania,	where	citizens’	referendums	and	legislative	minority	referendums	were	
introduced	to	break	with	the	dictatorial	use	of	referendums	in	the	past.	Yet,	in	Portugal	
and	 Romania,	 referendums	 can	 still	 be	 issued	 by	 the	 president,	 despite	 their	 past	
dictatorial	referendum	usage.
RESEARCH	IMPLICATIONS	AND	DIRECTIONS	FOR	FUTURE	RESEARCH
My	research	shows	that	 the	empirical	evidence	 for	 two	common	assumptions	 in	 the	
referendum	literature	is	lacking.	The	first	is	that	due	to	the	institutionalization	and	use	
of	national	referendums,	European	citizens	are	increasingly	gaining	direct	control	over	
political	decision-making	at	the	expense	of	political	parties.	 I	have	shown	that	this	 is	
not	the	case.	In	most	EU	countries,	the	use	of	national	referendums	is	limited	to	one-off	
events,	such	as	the	reform	of	the	constitution,	accession	to	the	EU	and/or	revision	of	
EU	treaties.	Referendums	are	also	rarely	an	expression	of	popular	sovereignty.	Even	in	
countries	where	referendums	are	held	more	often,	referendum	provisions	are	designed	
in	such	a	way	as	to	ensure	that	their	use	is	largely	controlled	by	the	political	elites	rather	
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than	the	people.	The	second	assumption	 is	 that	 the	use	of	 referendums	 is	driven	by	
structural	factors.	Academics	refer	to	a	certain	referendum	‘Zeitgeist’	which	is	said	to	
be	fuelled	by	growing	dissatisfaction	with	representative	democracy.	This	thesis	shows	
that,	without	arguing	whether	referendums	indeed	have	this	effect,	they	are	rarely	held	
because	the	population	asks	for	it	or	from	a	normative	desire	to	strengthen	democracy.	
On	 the	 contrary,	 referendum	are	 generally	 only	 called	 if	 the	 triggering	 actor	 has	 an	
interest	in	doing	so,	and	these	interests	rarely	match	the	justification	given	in	the	public	
debate.
Although	 most	 referendum	 scholars	 consent	 that	 there	 are	 differences	 between	
referendums	and	between	countries,	they	generally	go	along	with	the	discourse	that	
representative	 democracy	 is	 transformed	 by	 the	 use	 of	 referendums,	 and	 that	 this	
is	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 changing	 political	 values	 and	 public	 demands.	 I	 argue	 that	 such	
a	 discourse	 offers	 no	 insight	 into	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 referendum	use	 in	 Europe.	
In	 fact,	 the	 strategic	 role	 played	 by	 referendums	 is	 often	 obscured	 by	 the	 strong	
normative	appeal	typical	of	referendums.	Unravelling	referendum	strategies	is	crucial	
to	understanding	the	impact	of	referendums	on	democratic	decision-making.
In	 my	 research,	 I	 have	 analysed	 referendum	 strategies	 in	 five	 established Western 
EU democracies.	Therefore,	a	relevant	direction	for	future	referendum	research	 is	 to	
analyse	whether	referendums	have	the	same	functions	in	the	new	Central	and	Eastern	
EU	democracies.	Since	I	focused	only	on	EU	countries,	my	study	entails	a	bias	towards	
the	importance	of	EU	pressures,	and	it	is	therefore	also	relevant	to	analyse	referendum	
use	in	non-EU	democracies.
 
A	second	direction	 for	 future	 research	 is	 guided	by	new	 referendums	 that	will	 likely	
occur	 in	 the	near	or	more	distant	 future,	 fuelled	by	a	number	of	pressing	European	
issues,	such	as	the	European	debt	and	migration	crises	and	potential	withdrawals	from	
the	EU.	The	inability	of	mainstream	political	parties	to	take	a	clear	stance	on	these	issues	
feeds	the	electoral	success	of	populist	parties.	These	parties	have	a	strong	referendum	
discourse,	 which	 places	 mainstream	 parties	 on	 the	 defensive.	 Future	 research	 on	
referendums	should	therefore	focus	particularly	on	the	rising	success	of	populist	parties	
and	their	impact	on	referendum	use	and	discourse.	
A	 final	 and	much-needed	direction	 for	 future	 research	 is	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 public	
opinion	towards	referendums.	In	the	public	debate,	it	is	often	argued	that	‘the	people’	
wish	to	vote	in	referendums.	Although	I	initially	aimed	to	assess	whether	this	is	indeed	
the	case,	I	encountered	a	lack	of	comparative	data	on	public	support	for	referendums.	
We	simply	do	not	know	which	part	of	the	electorate	supports	referendums,	why	they	
do	so,	how	strong	this	 support	 is,	and	 if	 it	 is	 increasing	or	decreasing	over	time.	We	
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also	do	not	know	how	citizens	perceive	different	types	of	referendum,	nor	how	they	
perceive	the	way	in	which	referendums	are	used	in	their	country.	Given	that,	in	most	
countries,	referendums	are	primarily	triggered	by	political	actors	towards	whom	public	
dissatisfaction	is	directed	(the	government	or	political	parties	in	general),	referendums	
might	even	lead	to	higher,	rather	than	lower,	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction.	Unravelling	
whether	empirical	evidence	confirms	the	appeal	to	‘the	will	of	the	people’	is	crucial	in	
assessing	the	impact	of	referendums	on	democracy.
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
HET VOLK OF DE VORST 
DE	POLITIEK	VAN	HET	GEBRUIK	VAN	REFERENDA	IN	EUROPESE	DEMOCRATIEËN	
In	 de	 afgelopen	 decennia	 is	 er	 vanuit	 de	 academische	 wereld,	 zowel	 in	 Europa	 als	
daarbuiten,	 steeds	 meer	 aandacht	 uitgegaan	 naar	 referenda.	 Deze	 interesse	 wordt	
gevoed	 door	 een	 toegenomen	 aantal	 nationale	 referenda	 in	 de	 lidstaten	 van	 de	
Europese	Unie	 (EU)	met	name	 sinds	de	 jaren	90.	Veel	 referenda	 zijn	 gehouden	over	
het	lidmaatschap	van	de	EU	en	EU-verdragswijzigingen.	Hoewel	het	enthousiasme	van	
regeringsleiders	 over	 referenda	 duidelijk	 was	 afgenomen	 nadat	 zowel	 de	 Franse	 als	
Nederlandse	bevolking	 in	 2005	de	Europese	Grondwet	 in	 een	 referendum	verwierp,	
staan	referenda	vandaag	de	dag	weer	hoog	op	de	Europese	politieke	agenda.	In	2015	en	
de	eerste	helft	van	2016	alleen	al	werden	er	vier	EU-gerelateerde	nationale	referenda	
gehouden:	in	juli	2015	hield	Griekenland	een	referendum	over	de	schuldendeal	met	de	
Europese	Commissie,	de	Europese	Centrale	Bank	en	het	Internationaal	Monetair	Fonds;	
in	december	dat	jaar	volgde	Denemarken	met	een	referendum	over	de	flexibilisering	
van	de	Deense	uitzonderingsclausule	op	de	Europese	samenwerking	op	het	gebied	van	
vrijheid,	veiligheid	en	justitie;	in	april	2016	werd	in	Nederland	een	referendum	gehouden	
over	het	associatieverdrag	met	Oekraïne;	en,	tot	slot,	 in	 juni	2016	hield	het	Verenigd	
Koninkrijk	een	referendum	over	de	vraag	of	het	land	in	de	EU	moest	blijven.	Ook	werden	
er	 in	deze	periode	door	politici	uit	verschillende	 lidstaten	EU-gerelateerde	referenda	
beloofd,	of	formeel	aangekondigd	zoals	in	Hongarije	over	de	vluchtelingenquota.	
De	toename	van	het	aantal	referenda	in	de	Europese	lidstaten	wordt	weerspiegeld	in	de	
groei	van	het	aantal	academische	boeken	en	tijdschriftartikelen	over	het	onderwerp.	Deze	
publicaties	 omvatten	 bijvoorbeeld	 beschrijvende	 of	 vergelijkende	 onderzoeken	 naar	
referenda	die	zijn	gehouden	in	Europa	en	daarbuiten,	onderzoeken	naar	de	effecten	van	
referenda	op	het	besluitvormingsproces,	of	pleidooien	voor	of	tegen	referenda.	In	deze	
publicaties	wordt	de	groei	van	het	gebruik	van	nationale	referenda	over	het	algemeen	
geduid	als	een	transformatie	van	de	democratie:	een	verschuiving	van	besluitvorming	
door	 middel	 van	 vertegenwoordiging	 naar	 besluitvorming	 door	 middel	 van	 directe	
burgerparticipatie.	 Daarbij	 is	 de	 algemene	 veronderstelling	 dat	 deze	 verschuiving	
een	direct	gevolg	 is	van	publieke	ontevredenheid	over	de	parlementaire	democratie.	
Gesteld	wordt	dat	referenda	worden	gehouden	omdat	volksvertegenwoordigers,	door	
de	toenemende	mondialisering	en	invloed	van	‘Europa’,	niet	langer	in	staat	zijn	het	volk	
daadwerkelijk	 te	 vertegenwoordigen,	 waardoor	 belangrijke	 besluiten	 onvoldoende	
zijn	 gelegitimeerd.	 Referenda	 zouden	 dus	 gehouden	 worden	 om	 dit	 gebrek	 aan	
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democratische	legitimiteit	van	de	volksvertegenwoordiging	te	compenseren.
ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN	EN	DOELSTELLINGEN
In	mijn	boek	wil	ik	beide	veronderstellingen	onderzoeken.	Als	eerste	de	aanname	dat	het	
gebruik	van	nationale	referenda	in	Europa	een	verschuiving	naar	de	directe	democratie	
markeert.	 Ten	 tweede	 de	 veronderstelling	 dat	 deze	 verschuiving	wordt	 veroorzaakt	
door	een	normatieve	overtuiging	dat	belangrijke	beslissingen	direct	door	de	bevolking	
gelegitimeerd	 dienen	 te	 worden.	 Drie	 vragen	 staan	 centraal	 in	 mijn	 onderzoek:	
1)	 Is	er	 in	Europa	van	1950	tot	en	met	2014	sprake	geweest	van	een	 toename	 in	de	
institutionalisering	en	het	gebruik	van	nationale	referenda?	2)	Indien	ja,	markeert	deze	
toename	een	verschuiving	van	nationale	besluitvorming	door	vertegenwoordiging	naar	
besluitvorming	door	directe	burgerparticipatie?	En	3)	Welke	factoren	dragen	bij	aan	de	
institutionalisering	en	het	gebruik	van	nationale	referenda	in	Europese	democratieën?	
De	doelstelling	van	mijn	onderzoek	is	vierledig.	Om	de	eerste	en	tweede	onderzoeksvraag	
te	kunnen	beantwoorden,	is	een	eerste	doel	het	classificeren	van	referenda	op	basis	van	
de	vraag	door	welke	actor	zij	worden	getriggerd	(politici,	burgers	of	de	grondwet).	Op	
basis	van	deze	classificatie	wil	ik	in	de	tweede	plaats	een	cross-nationaal	vergelijkend	
onderzoek	 doen	 naar	 het	 bestaan	 van	 referendumwetgeving	 en	 de	 mate	 waarin	
referenda	zijn	gehouden.	 In	mijn	onderzoek	betrek	 ik	alleen	referenda	die	gehouden	
zijn	 op	nationaal	 niveau,	 aangezien	 regionale	 en	 lokale	 referenda	een	 fundamenteel	
ander	 karakter	 hebben.	 Om	 de	 derde	 onderzoeksvraag	 te	 kunnen	 beantwoorden,	
kijk	 ik	naar	de	 impact	van	zowel	structurele	 factoren	als	politieke	agency,	Een	derde	
doelstelling	van	mijn	onderzoek	is	daarom	te	onderzoeken	met	welke	motieven	politici	
referenda	houden,	waarbij	ik	een	onderscheid	maak	tussen	norm-gedreven	en	rationele	
motieven.	 Een	 laatste	 doelstelling	 is	 het	 verklaren	 van	 internationale	 verschillen	 in	
nationale	referendumwetgeving	en	–gebruik.	
Het	 eerste	 deel	 van	 mijn	 onderzoek	 (hoofdstuk	 4)	 bestaat	 uit	 een	 vergelijking	 van	
referendumwetgeving	en	-gebruik	in	alle	28	landen	die	tussen	1950	en	2014	lid	waren	
of	zijn	geworden	van	de	EU	(of	haar	voorgangers).	 In	het	tweede	deel	(hoofdstukken	
5-7)	doe	ik	onderzoek	naar	de	aanwezigheid	van	referendumwetgeving	en	de	motieven	
waarmee	 referenda	 zijn	 gehouden	 in	 vijf	 landen,	 te	 weten	 Frankrijk,	 Denemarken,	
het	 Verenigd	 Koninkrijk,	 Zweden	 en	 Nederland.	 Eerst	 vergelijk	 ik	 Frankrijk	 met	
Denemarken	(hoofdstuk	5);	twee	landen	waar	de	grondwet	bepalingen	bevat	voor	het	
houden	 van	 nationale	 referenda	 en	waar	 referenda	 relatief	 vaak	 zijn	 gehouden.	 Dit	
zijn	twee	landen	met	een	verschillende	politiek-institutionele	context:	Frankrijk	is	een	
meerderheidsdemocratie	terwijl	Denemarken	een	consensusdemocratie	is.	Door	middel	
van	een	dergelijk	‘Most Different Systems Design’	(MDSD)	is	het	mogelijk	om	de	factoren	
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te	identificeren	die	beide	landen	gemeen	hebben	en	die	verklaren	waarom	referenda	
in	de	landen	relatief	vaak	worden	gehouden.	Daarna	vergelijk	ik	het	Verenigd	Koninkrijk	
met	 Zweden	 (hoofdstuk	 6);	 eveneens	 landen	 met	 nationale	 referendumwetgeving,	
maar	waar	deze	 slechts	beperkt	heeft	geleid	 tot	het	houden	van	 referenda.	Ook	dit	
zijn	twee	landen	met	verschillende	democratische	stelsels.	Deze	vergelijking	stelt	mij	
in	staat	de	factoren	te	identificeren	die	beide	landen	gemeen	hebben	en	die	verklaren	
waarom	referenda	 in	deze	 landen	relatief	minder	vaak	gehouden	zijn.	Ten	slotte	doe	
ik	onderzoek	naar	Nederland	(hoofdstuk	7),	waar	de	grondwet	geen	bepalingen	bevat	
voor	het	houden	van	nationale	referenda	en	waar,	 tussen	1950	en	2014,	slechts	één	
referendum	gehouden	 is.	Deze	selectie	van	 landen	stelt	mij	 tevens	 in	staat	(impliciet	
in	hoofdstuk	8)	 een	vergelijkend	onderzoek	 te	doen	naar	 institutioneel	 vergelijkbare	
landen	in	een	zogenoemd	Most Similar Systems Design	(MSSD) (Denemarken,	Zweden	en	
Nederland	enerzijds;	Frankrijk	en	het	Verenigd	Koninkrijk	anderzijds),	om	zo	de	factoren	
te	identificeren	die	verschillen	in	het	gebruik	van	volksraadplegingen	verklaren.
EEN	CLASSIFICATIE	VAN	REFERENDA
Het	 argument	 dat	 referenda	 worden	 gehouden	 om	 tekortkomingen	 van	 de	
vertegenwoordigende	 democratie	 te	 compenseren,	 komt	 voort	 uit	 een	 neiging	 het	
referendum	puur	als	instrument	van	de	directe	democratie	te	beschouwen.	Als	zodanig	
wordt	 het	 instrument	 van	 de	 volksraadpleging	 vaak	 tegenover	 de	 representatieve	
democratie	geplaatst,	op	grond	van	de	claim	dat	het	referendum	is	gebaseerd	op	de	
notie	van	volkssoevereiniteit	en	de	vertegenwoordigende	democratie	op	de	notie	van	
parlementaire	soevereiniteit.	Tegenstanders	van	referenda	nemen	deze	veronderstelde	
theoretische	 onverenigbaarheid	 dikwijls	 als	 uitgangspunt	 om	 te	 beargumenteren	
dat	 referenda	 de	 legitimiteit	 van	 volksvertegenwoordigers	 ondermijnen.	 Echter,	
ook	 voorstanders	 van	 referenda	 die	 stellen	 dat	 referenda	 dienen	 om	 fouten	 in	 de	
representatieve	democratie	 te	herstellen,	gaan	ervan	uit	dat	besluitvorming	middels	
referenda	fundamenteel	verschilt	van	besluitvorming	door	politieke	vertegenwoordigers.	
In	mijn	proefschrift	wil	ik	benadrukken	dat	een	dergelijke	dichotomie	tussen	referenda	
en	 de	 representatieve	 democratie	 geen	 recht	 doet	 aan	 de	 verscheidenheid	 in	
referendumtypes,	-procedures	en	-gebruik	in	Europese	democratieën.	
In	hoofdstuk	2	presenteer	ik	een	classificatie	van	referenda	op	basis	van	twee	politiek-
theoretische	 dimensies.	 De	 eerste	 dimensie	 onderscheidt	 de	 liberaal-democratische	
notie	 van	 representatieve	 besluitvorming	 van	 de	 klassiek-democratische	 notie	
van	 directe	 burgerparticipatie	 en	 gaat	 derhalve	 over	 de	 vraag	 of	 burgers	 indirect	
deelnemen	aan	de	besluitvorming	 (door	het	 kiezen	van	volksvertegenwoordigers)	of	
direct	(door	zelf	besluiten	te	nemen).	De	tweede	dimensie	onderscheidt	geaggregeerde	
besluitvorming	van	geïntegreerde	besluitvorming,	en	gaat	derhalve	over	de	vraag	of	
besluiten	worden	gemaakt	op	basis	van	het	meerderheidsprincipe	of	op	basis	van	een	
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integratie	van	minderheidsstandpunten.	Alle	referenda	stellen	burgers	 in	staat	direct	
deel	 te	nemen	aan	de	besluitvorming,	omdat	zij	burgers	de	mogelijkheid	bieden	om	
direct	over	besluiten	te	stemmen	in	plaats	van	op	vertegenwoordigers	die	de	besluiten	
vervolgens	namens	hen	nemen.	En	in	alle	referenda	beslist	uiteindelijk	de	meerderheid.	
Niet	alle	referenda	zijn	echter	een	pure	weerspiegeling	van	volkssoevereiniteit,	noch	
van	het	strikte	meerderheidsbeginsel.	Dit	hangt	in	de	eerste	plaats	af	van	de	vraag	wie	
uiteindelijk	bepaalt	of	het	referendum	gehouden	wordt.	
Op	 basis	 van	 dit	 criterium	 onderscheid	 ik	 vijf	 verschillende	 typen	 referenda:	 1)	
parlementaire	 meerderheidsreferenda	 (getriggerd	 door	 een	 meerderheid	 van	
volksvertegenwoordigers);	 2)	 presidentiële	 referenda	 (getriggerd	door	de	president);	
3)	 parlementaire	 minderheidsreferenda	 (getriggerd	 door	 een	 minderheid	 van	
volksvertegenwoordigers;	4)	volksreferenda	(getriggerd	door	burgers);	en	5)	verplichte 
referenda	(getriggerd	door	de	grondwet).	Bij	volksreferenda	hebben	burgers	de	grootse	
controle	over	het	referendumproces,	omdat	zij	zelf	bepalen	of	het	referendum	gehouden	
wordt.	 Hoewel	 in	 dergelijke	 referenda	 de	 meerderheid	 uiteindelijk	 beslist,	 kunnen	
volksreferenda	een	bescherming	bieden	aan	minderheidsstandpunten:	er	is	immers	veelal	
maar	een	klein	deel	van	het	electoraat	nodig	om	het	initiatief	tot	een	volksraadpleging	
te	kunnen	nemen.	Referenda	die	worden	uitgeschreven	door	volksvertegenwoordigers	
bieden	hun	primair	een	instrument	om	controle	over	de	besluitvorming	uit	te	oefenen.	
Parlementaire	meerderheids-		en	presidentiële	referenda	onderstrepen	daarbij	primair	
het	meerderheidsprincipe,	 terwijl	 parlementaire	minderheidsreferenda	meer	 ruimte	
bieden	voor	het	integreren	van	oppositiestandpunten	in	de	besluitvorming.	Verplichte	
referenda	zijn	niet	gemakkelijk	te	plaatsen	in	het	tweedimensionale	kader,	omdat	deze	
niet	direct	worden	getriggerd	door	politici	of	burgers	maar	door	de	grondwet.	In	veel	
gevallen	 bepaalt	 de	 regering	 echter	 of	 ‘verplichte’	 volksraadplegingen	 daadwerkelijk	
gehouden	moeten	worden.	
De	plaatsing	van	verschillende	typen	referenda	in	het	tweedimensionale	kader	is	ook	
afhankelijk	 van	 wie	 de	 agenda	 bepaalt,	 het	 scala	 aan	 onderwerpen	 waarover	 een	
referendum	gehouden	kan	worden,	het	effect	van	referenda	(bindend	of	adviserend),	
en	of	er	drempels	(wat	betreft	opkomst	of	vereiste	meerderheid)	van	toepassing	zijn.	De	
invloed	van	burgers	op	het	referendumproces,	en	daarmee	het	besluitvormingsproces,	
wordt	 beperkt	 wanneer	 referenda	 louter	 adviserend	 zijn	 en	 alleen	 in	 uitzonderlijke	
gevallen	gehouden	kunnen	worden.	De	invloed	van	burgers	is	ook	kleiner	wanneer	er	
een	opkomstdrempel	van	toepassing	 is.	 In	zulke	gevallen	wordt	de	uitkomst	van	een	
referendum	 niet	 simpelweg	 bepaald	 door	 een	 gewone	 meerderheid	 van	 stemmen,	
maar	moet	 er	 tevens	 een	 bepaald	 percentage	 van	 het	 electoraat	 zijn	 stem	 hebben	
uitgebracht.	Als	er	een	goedkeuringsquorum	(of	een	afkeuringsquorum)	van	toepassing	
is,	moet	de	meerderheid	van	stemmen	tevens	een	bepaald	percentage	van	het	electoraat	
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vertegenwoordigen	 om	 een	 voorstel	 goed	 te	 keuren	 (of	 te	 verwerpen).	 Referenda	
met	 drempels	 bieden	 derhalve	 meer	 bescherming	 aan	 minderheidsstandpunten	
dan	 referenda	 zonder	 drempels.	 Daarmee	 zijn	 dus	 niet	 alle	 referenda	 een	 pure	
weerspiegeling	van	de	twee	noties	die	ten	grondslag	liggen	aan	de	directe	democratie:	
volkssoevereiniteit	 en	het	meerderheidsbeginstel.	 Sommige referenda versterken de 
directe	participatie	van	het	Volk,	terwijl	andere	referenda	de	positie	van	de	politieke	
meerderheid	 versterken,	 meestal	 de	 uitvoerende	 macht	 ofwel	 Machiavelli’s	 Vorst.	
Sommige	 referenda	 onderstrepen	 primair	 het	 meerderheidsbeginsel,	 terwijl	 andere	
referenda	meer	ruimte	bieden	voor	het	beschermen	van	minderheidsstandpunten.	
EEN	VERSCHUIVING	VAN	DE	VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE	NAAR	DE	DIRECTE	DEMOCRATIE?
Dit	 onderscheid	 is	 belangrijk	 in	 een	 onderzoek	 naar	 de	 beschikbaarheid	 van	
referendumwetgeving	 in	 Europa	 en	 het	 daadwerkelijke	 referendumgebruik.	 Mijn	
onderzoek	 laat	 zien	 dat	 in	 alle	 24	 EU-landen	 waar	 de	 grondwet	 bepalingen	 bevat	
voor	het	gebruik	van	nationale	referenda,	referenda	getriggerd	kunnen	worden	door	
politici	(parlementariërs	of	de	president),	terwijl	in	slechts	tien	EU-landen,	voornamelijk	
in	 Centraal-	 en	 Oost-Europa,	 referenda	 getriggerd	 kunnen	 worden	 door	 burgers.	
In	 20	 EU-landen	 bepaalt	 de	 grondwet	 dat	 de	 politieke	 meerderheid	 (parlementaire	
of	presidentiële)	 referenda	kan	uitschrijven,	 terwijl	 in	 slechts	elf	 -	 vooral	 consensus-	
–	 democratieën	 parlementaire	 minderheden	 dit	 kunnen	 doen.	 Zelfs	 bij	 de	 meeste	
‘verplichte’	 referenda	 bepaalt	 de	 regering	 uiteindelijk	 of	 het	 referendum	 doorgang	
vindt	 of	 niet.	 Daarom	 concludeer	 ik	 in	mijn	 proefschrift	 dat,	 hoewel	 er	 slechts	 vier	
EU	 landen	 zijn	 waar	 de	 grondwet	 geen	 bepalingen	 bevat	 voor	 het	 houden	 van	
nationale	 referenda,	 er	 geen	 sprake	 is	 van	 een	 substantiële	 EU-brede	 verschuiving	
van	de	vertegenwoordigende	naar	de	directe	democratie	in	termen	van	het	karakter	
van	beschikbare	 referendumwetgeving:	 over	 het	 algemeen	 ligt	 de	 controle	 over	 het	
referendumproces,	 en	 daarmee	 het	 besluitvormingsproces,	 in	 de	 handen	 van	 de	
regerende	meerderheid.
Het	onderscheid	is	nog	belangrijker	wanneer	het	gaat	om	het	daadwerkelijke	gebruik	
van	 referenda.	 In	 de	 meeste	 lidstaten	 worden	 referenda	 slechts	 bij	 uitzondering	
gehouden.	 Het	 toegenomen	 aantal	 referenda	 in	 de	 EU	 als	 geheel	 is	 dan	 ook	 vooral	
toe	te	schrijven	aan	frequent	gebruik	van	referenda	in	een	beperkt	aantal	landen,	met	
name	 in	 Ierland	 en	 Italië.	 Echter,	 zelfs	 in	 deze	 landen	worden	 niet	 zoveel	 referenda	
gehouden	als	in		bijvoorbeeld	Zwitserland	–	dat	over	het	algemeen	gezien	wordt	als	het	
ideaaltype	model	van	de	directe	democratie.	Evenmin	markeert	de	toename	 in	deze	
landen	een	verschuiving	naar	de	directe	democratie.	 In	 Ierland	gingen	alle	referenda	
over	 constitutionele	 kwesties	 waarover	 politieke	 partijen	 intern	 verdeeld	 waren.	
Door	 burgers	 direct	 over	 zulke	 controversiële	 kwesties	 te	 laten	 beslissen,	 konden	
partij-afsplitsingen	worden	voorkomen.	 In	 Italië,	als	ook	 in	enkele	Centraal-	en	Oost-
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Europese	landen,	zijn	relatief	veel	volksreferenda	gehouden,	maar	ook	deze	zijn	in	de	
eerste	plaats	instrumenten	in	handen	van	politieke	partijen.	In	de	overige	15	lidstaten	
werden,	zo	toont	mijn	onderzoek	aan,	34	van	de	38	optionele referenda uitgeschreven 
door	 een	 parlementaire	meerderheid	 of	 de	 president.	 Het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	
de	EU-lidstaten	markeert	dus	geenszins	een	verschuiving	naar	de	directe	democratie,	
maar	 in	 plaats	 daarvan	 bevestigen	 referenda	 de	 bestaande	 vertegenwoordigende	
besluitvormingsdynamiek.	Vandaar	dat	de	vraag	naar	wat	de	institutionalisering	en	het	
gebruik	van	nationale	referenda	in	de	Europese	democratieën	verklaart,	 in	de	eerste	
plaats	een	vraag	wordt	waarom	sommige	typen	referenda	zijn	geïnstitutionaliseerd	en	
gehouden	en	andere	typen	niet,	alsmede	waarom	referenda	in	sommige	landen	vaker	
worden	gehouden	dan	in	andere	landen,	en	waarom	over	bepaalde	vraagstukken.
WAT	VERKLAART	HET	GEBRUIK	VAN	REFERENDA	IN	EUROPESE	DEMOCRATIEËN?	
Om	 deze	 vraag	 te	 beantwoorden,	 onderzoek	 ik	 zes	 aannames	 over	 de	 mogelijke	
factoren	 die	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 beïnvloeden.	 Deze	 aannames	 komen	 voort	
uit	 vier	 stromingen	 in	 de	 institutionele	 theorie:	 het	 klassiek	 institutionalisme,	 het	
historisch	 institutionalisme,	 het	 sociologisch	 institutionalisme	en	het	 rationele-keuze	
institutionalisme.	 Vanuit	 het	 klassiek	 institutionalisme	 onderzoek	 ik	 in	 welke	 mate	
referenda	 ‘passen’	 binnen	 de	 algemene	 politiek-institutionele	 context.	 Vanuit	 het	
historisch	 institutionalisme	 onderzoek	 ik	 de	 rol	 van	 ‘padafhankelijkheid’	 in	 politieke	
keuzes	 om	 referendumwetgeving	 te	 implementeren	 of	 gebruiken.	 Vanuit	 het	
sociologisch	institutionalisme	onderzoek	ik	in	hoeverre	politici	 in	deze	keuzes	primair	
gedreven	worden	door	de	publieke	opinie	en/of	eigen	normatieve	overtuiging.	Tot	slot	
onderzoek	ik	vanuit	het	rationele-keuze	institutionalisme	de	strategische	motieven	die	
politieke	actoren	hebben	om	referenda	uit	te	schrijven.	Uit	deze	vier	theorieën	leid	ik	
zes	verschillende	factoren	af	die	het	gebruik	van	referenda	mogelijk	beïnvloeden:	twee	
factoren	die	betrekking	hebben	op	de	motieven	van	politieke	actoren	om	referendum	
wetgeving	 te	 formaliseren	 of	 te	 gebruiken,	 namelijk	 1)	 strategische	 belangen	 of	 2)	
politieke	waarden;	en	vier	factoren	die	betrekking	hebben	op	de	structurele	context	die	
het	handelen	van	deze	actoren	beïnvloedt:	3)	type	democratie,	4)	aantal	vetospelers,	5)	
ervaring	met	referenda	in	het	verleden,	en	6)	vraag	vanuit	de	bevolking.	
Mijn	onderzoek	naar	de	besluiten	tot	het	wel	of	niet	formaliseren	van	referenda	in	vijf	
landen	 (Frankrijk,	Denemarken,	het	Verenigd	Koninkrijk,	Zweden	en	Nederland)	wijst	
uit	 dat	 het	 al	 dan	 niet	 invoeren	 van	 referendumwetgeving	 meestal	 het	 resultaat	 is	
van	een	strijd	om	de	politieke	macht	 tussen	oppositiepartijen	enerzijds	–	die	menen	
dat	 zij	 hierdoor	 hun	 politieke	 invloed	 kunnen	 vergroten	 –	 en	 de	 regerende	 partijen	
anderzijds	 –	 die	 over	 het	 algemeen	 tegen	 de	 invoering	 van	 referendumwetgeving	
zijn	 uit	 angst	 deze	macht	 te	 verliezen.	 In	 de	meeste	 landen	werd	 uiteindelijk	 alleen	
wetgeving	geïntroduceerd	die	politici,	meestal	bij	meerderheid,	in	staat	stelt	referenda	
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uit	te	schrijven.	De	conclusie	van	deze	studie	is	dat	politici	dit	vervolgens	alleen	doen	
wanneer	het	 in	hun	belang	 is.	Dit	belang	kan	te	maken	hebben	met	de	uitkomst van 
een	referendum	(bijvoorbeeld	toen	de	Deense	regering	in	1986	een	referendum	hield	
over	de	Europese	Akte	nadat	deze	door	het	parlement	was	weggestemd)	of	met	de	
handeling	van	het	uitschrijven	van	het	referendum	(bijvoorbeeld	toen	de	Conservative 
Party	 in	 het	 Verenigd	 Koninkrijk	 instemde	met	 een	 referendum	 over	 het	 kiesstelsel	
omdat	zij	een	coalitie	wilde	vormen	met	de	Liberal Democrats).	
Met	name	de	controverse	over	de	Europese	integratie	en	het	toenemende	electorale	
succes	van	populistische	partijen	zijn	belangrijke	voedingsbronnen	voor	het	uitschrijven	
van	 referenda.	 Europese	 kwesties	 hebben	 de	 neiging	 de	 traditionele	 politieke	
scheidslijnen	te	doorsnijden,	met	name	in	de	‘oude’	EU-lidstaten.	Als	zodanig	hebben	
veel	gevestigde	politieke	partijen	moeite	met	het	 integreren	van	EU-kwesties	 in	hun	
partijideologie.	 Deze	 gevestigde	 partijen	 zijn	 vaak	 intern	 verdeeld	 tussen	 een	 pro-
Europese	partijleiding	en	eurosceptische	partijleden.	Dit	geldt	zowel	voor	centrumlinkse	
als	centrumrechtse	partijen.	Daarbij	 zijn	Europese	kwesties	ook	steeds	meer	politiek	
gevoelige	onderwerpen	geworden	waarop	partijen	stemmen	kunnen	verliezen,	neem	
bijvoorbeeld	de	Griekse	schuldencrisis	of	de	Europese	migratiecrisis.	Wanneer	er	een	
grote	 kans	 bestaat	 dat	 verdeeldheid	 over	 een	 bepaald	 onderwerp	 uitmondt	 in	 een	
coalitie-	of	partijbreuk	of	wanneer	partijen	dreigen	stemmen	te	verliezen	vanwege	hun	
positie	ten	aanzien	van	politiek	gevoelige	onderwerpen,		zullen	partijen	geneigd	zijn	om	
dergelijke	kwesties	in	een	referendum	voor	te	leggen	aan	‘het	volk’.	De	partij	wordt	dan	
niet	gedwongen	om	zelf	een	standpunt	in	te	nemen.	Referenda	dienen	dus	vooral	ter	
bescherming	van	de	gevestigde	politieke	partijen.		
Een	dergelijk	defensief	gebruik	van	referenda	wordt	aangewakkerd	door	het	toenemende	
electorale	 succes	 van	 populistische	 partijen.	 Deze	 partijen	 pleiten	 met	 name	 voor	
referenda	over	soevereiniteitskwesties	en	immigratie.	Ze	benadrukken	dat	de	‹gewone	
burgers›	steeds	meer	vervreemd	zijn	van	de	politieke	elite	als	gevolg	van	een	verlies	
van	nationale	 soevereiniteit	 aan	de	EU	en	 toenemende	 immigratie.	Dit	 zijn	 kwesties	
waarover	 ‘het	 establishment’	 doorgaans	 niet	 tot	 een	 eenduidig	 standpunt	 komt	 en	
waarop	 sommige	 groepen	 burgers	 zich	 niet	 vertegenwoordigd	 voelen.	 Populistische	
partijen	stellen	dat	referenda	de	wil	van	de	meerderheid	herstellen	door	het	omzeilen	
van	de	politieke	elite.	 In	alle	vijf	onderzochte	 landen	heeft	een	dergelijk	populistisch	
discours	het	belang	van	referenda	in	het	politieke	debat	versterkt.	
In	 de	 publiekelijke	 rechtvaardiging	 van	 referenda,	 verwijzen	 politici	 vaak	 naar	 de	
noodzaak	dat	beslissingen	over	belangrijke	onderwerpen	als	soevereiniteitsoverdracht	of	
grondwetswijzigingen	rechtstreeks	door	het	volk	worden	gelegitimeerd.	Met	betrekking	
tot	 EU-aangelegenheden	 stellen	 voorstanders	 van	 referenda	 dat	 volksraadplegingen	
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zullen	bijdragen	aan	het	verminderen	van	het	vermeende	 ‹democratisch	 tekort›	 van	
de	EU.	Hoewel	dergelijke	normatieve	argumenten	 inderdaad	de	 rol	 van	 referenda	 in	
het	debat	 vergroten,	hebben	 ze	niet	 tot	 gevolg	dat	 referenda	daadwerkelijk	worden	
gehouden.		Opvallend	is,	zo	laat	mijn	onderzoek	zien,	dat	de	actoren	die	een	referendum	
over	een	bepaald	onderwerp	rechtvaardigden	met	dergelijke	normatieve	argumenten,	
deze	 argumenten	 gemakkelijk	 loslieten	wanneer	 een	 referendum	niet	 in	 hun	belang	
was.	Een	duidelijk	voorbeeld	is	dat	geen	enkele	lidstaat	behalve	Ierland	een	referendum	
heeft	gehouden	over	het	Verdrag	van	Lissabon	(getekend	in	2007),	terwijl	verschillende	
Europese	 politieke	 leiders	 een	 referendum	 over	 de	 voorloper	 van	 dit	 verdrag,	 de	
Europese	Grondwet,	wel	noodzakelijk	achtten.		
 
Er	is	tevens	weinig	bewijs	voor	de	hypothese	dat	politici	primair	worden	gedreven	door	
een	vraag	naar	referenda	vanuit	de	bevolking.	Weliswaar	creëert	politieke	onvrede	over	
de	nationale	of	Europese	politiek	een	context	waarin	politici	eerder	geneigd	zullen	zijn	
referenda	te	beloven.	Politici	suggereren	immers	dikwijls	dat	zij	door	het	houden	van	een	
volksraadpleging	tegemoetkomen	aan	deze	onvrede.	Echter,	ook	hier	geldt	dat	politici	
zelden	referenda	houden	als	dit	niet	in	hun	belang	is,	ongeacht	de	vraag	naar	referenda	
vanuit	de	bevolking.	Nog	belangrijker	 is	het	 feit	dat	we	simpelweg	niet	weten	of	 (en	
welke)	burgers	willen	stemmen	in	referenda	en	in	wat	voor	soort	referenda.	Dit	komt	
doordat	er	een	gebrek	is	aan	longitudinale	en	vergelijkbare	opiniedata	over	referenda.	
Dit	 maakt	 statistische	 analyses	 van	 de	 steun	 voor	 referenda	 vrijwel	 onmogelijk.	
Beweringen	dat	het	gebruik	van	referenda	wordt	gevoed	door	een	vraag	naar	referenda	
vanuit	de	bevolking	zijn	dus	grotendeels	gebaseerd	op	veronderstellingen	in	plaats	van	
op	empirisch	bewijs.
WAT	VERKLAART	INTERNATIONALE	VERSCHILLEN	IN	HET	GEBRUIK	VAN	REFERENDA?
Hoewel	 het	 rationele-keuze	 institutionalisme	 ons	 in	 staat	 stelt	 te	 begrijpen	waarom	
politici	 besluiten	 een	 referendum	 te	 organiseren,	 kan	 het	 niet	 volledig	 verklaren	
waarom	 referenda	 in	 sommige	 landen	 vaker	 worden	 gehouden	 dan	 in	 andere	
landen.	 Dit	 vereist	 bovenal	 een	 begrip	 van	 de	 institutionele	 en	 historische	 context	
van	 deze	 landen.	 In	 de	 eerste	 plaats	 is	 het	 karakter	 van	 de	 referendumwetgeving	
dat	 in	 een	 land	 beschikbaar	 is	 sterk	 verankerd	 in	 de	 democratische	 traditie	 van	 dit	
land.	 Parlementaire	 minderheidsreferenda	 en	 volksreferenda	 komen	 bijvoorbeeld	
vaker	 voor	 in	 consensusdemocratieën	 dan	 in	 meerderheidsdemocratieën.	 Dit	
is	 logisch	 omdat	 zulke	 referenda	 meer	 ruimte	 bieden	 voor	 het	 integreren	 van	
minderheidsstandpunten	 in	 de	 besluitvorming,	 hetgeen	 ten	 grondslag	 ligt	 aan	 de	
consensusdemocratie.	 Referenda	 in	 consensusdemocratieën	 hebben	 bovendien,	
vooral	 wanneer	 deze	 getriggerd	worden	 door	 een	 parlementaire	minderheid	 of	 het	
electoraat,	 meestal	 een	 opkomst-,	 goedkeurings-,	 of	 afkeuringsdrempel.	 Omdat	 in	
referenda	met	 zulke	 drempels	 de	 uitkomst	 niet	 simpelweg	 bepaald	wordt	 door	 een	
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gewone	meerderheid	van	stemmen,	worden	zulke	referendumdrempels	meestal	niet	
toegepast	 in	meerderheidsdemocratieën,	 zoals	 het	 Verenigd	 Koninkrijk	 en	 Frankrijk.	
Tot	 slot,	 van	 de	 weinige	 meerderheidsdemocratieën	 in	 de	 EU,	 ontbreekt	 alleen	 in	
Griekenland	 en	 Cyprus	 wetgeving	 voor	 verplichte	 referenda.	 Verplichte	 referenda	
maken	 het	 de	 regering	 moeilijker	 om	 grote	 institutionele	 wijzigingen	 (bijvoorbeeld	
grondwetswijzigingen)	 door	 te	 voeren.	 Ongetwijfeld	 is	 een	 dergelijk	 referendum	
noodzakelijker	 in	 meederheidsdemocratieën	 dan	 in	 consensusdemocratieën,	 omdat	
grote	 institutionele	wijzigingen	 in	meederheidsdemocratieën	 anders	 zouden	worden	
doorgevoerd	met	een	gewone	meerderheid	van	stemmen.
Het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 (of	 de	 invoering	 van	 referendumwetgeving)	 wordt	 ook	
beïnvloed	door	het	aantal	actoren	die	nodig	zijn	om	een	referendum	uit	te	schrijven	
(of	 referendumwetgeving	 aan	 te	 nemen)	 en	 die	 referenda	 dus	 mogelijk	 kunnen	
blokkeren.	 	 Deze	 actoren	 worden	 vetospelers	 genoemd.	 De	 impact	 van	 het	 aantal	
vetospelers	op	besluiten	om	referenda	te	formaliseren	of	te	gebruiken,	 is	afhankelijk	
van	hun	voorkeuren	en	die	van	andere	spelers.	In	landen	waar	referenda	relatief	vaak	
worden	gehouden	komt	dit	voornamelijk	doordat	het	uitschrijven	van	een	referendum	
slechts	de	goedkeuring	behoeft	van	een	beperkt	aantal	spelers,	zoals	een	deel	van	het	
electoraat	 (Italië),	de	president	 (Frankrijk),	of	de	grondwet	 (Ierland	en	Denemarken).	
Referenda	worden	minder	vaak	gehouden	in	landen	waar	een	referendum	vrijwel	alleen	
kan	 worden	 uitgeschreven	 door	 de	 parlementaire	 meerderheid,	 zoals	 het	 Verenigd	
Koninkrijk.	Maar	hoewel	 het	 aantal	 vetospelers	bepalend	 is	 voor	de	 speelruimte	die	
actoren	hebben	 in	het	 implementeren	van	 referendumwetgeving	of	het	houden	van	
referenda,	worden	zulke	beslissingen	toch	vooral	gedreven	door	politieke	voorkeuren	
en	 belangen.	 Bijvoorbeeld,	 door	 de	 rigiditeit	 van	 de	 Nederlandse	 Grondwet	 en	 de	
hoge	 mate	 van	 fragmentatie	 van	 het	 Nederlandse	 partijenstelsel,	 zijn	 invloedrijke	
referendumtegenstanders	 er	 herhaaldelijk	 in	 geslaagd	 referendumwetgeving	 te	
blokkeren.	Een	groot	aantal	vetospelers	verklaart	ook	waarom	referenda	in	Nederland	
nauwelijks	 zijn	 gehouden.	 Het	 referendum	 over	 de	 Europese	 Grondwet,	 gehouden	
in	 2005,	 werd	 gehouden	 omdat	 potentiële	 vetospelers	 een	 belang	 hadden	 bij	 de	
volksraadpleging.
Het	 begrijpen	 van	 de	 debatten	 over	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden	 is	 belangrijk	 om	
huidige	 debatten	 te	 kunnen	 duiden.	 Het	 verband	 tussen	 ervaring	 met	 referenda	 in	
het	verleden	en	het	huidige	gebruik	van	referenda	verschilt	echter	van	land	tot	land.	
Ervaring	met	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden	 is	 geen	 garantie	dat	 referenda	 later	worden	
geïnstitutionaliseerd	of	gebruikt.	Een	voorbeeld	is	Nederland,	waar		in	de	late	achttiende	
en	 vroege	 negentiende	 eeuw	 een	 aantal	 nationale	 referenda	 zijn	 gehouden,	 maar	
waar	het	instrument	tot	aan	2005	niet	meer	gebruikt	werd	op	nationaal	niveau.	Er	is	
een	aantal	 landen,	waaronder	Spanje	en	Duitsland,	waar	een	negatieve	ervaring	met	
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dictatoriale	 referenda	de	 reden	 is	dat	nationale	 referenda	nauwelijks	 een	 rol	 spelen	
in	de	hedendaagse	politiek.	Daarnaast	is	er	een	aantal	landen,	zoals	Italië,	Letland	en	
Litouwen,	waar	volksreferenda	en	parlementaire	minderheidsreferenda	zijn	ingevoerd	
om	 te	 breken	met	 het	 dictatoriale	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden.	 Echter,	 in	
Portugal	en	Roemenië,	 kunnen	 referenda	nog	 steeds	worden	uitgeschreven	door	de	
president,	ondanks	hun	verleden	van	dictatoriaal	gebruik	van	referenda.
ONDERZOEKSIMPLICATIES	EN	SUGGESTIES	VOOR	TOEKOMSTIG	ONDERZOEK
Mijn	 onderzoek	 laat	 zien	 dat	 het	 bewijs	 voor	 twee	 gangbare	 aannames	 in	 de	
referendumliteratuur	ontbreekt.	De	eerste	aanname	is	dat	de	Europese	burgers	door	
de	institutionalisering	en	het	gebruik	van	referenda	steeds	meer	directe	controle	krijgen	
over	de	politieke	besluitvorming	ten	koste	van	politieke	partijen.	Mijn	onderzoek	laat	
zien	 dat	 dit	 niet	 het	 geval	 is.	 In	 de	meeste	 EU-landen	 is	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	
beperkt	 tot	 eenmalige	 gebeurtenissen,	 zoals	 de	 hervorming	 van	 de	 grondwet,	 EU-
lidmaatschap,	 en/of	 herziening	 van	 EU-verdragen.	 Referenda	 zijn	 daarnaast	 zelden	
een	 weerspiegeling	 van	 volkssoevereiniteit.	 Zelfs	 in	 landen	 waar	 referenda	 vaker	
worden	gebruikt,	zijn	referendumbepalingen	zodanig	ontworpen	dat	het	gebruik	wordt	
gestuurd	door	de	politieke	elites	in	plaats	van	‘het	volk’.	De	tweede	aanname	is	dat	het	
gebruik	van	referenda	wordt	gedreven	door	structurele	factoren.	Er	wordt	gesproken	
over	een	referendum	‘Zeitgeist’	die	zou	worden	gevoed	door	toenemende	onvrede	over	
de	vertegenwoordigende	democratie.	In	mijn	proefschrift	wil	ik,	zonder	een	uitspraak	
te	willen	doen	over	de	vraag	of referenda	deze	consequentie	hebben,	 laten	zien	dat	
referenda	zelden	worden	uitgeschreven	omdat	de	bevolking	er	om	vraagt,	noch	vanuit	
een	normatieve	wens	om	de	democratie	te	versterken.	Integendeel,	een	referendum	
wordt	over	het	algemeen	alleen	uitgeschreven	als	dit	het	belang	dient	van	degene	die	
het	referendum	uitschrijft,	en	dit	belang	komt	zelden	overeen	met	de	rechtvaardiging	
die	wordt	gegeven	in	het	publieke	debat.	
Hoewel	 de	meeste	 referendumonderzoekers	 toegeven	 dat	 er	 verschillen	 zijn	 tussen	
referenda,	 en	 tussen	 het	 gebruik	 ervan	 in	 verschillende	 landen,	 gaan	 zij	 over	 het	
algemeen	 mee	 in	 het	 discours	 dat	 de	 vertegenwoordigende	 democratie	 door	 het	
gebruik	van	 referenda	aan	verandering	onderhevig	 is,	en	dat	dit	een	direct	gevolg	 is	
van	 veranderende	 politieke	 waarden	 en	 vraag	 naar	 referenda	 vanuit	 de	 bevolking.	
Ik	 beargumenteer	 in	 mijn	 proefschrift	 dat	 een	 dergelijk	 discours	 geen	 inzicht	 biedt	
in	 het	werkelijke	 karakter	 van	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	 Europa.	 Sterker	 nog,	 de	
strategische	 rol	 van	 referenda	wordt	 dikwijls	 verbloemd	 door	 de	 sterke	 normatieve	
aantrekkingskracht	van	referenda.	Het	ontrafelen	van	referendumstrategieën	is	daarom	
cruciaal	om	het	effect	van	referenda	op	de	democratische	besluitvorming	te	begrijpen.
Ik	 doe	 onderzoek	 naar	 referendumstrategieën	 in	 vijf	gevestigde democratieën in de 
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EU.	Het	 is	daarom	relevant	te	onderzoeken	wat	de	rol	van	referenda	 is	 in	de	nieuwe	
democratieën	in	Centraal	en	Oost	Europa.	Omdat	ik	alleen	EU	landen	in	mijn	onderzoek	
heb	meegenomen,	kan	 ik	het	specifieke	EU-effect	op	het	gebruik	van	 referenda	niet	
geheel	op	waarde	schatten,	en	het	is	daarom	relevant	te	onderzoeken	op	welke	manier	
referenda	worden	gebruikt		in	niet-EU	democratieën.
Een	 tweede	 richting	 voor	 toekomstig	 onderzoek	 is	 gekoppeld	 aan	mogelijke	 nieuwe	
referenda	 in	 de	 (nabije)	 toekomst,	 met	 name	 over	 prangende	 Europese	 kwesties,	
zoals	 de	 schulden-	 en	migratiecrises	 en	mogelijke	 EU-uittredingen.	 Het	 onvermogen	
van	gevestigde	politieke	partijen	om	een	duidelijk	 standpunt	 in	 te	nemen	over	deze	
kwesties	 voedt	 bovendien	 het	 electorale	 succes	 van	 populistische	 partijen.	 Deze	
partijen	hebben	een	sterk	referendumdiscours	waarmee	de	gevestigde	partijen	in	de	
verdediging	worden	gedrukt.	Toekomstig	onderzoek	naar	referenda	zal	zich	daarom	in	
het	bijzonder	moeten	richten	op	de	toenemende	succes	van	populistische	partijen	en	
de	impact	hiervan	op	het	referendum	gebruik	en	-discours.
Een	 laatste	 en	 noodzakelijke	 onderzoeksrichting	 voor	 de	 toekomst	 is	 diepgaand	
onderzoek	naar	de	publieke	opinie	 ten	aanzien	van	 referenda.	 In	het	publieke	debat	
wordt	vaak	benadrukt	dat	‘het	volk’	de	wens	heeft	te	kunnen	stemmen	in	referenda.	
Ik	wilde	deze	veronderstelling	in	mijn	proefschrift	onderzoeken,	maar	ik	stuitte	op	een	
gebrek	 aan	 vergelijkende	opiniedata.	We	weten	hierdoor	 simpelweg	niet	 of	 en	welk	
deel	 van	 de	 kiezers	 referenda	 steunen,	 waarom	 ze	 dat	 doen,	 hoe	 sterk	 deze	 steun	
is	 en	 of	 zulke	 steun	 toe-	 of	 afneemt.	We	weten	 ook	 niet	 hoe	 burgers	 verschillende	
soorten	referenda	ervaren,	noch	wat	zij	vinden	van	de	wijze	waarop	referenda	in	hun	
land	worden	gehouden.	Referenda	worden	over	het	algemeen	uitgeschreven,	dan	wel	
gestuurd,	 door	 de	 actoren	 (de	 regering	 of	 politieke	 partijen	 in	 het	 algemeen)	 tegen	
wie	de	politieke	ontevredenheid	 is	gericht.	Daarom	kunnen	 referenda	misschien	wel	
leiden	 tot	een	hogere	 in	plaats	van	 lagere	mate	van	democratische	ontevredenheid.	
Het	beantwoorden	van	de	vraag	of	er	voldoende	empirisch	bewijs	is	om	het	beroep	op	
‘de	wil	van	het	volk’	te	onderschrijven,	is	van	cruciaal	belang	om	conclusies	te	kunnen	
trekken	over	de	invloed	van	referenda	op	de	democratie.
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DANKWOORD (ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IN DUTCH)
Mijn	ouders	hebben	denk	 ik	 altijd	al	wel	 geweten	dat	 ik	 later	 ‘iets	met	politiek’	 zou	
gaan	doen.	Bij	een	conflict	op	het	schoolplein	stond	ik	altijd	vooraan	om	mij	ermee	te	
bemoeien	en	andere	kinderen	te	vertellen	wat	ze	moesten	doen.	In	het	politiek	bewogen	
jaar	2002	begon	ik	aan	mijn	opleiding	politicologie	aan	de	VU	in	Amsterdam.	Na	mijn	
afstuderen,	in	2006,	had	ik	het	geluk	dat	ik	mijn	eerste	baan	kreeg	bij	de	organisatie	waar	
ik	stage	had	gelopen,	de	Wetenschappelijke	Raad	voor	het	Regeringsbeleid	 (WRR)	 in	
Den	Haag.	Hier	werd	mijn	interesse	in	het	schrijven	van	een	proefschrift	aangewakkerd.	
In	 december	 2007	 begon	 ik	 dan	 ook	 aan	mijn	 promotieonderzoek	 aan	 de	 Radboud	
Universiteit	in	Nijmegen.	
	 Zoals	de	meeste	promovendi	werd	ik	vaak	gekweld	door	onzekerheid	en	twijfelde	
ik	of	ik	wel	in	staat	was	een	proefschrift	te	schrijven.	Bovendien	geloofde	ik	vaak	niet	
dat	mijn	onderzoek	ook	maar	iets	zou	bijdragen	aan	het	wetenschappelijke	debat,	laat	
staan	aan	een	betere	maatschappij.	In	2012	nam	ik	een	pauze	van	mijn	onderzoek	en	
maakte	ik	de	overstap	van	de	universiteit	naar	de	beleidsadvisering;	 iets	waar	ik	nog	
altijd	veel	plezier	in	heb	(anderen	vertellen	wat	zij	zouden	moeten	doen,	is	nog	steeds	
iets	dat	ik	graag	doe!).	Toch	bleef	er	iets	knagen,	want	er	lagen	nog	steeds	losse	flodders	
proefschrift	en	tig	ideeën	op	de	plank.	Bovendien	was	mijn	passie	voor	het	onderwerp	
van	mijn	promotieonderzoek,	referenda	en	democratie,	nog	niet	verdwenen.	Met	een	
beetje	meer	zelfvertrouwen	en	een	meer	pragmatische	blik	pakte	ik	daarom	in	de	herfst	
van	2014	de	draad	weer	op	en	besloot	ik	mijn	proefschrift	alsnog	af	te	ronden.	
	 Dat	dit	uiteindelijk	is	gelukt,	heb	ik	in	de	eerste	plaats	te	danken	aan	mijn	copromotor,	
Wim	 van	 Meurs.	 Wim,	 zonder	 jouw	 onbegrensd	 vertrouwen	 zou	 mijn	 onderzoek	
nog	 steeds	op	de	plank	 liggen.	 Je	betrokkenheid	was	onuitputtelijk.	Gedurende	mijn	
onderzoek	 heb	 jij	 je	 als	 historicus	 stiekem	 ook	 een	 beetje	 ontpopt	 tot	 politicoloog	
(ja,	dat	is	een	compliment!).	Jouw	kritische	doch	altijd	constructieve	feedback	bracht	
logica	in	mijn	argumentatie,	en	je	verrijkte	mijn	boek	met	een	beetje	meer	historische	
context.	Je	was	meestal	optimistisch	en	complimenteus,	maar	hakte	er	ook	in	met	een	
botte	bijl	als	dat	nodig	was	(“Saskia,	dit	is	NIET	relevant.”).	Ik	ben	meer	dan	dankbaar	jou	
als	mentor	te	hebben	gehad!
	 Mijn	 proefschrift	 zou	 ook	 niet	 af	 zijn	 gekomen	 zonder	 mijn	 promotor,	 Marcel	
Wissenburg.	Marcel,	 jij	 stapte	 in	2014	aan	boord	en	gaf	mijn	onderzoek	het	politiek-
theoretische	 ‘sausje’	 dat	 het	 nodig	 had.	 Ik	 lag	 vaak	 krom	 van	 het	 lachen	 door	 jouw	
opmerkingen	in	de	kantlijn	(“Niets	inhoudelijk	mis	met	deze	paragraaf	–	het	is	gewoon	
dat	 het	 compositorisch	 overkomt	 of	 je	 in	 een	 toerbus	 alle	 historische	 en	 artistieke	
hoogtepunten	van	Uddel	hebt	gezien,	en	de	gids	dan	zegt	“en	nu,	dames	en	heren,	gaan	
we	nog	een	keer	hetzelfde	rondje	Uddel	maken,	maar	dan	stapvoets!””).	Bovenal	gaf	je	
mij	met	jouw	enthousiasme,	humor	en	relativeringsvermogen	het	vertrouwen	dat	mijn	
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boek	er	wel	kwam	en	dat	het	bovendien	 iets	 zou	bijdragen	aan	het	maatschappelijk	
debat	(dit	werd	bovendien	verder	versterkt	door	de	actualiteit!).	
	 Graag	wil	ik	ook	de	leden	van	mijn	manuscriptcommissie	bedanken	voor	het	lezen	
en	beoordelen	van	mijn	proefschrift:	Remieg	Aerts,	Ben	Crum	en	Andrej	Zaslove.	Jullie	
hebben	mij	een	hele	fijne	en	ontspannen	zomer	bezorgd.	
	 Aan	 de	 Radboud	Universiteit	 heb	 ik	 samen	mogen	werken	met	 een	 aantal	 zeer	
talentvolle	en	inspirerende	mensen.	Een	aantal	van	hen	wil	ik	in	het	bijzonder	bedanken.	
In	de	eerste	plaats	mijn	oud-kamergenoot	Kristof	Jacobs.	Naast	een	nerderige	passie	
voor	referenda,	hebben	we	ook	veel	dagelijkse	perikelen	met	elkaar	gedeeld.	Het	liefst	
onder	het	genot	van	een	koffietje	en	een	wandeling	achter	TvA5.	Wat	fijn	dat	je	mij	jouw	
interviews	met	vooraanstaande	Nederlandse	politici	liet	gebruiken	en	dat	je	uitgebreid	
de	tijd	nam	om	feedback	te	geven	op	mijn	methoden	hoofdstuk.	Niels	Spierings,	mijn	
redder	 in	 nood	op	 SPSS-vlak.	 Al	 je	 spoedlessen	waren	 zeer	waardevol,	 ook	 al	 is	 dat	
hoofdstuk	 uiteindelijk	 niet	 in	 het	 boek	 terechtgekomen.	 Dank	 ook	 dat	 je	mij	 kennis	
hebt	 laten	maken	met	 gin-tonic	 en	 eerlijke	 chocola.	 De	 RepDem-club:	 wat	was	 ons	
interdisciplinaire	samenkomen	waardevol!	In	het	bijzonder	wil	ik	Joris,	Tim	en	(kleine)	
Wim	noemen:	het	gezegde	‘samen	uit,	samen	thuis’	gaat	gelukkig	uiteindelijk	toch	nog	
op.	Monique	Leyenaar	en	Bob	Lieshout,	dank	voor	jullie	begeleiding	tijdens	een	eerdere	
fase	van	mijn	promotieonderzoek.	Tenslotte	Bertjan	Verbeek,	bedankt	voor	het	cruciale	
steuntje	in	de	rug	toen	dat	nodig	was.		
	 Ik	wil	ook	een	aantal	mensen	buiten	Nijmegen	bedanken.	In	de	eerste	plaats	Stijn	
van	Kessel.	Jouw	vele	peptalks,	inhoudelijke	adviezen	en	flauwe	grappen	hielpen	mij	er	
vaak	doorheen	en	vooruit.	Je	bent	een	dierbare	vriend!	Ben	Crum	en	Monika	Sie,	voor	
het	 voeden	 van	mijn	 enthousiasme	 voor	 politicologisch	 onderzoek.	 Jullie	 zijn	 allebei	
nog	altijd	een	ware	inspiratiebron!	Jan-Herman	Reestman,	Niek	Pas,	Bertil	Videt,	Paul	
Taggart,	 Elise	 Uberoi,	 Bruno	 Kaufmann	 en	 Paul	 Lucardie,	 jullie	 feedback	 heeft	 mijn	
casestudies	verrijkt	en	mij	het	vertrouwen	gegeven	dat	mijn	landenhoofdstukken	hout	
snijden.	Mijn	collega’s	bij	The	Broker	en	INCLUDE,	bedankt	dat	ik	de	ruimte	kreeg	om	
mijn	proefschrift	af	te	schrijven.	De	sparringsmomenten	aan	de	lunchtafel	waren	meer	
dan	waardevol.	Andy	Brown,	naast	mijn	Engelse	corrector,	ook	mijn	bier-en-curry	buddy	
en	mental	coach	gedurende	de	laatste	fase.	Marit	Bol,	wat	ben	ik	blij	dat	jij	het	maken	
van	een	literatuur-	en	bronnenlijst	wel	leuk	vindt	en	dat	je	orde	hebt	kunnen	scheppen	
in	mijn	chaos.	Casper	Rutting,	commissaris	bij	de	Nederlandse	 taalpolitie.	 Jouw	rode	
pen	was	venijnig	als	 altijd,	maar	daarom	des	 te	waardevoller.	 Tot	 slot,	René	Blits	en	
Liselotte	Doeswijk,	jullie	creatief	vermogen	heeft	mijn	proefschrift	een	prachtige	omslag	
bezorgd.
	 Ik	 prijs	 mij	 gelukkig	 met	 mijn	 lieve	 (schoon)familie	 en	 vrienden.	 Jullie	 hebben	
misschien	niet	altijd	begrepen	waarom	ik	mijzelf	zo	heb	gekweld	met	het	persé	af	willen	
schrijven	van	mijn	proefschrift,	maar	hebben	desalniettemin	rustig	afgewacht	tot	het	
zover	was.	Mama	en	papa	(en	John	en	Geeske),	dank	jullie	wel	dat	jullie	mij	steunen	in	
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mijn	soms	rare	keuzes	en	sprongen,	dat	ik	mij	heb	mogen	ontwikkelen	tot	wie	ik	ben,	
dat	 jullie	mij	 stimuleren	om	het	beste	uit	mijzelf	 te	halen	en	mij	 soms	afremmen	als	
dat	nodig	is.	Eline,	dankjewel	dat	je	mij	altijd	laat	weten	dat	je	trots	bent	op	je	zusje;	ik	
ben	dat	ook	op	jou!	Ik	ben	dankbaar	dat	ik	dit	moment	met	mijn	grootouders,	Henny,	
Jenny	en	Henry,	mag	delen	(oma	Henny,	opa	is	vast	ook	heel	blij	dat	het	eindelijk	af	is!).	
Jullie	betrokkenheid	bij	mijn	leven	is	ontzettend	waardevol.	Lieve	Jägerbende,	en	lieve	
andere	vrienden,	door	jullie	bleef	ik	overeind	en	besefte	ik	dat	mijn	proefschrift	slechts	
een	minuscuul	stipje	is	in	het	grotere	geheel.	Sorry	voor	alle	gemiste	verjaardagen	en	
borrels;	vanaf	nu	ben	ik	er	weer	bij!	Annemarie	Loseman	en	Karlijn	Muiderman,	zoveel	
meer	dan	mijn	paranimfen.	Ik	ben	dankbaar	deze	twee	prachtige	mensen	aan	mijn	zijde	
te	hebben	staan.	
	 De	laatste	persoon	die	ik	wil	noemen	is	mijn	steun	en	toeverlaat,	René	Blits.	Lieve	
René,	wat	 ben	 ik	 ontzettend	bevoorrecht	 jou	naast	mij	 te	 hebben.	 Je	 hebt	wat	met	
me	te	stellen	gehad	de	afgelopen	twee	jaar.	Bedankt	voor	je	onvoorwaardelijke	liefde,	
steun,	vertrouwen,	aanmoediging,	en	vooral	geduld.	Dit	proefschrift	is	ook	een	beetje	
die	van	jou.	Ik	ben	zo	blij	dat	deze	donkere	wolk	boven	ons	hoofd	verdwenen	is	en	dat	
er	ruimte	is	voor	een	nieuw	leven	samen.	Ik	kan	niet	wachten!
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(NWO).	In	2012,	she	started	her	career	in	policy	advice.	During	that	year,	she	worked	at	
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After the French and Dutch public rejected the European Constitution in 
2005, enthusiasm for referendums declined markedly among political 
leaders in Europe. Today, however, they are back on the agenda, with 
EU-related referendums being held in Greece in July 2015 on the country’s 
bailout deal, in Denmark in December 2015 on its opt-out from the EU area 
of freedom, security and justice, in the Netherlands in April 2016 on the EU’s 
Association Agreement with Ukraine, and in the UK in June 2016 on Brexit.
 
In this book, Saskia Hollander demonstrates that the generally assumed 
dichotomy between referendums and representative democracy does not 
do justice to the diversity of types of referendum and how they are used in 
EU countries. Although in all referendums citizens vote directly on issues 
rather than letting their political representatives do this for them, some 
referendums are more direct than others. Rather than reflecting the direct 
power of the People, most referendums in EU countries are held by, and 
serve the interest of, the political elites, most notably the executive – i.e. the 
Machiavellian Prince.
This book places political agency as central to referendum research. It 
argues that referendums are called because political actors have an interest 
in doing so, and that their interests rarely match the justifications given in 
the public debate. Instead of being driven by the need to compensate for 
the deficiency of political parties, political actors use referendums primarily 
to protect the position of their party. In unravelling the strategic role played 
by national referendums in decision-making, this book makes an 
unconventional contribution to the debate on the impact of referendums on 
democracy. 
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